24912

ANIRUDDHA'S COMMENTARY

AND

THE ORIGINAL PARTS OF

VEDÂNTIN MAHÂDEVA'S COMMENTARY

ON THE

SÂṂKHYA SÛTRAS

TRANSLATED

WITH AN INTRODUCTION ON THE AGE AND ORIGIN OF THE SÂṂKHYA SYSTEM

BY

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TO

PROFESSOR ALBRECHT WEBER

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED

AS A TOKEN

OF HIGH ESTEEM AND GRATITUDE.

INTRODUCTION.[1]

The starting-point of an inquiry into the age and origin of the Sâṃkhya philosophy is the question of its relation to Buddhism. Tradition regards the Sâṃkhya system as older than Buddha and even as the source from which the most celebrated of all Indians has derived his doctrine. Lately, however, two eminent scholars have raised their voices against the correctness of this tradition, *viz.*, Max Müller (Chips I. 227 seq.) and Oldenberg (Buddha, translated by W. Hoey, 92 note), both of whom declared their inability to detect any definite similarities between the two systems. Though, in my opinion, these two scholars are not right in doubting Buddha's dependence on Kapila, it is their unquestionable merit to have shown that the traditional view has not hitherto been sufficiently proved, and to have invited discussion on the question. All elder savans, Colebrooke (Misc. Ess.[2] I. 240), Hodgson (Journal As. Soc. Beng. III. 428), Burnouf (Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme Indien 211, 455, 511, 521, 522), Wilson (Works, ed. Rost, II. 346), Lassen (Indische Alterthumskunde[2] I. 995-998), Barthélemy St. Hilaire (Premier Mémoire sur le Sânkhya 493 seq.) and others founded the connection between the Sâṃkhya philosophy and

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[1] The greater part of this introduction is a translation of a contribution to the 'Abhandlungen der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenchaften, I. Cl. XIX. Bd. III. Abth.'

Buddhism on arguments of the most general nature or on such arguments which no longer hold good at the present time when we possess more original documents of Buddhism and know the Sâṃkhya doctrines better. Professor Weber, too, who regards the Sâṃkhya philosophy as the oldest of the existing systems and Buddhism as having been originally only a form of the Sâṃkhya doctrine (History of Ind. Lit., transl. by Man and Zachariae,[2] 235 seq., 165), will, I suppose, not think it superfluous to adduce further arguments for the pre-buddhistic age of the Sâṃkhya system and for Buddha's dependence on the same. Of more recent authors on the subject, John Davies (Sānkhya Kārikā p. 8) has nothing to support the coherence of the two systems but that "in each, knowledge and meditation took the place of religious rites." Barth (Religions of India[2] 116) says doubtfully: "Evidently (?) the two systems have grown up side by side, and have borrowed mutually from one another. We question, however, whether the true origin of Buddhism is to be sought in this quarter." L. von Schroeder (Pythagoras und die Inder 69 seq., Indien's Literatur und Cultur 257 seq., 684 seq.) tries to prove the dependence of Buddha on Kapila's views by alleging three points in which both agree: the elimination of the notion of God, the assumption of a multitude of individual souls, and the conception of absolute liberation of the soul from the bonds of the material world as the highest aim. The first of these three arguments—which, by the bye, has often been advanced—may be admitted as passable,

but not as cogent, because it is weakened by the arguments which Max Müller has adduced (Chips I. 229), and because the tendency of doing without the notion of God is also met with elsewhere in India. The second argument, the assumption of a multitude of individual souls on both sides, proves nothing; for this assumption was natural with all Indians who did not confess the monism of the Vedânta philosophy. And, besides, this agreement of Buddhism with the Sâṃkhya doctrine is not even a perfect one, since Buddha denied a permanent psychic substance (Oldenberg 252 seq.), and hence did not acknowledge the soul in the same sense as the Sâṃkhyas. The third argument, when stated in that general way, will not stand the test better; for, except the materialism of the Chârvâkas, there is not one Indian system which does not regard the liberation of the soul from the bonds of the material world as the highest aim of human effort. In short, if the internal probability of the Buddhistic legends in which Kapila and Pañchaśikha are mentioned as predecessors of Buddha[1], is

[1] Professor Ernst Leumann writes to me in a letter, dated 12th May 1892, that the Jaina legend, too, places Kapila before the time of Buddha and Mahâvîra, mentioning him along with Ṛishabha, Bharata and Marîchi, who are, of course, persons incorporated from Brahmanical tradition. The passage which comes into consideration is, as I am kindly informed by Prof. Leumann, Âvaśyaka-chûrṇi III. 250–252 (on Âvaśyaka-niryukti III. 153[b]). Marîchi, it is stated there, had induced Kapila to renounce the world, but Kapila, though getting Âsuri as a disciple, did not know what to teach; after his death, however, he was born again as a god and imparted the Sâṃkhya doctrine to Âsuri from the air. *Sa cha*

not rated very high nor regarded as a sufficient testimony for the priority of the Sâṃkhya system, then the question regarding the relation between Buddhism and Sâṃkhya philosophy still remains an open one.

He who undertakes to examine this question and does not want to lose his way in the mist, has to renounce an idea which has been sometimes expressed, *viz.*, that the original system of Kapila may have been essentially different and simpler than that which is contained in the later documents handed down to us. The Sâṃkhya system has not undergone any remarkable alteration from the time of the definitive redaction of the Mahâbhârata to that of the composition of our methodical text-books, and no important change could have taken place earlier; the whole character of this system, which is self-consistent and evidently the work of *one* man, speaks against this assumption. In order to keep solid ground under our feet, we have, therefore, simply to compare the Sâṃkhya documents as extant at present with the original records of Buddhism or with Oldenberg's excellent elaboration of them. If we do this, we will have less chance of meeting with coincidences in points of general nature than with coincidences in details; for whether Buddha has borrowed from the Sâṃkhya system, or Kapila from Buddhism, the borrower has at any rate given up fundamental conceptions; and under these circumstances we can only expect that a connection will

tatra darśayaty avyakta-prabhavaṃ vyaktaṃ, chaturviṃśati-prakâraṃ jñânaṃ prakâśayati.

eventually betray itself chiefly *in details.* Besides, such similarities will be conclusive not only in the case of the Abhidharma, or the metaphysics of the Buddhists, as Max Müller seems to think (Chips 227), but even more in that of external peculiarities which are retained involuntarily in the mode of expression. But, for the rest, everyone will agree with Max Müller, when he says *l. c.:* "Such similarities would be invaluable. They would probably enable us to decide whether Buddha borrowed from Kapila or Kapila from Buddha, and thus determine the real chronology of the philosophical literature of India, as either prior or subsequent to the Buddhist era." To these words I have only to add the wish that the subsequent series of coincidences, observed by me, may satisfy Max Müller's demand for 'definite similarities.'

In accordance with the preceding remark I advance an example of a mere external coincidence which seems to me to deserve especial notice:

1. Buddha's predilection for classifying even abstract notions is shown to us in pedantic enumerations which are constantly found in his sermons: the fivefold clinging to the earthly, the sacred eightfold path, the twelve-part knowledge (Oldenberg 128, 129), the eightfold abstinence (Oldenberg 383 note), the fourfold onward effort and the like (Oldenberg 287: "Virtues and vices have their number: ... there are five powers and five organs of moral life. Hereticals and unbelievers also know the five impediments and the seven elements of illumination, but Buddha's disciples alone know, how that cinq becomes a dix, and this seven a fourteen").

Exactly the same peculiarity offers itself in the Sâṃkhya system which has got its name from the enumeration of the principles[1] and perhaps also from the particular predilection for clothing abstract notions into the garb of dry numerical proportions. We often meet in the Sâṃkhya writings with the threefold pain, (*i. e.*, with the pain due to one's self, to other beings and to supernatural influences) and once (Aniruddha on Sûtra II. 1) with the twenty-onefold pain; we find the fivefold affections (Sûtra II. 33), the fourfold indifference (Tattvakaumudî on Kârikâ 23, Aniruddha on Sûtra II. 1), the fourfold ignorance (Pañchaśikha in Vyâsa's Yogabhâshya II. 5; cf. F. E. Hall, Sânkhya-Sâra, Preface p. 24 note), the fiftyfold intellectual creation (Kârikâ 46), the twenty-eightfold inability (Kârikâ 49, Sûtra III. 38, 42), the ninefold acquiescence (Kârikâ 50, Sûtra III. 39, 43), the eightfold perfection (Kârikâ 51, Sûtra III. 40, 44) and even the sixty-twofold error (Sûtra III. 41), subdivided into the eightfold 'obscurity,' the eightfold 'illusion,' the tenfold 'great illusion,' the eighteenfold 'darkness' and the eighteenfold 'utter darkness' (Kârikâ 48, commentaries to Sûtra III. 41). And if we cast a glance into the Tattvasamâsa, we find among the twenty-five short Sâṃkhya Sûtras only seven in which the notion indicated is not determined numerically.

I think that this remarkable coincidence cannot be explained merely by the general predilection of the

[1] Compare especially the quotations from the Mahâbhârata, given by F. E. Hall, Sânkhya-Sâra, Preface p. 6 note.

Indians for systematizing, but that in this case we must acknowledge the continuity of a peculiar scholastic method. If then we ask who has transmitted this dry method of teaching to the other, whether Buddha to Kapila or Kapila to Buddha, we are evidently referred by the object itself to Kapila, the founder of the *enumerative philosophy*.

2. Although it is the aim of all philosophical systems of India to liberate man from the pains of human existence in this or that way, yet the idea that this life is a *life of pain* is nowhere so well developed as in the Sâṃkhya philosophy. If we open the textbooks of the orthodox schools, we find that they all make, in the first aphorism, a kind of declaration about the contents in the usual way without any pessimistic savour; the two principal works of the Sâṃkhya school only, the Kârikâ and the Sûtras, make an exception; for they begin both with the word *duḥkha*. "Because of the trouble that comes from the threefold pain there exists the desire to know the means of removing it", such is the commencement of the Kârikâ, and Sûtra I. 1 runs thus: "Well, the absolute cessation of the threefold pain is the absolute aim of Soul." This pessimistic tone on which the Sâṃkhya doctrine is tuned sounds loudest and fullest in Sûtras VI. 7, 8: "*Nobody is happy anywhere*[1]." (The opponent contests this with a hint at

[1] According to the reading of Aniruddha. Vijñânabhikshu, the Vedantist, moderates this strong sentence characteristically by removing the negative particle: "For [only] somewhere someone is happy."

experience which shows that there is joy also, but gets the reply :) "Since this joy also is mingled with pain, the discriminative reckon it as pain." We are, moreover, entitled to establish the pessimism of the Sâṃkhyas with quotations from the works of the Yoga system, since this—a mere complement, worked out of the Sâṃkhya philosophy is in congruity with the views of its original in all points which do not refer to the Yoga-praxis or to the personality of God. With perfect right the Yoga Sûtras bear the same name as the Sâṃkhya Sûtras, *viz.* *Sâṃkhya-pravachana.* It is, therefore, genuine Sâṃkhya doctrine, what we read in Yoga Sûtra II. 15: "*To the discriminating everything is painful,*" or what the holy Jaigîshavya says, in Vyâsa's old and excellent commentary on Yoga Sûtra III. 18: "Whatever I have experienced, born over and over again among gods and men, *all this was nothing but pain.*"[1] Here we have not only a mere

[1] The discourse of Jaigîshavya with Âvaṭya is interesting enough to deserve a translation *in extenso :*

That knowledge which springs from discrimination was obtained by the holy Jaigîshavya who—in consequence of the immediate perception of the impressions [left in his internal organ]—beheld the series of his changing existences in ten great mundane periods. Then said the holy Âvaṭya who assumed a [gross] body [for the sake of this discourse]: "Since the Sattva of your internal organ is unsuppressed [by Rajas and Tamas] on account of your merit (*bhavyatvât*) and since, therefore, you behold the pain, caused by being born in hell and in the form of brutes in ten great mundane periods, what have you, born over and over again among gods and men, discerned as predominant, joy or pain?" Jaigîshavya replied to the holy Âvaṭya: "Since the Sattva of my internal organ is unsuppressed [by Rajas and Tamas] on account of my merit, and since, therefore, I behold the pain, caused by being born in hell and in the form of brutes in ten great mundane periods, I know this: Whatever I have felt, born over and over again among gods and men, all this was nothing but pain." The holy Âvaṭya said: "Are the power over Nature and the highest joy of acquiescence which you, sublime one, have attained, also reckoned by you as pain?" The holy Jaigîshavya replied: "This is called the highest joy of acquiescence only in comparison with the joy arising from objects, [but] it is nothing but pain in comparison with the isolation [of the liberated soul]. This [highest acquiesence] is a condition of the Sattva of the internal organ and belongs [as such] to the three constituents; [and] the feeling of anything belonging to the three constituents is to be classed with that which is to be given up."

similarity, but a complete sameness with the Buddhistic view of the world; and though this coincidence does not offer a handle to find out to which of the two systems priority belongs, still it is an important link of that chain which unites Buddha with Kapila.[1]

3. "Buddha discredited the sacrificial system; he censured with bitter irony the knowledge of Vedic scribes as sheer folly, if not as shameless swindle," Oldenberg 172. But the chief ground on which the Vedic ceremonial was abominated by that man

[1] I am here in strict opposition to Barth who says (Religions of India[2] 116): "It (*i. e.*, the Sâṃkhya system) is especially very little given to sentiment, and it cannot be from it that the pessimism was derived which is stamped so deeply on all the conceptions of Buddha." The department of feelings and sentiments, it is true, is much neglected in all orthodox systems; but if any of them is comparatively 'given to sentiment,' it is the Sâṃkhya system.

whose first commandment it was 'not to hurt any living being,' was the performance of bloody sacrifices, required by the Brahmanical ritual. Now it is known that the Sâṃkhya system likewise objects to the Vedic sacrificial rites in Kârikâ 2 and in the Sûtras I. 82—85. This coincidence would not be of considerable importance, but for the fact that 'impurity' stands first among the reasons which bring the sacrifices down to the level of the worldly means for the suppression of pain. Doubtless the commentators are right in explaining 'impurity' by the immolation of animals, which is regarded as a guilt under any circumstances and as necessarily conducive to undesired consequences, although the sacrificer may attain his wishes by his oblations.[1] The idea with regard to this point is, therefore, the same in the Sâṃkhya system as in Buddhism, but it must be noticed that the Sâṃkhyas consider the ritual—though not as a means for the attainment of the highest aim—still as useful, in spite of the demerit inherent in the sacrifice. This is ascertained from the words of the ancient Sâṃkhya teacher Pañchaśikha which are preserved in Vyâsa's Yogabhâshya

1 Professor Leumann, in his letter mentioned in p. III note, refers me to a remarkable passage which dates at least from the beginning of our era, *viz.*, to a S'loka preserved in the Âvaśyaka-niryukti VIII. 195 (208 in Professor Weber's 'Verzeichniss der Sanskrit—und Prâkrit-Handschriften der Königl. Bibliothek zu Berlin' II. 751, line 22). It is said there that compassion towards animals (*pâṇiṇaṃ dayâ*) has been the quintessence of Kapila's doctrine.

II. 13,[1] and partly in the Sâṃkhya-tattva-kaumudî to Kârikâ 2. In rejecting the sacrifices absolutely, Buddha holds the more advanced stand-point, compared with which the less decided view of the Sâṃkhya philosophy has, in all probability, a title to priority.

4. Another noteworthy coincidence seems to me to be found in the fact that both systems object to that self-torture which was always esteemed highly in India as a means of liberation. Our records report, it is true, that Buddha had recognized the fruitlessness of self-torture in his own person, but it will hardly be possible to decide whether this is a legend or an account of a real fact. Oldenberg, though inclined to the latter opinion, prominently mentions in pages 108, 109, all the arguments which support the other side of the alternative. At any rate the Sâṃkhya philosophy maintains the same stand-point in Sûtra III. 33 (34 according to Vijñânabhikshu), which is literally repeated VI. 24: *sthirasukham âsanam* "The posture [of one engaged in meditation must be] steady and pleasant." These words are certainly based on ancient tradition, for they form also

1 *Syât svalpaḥ saṃkaraḥ, sa-parihâraḥ sa-pratyavamarshaḥ kuśalasya nâ 'pakarshâyâ 'lam. Kasmât? Kuśalaṃ hi me bahv anyad asti, yatrâ 'yam âvâpa-gataḥ svarge 'py apakarsham alpaṃ karishyati i. e.* "There may be a slight admixture [of guilt in the sacrifice; but this] is to be averted [by atonements, or, if it is not averted, its consequences are easily] to be endured; [therefore] it is not able to diminish the delight [gained by means of the meritorious acts]. Why [not]? So much [more] delight falls to my share on the other hand, that this [admixture of guilt], inherent [in my merit,] will cause me [only] little harm even in heaven."

Yogasûtra II. 46. This is very important, as the Yoga-praxis has matured in later times a great number of postures which cannot have been anything but uneasy even for Indian joints.

5. When Oldenberg says in page 251 that "the speculation of the Brahmans apprehended being in all becoming, that of the Buddhists, becoming in all apparent being," he means by 'speculation of the Brahmans' that of the Vedânta; for the Sâṃkhya system is in regard to this point, too, in perfect agreement with Buddhism. The whole world with everything in it—the souls only excepted—, *i. e.* all that belongs to Prakṛiti in the opinion of the Sâṃkhyas, does not possess any more characteristic quality than that of constant becoming and change (*pariṇâmi-nityatva*). Now, it is a merit of Oldenberg to have emphatically pointed out the fact (p. 212) that primitive Buddhism does not yet know the often mentioned speculations on the nothingness of the world, but that, on the contrary, the idea of nothingness belongs only to the later metaphysics of the Buddhists. The world of objects is, therefore, considered to be real by Buddha as well as by Kapila (cf. Sûtra I. 79, VI. 52); and this world of objects comprehends also *the psychic organs and states* according to the systems of both. As, in the Sâṃkhya philosophy, even the highest internal processes, like thinking, volition, judging, etc., are mechanical functions of Matter, which are not to be ascribed to the Âtman, but must be known to be *anâtman*, so Buddha teaches, too, that *vedanâ, saññâ, viññânam* 'sentiments, conceptions and cognition' are

anattâ (=*anâtman*). In the important chapter Mahâvagga I. 6, which treats of this question, and which has been brought by Oldenberg—not rightly, as I presume—in connection with the doctrine of the Brahman-Âtman, professed by the Upanishads, the result of the reflection is that we must say even about *vedanâ, saññâ, viññânam: n' etaṃ mama, n' eso 'ham asmi, na me so attâ* "That is not mine, that am not I, that is not my Self." From Oldenberg's work, p. 215 note, I conclude that this is a standing formula in the Buddhistic canon.

The "conviction that the Self of man cannot belong to the world of evolution" (Oldenberg 215) is expressed with nearly literal conformity in Sâṃkhya Kârikâ 64: "So from the study of the principles arises the conclusive......knowledge: *nâ 'smi, na me, nâ 'ham.*" The importance of this close coincidence which appears even in the mode of expression is not lessened by the fact that the Sâṃkhya philosophy and Buddha differ in their conception of the Âtman itself. Again Buddha who denies that Soul is a consistent entity maintains the more radical standpoint which as such is most probably posterior to that of the Sâṃkhya system.

6. On this difference of the conception of the Âtman depends also the extraordinarily slight difference which exists between the highest aim of human effort in the Sâṃkhya philosophy and the Nirvâṇa of Buddhism. The liberation of the Âtman is, according to Kapila's doctrine, its complete isolation from Matter, *i. e.*, even from all psychic processes and states, an eternal ab-

solute existence, void of pain and sorrow, but also void of joy and happiness. In short, the Sâṃkhyas divest the liberated Âtman of self-consciousness. If this idea is combined with Buddha's doctrine of the inconstancy of the Âtman, we arrive at the Nirvâṇa which—in spite of all reflections of the oldest Buddhistic records on its undiscernibility—was originally nothing else, nor could be anything else, but the negation of existence.

7. I have already, in my German translation of the Sâṃkhya-pravachana-bhâshya, on page 228, note 2, pointed out the peculiar figurative way in which the different stages of acquiescence (*tushṭi*) are named, *viz.*: water, wave, flood, rain, excellent water, most excellent water, crossing, happy crossing, perfect crossing (*pára, supára, párapára*). Add to this the synonymous denominations of the first three perfections (*siddhi*): *tára, sutára, táratára.* All Sâṃkhya commentaries have preserved these strange denominations with unessential variants[1], beginning with Gauḍapâda who has found them in 'another compendium' (*s'ástrántara*, commentary on Kârikâ 50). Wilson (Sâṃkhya Kârikâ p. 155) does not know what to do with these expressions which, in his opinion, have quite different meanings, than they usually bear, in this connection; he regards them as 'slang or mystical nomen-

[1] *sunetra*, in Gauḍapâda's commentary, will certainly not mean 'a beautiful eye,' as Wilson, Sâṃkhya Kârikâ p. 155 supposes, but it will be a synonyme of *supâra*; *nârîka* ('feminine' according to Wilson) is probably deformed out of a derivation of *nadî*; and *sutamas* seems to be a corruption of *sutára*.

clature' and ends his remarks on them with these words: "No explanation of the words is anywhere given, nor is any reason assigned for their adoption." Thus all commentators of the Kârikâs as well as of the Sûtras find themselves here before a riddle which they do not even try to explain, while they believe they are able to expound everything else. This speaks in favour of the assumption that these obscure words represent a very old tradition which has become totally unintelligible. I have no doubt that these denominations are based on the same metaphor which is current in Buddhism, *viz.*, on that of passing over the ocean of mundane existence into the harbour of liberation. The 'acquiescences' of the Sâṃkhya-system are, as preliminary stages of liberation, compared with smooth waters which facilitate the passage of those who have reached them.

While exhibiting these coincidences[1], I have several times pointed out the probability that the views of Buddhism may be regarded as the outcome of the corresponding Sâṃkhya doctrines; but this point still requires a more explicit and universal confirmation. The unadulterated Sâṃkhya doctrine was, by nature, originally intended to be the property of a limited school only; the doctrine of Buddha, however, was from the beginning meant for a much wider circle.

[1] An investigation into the relation between Jinism and Sâṃkhya philosophy would be supplementary to my disquisition. I would therefore refer the reader to Barth's work (Religions of India[2] 146) where an important coincidence of these two systems is noticed.

Now, as the above-mentioned coincidences bring the question whether Buddhism developed from the Sâṃkhya philosophy or the latter from the former, prominently before us, it will be well for us to consider the internal improbability of the founder of a consistent philosophical system collecting his materials from a religion which leaves the most important questions open, because they do not serve any practical purpose. To suppose this amounts to an inversion of the natural course of mental development. On the other hand, all becomes comprehensible and intelligible, if we accept that Buddha lived under the influence of a special philosophical system, that its view of the world was the starting-point from which he proceeded in his contemplations, and that he took from it what appeared to him to be useful for the conversion and enlightenment of the masses. Whoever is familiar with Indian literature will not offer, against this, the objection that all our Sâṃkhya documents—even the oldest which are contained in the Upanishads and in the Mahâbhârata—are considerably younger than Buddhism, and that possibly not a single passage, treating of Sâṃkhya doctrines, will be producible from the pre-buddhistic Indian literature.[1] The question why the Brahmanical litera-

[1] The three *guṇâs* being the most original property of the Sâṃkhya system, one would feel tempted to see the earliest mention of a fundamental view of our system in a verse of the Atharvaveda, 10. 8. 43: *puṇḍarîkam nava-dvâram tribhir guṇebhir âvṛitam;* and, in fact, Muir and Weber have explained the verse in this sense, as I learn from Scherman's book 'Philosophische Hymnen

ture begins to take notice of our system only in comparatively recent times and not earlier will be discussed below; at present I may be allowed to refer to the following point. If the afore-mentioned arguments prove the connection of Buddhism with the Sâṃkhya philosophy and the priority of the latter, some further coincidences will have to be added which would be susceptible of receiving a different explanation under other circumstances. In my opinion such views as belong equally to the Vedânta and to the Sâṃkhya system must be derived from the latter and not from the former, if they are met with also in Buddhism.[2] For instance the idea

aus der Ṛig- und Atharva-Veda-Sanhitâ' (Strassburg, London 1887) p. 62. Scherman himself follows the opinion of the St. Petersburg Dictionary according to which the meaning of *guṇa* has nothing to do here with the philosophical sense the Sâṃkhyas give to the word, and I do the same. The meaning of *puṇḍarîka* becomes clear from Chhândogya Upanishad 8. 1. 1, where the word is glossed by *veśman* (cf. also Taittirîya Âraṇyaka 10. 10. 3), and *nava-dvâraṃ veśma* is, of course, the human body (cf. Mahâbhârata 5. 1070). In our passage from the Atharvaveda this is described as 'enveloped by three cords, (*i. e.*, in three different ways),' whereby skin, nails and hair and nothing else can be intended.—Professor Roth, in reply to my request to communicate to me Sâyaṇa's explanation of this passage, kindly informed me that the tenth book is missing in Shankar Paṇḍit's edition of Sâyaṇa's commentary on the Atharvaveda.

[2] Exactly the opposite result is arrived at by Edmund Hardy 'Der Buddhismus nach älteren Pâli-Werken' (Münster 1890) p. 24, where he declares—without, however, properly discussing such an important question— : "Hence it is also not in the Sâṃkhya system of Kapila nor in any other system, but only in the doctrine

that a special kind of 'ignorance'—as the ultimate cause of metempsychosis—drives the individuals from one existence into the other, and the employment of some technichal expressions besides. Among the latter, one has especially struck me, of which the Sâṃkhyas as well as the Buddhists make a free use, *viz.*, *saṃskâra-saṃkhâra*. With the Sâṃkhyas, *saṃskâra* means 'disposition,' the existence of which is explained by the impressions left in the internal organ by events, perceptions, sensations, etc. (even in previous existences). The *avidyâ-saṃskâra*, 'the innate disposition to ignorance,' *i. e.*, to confounding Matter with Soul, is the root of all evil.[1] Buddha employs the word *saṃkhâra* in other senses, it is true, but in such a variety of senses that the principal meaning of the Buddhistic term may very well be considered as connected with the use of the word *saṃskâra* in the Sâṃkhya philosophy. *Saṃkhâra* means (according to Oldenberg 242, Edmund Hardy 163) 'conformation,' then 'everything that is,' and particularly 'that which makes the existing what it is.' This last meaning which appears especially in the expression *saṃkhâruppatti* 'arising

of the *brahman-âtman*, that we must look for the starting-point of Buddhism." It is, however, not my intention to show that Buddhism at its inception was not at all influenced by the Vedic culture, especially by that derived from the older Upanishads, but to point out that it drew its materials *principally* from the Sâṃkhya system. The Vedic culture might have contributed to the rise of Buddhism to the same extent as those popular views which are called 'l'indouisme populaire' by Senart.

[1] Cf. especially Aniruddha's commentary on Sûtra II. 1, page 90, line 9–13 of the present volume.

according to the respective conformations' seems to me to be so closely related to the idea of 'disposition' that I do not hesitate to derive the different Buddhistic meanings of the word directly from this notion.

Professor Weber considers the Sâṃkhya to be the oldest of the existing systems, and I follow this opinion so far as I, too, am convinced that the doctrines of no other school have been presented *in systematic form* as early as those of the Sâṃkhya philosophy. The other systems as such certainly have been founded in post-buddhistic time and not earlier. But this judgment must be different, if we advert to *the fundamental ideas;* for there can be no doubt in my opinion that the idealistic doctrine of the Upanishads regarding the Brahman-Âtman—a doctrine which has grown from the Veda and which is the nucleus and centre of the later Vedânta system —is an older product of philosophical thinking than the leading ideas of the other systems. Apparently the foundation of the Sâṃkhya philosophy is to be sought in a reaction against the propagation of the consistent idealism which began to be proclaimed with enthusiasm.

To the mythical and fabulous accounts of Kapila's person, birth-place and region of activity that are contained in the Mahâbhârata, in the Purâṇas and elsewhere, as little value is to be attached as to those statements about Kapila in the north-buddhistic narrative of the settling of the S'âkyas in Kapilavâstu.[1]

[1] See Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, p. 11 *seq.*, and also Divyâvadâna, ed. by Cowell-Neil, p. 548. If any mention of Kapila

Nor am I able to accept the conclusions which Weber (History of Ind. Lit.[2] 137, 236, 284, Indische Studien I. 434) draws from the similarity of sound of the names of Kapila and Kâpya Patamchala (in the Brihadâranyaka Upanishad). The only reliable tradition appears to be that connected with the name of Kapilavâstu which means 'Kapila's residence.' The place was evidently named after the great sage in his honour; but it is not known whether he was born there or lived there. It may have been the principal scene of his activity, it may also be a town built later on in that region. At any rate, if we are allowed to assume that the Sâmkhya system was regarded as authoritative at Kapilavâstu and its environs, this explains most naturally why the founder of Buddhism, who was born there, relied on that system.[1] There is another point of importance in perfect accordance with this view. The home of Buddhism had, as is shown by Oldenberg in a lucid manner,—though it was already inhabited by Aryans at the time when the Vedic culture was developed—accepted this peculiar culture from the western peoples only at a comparatively recent time, and had, at any rate even in the sixth century before Christ, not nearly so much been imbued with it as those countries in which the Brahmanical community arose. The origin of the Sâmkhya system appears in the proper

be found in the Pâli Piṭakas, it would, of course, deserve greater attention.

By the bye, I write Kapilavâstu, because Kapilavastu seems to me to be a wrong transliteration of the Original Pâli Kapilavatthu.

[1] Cf. Weber, Indische Studien I. 435.

light only, when we understand that in those regions of India which were little influenced by Brahmanism the first attempt had been made to explain the riddles of the world and of our existence merely *by means of reason*. For the Sâmkhya philosophy is, in its essence, not only atheistic, but also inimical to the Veda. All appeals to S'ruti in the Sâmkhya texts lying before us are subsequent additions; we may altogether remove the Vedic elements, grafted upon the system, and it will not in the least be affected thereby. The Sâmkhya philosophy had been originally, and has remained up to the present day, in its real contents, unvedic and independent of the Brahmanical tradition. In the Mahâbhârata, XII. 13702, the Vedas are mentioned as something separate from *Sâmkhya*, *Yoga*, *Pañcharâtra* and *Pâs'upata*, and, in verse 13711, *Sâmkhya* and *Yoga* are described as two very ancient systems (*sanâtane dve*) by the side of 'all Vedas' (*i. e.*, Samhitâs, Brâhmaṇas, Âraṇyakas and Upanishads). Here we certainly meet with a tradition of that contrast which once had really existed. That the Sâmkhya philosophy appears in later times among the orthodox systems, is not to be wondered at; the fact proves that this system, on account of its sober lucidness, has stood its ground against Vedantic supernaturalism, and that consequently the Brahmans have adopted it, owing to their great ability of appropriating all intellectual elements of importance; as they have, for instance, incorporated into the body of their doctrines the religion of the Bhâgavatas or Pâncharâtras which was originally equally

unvedic. The least nominal acknowledgment of the Veda and of the prerogatives of the Brahmans was surely sufficient for a system passing as orthodox; and if the Buddhists had not refused to acknowledge the authority of the Vedas and of the Brahmans, they might, without any essential alteration of their doctrines, have become a Brahmanical sect, and Buddha a Ṛishi, like his predecessor Kapila.[1] From this view the fact that the Sâṃkhya doctrines, in spite of their high antiquity, are met with in the Brahmanical literature not earlier than in the well-known passages of the Kaṭha, Maitrî, S'vetâśvatara, Praśna and other younger Upanishads, becomes comprehensible.

The whole subject will be treated more fully in the first chapters of my work on the Sâṃkhya philosophy, where I intend especially to refute the idea which sometimes finds expression that there exists a connection between the cosmogonical theories of the Vedas and the Sâṃkhya doctrine of evolution. The former are popular mythology, and the latter is the result of philosophical investigation based on an inductive method of argument. For this and other reasons I maintain also that the Prakṛiti (primitive Matter) of the Sâṃkhya system has nothing to do with the primordial water of the Vedic mythology which either itself produces the world, or from which the creator produces it (Ṛigveda X. 129. 3, 4; VI. 50. 7; X. 30. 10; 82. 6; 121. 7, 8; Atharvaveda IV. 2. 6; X. 7. 10; Taittirîya Saṃhitâ 5. 6. 4. 2; 7. 1. 5. 1; S'atapatha Brâhmaṇa 11. 1. 6. 1, 2; 14. 8. 6. 1 and very frequently elsewhere; cf. Weber, Indische Studien IX. 2, 74, Scherman, Philosophische Hymnen p. 6—9).

[1] Even so, Buddha has come to be regarded as an Avatâra of Vishṇu in the wild syncretistic speculations of the modern Hindus.

When I prepared the edition of the two Sâṃkhya texts[1] the translation of which I lay before the public herewith, I had the conviction that no manuscript of the Aniruddhavṛitti was existing in the India Office Library, since Mr. F. E. Hall, on page VI of his edition of Ballantyne's Sâṃkhya Aphorisms (London 1885) does not mention a MS. belonging to the I. O. L., when speaking of the MSS. of Aniruddha's work which were within his reach. I omitted for this reason to make an inquiry, and I must confess that this was a fault of mine. On the receipt of my edition, however, Dr. R. Rost informed me to my surprise of the existence of such a MS. in the library under his charge, and kindly placed the same at my disposal. An examination of this MS. showed that my regrettable neglect had fortunately not caused any very serious detriment to my edition of the Aniruddhavṛitti, and that the loss that had been incurred might easily be repaired in this volume. Three or four passages which were susceptible of improvement by consulting that MS. have been corrected in notes appended to this translation, and all the *variæ lectiones* are added at the end.

The MS. is numbered 3044, and has 69 leaves. It is legibly and correctly written in Devanâgarî cha-

[1] Published in the Bibl. Ind. in 1888.

racter, and dated Saṃvat 1875, *i. e.*, 1819 A. D. It belongs to the same class as the MS. which is marked B in my edition. This is ascertained by the fact that, according to my counting, these two MSS. have 165 readings in common which differ from the text of my edition, while the I. O. L. MS. shares only in 58 readings of this kind with A, C, or AC.

On pages VII—IX of the preface to my edition of Aniruddha's commentary, various arguments were advanced to show that Aniruddha lived about 1500 A. D. This conclusion has, in the most desirable manner, been confirmed by a notice in R. G. Bhandarkar's Report on the search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency during the year 1883-84 (Bombay 1887), p. 82. Here we are informed that a commentary on S'atânanda's Bhâsvatîkaraṇa has been composed by Aniruddha, son of Bhâvaśarman and grandson of Mahâśarman, and that the author gives in this work the year 1520 (Saṃvat, or 1464 A. D.) as the date of his birth, and the 31st year of his life (or 1495 A. D.) as the time when he wrote this astronomical commentary. The proper name Aniruddha is of such rare occurrence that there is no probability of the astronomer and the philosopher being two different contemporaneous persons.

The time of Vedântin Mahâdeva, however, whom I have tentatively placed about 1600 A. D. is really the end of the seventeenth century. For I learn from Aufrecht's admirable Catalogus Catalogorum p. 436 —and could have learned earlier from Professor Weber's equally admirable Verzeichniss der Sanskrit-

und Prakṛit-Hand-schriften der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin II. (1886) No. 1524, p. 113—that our Mahâdeva, the pupil of Svayaṃprakâśa Tîrtha (or ° Sarasvatî, or ° Ânanda Sarasvatî), composed his Vishṇusahasranâma-ṭîkâ in 1694 A. D.

I leave the translations and explanations contained in this volume to the judgment of Sanskrit scholars without a word either of recommendation or of extenuation. I must, however, gratefully acknowledge my obligations to my learned friend Paṇḍit Haraprasâd Shâstrî, M. A., of Calcutta, who in spite of his many official engagements kindly undertook to read a proof of this work. His services were most valuable to me in two ways. He corrected my English, and made numerous ingenious suggestions which led to the improvement of my translation in many places. As Paṇḍit Haraprasâd is not only an excellent Sanskritist but also one of the few native scholars who fully appreciate the European method of scientific research, I could not have secured better assistance.

Königsberg i/Pr. R. GARBE.

ANIRUDDHA'S COMMENTARY, TRANSLATED.

BOOK I.

SALUTATION TO THE HOLY GAṆEŚA!

Om! Salutation to the primordial cause of developed Matter!

> Having worshipped the remover of obstacles (Gaṇeśa), Vishṇu, Sûrya, Sarasvatî, Lakshmî, Gaṅgâ, and the great Lord (S'iva), I begin to compose the commentary.[1]

Man, forsooth, devotes himself to the doctrine of liberation in consequence of indifference [to worldly pleasures and pains]. Indifference is twofold, that caused by sorrow and the like, and that resulting from the extinction of the demerit of former existences. In this sense, Scripture says: "On which day soever he becomes indifferent, on that day he should renounce the world." And he who has devoted himself to the doctrine [aforesaid] becomes liberated in consequence of the higher indifference (*para-vairâgya*).[2] So says Patañjali: "The consciousness of being the subjugator in one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects, is indifference. That [indifference] is the higher one which is freedom from thirst after the constitutive powers (*guṇa*), which [freedom] results from the knowledge of Soul" (Yogasûtra 1. 15, 16). To teach this higher

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[1] Aniruddha's commentary is a *vṛitti*, while Vijñânabhikshu has composed a *bhâshya*. The difference is this: a *vṛitti* is a commentary which gives the accepted and traditional interpretation, while one can put in new interpretations in a *bhâshya*.

[2] The latter of the two kinds of indifference, described above, is intended.

indifference, the very compassionate great sage Kapila who desired to save the world composed the first aphorism, when beginning the doctrine of liberation.

Om! Salutation to [the Lord] who consists of existence, thinking and delight!

> Having acquainted myself with Aniruddha's commentary and having understood the Sâṃkhya doctrine, Mahâdeva, called the Vedântist, draws up the quintessence of the [said] commentary.

The great sage Kapila, desirous of saving the world, seeing that the knowledge of the excellence of the fruit is, through the longing [which it engenders] for the fruit, the cause of [people's] devoting themselves to the means [by which the fruit is attained], describes the excellence of the fruit:

1. Well, the absolute cessation of the threefold pain is the absolute aim of Soul.

'Well' (*atha*), this [word] serves as an auspicious omen, but it does not denote subsequence to *any* action, because [the idea of] subsequence is out of place on account of Scripture which says: "On which day etc."[1] Besides, the utterance of an auspicious word is befitting at the beginning of an undertaking; and the word *atha* is to be found in use as expressing an auspicious omen:

> "The word *om* and the word *atha*, these two broke through Brahman's throat and came out in times of yore; therefore both of them are auspicious."

As for the 'threefold pain,' the bodily and the mental are [reckoned as] one, because they are comprised in 'that due to one's self' (*âdhyâtmika*); the [pain] due to the beings [of outer world, the *âdhibhautika*] is that which is caused by beasts, birds and the like; the [pain] due to supernatural influences

[1] Cf. the introduction to this aphorism.—The word *atha* does not here mean 'after something', because what follows after the word *atha* is not subsequent to anything, but is the absolute beginning of a new thing.

(*âdhidaivika*) is that which is caused by planets, demons and the like. "But then, do not these cease of their own accord, as pains last [only] two or three moments?" To this [the author] gainsays [the word] 'absolute.' Not the cessation of some special pains is intended, but that of [everything] which belongs to the genus pain. For the cessation of the future [pains] also is what is meant by the word 'absolute.' Merit, wealth, pleasure and liberation are human aims, but the [first] three are not absolute, because of their evanescent character [and] because of their being [the same as] happiness arising from [perceptible] objects. [The state] of liberation, however, is not so, because [liberation] is eternal, being nothing else but Light [which is the essence of Soul]. Therefore it is said: 'the absolute aim of Soul.'

"Let the cessation of pain be Soul's aim; still, as this is attained to already by visible and easy means, what sober man will betake himself to the restraint of the thinking organ and to other difficult means[1] which are to be obtained from the Institutes and to be applied with success [only] by the toil of many successive births? So it is said:

> "If you find honey [in a hole] of the Arka-tree [on your way], why will you go to the [woody] mountains? The desired thing being at hand, what sensible man will take pains [to obtain it]?"[2]

For the case is this: medicines and other [remedies] bring on the cessation of bodily pains; beautiful women, delicate food and the like bring on the cessation of mental pains; different ways, taught by those who declare the contents of the Institutes of polity, cause the cessation of the pains due to the beings [of the outer world]; propitiatory ceremonies (*śânti*), gems, spells and the like [*viz.*, amulets, diagrams etc.], cause the cessation of pains due to supernatural in-

[1] *Viz.*, *çravaṇa-manana-nididhyâsanâdi.*

[2] This śloka occurs in the S'abarabhâshya to the Mîmâṃsasûtra 1. 2. 4 and in the Sâṃkhyatattvakaumudî in the Vṛitti to Kârikâ 1.

fluences." With reference to this [objection] the second aphorism [declares]:

The word 'well' serves as a benediction.—The absolute cessation of the threefold pain, *viz.*, of that due to one's self, of that due to the beings [of the outer world] and of that due to supernatural influences,—*i. e.*, the cessation characterized by the non-revival of [anything] which belongs to the genus pain—is the absolute aim of Soul; that is to say, it is the highest among the four aims of Soul [or human aims], merit, wealth, pleasure and liberation; because the [first] three are transitory, whereas liberation, *i. e.*, the said cessation, is not transitory. This is the meaning. As regards those [different kinds of pain], the pain due to one's self is bodily and mental. The bodily one is caused by disturbances of the windy, bilious and phlegmatic humours, the mental one is produced by love, choler, lust, delusion, envy and the like; both are due to one's self because of their being appeasable by inner remedies; therefore, people denote either by the term inner [pain]. The one due to the beings [of the outer world] is caused by beasts, birds, plants and the like, the one due to supernatural influences by planets etc. People denote these two kinds by the term outer [pain].

"But then, let the aforesaid cessation be the absolute aim of Soul; still, what reason is there for betaking one's self to a doctrine which is the cause of the knowledge of truth, *i. e.*, of the cognizance of the difference between Matter[1] and Soul? For, as there exist medicines etc. for the cure of bodily pains, beautiful women, delicate food etc. for that of mental pains, [remedies] taught in the Institutes of polity, such as residing in safe places etc., to cure the pains due to the beings [of the outer world], and gems, spells, powerful herbs etc., to cure the pains due to supernatural influences—[all these remedies] being easily attainable—, it will be hard to find somebody who might betake himself to that very difficult knowledge of truth which is to be gained [only] by the toil of many successive births, and, therefore, [still] harder to

[1] *Sattva* 'the first of the three constituents (*guṇa*) of [primitive] Matter (*prakṛiti*)' is sometimes used in the sense of *prakṛiti* (*pars pro toto*).

find somebody who might devote himself to a doctrine [for that purpose]." To this [the author] replies:

2. This is not effected by visible [means], because even after the cessation the recurrence is seen.

We do not say that the cessation [of pain] simply is Soul's aim, but [we mean] the cessation of [its] arising [again]. And pain does not necessarily cease in consequence of [the application of] medicines etc.; or, if [the pain] ceases somehow, there is no certainty that another would not be again.

Let [even] the cessation of pain [be obtainable by visible means]; still, this is not Soul's aim, because such obviating must be undertaken again and again. Therefore [the author] utters [the following aphorisms]:

This is not effected, *i. e.*, the absolute cessation of pain is not effected, by visible [means], that is to say: by the aforesaid medicines etc. Why [not]? Because—'immediately' is to be supplied—after the cessation, *i. e.*, after the cessation of pain, its recurrence is seen, *i. e.*, the arising [again] of something belonging to the genus pain is seen. The meaning is this: not by the aforesaid remedies a cessation of pain is [brought about] which is characterized by the non-revival of pain, because, though this or that pain may have been destroyed by this or that remedy, the arising of other pains is seen. Therefore, the knowledge of truth is to be sought for, though it be not easily obtainable.

"But then, granted that the cessation of future pains is not [to be effected] by medicines etc., applied formerly; still, if the obviating is undertaken again and again, the cessation of future pains may take place also." [The author] apprehends [that this line of argument may be taken by an opponent]:

3. "As hunger is daily obviated, Soul's aim [may be attained] by practising the obviation of it [*viz.*, of pain]."

"As Soul's aim [is attained], in the case of one satisfied,

by daily eating excellent food etc. for the sake of obviating hunger, so Soul's aim [may be attained] by the constant obviation by medicines etc. for the sake of the cessation of pain."

[The author] states his dogma:

"Whenever pain shall arise, it is to be obviated; and thus the cessation of pain is Soul's aim; as, whenever there is hunger, one must eat, [and, in this case,] the cessation of hunger in the eater is Soul's aim."

[The author] establishes his dogma:

4. Because they are not always to be had, and because, even if they were to be had, the existence is still possible, [such an aim] must be rejected by those who are experienced in logical proofs.

For there are not physicians [nor medicines] etc. to be had in every place nor at all times; and, even if they were to be had, the absolute cessation of the threefold pain would not take place. For desire etc. must necessarily exist because of [the existence of] the body, and experience teaches (*drishṭam*) that no one possessing a body is happy. Therefore, this Soul's aim [mentioned by the opponent] must be rejected by those who are acquainted with logical proofs, and that [aim] which is attainable by [our] philosophy must be accepted.

[The author] mentions another reason:

For there are not physicians etc. in every place and at all times. 'Even if they were to be had' means: even if physicians etc. were at hand, 'because the existence is still possible': because the existence of pain is still possible. For pain cannot with certainty be cured even by physicians and the like, with medicines etc. Moreover, when bodily or some other pain has departed, there may still exist that which is mental or of some other kind; so that there is no complete liberation from pain [attainable by this method]. Therefore, such a Soul's aim must be rejected by those who are experienced in logical proofs.

[The author] mentions another reason:

5. Also because of the superiority of liberation, in accordance with Scripture which teaches [its] superiority to all [else].

Further, it is known that the cessations of the three kinds of pain are superior to each other, and that liberation is superior to all [of them], because it is eternal and one and identical with the removal of all pains.[1]

And then, there is no such philosophical system in which liberation is not Soul's aim; and, [likewise, it is a universal dogma that] liberation is not simply the cessation of pain [caused] by medicines etc. Hence [your—the opponent's—objections do not seem to be meant very earnestly, but] your doctrine will be the same as ours. Therefore [the author] says:

One ought not to strive for the removal of this or that pain by these or those means, because liberation is superior [to all other cessations of pain] on account of being eternal and identical with the removal of all pains. As Scripture also teaches the superiority [of liberation] to all [else]: "There is nothing higher than the gaining [the—isolation] of Soul," one ought to strive only for the knowledge of truth, which is the means thereof [*i. e.* of liberation].

"But then, if the word 'liberation' is used, it is [to be] understood 'from bondage.' Now, is this bondage essential or adventitious? In the former case, it cannot be destroyed; in the latter, it will perish by itself. Of what use, then, is the knowledge of truth?" To this [objection the author] answers:

6. And there is no difference in both [cases].

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[1] *I. e.*, the cessation of a mental pain may be superior to the cessation of a physical pain, etc., but the cessation of all pains is superior to all other cessations.

Only if [an opponent's] own opinion is proved to be correct, the opinion of his adversary may be censured, but not otherwise. And thus it is said:

> "Where one mistake is common to both, the refutation also is the same; the one is not to be asked [by the other] in the discussion of such an object."[1]

"Does the instruction about the means for liberation refer to one bound *essentially*, or is the case different?" With regard to this [question the author] says:

Whether bondage be essential or adventitious, makes no difference as to the necessity of striving for liberation. We can tell both how to account for bondage and liberation, [and we shall do so immediately]. This is the sense.

Now, in order to demonstrate the nature of bondage and liberation, [the author] gives at first the arguments contradictory to bondage's being essential:

7. The enjoining of the means for the liberation of one bound *essentially* would be impracticable.

Because, [if one bound essentially could be liberated,] the essence would perish, *i. e.*, the perishing of the real nature would take place, [which is an impossibility]. And it is said:

> "In reality (*vastusthityâ*) there is neither bondage, nor, in the absence of it, liberation; both are created by ignorance, [but really] both are nothing."

This [the author] confirms:

8. Since the essential nature is imperishable, [Scripture] would be unauthoritative, inasmuch as [its injunctions] could not be executed.

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[1] The meaning of this verse, applied to the case in question, is the following. The Sâṃkhya says: "If my system can be charged with such a mistake, yours is subject to the same treatment, whether you be a Vedântist or a Naiyâyika etc.; to what purpose, then, do we dispute?" Aniruddha's explanation is based on the supposition that the opponent is not a Chârvâka.

Since bondage could not vanish, if it were eternal by nature, the execution [of Scripture's injunctions] for the sake of its destruction would [in that case] be impossible.

"[But] somebody may teach something impossible, too, in order to deceive [others], as for instance: '[Come along, I shall show you a man who holds] hundred herds of elephants on his finger's end.'" To this [objection the author] replies:

9. The enjoining of something impossible is impracticable; though [such a thing] be enjoined, it is no [real] injunction.

[This is] clear.

[The author] ponders an objection:

10. If [somebody says:] "As in the case of the white cloth and of the seed,"—

> "The destruction even of the essential nature is seen, as for instance, in the case of a cloth, the whiteness [is destroyed] by dies or [dirt], and [the germinating power of] the seed by the production of the sprout."

[The author] states his doctrine:

11. [As such cases are to be accounted for] by the appearance and non-appearance of some power, nothing impossible is enjoined, [when somebody is told to make some power or quality disappear].

Since the [eternal] existence of [all] products is established, the whiteness[1] of the cloth is not destroyed, but [only] overcome by dies or [dirt], and it appears again in consequence of the washing. Likewise, by the production of the sprout [the germinating power of] the seed is not

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[1] The whiteness of cotton is a product of water, air and light.

destroyed, but [only] overcome; its appearing again, however, is not seen because of the heterogeneousness of the thing.[1]

"But then, the Self may not be bound *essentially*, but it will be bound by Time." To this [objection the author] replies:

12. Not from the connection with Time, because the omnipresent and eternal is associated with all.

This[2] [opinion of the opponent] could be [correct], if this [Self] were sometimes connected with Time and sometimes not. [But this is known not to be the case,] because the eternal and omnipresent [Self] is subject to the association with all time. It is called 'eternal' because of the association [of Soul] with all time; the word 'omnipresent' is added to no perceptible purpose (*sampâtâyâtam*) on account of the following aphorisms being brought into consideration.

"[The Self] will be bound by Space." To this [objection the author] replies:

13. Nor from the connection with Space either, for that very reason.

Because the omnipresent and eternal [Self] is associated with all Space.

"Then it will be bound in consequence of a condition." To this [the author] replies:

14. Not in consequence of a condition, because this is a property of the body.

'This,' *i. e.*, condition. 'Because [this] is a property of the body' is [only] an elliptical argumentation; [in reality there are many reasons against this allegation, and] the main point is: because [Soul] is invariable.

[1] A bad subterfuge!

[2] *Ayam*, viz., *pakshaḥ*.

"[But such] a condition will belong to the Self also." To this [the author] replies:

15. Nothing—adheres to this Soul.

'Nothing—adheres to this Soul' is a passage in Scripture (cf. Bṛih. Up. 4. 3. 16); this would be untrue, [if the opponent's opinion that Soul also may be conditioned were correct].

"[The Self] may be bound by the works." This [the author] refutes:

16. Not by the works, because these are the property of another, and because there would be an extension beyond limits.

Because the Self is void of qualities, the works are not the property of the Self, [but of the eternal organ]. "But" [the opponent goes on to object] "it [the Self] will be bound by the works, though these be the property of another." This is not correct; for nothing is imposed on one thing by the property of another, because [in that case] the variety of the universe could not be accounted for,[1] and 'because there would be an extension beyond limits', *i. e.*, even the liberated Selfs would be subject to being bound [again], the difference [of every soul from the owner of the works] being all the same; [and thus there would be a state of things which is desired not even by the opponent].

[The author] states another argument contradictory [to the opponent's view]:

17. There could not be diverse experience, [if Soul were bound by works], while these are the property of another.

[1] *I. e.* Everything ought to be homogeneous, if there were a transition of qualities from one thing to the other.

As is known, some are happy and some are miserable. Now, there is nobody by whom works conducive to happiness or works conducive to pain have not been done in the beginningless series of mundane existences. If [therefore] effects were produced in one by the property [*i. e.*, by the merit and demerit] of another, all ought to be either happy or miserable.

"[Still,] effects may be produced in one by the property of another, and Matter may be the regulator. Bondage will belong to that soul for which it is operating." To this [the author] replies:

18. If [you say: "Bondage[1]] is caused by Matter," [I gainsay thereto]: No, that also is dependent on another.

Because Matter also is omnipresent and, therefore, equally associated with all souls, a regulation [of bondage and liberation] cannot be [effected simply by Matter] without works. Hence that also is dependent on works. And the reason contradictory to this [*viz.*, to work's being the cause of bondage] has been stated [in aphorism 16].

"If the Self's bondage is not caused by Matter etc. [*viz.*, by Time, Space, conditions or works], and if it does not belong [to Soul] essentially, then instruction in the doctrine of liberation is useless." To this [the author] replies:

19. [The Self] which is, by nature, eternally pure, intelligent and free, does not stand in connection with this, when there is no connection with that.

'Pure,' *i. e.*, void of qualities; 'intelligent,' *i. e.*, clear [as a crystal, *i. e.*, not tainted by the affections of the internal organ]; 'does [not] stand in connection with this,' *i. e.*,

[1] Supply *baddhatâ* and compare the end of Vijñânabhikshu's commentary on this aphorism.

'does [not] stand in connection with bondage; 'when there is no connection with that,' *i. e.*, when there is no connection with Matter. Without non-discrimination bondage never belongs to the Self, but from non-discrimination springs the egotizing delusion (*abhimâna*) that there is bondage. And this [delusion], forsooth, is to be removed by instruction in [our] doctrine.

"Then its [the Self's] bondage will be [produced] by ignorance." To this [the author] replies:

20. Nor from ignorance either, since bondage cannot be [caused] by a non-entity.

For ignorance is either anterior or posterior non-existence of knowledge. In both cases it is a non-entity, and by a non-entity the bondage of an entity, as the Self is, cannot be [caused]. Therefore, the sentence 'bondage is [caused] by ignorance' is merely an expression, [but] not [an exact statement of] truth.

"Let ignorance be [neither anterior nor posterior non-existence of knowledge, but simply] something different from knowledge and an entity." To this [objection, made by a follower of S'ankara, the author] replies:

But if [a S'ânkara declares] ignorance [to] be an entity, [the author] says:

21. If [you declare ignorance to] be an entity, [your] doctrine is given up.

For us [Sâṃkhyas] ignorance, indeed, [*might* be real; but] if it were real, it could not be destroyed, and hence there would be no liberation. But for [you,] the asserters of non-duality, ignorance cannot be real, [as you admit only one reality, *viz.*, Soul]. For [us and other] asserters of duality, however, a real thing that is without beginning cannot perish, and, therefore, [such] an instruction [as given by you] is idle.

[The author] adduces another argument against [the opponent] :

[This is] clear.

22. And a duality of heterogeneous things would offer itself.

If ignorance [is declared by you to] be real and without a beginning, then [you must admit that] it is eternal and coordinate with the Self. And if it is not the Self [which it cannot be according to your doctrine], then there exists a duality of heterogeneous things.

"Then such may be the state of [all] other things; but ignorance will [form an exception and] be perishable, though real and without a beginning." This [the opposing S'âṅkara] says [in the following aphorism] :

For those [*viz.*, the adherents of S'aṅkara] hold that there is neither a duality of homogeneous nor of heterogeneous things, [while the Sâṃkhyas accept both, a plurality of homogeneous souls and a duality of heterogeneous things, *i. e.*, of Soul and Matter].

[The author] ponders a [fresh] objection [of the same opponent] :

23. If it [be said to] have the nature of both these opposites,—

"[Ignorance] may have the nature of [both things] opposite to each other, *i. e.*, it may be without beginning, [able to cause the bondage of Soul and, therefore, an entity] as well as perishable and, therefore, having the character of [a non-entity, *i. e.*, of] antecedent non-existence [of knowledge]."

[To this objection the author] gives the [following] answer :

"Ignorance is not real—else a duality of heterogeneous things would offer itself—nor unreal either, because its effects are perceived; but it is real as well as unreal." If [the S'âṅkara says so, he gets the following reply] :

24. No, because such a thing cannot be imagined.

Such a thing is imagined nowhere, by nobody and never.

"If [it were] so [as you Sâṃkhyas assert], to which predicament do Matter and [your] other [principles] belong, as they are different from the six categories [of the Vaiśeshikas] ?" With reference to this [question the author] declares :

25. We are not asserters of six categories, like the Vais'eshikas, etc.

[This is] clear.

"If [you say that] there is no definite number of categories, how [is it that you state] twenty-five principles ?" With reference to this [question the author] declares :[1]

By the word 'etc.' the Naiyâyika is meant; for he is the asserter of sixteen categories.

26. Though there is no definite [number], the absurd is not to be accepted; else we should be equal to children, madmen and the like.

We do not say that there are only six categories, but we do not, nevertheless, accept what is not proved by arguments; else we should be like children and madmen. And thus [it is said] :

> "[Even] on account of the word of an authority the great gods do not fall down from heaven; [only] that sentence which is proved by arguments is to be accepted by me and by others who are like you."

[1] There is the following connection between this introduction and aphorism 26: Although we say that twenty-five principles will explain the phenomena of the world, we admit that there is no definite number of categories and consider the Vaiśeshikas as decidedly unreasonable.

[The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the Buddhists :

27. Likewise, its [bondage] is not caused by a beginningless influence of the objects.

"'Its,' *i. e.*, the Self's, bondage will be caused by the beginningless [series of] impressions that are produced by the objects:" this [doctrine of the Buddhists] is not [true]. Firstly, *for us* there exists no connection of the Self with any impression, and, therefore, bondage cannot be [through such an influence. On the other hand] *according to the theory of the Buddhists* there is no permanent Self, and, therefore, an impression, too, cannot last such a long time[1] [as bondage exists] ; hence, who is bound ?

"The continuity of [momentary] Selfs will be bound by the continuity of impressions [which proceed] from the influence of the external things." To this [fresh objection of the Buddhist the author] replies :

28. Again, between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer because of the local separation, as [there is no such relation] between the inhabitant of Srughna and that of Pâṭaliputra.

If [the following] should be said [by the Buddhist]: "Between the sun and a vessel filled with water [in which the sun reflects], the relation of influenced and influencer is also seen," [we reply :] *There* [in the example] the influence proceeds from the connection with the rays, *here* [in our case] there is no such connection.—If [the Buddhist goes on objecting : "The connection exists] by means of the impressions," [we say :] No ! since these do not last a sufficiently long time,[1] how can there be a connection ?—If [he declares that the influence is exerted] on the continuity [aforesaid, we reply :] If [the Self] to which you ascribe this continuity (*saṃtânin*) is [regarded by you as] distinct [from the continuity], you abandon your doctrine [of the momentariness of the Self, because you acknowledge a permanent Self implicitly]. Or is [the Self regarded by you as] not distinct [from the continuity] ? Still, something must be done by it [to bring forth the continuity]. Such doing, however, is impossible, as [the Self] is momentary [in your opinion]. And if you deny this doing, of what use is [your stating] such a thing[2] which is equal to a non-entity ?

[1] Because there would be no recipient (*âśraya*).

"Granted that the influence on the internal is not [effected] by impressions. [But], as the Self is omnipresent, the influence will take place in consequence of the Self's connection with some external place." To this [the author] replies :—

29. For both there would be no distinction, if the influence were received in some special place.

For the asserters of *one* [all-pervading] Self [the S'âṅkaras] there cannot be a distinction [between the liberated and the bound soul under these circumstances], because the influence would be *always* received and hence no liberation [could take place]. For [us and other] asserters of a multiplicity of Selfs, however, there cannot be [such] a distinction [on the said supposition], since all [souls] would be connected with all objects, and, therefore, the same perception would arise [in all souls] simultaneously.

[The author] ponders a [fresh] objection :

30. If [the Buddhist says : "This distinction may be] occasioned by the invisible [power],"—

[1] Cf. the commentary to the preceding aphorism. [2] *Viz.*, the *saṃtânin*.

"Though in consequence of the constant connection [with all objects] perception becomes everywhere possible, still, when a perception arises by means of the invisible [power of merit and demerit,] belonging to this or that [soul], this [invisible power] is the cause of that [perception]. Therefore, perception does not extend to everything [simultaneously, and so the distinction of bound and liberated souls is not set aside by our doctrine]."

[The author] offers the refutation [of this objection]:

31. As the two [the agent and the patient] do not belong to the same time [according to your opinion], they cannot stand in the relation of benefitted and benefactor.

[This is] clear.

[The author] ponders [another] objection:

32. If [the Buddhist says:] "This may be as in the case of ceremonies performed for a son,"—

"As some benefit is rendered to a not yet existing son by ceremonies performed for a son etc., *i. e.*, by means of consecrations, so also in our case something will be [bestowed by the present Self on the future Self]."

[With regard to this the author] states his doctrine:

'As in the case of ceremonies performed for a son' *i. e.*, as in the case of consecrating ceremonies performed for a son.

33. For, according to that [opinion held by you], there is no one permanent Self which can be consecrated by the ceremonies performed in order to promote conception etc.[1]

[1] The following commentary gives no explanation of this aphorism which contains a perspicuous refutation of the Buddhist's objection, but adds simply the Sâṃkhya view on the subject.

[But in our opinion] the Self is without beginning, eternal, pure and intelligent; with regard to *such* [a Self] the throwing of clarified butter into fire and the like are justified.

[The Buddhist] declares that the Self is not permanent intelligence:

34. "Since no permanent product exists, it is momentary."

"Existence is practical efficiency; and this [practical efficiency manifests itself], according to an invariable rule, either successively [by degrees] or all at once. Now, these two [kinds of manifestation of practical efficiency] cannot belong to a thing which is not momentary [but permanent]; therefore, these two compel us to accept the momentariness [of all existing things, *i. e.*, of the Self also]."[1]

[The author] refutes [this doctrine]:

35. No, because this is confuted by recognition.

Although [for the purpose of a regular refutation of the opponent's doctrine] the permanent existence [of the objects] ought to be confirmed by arguments proving [that] the efficiency [of the objects takes place], when there is a concomitant [cause], and [that] the efficiency [of the objects does] not [take place], when there is no concomitant [cause],—still, [another] refutation is given [by the author, *viz.*] by means of the unobstructed recognition which is expressed by the words 'This is the same [man or thing, we have seen before],' since [this recognition] is established by the concurrence of all teachers. This point is treated at

[1] This is an abstract of a portion in the Bauddha chapter of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, as I have already stated in the Preface to the edition of the Aniruddhavṛitti, p. VIII. Mr. Gough's translation of that passage is far from being clear.

length elsewhere and, therefore, it is not discussed here in a detailed manner.

[The author] adduces another argument against [the Buddhist]:

36. And because it is contradicted by Scripture and by reasoning.

Scripture teaches that there is a [permanent] soul which enjoys what must be enjoyed in later births, and reasoning [teaches]: if works do not bear fruits to be enjoyed [hereafter], who, forsooth, will betake himself to performing them? "[But] we see" [the opponent objects] "that compassionate people act [for others] without expectation [of reward." To this we reply:] No, for even in this case they gain merit themselves by bestowing [benefits] on others, and, though it be not their intention to obtain merit, this will be a means for their liberation.

[The author] adds a further argument against [the Buddhist's theory]:

37. And because the example is not valid.

Since [from your standpoint] everything forms part of the subject under discussion (*paksha*), you cannot allege an example, [as you have done in aphorism 32; and, therefore, there is really no base for arguing with you. And] if [you say that everything] does *not* form part [of the subject which is being discussed], the very[1] [thing you except] is a permanent one, [and by admitting such exception you abandon your doctrine of the momentariness of all things]. "But then, the momentariness of that also [which we except and which may serve as example] may be proved by some other reason." Even in this case the example would not be valid [on account of the want of parallelism].

[1] *Sa, viz., apravishṭárthaḥ* or *°vishayaḥ*.

[The author] teaches [now], that, [in contrast with the Buddhist's doctrine in aphorism 34], practical efficiency is impossible on the theory of the momentary duration [of all things]:

38. The relation of cause and effect cannot exist between two things coming simultaneously into existence.

I. e., between that thing which is characterized by itself [*viz.*, the cause] and its practical efficiency [*viz.*, its effect], if [the former did not exist previously to the latter, but] if both came simultaneously into existence, like the left and the other [the right] horn [of the cow]. This is [or rather will be] explained frequently [in the present volume].

"The relation of cause and effect will simply be a consequence of the existing in prior and subsequent time." To this [fresh objection of the Buddhist the author] replies:

Does the relation of cause and effect [or product] exist between the clay and the jar, as simultaneously coming into existence, or as successive? The former is not the case, because there is no reason in favour of this side of the alternative (*vinigamaka*), and because, [if this were true,] it would not be fit for a man who wants a jar, to operate with clay etc.

Nor is the latter the case, as [the author] says [in the following aphorism]:

39. Because, when the prior departs, the subsequent cannot arise.

It might be so, [as you say], if [the prior] did place some surplus [into the subsequent]. This, [however,] is impossible [on your theory], since [you declare that everything] is momentary.[1]

[1] According to the Sâṃkhya doctrine, the product is nothing else but the material cause in a different condition (*avasthâ*).

[The author] elucidates this:

40. Moreover, [this is] not [correct], because, while the one exists, the other cannot be, and the two keep always asunder.

Moreover, the relation of cause and effect cannot exist [on your theory] for the following reason: at the time, when the relation between the cause and its result [manifests itself to us], the effect cannot exist [in your opinion], because the two [must] always keep asunder, [if things are momentary]. But let alone [the argument of] practical efficiency [of the cause]; it is altogether improper [*for you*] to use such expressions as 'this is the cause, this is the effect.'[1]

"But then, the existence of the cause at the time [of the existence] of the product is to no purpose; [the nature of a cause] will be [determined] by the mere existence in prior time." To this [the author] replies:

41. If [causality] consisted merely in priority, there would be no determination.

Does [that kind of causality which you accept] pertain to something belonging to a different continuity or to the same continuity [of momentary existences as the product]? If [you say] "to something belonging to a different continuity," there would be an extension beyond limits; and if [you say] "to something belonging to the same continuity," there would be [on your theory] an absolute (*niranvaya*) destruction [of the cause before the product arises]. Hence this [supposed cause belonging to the same continuity] would

[1] *Tathâ hi: yo jânâti, sa vyavâharati; na ca kârya-kâraṇayor ekakâla-vartamânatvaṃ bhavad-avasthâyâm asti, tena kârya-kâraṇa-jñânaṃ na bhavishyati*, Paṇḍit.

be equal to [a cause] belonging to a different continuity, and, for this reason, there would be no determination [of the material cause of this or that product]. And that no connection exists [between cause and product], is [expressly] declared [by you].

"But we see that even a non-entity can be the cause, as for instance, when a buffalo or another [animal] dies after the shot of an archer. [In this case, only] after [the death of the buffalo, the archer] is the agent with regard to the death of the [animal] wounded by the arrow; [but if the wounded buffalo does not die or if it is not hit upon, the archer is simply a shooter. Therefore, we deny that there is a cause for the archer's being the killer of the animal." To this objection we reply:] No, because in this case also there is a connection [of the killer] with the death [of the animal] through the action [of the former, *viz.*, through the shooting].

It was said [by the Buddhistic opponent in the introduction to aphorism 28], that bondage results from the influence of the external things. [This assertion having been disproved, the author] refutes [now the Yogâchâra-Buddhist] who asserts that Thought only exists, (*vijñâna-vâdin*) [and who rises in opposition by saying:] "But an external thing, too, does not exist, since the [whole] world consists of Thought."

42. Not Thought alone, because of the conception of the external.

The world is not Thought alone. If it were so, there could be [only] the conception 'I am a jar,'[1] but not 'This is a jar.' If [the opponent objects: "The latter conception may arise] from a special impression," [we reply:] No, since, on the theory that external things do not exist, there

[1] Because Thought is the essential nature of the Self (*âtmasvarûpa*).

can be no impression [having the form] of a jar, how is [the existence of] a *special* [impression possible]? Moreover, [we must ask:] Is the cause of [your supposed] impression again nothing but a [pure] impression [or disposition], or is it the impression [left by a previous perception] of something external? If you accept the latter,[1] then there is something besides [Thought], and, therefore, this very object is the external thing [we declare to be existent]. "But" [the opponent says] "there is no external object, because a whole which is distinct from its parts does not exist, that is to say: because the parts and the whole are one on account of being perceived as one." [To this we reply: Sometimes] the whole moves, when a part moves [*f. i.*, a tree shaken by a storm; but sometimes] the whole does not move, while a small part [moves, *f. i.*, a tree touched by a mild wind]. By perceiving [the latter, *viz.*,] that [the whole] does not move, [while parts move], opposite properties are attributed [to the whole and to its parts], whence follows that [the two] are distinct and, therefore, not one. Likewise, [other] arguments may be adduced against [the identity of the whole with its parts, for example:] that [the part] is dyed [*f. i.*, in the case of a cloth], or covered [*f. i.*, in the case of the human body], or belonging to a special place [*f. i.*, in the case of a tree some twigs of which reach into the neighbouring compound] etc.,[2] while [the whole] is not so. [But] granted [even] that the whole be not [something distinct from its parts], still [the existence of] the external objects is not to be denied, because an aggregate of atoms [—to use the term of the Vaiśeshikas—] is apprehended as extensive. [To this the Yogâchâra opposes again by saying:] "No,

[1] The answer to the *former* side of the question is not found sooner than on page 24, line 5 of my edition: *vâsanaiveti pakshe.*

[2] *Âdi* means, among other things, *tatkâlatvâ-'tatkâlatva*; an example for this possibility may be a cow which has been destroyed and of which only the horns are left.

for the atom can be inferred only from the whole, [that is to say,] from the product; [and] if this does not exist, [as we assert], from what is [the atom] to be inferred? [Moreover], since the atoms are beyond the reach of the senses, and their aggregate has no additional property whatever given to it, the conception 'this [aggregate] is extensive' is an erroneous one, and hence [we say:] 'The world is Thought alone.'" With regard to these [objections] we declare: [All this is wrong], because, [as we have shown,] the whole and its parts are distinct [from one another]. Again, as the two are different, the whole [*viz.*, the tree] does not tremble, while some parts do so; but only where the majority of the parts does tremble, there the whole trembles. The same conclusion is to be arrived at also in the case of the contrariety of [the state of being] dyed and not dyed, etc. Therefore, [the existence of] the external object is an established fact.—And if you accept [the former side of the alternative propounded page 24, line 3, *viz.*, that the cause of your supposed impression is again] nothing but a [pure] impression [or disposition, quite independent from any external object], the perception [of everything] would always arise.[1]

"As a perception without objects is excluded by experience (*adarśanât*), even perception does not exist on account of the non-existence of the objects." This the asserter of the [absolute] void (*śûnya-vâdin*) says [in the following aphorism]:[2]

"From the example of the perception of what appears in dreams,

[1] That is to say: if the efficiency of a certain disposition were not dependent on an external object, the time of the perception would be determined by nothing.

[2] Only Aniruddha ascribes Sûtra 43 to the S'aṅkaka, the three other commentators consider it as spoken by the Saiddhântika.

it follows that [perception] is possible even in the absence of objects." With reference to this [objection the author] says:

43. "Since, as the one does not exist, the other [too] does not, there is the void then."

"Since, as the objects do not exist, perception [too] does not, there is the [absolute] void. [And,] if some one declares that [perception] may have itself for its object, this is contradicted by the argument that the same thing cannot be subject as well as object (*kartri-karma-virodha*)."

44. "The void is the reality; the positive perishes, because perishing is the character of things."

"If the reality were of a positive nature, the reality would perish, because the positive perishes. In this case there would be no liberation. 'Because perishing is the character of things,' *i. e.*, because things necessarily perish."

[The author] justifies [now his doctrine]:

45. [This is] a mere denial by unintelligent persons.

[What the opponent says:] "Non-existence does not perish," is a mere assertion, but not truth. 'Unintelligent persons' are those who do not know the institutes of philosophy. [The objection is easily confuted by the following reasons: firstly,] because prior non-existence is seen to perish; [secondly,] because the positive does not perish, as the [eternal] existence of [all] products is settled; [thirdly] because even, if [the opponent] uses the word 'perishing' in the sense of 'disappearing,' Matter and Soul do not perish.

"But" [an orthodox philosopher may remark] "there is no non-existence at all! Why, then, do you ponder over its perishing and non-perishing?" [To this we reply:] How, then, does the perception arise 'there is no jar on the

ground'? If [you say that such perception] rests on the ground [simply], the perception of the non-existence of the jar ought to obtain [in the same manner] even [at the time], when the ground is possessed of the jar, since the ground [itself] remains in the same condition. [And] if [you object to this and declare:] "The perception of the non-existence [of the jar] rests on the *pure* ground; when the jar is present, there is no purity," [we must ask:] Is [this] purity simply the essential nature of the ground, or something different from it? If [you say that] it is simply the essential nature, then this does exist even at the time when the jar is present, and, therefore, [then also] there ought to be the perception of the [jar's] non-existence. And if you accept that [purity] is something different, this very thing is [our] non-existence.—"Then" [the opponent goes on disputing] "you speak of the [jar's] non-existence, when the ground is solitary; it is not solitary in the presence of the jar; where is the reason for speaking of non-existences?" This is not [proper; for let us ask:] Does 'solitariness' mean the being [only] one numerically, or does it mean something else? Now, the being [only] one numerically does obtain also when the ground is possessed of the jar; and if you accept that [solitariness] is something else, this very thing is [our] non-existence, [which, by the bye, cannot be denied for the following reason:] if there were no heterogeneousness of objects, [*i. e.*, if the difference of existence and non-existence did not hold good], there could be no heterogeneousness of cognition.

[Another objection is raised now:] "But, as a connection between the existent and the non-existent is not [possible], how can the perception of a non-existent thing take place? As, for example, the perception 'this is a jar' follows from the fact that the jar is observed, when it stands in connection with the senses (*indriyánvaya*), and that it is not observed, when there is no connection [with the senses,

indriya-vyatireka]—so the perception of a non-existent thing, too, ought to have the [same] cause, [that is to say: the perception of the non-existence of the jar ought to depend on the connection of the senses with the said non-existence; and such connection is impossible, because the senses are existent." To this we reply:] The cause, forsooth, is to be determined from our acquaintance with the facts, but facts taught by experience cannot be denied [by means of aprioristic speculations]. Again, since we are not asserters of a certain number of categories, some sort of connection adequate [to produce the perception of a non-existence] might well take place [in our opinion]. What harm is that to us? Hence non-existence is.

[The author] alleges another argument:

46. This, too, because it shares in the fate of the two [other] doctrines.

'This' theory of the [absolute] void, 'too,' must be rejected, because it shares in the fate of the doctrine that everything is momentary (cf. aph. 34), and in that of the doctrine that Thought alone exists (cf. aph. 42). As [the theory of] the momentariness was refuted by recognition through sense-perception [in aph. 35], and [the theory of the sole existence of] Thought by the perception of the external things [in aph. 42], just so this theory of the [absolute] void, too, must be rejected, because we apprehend all things entirely by perception.

[The author] states another argument against [this nihilistic doctrine]:

47. There can be no Soul's aim, in both ways.

If [you say that] the void is non-existence, what sensible man might endeavour after non-existence! [And, therefore, in this case] the use of such positive expressions as 'Liberation is Soul's aim' would be unmeaning. Or is the void [in your opinion] something different from the existent as well as from the non-existent? As such a thing is contradicted by experience, also [in this case] there could be no Soul's aim.

In order to confute the asserter of the [absolute] void [thoroughly, the author] mentions the doctrine of the Jainas who hold that the Self is of the same extension as the body:

48. It is not, because of the special kind of wandering.[1]

The void is not the reality, because the void cannot wander. And the wandering [of the soul] is learned [from the institutes]. And so Scripture[2] says: "Yama pulled out by force the soul being as big as a thumb" (Mahâbh. 3. 16763), "By bad deeds it goes to hell, by good deeds it goes to heaven, by knowledge it goes to Brahman's world."

This [view which is superior to the nihilistic theory, but, nevertheless, not absolutely true, the author] refutes [in the following aphorism]:

49. Because this [wandering] is impossible in the case of the [soul which is] immovable.

[This is] clear.

[The author] explains now the immovability [of the soul]:

50. If it were limited, like a jar etc., it would

[1] *I. e.*, the void is not, because a special kind of wandering is ascribed to the Self which, for this reason, is declared by the Jainas to be of bodily extension.

[2] It is very strange that Aniruddha declares a quotation from the Mahâbhârata as S'ruti.

come under the same conditions; and this is a false doctrine.

Jars and the like are limited and, [therefore,] movable. If [the soul] existed under the same conditions as these [things], it would be perishable; hence [the theory of the Jainas] is a false doctrine. Moreover, at the time of transmigration into another birth, the soul must [in the opinion of the Jainas] contract or expand, according as it assumes the bodily extension of an elephant or of a worm; for this reason it would consist of parts and, therefore, be not eternal.

"But thus you are in contradiction with the scriptural passage where [the soul is said to be as] big as a thumb etc. (Mahâbh. 3. 16763)." To this [objection the author] replies:

51. Also the scriptural passages about the wandering are [to be understood] on account of the conjunction with an Upâdhi, like [the motion of] the space.

As the idea that *the space* within a jar moves, when [in reality only] the jar moves, depends on a special Upâdhi, *viz.*, on the jar or something like it,—just so the conception that the Self wanders depends on its being determined by the body etc. [*viz.* by the internal organ and by the senses].

"What is the use of [stating] an Upâdhi? The difference [of the liberated and of the bound soul] will [simply] result from the diversity of the works." To this [the author] replies:

Since the Self is unlimited according to the authority [of the Bhagavadgîtâ 2. 24]: "Eternal, omnipresent and constant etc.," the scriptural passages about the wandering [of the soul] are to be explained as meaning a wandering which belongs to the Upâdhi.

Moreover, [this is the right explanation], because we learn that the wandering [in question] depends on Matter, from the following scriptural verse:

> "As, when a jar is carried, the space enclosed in the jar [*seems* to move], while [in reality only] the jar is carried, but not the space,—just so is the soul which may be compared with the ether [or space," Brahmabindûpanishad 13],

and, among others, from the following traditional verse:

> "Matter does the works, the nature of which it is to bear joyful and sorrowful fruits; and Matter, wandering through the three worlds at its will, enjoys [these fruits, too." Mahâbh. 12, 11307*b*, 11308*a*]

It has already been denied above [in aph. 16] that bondage is caused by works, in the shape of enjoined or forbidden actions. Now [the author] rejects also [the opinion that] it [bondage] arises from works, in the shape of their invisible power:

52. Not from works, too, because these are not the property of it [*i. e.*, of the soul].

It would be so, [as you say], if works were the property of the Self. But the Self has no property whatever, because it is without qualities.

"Works, [however,] will be its property! What contradicts [that theory]?" Thereupon [the author] replies:

53. Amongst other [reasons], the scriptural passages which declare that [the Self] is without qualities etc. will be contradicted.

The scriptural passage 'For nothing adheres to this soul' (Bṛihadâraṇyakopanishad 4. 3.16) is, [for instance,] opposed [to this view].

"Granted [then] that [works] be not the property of the Self, [still] the special kind of motion [by which the Self wanders into other worlds and other mundane existences] may be [brought about] as well by [works, though they be] the property of another [that is to say: of the internal organ];

for the Self, being omnipresent, stands in connection with everything [and, therefore, also with the constraining power instilled in to the inner organ by works]." To this [the author] replies:

54. There would be an extension beyond limits, if [the binding power] were the property of another.

Since the connection with everything [mentioned by you] belongs equally [to the bound and to the liberated soul], bondage would attach to the liberated souls, too, [according to your supposition].

"But then, you also accept a distribution of merit and demerit [in such a manner that both are associated with the bound soul, but not with the liberated]; [and, besides,] experience teaches that the bound endeavours[1] after liberation. [Hence,] as your doctrine on this [subject] will be the same as ours, we agree [with one another]." To this [the author] replies:

55. In spite of that association there is no agreement, because of non-discrimination.

Though [we accept both] an association [of the bound soul] with merit and demerit, [the two doctrines are] not of the same character, 'because of non-discrimination' [from which that association arises according to *our* opinion]. If the association of the Self with merit and demerit were real, then [our two doctrines] would be alike; but as [*we* teach that] there exists [only], in consequence of non-discrimination, the delusion of the Self's being associated with merit and demerit, where is an agreement [between us both]?

"Granted that bondage results from non-discrimination; still, [I suppose], we concur [both] in acknowledging that

[1] Which endeavouring is caused by merit won by previous good actions.

merit serves the purpose of the destruction of non-discrimination. Else bondage would be everlasting." To this [the author] replies:

56. The removal of it depends on a fixed cause, like that of darkness.

If that which has been ascertained as the cause of something by positive and negative argumentation, could be wanting [occasionally at the arising of the respective product], there would be absolutely no reliance [on anything].[1] As light [alone] is [competent] to destroy darkness, thus also, in our case, the destruction of non-discrimination is [brought about] by discrimination [alone, and not by merit, as you believe]. And if we acknowledge that merit serves the purpose of [promoting] discrimination, what harm is that [to our theory]? For this can well be done by merit, though it belongs to Matter, [or more specially, to the internal organ].

What is this thing, called darkness? Some[2] say: "Darkness is a non-entity." This is not [true], because we perceive it in a positive form (*vidhi-mukha-pratîteḥ*) [and say 'darkness comes, darkness disappears,' and not 'light disappears, light comes' in that sense]. With reference to the opinion that [darkness] is a non-entity, [let us ask:] Is it prior or posterior non-existence of light? If [the opponent says,] "Prior non-existence;" then [we reply:] As, when a jar is produced, the prior non-existence of the jar is destroyed, just so [in our case], when light appears, there ought to be the notion that 'the prior non-existence of light is destroyed'; [in reality, however, such notion does not exist;

[1] *I. e.*, nobody would be able to determine the cause of anything.

[2] *Viz.*, the Naiyâyikas and Vaiśeshikas, whereas the followers of the Mîmâṃsâ, Vedânta, Sâṃkhya and Yoga systems declare darkness to be an entity (*bhâva*).

on the other hand we think 'darkness is gone.' Moreover,] since there is the prior non-existence of the future light [also], when the present light exists, [even at this time] darkness ought to continue undestroyed [which is not the case, as everybody knows]. "Then," [says the opponent,] "it is posterior non-existence [of light]." As, however, this is imperishable, darkness ought to be perceived [even] in the presence of a new light, just as [even] after the production of a new jar the posterior non-existence of a destroyed jar continues. But [as regards] *reciprocal* non-existence, [this] subsists regularly between two [positive] things [and, therefore, between light and darkness also; and so that cannot be an argument to prove darkness to be a non-existence].[1] That [darkness] be *absolute* non-existence [of light], is not to be supposed, because this is fallacious (*dushṭatvât*). The same is taught [in the following verses :]

> "Non-existence of light is not darkness; this is the common opinion of the old teachers, as we learn from the Purâṇas that blackness is a quality of the shadow,[2] [and only positive things have qualities]. For, according as a lamp is far or near, the shadow is huge or small, [and according as the former is stationary or not, the latter] moves or does not move; [besides,] it follows the body. [All this] could not be, if [the shadow] were not a real thing; [for it is only to such things that these qualities belong]."

But the tenet 'darkness is an entity' follows [already] from the fact that [darkness] is perceived, [because a perception is only possible,] when there is an entity. [The opponent objects :] "Things are seen [only] in the presence of light; how can, therefore, [something] be seen in the absence of it?"[3] [To this we reply :] This is simply the heterogeneousness [of darkness from all other

[1] For *anyo'nyâbhâva* is nothing else but *bheda*.

[2] The shadow is considered as a kind of darkness (*tamo-viśesha*).

[3] The opponent means that, if darkness were a real thing, it could only be seen by light.

real things; the latter are only seen by light, while it is the nature of the former not to be visible by light]. As an owl sees without standing in need of light, just so the perception of darkness does not require any light, because this is the peculiarity of the thing. Hence [darkness][1] is a special colour which is imparted and seen where a cover [veils light]. Some, however, hold, that [darkness] is [not a colour, but] a substance different [from the nine substances of the Naiyâyikas]. In this sense it is said :

> "Darkness, forsooth, is moving, black, and distinct as far or near [in time and space]; as it has qualities different from the qualities of the acknowleged[2] [nine substances], it must be distinguished from those nine."

But whether [darkness] be a quality or a substance, this does no harm to our theory, because we are not asserters of a special number of categories. Still, what we state, is, that [darkness] is not a non-entity.

"You have said that liberation results from discrimination. Then liberation ought to devolve upon everybody, because the discrimination of jars, clothes etc. is made by all of us." To this [the author] replies :

57. Since the non-discrimination of other things [results] from the non-discrimination of Matter, [the one] is abandoned, if the other is abandoned.

Matter is the root of all [products]. From the non-discrimination of that [from Soul] the non-discrimination of [all] other things [from Soul] arises. Now, these things may be discriminated from each other or they may not be; liberation and bondage do not depend thereon, but on the

[1] *Ayaṃ, viz., padârthaḥ.*

[2] *Niḥsparçatvân na pṛithivy ap tejo vâyuḥ, rûpavattvân nâ 'kâço dik kâla âtmâ manaç ce'ty-âdi*, Paṇḍit.

discrimination and non-discrimination of Matter [from Soul]. 'If the other is abandoned,' *i. e.*, if the non-discrimination of Matter is abandoned, the non-discrimination of all things is abandoned, for the reason aforesaid.

"Granted that liberation results from discrimination; [still], is this [discrimination] connected with the Self or not? If [you say that] it is connected with the Self, then the invariableness of the Self is given up; [and] if [you say that] it is not connected, then [your theory is to be charged with] an extension beyond limits." To this [the author] replies:

58. But [this is] a mere expression, no reality, since it resides in the thinking organ.

'It is connected with the Self' is, however, a mere expression; [for] a real connection does not exist. [But] though there is no connection, still, since discrimination resides in the thinking organ, there exists the delusion that discrimination dwells in the Self, on account of the proximity [of the Self] to the thinking organ. This we shall explain [in detail later on].

"Let the discriminative knowledge result from the mere hearing [of the truth], to what purpose is the immediate (*aparoksha*) cognition which can be attained [only] by the toil of many births?" To this [the author] replies:

59. [Non-discrimination] is not removed even by argument, as in the case of one mistaken in the line of direction, without immediate [cognition].

[This is] clear.

"[According to your doctrine] there is [a series of material principles] beginning with primitive Matter, and these are transformed successively into the 'great one' [*i. e.*, the judging organ] etc. But we see nothing [of this process]." To this [the author] replies:

60. Imperceptible things are apprehended by inference, as a [hidden] fire by means of the smoke etc.

It would be so [as you say, *i. e.*, imperceptibleness would be a sufficient reason for denying the existence of anything], if sense-perception alone were a means of cognition (*pramâṇa*) and not inference and [testimony, too]. For primitive Matter and the following [material principles] are, though invisible, proved by means of inductive (*sâmânyato dṛishṭa*) inference.

[The author] states now the order of creation of those things among which primitive Matter is the first:

61. Primitive Matter is the state of equipoise of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; from primitive Matter [proceeds] the 'great one'; from the 'great one,' the egotizing organ; from the egotizing organ, the five rudiments and the two kinds of senses; [then follow] the gross elements. These, together with Soul, form the series of the twenty-five.

Although primitive Matter is the state of equipoise of the three [constituents], still, the word 'primitive Matter' is also conventionally[1] used to denote every one [of these] severally.[2] The 'great one' is the judging principle; the 'egotizing organ' is [the substratum of] the egotizing delusion; the 'five rudiments' are [the substrata of] sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.

The 'two kinds of senses' are (1) the external, *viz.*, the five senses [or faculties] of action, *i. e.*, the faculties of

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[1] *Sâṃketikaḥ* = *śâstra-paribhâshânusâreṇa*, Paṇḍit.

[2] I have not met with a single passage in the Sâṃkhya works where *prakṛiti* is used in this sense.

speaking, walking, taking, secretion and generation, and the five senses of perception, *i. e.*, the faculties of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling; (2) the internal [sense, called] *manas*. The 'gross elements' are ether, air, fire, water and earth; these must be known to have arisen from the five rudiments. The word 'gross' implies that [the rudiments] are to be estimated as *subtile* elements. The soul is mentioned [in our aphorism] to complete the number, but not with reference to the order of creation, because the Self is eternal.

With a view [to show how] the respective causes are to be inferred from the products, [the author] inverts now the order:

The three [constituents], Sattva etc., are substances, because they possess the qualities of lightness etc. To denote these, the word *guṇa* ('constituent' and 'a factor of secondary importance') is employed, because they are the implements of soul. Primitive Matter, now, is nothing but these [three constituents], and not another thing forming their receptacle, since it will be said [in aph. VI. 39]: "Sattva and the others are not properties of it, because it consists of them." The 'state of equipoise' is the reverse of a combination in which one is less or more than another, that is to say: the state of being not developed into a product. And thus the definitive meaning is this: primitive Matter consists of the three constituents as long as these are not [transformed into] products. This, however, is [only] the definition of *mûla-prakṛiti* [or 'the radical form which is the root of all']; *prakṛiti* [or 'radical form'] in general is to be defined as the material cause of another principle.

[The author] teaches now the order in which [the enumerated principles] are to be inferred [from each other]:

62. The five rudiments [are inferred] from the gross [elements].

The cognition of the five rudiments is [arrived at by inference] from their product, the five gross elements, which are, according to the difference of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, conducive to delight, pain or apathy.[1]

63. The egotizing organ from the external and internal [senses as well as] from these [rudiments].

The cognition of the egotizing organ is [arrived at] from its products which are the external and internal senses as well as these five rudiments.

64. The internal organ from that.

The cognition of the internal, *i. e.*, of the judging [or deciding] organ [*buddhi*, is arrived at] 'from that,' *i. e.*, from its product, the egotizing organ.

65. Primitive Matter from that.

The cognition of primitive Matter is [arrived at] 'from that,' *i. e.*, from its product, the 'great' principle.

66. Soul from the fact that the combined is for the sake of another.

The cognition of Soul is not [arrived at, by any means, in a manner similar to that of the preceding aphorisms, *i. e.*, not] from primitive Matter's being a product [of Soul. This would be a totally wrong supposition,] because primitive Matter is eternal, and Soul cannot be [material] cause. But primitive Matter exists for the sake of another, because it is a combined [substance], *i. e.*, because it consists of the three constituents. And this other is the soul. Therefrom the cognition of it [results]. This [soul] must be declared to be uncombined, from fear of a *regressus in infinitum*.

"But primitive Matter will have some cause [nevertheless]." To this [the author] replies:

[1] These qualities which do not yet belong to the 'rudiments' characterize the gross elements as products.

67. Since there is no root for the root, the rootless is the root.

Since the material principle which is the root [of all] has no root or cause, just this rootless cause is the root. This is [our] primitive Matter.

[The author] states the reason for that:

68. Though there be a succession [of causes], there must be a halt at one point; and so [primitive Matter] is a mere name.

If there were another cause of primitive Matter, and another cause of that one, again, [and so on], there would be the fault of a *regressus in infinitum*. Therefore, a root which has no cause must be accepted at last. Nothing else but this [extreme point] is what we call 'primitive Matter.' It would, however, be a superfluous complication (*gaurava*) to accept more than the twenty-five principles [enumerated in aph. 61].

"[But] since primitive Matter is invisible, how can this be ascertained as the [first] cause? [Why do'nt you acknowledge the atoms as such?]" To this [objection made by a Vaiśeshika or Naiyâyika, the author] replies:

69. [The fault found][1] with primitive Matter concerns equally both of us.

Both, the teacher and the opponent, are in the same condition. As, though an atom is invisible, the atoms are inferred [by you], because their qualities [colour, taste etc.] are seen in jars and the like, just so also in our case primitive Matter, consisting of three constituents, is inferred as

[1] Supply *doshaḥ* according to Aniruddha's view.

the cause [by us], since we see that the nature of three constituents belongs to the world. For an affectionate wife gives pleasure to her husband, and, therefore, shows the nature of Sattva; by ill behaviour she causes pain, and shows, as such, the nature of Rajas; by separation she causes apathy, and shows then the nature of Tamas. Thus all things are to be regarded.

"If liberation resulted from the cognition of the difference [between Matter and Soul, as you say], then liberation ought to arise [immediately] from the mere hearing of [the truth as propounded in] the institutes. And thus it is not [in reality], because we see [in daily life] that the one [attains liberation] quickly, the other after a long time [and many never]." To this [the author] replies:

70. Since the capable are of three kinds, there is no rule.

Those who are capable [of receiving instruction] are of three kinds because of the difference of the excellent, mediocre and inferior. Their difference results from the difference of ignorance and of the other cooperating factors,[1] while the difference of these [again] results from the difference of the invisible power [of merit and demerit]. Therefore, there is no [such] rule that [the liberation of everybody must take place] in consequence of the mere hearing.

"The causal connection has been taught above in Sûtra [61]: 'From primitive Matter [proceeds] the 'great one' [etc.],' but no succession [will be intended there]." This error [the author] sets aside [in the following aphorism]:

71. The first product is that called the 'great one'; this is the thinking organ.

[1] *I. e.*, *asmitâ*, *râga*, *dvesha*, *abhiniveśa*; cf. III. 37.

The first product of primitive Matter is the 'great' principle or judging organ, [also called] thinking organ,[1] because thinking [is its function].

72. The egotizing organ is the subsequent.

The immediately following product of the judging organ is the egotizing organ.

73. The others are products of that.

'The others,' *i. e.*, the eleven senses and the five rudiments, are products of the egotizing organ. Mediately, also the [gross] elements, the products of the rudiments, are called products of that.

"But then, if it is thus [*i. e.*, if you declare the visible world to be a product of the egotizing organ], you abandon your doctrine that the world is a product of primitive Matter." To this [objection of the Vaiśeshikas the author] replies:

74. It is the first cause, through that mediately, as is the case with the atoms.

As [according to the Vaiśeshikas] a jar which is the [immediate] product of a lump of clay, has the atoms for its cause mediately, just so also [our] primitive Matter is the principal cause [of all products mediately].

"Since primitive Matter and Soul are [both] eternal, which [of the two] is the cause of the creation's commencement?" With regard to this [question the author] replies:

75. While both are antecedent, since the one lacks [this character], it belongs to the other.

Something has not the character of the cause simply on

[1] *Manas* is not used technically here; cf. Vijñânabhikshu's commentary on this aphorism.

account of being antecedent [to the product], but [only, if the causal connection is established] by positive and negative argumentation.[1] Now, among the two, 'the one,' *i. e.*, the soul, lacks the qualification of being the cause since Scripture teaches its invariableness. Hence 'the other,' *i. e.*, primitive Matter, possesses the character of the [first] cause.

"[But,] since [the existence of] the atoms is not disputed, let these alone be the cause." To this [objection, raised by a Vais'eshika, the author] replies:

76. Being limited, they cannot be the material [cause] of everything.

That which is limited cannot be the material [cause] of everything; as yarn cannot be the cause of a jar. Therefore, it would be necessary [according to your theory] to ascribe a separate cause to every special thing. And [in our opinion] it is simpler to accept one single cause.

[The author] alleges Scripture to [corroborate] this:

77. And because of Scripture which says that [the world] proceeded therefrom.

The *reason* [for the world's being a product of primitive Matter] has [duly] been stated at first [in aph. 75]. Besides, Scripture says that primitive Matter is the cause of the world, in the passage "The world arises from primitive Matter."

"[But] experience teaches that a jar which previously did not exist comes into existence. Let, [therefore,] prior non-existence be the cause [of each product], since this invariably precedes [the arising of everything]." To this [the author] replies:

[1] *Kiṃ tu pûrvabhâve sati yasya vastunaḥ sattve yad utpadyate, yadabhâve cha notpadyate, tat prati tad vastu kâraṇam*, Paṇḍit.

78. A thing does not proceed from nothing.

A real thing does not arise from something unreal. As experience teaches that the product is of the same description as the cause, the world, too, would be unreal [according to your opinion].

"Let the world, too, be unreal; what harm is that to us?" To this [remark, made by a follower of S'aṅkarâchârya, the author] replies:

79. [The world] is not unreal, because there is no confutation, and because it is not the result of a faulty cause.

When there is the [wrong] notion that a [piece of] mother of pearl be silver, [this opinion regarding the existence of] the silver is confuted by the [subsequent correct] notion 'This is not silver.' But, in our case, nobody ever has the notion 'This world has not the character of something real,' by which [notion] the reality [of the world] might be confuted. Again, if something is the result of a faulty cause, we are convinced that it is false; as, for instance, somebody's perception of a [white] conch-shell as yellow which results from the fault of jaundice [by which the eye-sight is damaged] etc.[1] But, in our case, such a depravity [of the senses] is quite out of the question, because the cognition of the world is genuine with all and always. Hence the world is not unreal.

"But then, let something unreal be the [first] cause; still the *world* will not be unreal." With reference to this [objection the author] says:

80. If something real [is the cause], this is established by the connection with that; [but] if something unreal [were the cause], how could this be, since it would be unreal?

[1] *Âdi* may be interpreted by the following superstition mentioned in some Vedânta and Nyâya books. If the eye is besmeared with the grease of a frog, a straight cane is seen in the shape of a serpentine line.

If something real is the material cause, then, according to the maxim that the product has the qualities of the cause, 'this is established,' *i. e.*, the reality of the product is established, 'by the connection with that,' *i. e.*, by [the product's] connection with the reality [of the cause. But] if something unreal [were the first cause], then the world, [too], could not be real; and 'since it would be unreal,' that is to say: since the world would be necessarily unreal, 'how could this [*i. e.*, the world's reality] be?' For the unreal cannot have the character of the real.

"Let work alone be the cause of the world; what is the use of inventing primitive Matter?" To this objection [raised by a Mîmâṃsaka, the author] replies:

The comparative [*kutastarâm* is employed in the aphorism] in the sense of the positive [*kutas*].

81. No; for work cannot be material [cause].

The invisible power [of merit and demerit arising from works] may be the *causa efficiens;* but we never see that merit and demerit are the *causa materialis.* Since liberation results from the discriminative knowledge of primitive Matter and Soul, primitive Matter must be accepted.

"Since liberation is attainable already by undertaking the things enjoined in the Veda, what is the use of [discerning] primitive Matter?" To this [the author] replies:

82. This does not result even from scriptural [means. What is gained thereby] is not Soul's aim, because it is brought about [by works], and, therefore, [the performer] is exposed to returning.

'Scriptural [means]' are those which are learned from

[Scripture, *i. e.*, from] the Veda, *viz.*, sacrifices and the like. Even from [the application of] these liberation does not result, 'because [what is gained thereby] is brought about [by works], and, therefore, [the performer] is exposed to returning.' Since [liberation as supposed by you] is a product [of actions] and as such not eternal, the liberated would be exposed to a continuance of new mundane existences. Hence this is not Soul's aim.

[The author] shows now what is [really] Soul's aim:

83. Scripture says that he who has attained to discrimination in respect to these does not return.

Scripture says that [only he who has attained to discrimination 'in respect to these,' *i. e.*, in respect to primitive Matter and Soul, does not return in consequence of his discriminative knowledge. This scriptural passage is [the last clause of the Chhândogya Upanishad]: "*He* does not return again."

[The author] alleges an argument against the opposite opinion:

[According to Mahâdeva, the word *tatra* in the aphorism does not mean 'in respect to these,' but 'there.']

'There,' *i. e.*, in Brahman's world. The scriptural passage [alluded to] is: "*He* does not return again."—[Discrimination is the real cause of liberation], since in the following verse:

> "All these [will be] united with Brahman, when the time of the dissolution of the world (*pratisaṃchara*) has come. At the end of the last [mundane period] they enter the highest abode, having purified their souls."

a stress is to be laid (*svarasa*) on the expression 'having purified their souls' (*kritâtman*, = 'having attained to discrimination').

"What, then, is the fruit of work like?" This [the author] says [in the following aphorism]:

84. From pain comes pain, as relief from cold is not [effected] by affusion of water.

If liberation were to be brought about by [ritual] works, then, since such works comprehend pain [caused to the victims], liberation, too, being the product of these [actions], would involve pain. At least, since [such a liberation] must perish, there would be pain at last. For relief from cold is not [imparted] to one afflicted by cold through affusion of water, but, rather, only [more] cold [is occasioned].

"The fact, [however,] that something is brought about by works [in general] does not bring on pain; but the reason [for the fruit's being painful] is the being brought about by works which are undertaken with a special desire; for works undertaken without any desire are means for [the attainment of] liberation. Thus Scripture says:

> "Some sages, wishing for wealth, went to death by their works with their children; but other sages who [had no wishes, but] were given to meditation obtained the highest immortality through [ritual] works."[1]

With reference to this [view, the author] declares:

85. Since it is equally brought about [by works], whether these be undertaken with or without desire,—

Granted that what is brought about by works, undertaken without desire, be not painful; still, though there is a difference between works done with desire and such done without desire, the fact that liberation [as accepted by you] is brought about by *works* remains the same. Since [such a liberation] would be perishable because of being brought about [by actions], there would be pain again. And the scriptural passage [quoted by you] which says that works done without desire are means for [the attainment of] liberation, refers to knowledge [which is promoted by such works].

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[1] This S'ruti is found, with slight variations, in the Sâṃkhya-Tattvakaumudî to Kârikâ 2.

And, as liberation results from knowledge (cf. III. 23), these [works] are *mediately* means of liberation.

"[But,] if liberation results from the knowledge of the difference between Matter and Soul, [as you accept], still [this liberation, too,] may be perishable, and, therefore, mundane existence may begin again. Hence [you] the teacher and [I] the opponent are [equally exposed to] the same [objection]." With regard to this [remark the author] declares:

86. [Nothing positive falls] to him who is liberated definitively, [but] only the absolute destruction of bondage; hence there is no parity.

There is [only] the destruction of bondage in the case of 'him who is liberated definitively,' *i. e.*, essentially. Bondage is non-discrimination. By the removal of it non-discrimination is destroyed, *i. e.*, [absolutely] annihilated. Now, since the annihilation of non-discrimination is a [definitive] posterior non-existence, how can there be a return of mundane existence, and [how can you talk of] a parity [in regard to our two doctrines]?

It has been taught [in aph. 61] that there is a set of twenty-five [principles]; and, since this is not to be ascertained except by proof, [the author] explains now what this [*i. e.*, proof] is:

87. The determination of something which has not [previously] been in connection with both nor with one of the two [others] is right cognition. What is most conducive to that, is the thing in question [*i. e.*, 'proof' or rather 'means of knowledge'].

'With both,' *i. e.*, with the eventual [association existing between] sense and object, that is to say: with perception[1]; 'nor with one of the two [others]' *i. e.*, [neither] with an eventual characteristic sign [leading to inference] nor with a scriptural declaration, that is to say: [neither] with inference nor with testimony.—'The determination of something which has not [previously] been in [such a] connection' means 'the determination of a thing [previously] not determined,' *i. e.*, 'right cognition' (*pramâ*) or 'right notion' (*pramiti*) or 'result' [of perception, inference or testimony]. Hereby is explained what is called [else] 'a means of knowledge by which one arrives at an unknown thing.'—[The clause:] 'what is most conducive to right cognition, is proof [or rather: means of knowledge]' is the general definition of *pramâṇa*.

"How many means of knowledge are there?" To this [the author] replies:

88. There are three different means of knowledge; since, if these are established, everything can be ascertained, no more are to be established.

Perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumâna*), and testimony (*s'abda*) are the means of knowledge. [To this a Mîmâṃsaka objects:] "What, are analogy (*upamâna*), self-evidence (*arthâpatti*), non-existence (*abhâva*), proportion (*saṃbhava*), and tradition (*aitihya*) [no means of knowledge]?" With reference to this it is declared [in the aphorism]: 'Since, if these are established,' etc. [That is to say:] Means of knowledge are assumed in order to determine what is cognoscible. Now, since, if [our] three different means of knowledge are established, there results [from these]

[1] The locative case is dependent on *asaṃnikrishṭa* as well as the genitive case.

the ascertainment of [everything] which is cognoscible [according to your opinion] through all [those] means of knowledge [enumerated by you], 'no more are to be established' as distinct means of knowledge. For those [means which you accept besides] are contained in [our] three means of knowledge; [the former] are brought under [our three heads] by great teachers in their proper place: [those of your additional means] by which a cognition is obtained *so* that this cognition exists when there is a contact between the senses and the object, and that this cognition does not exist when there is no such contact,[1]—belong to perception, etc.[2] Therefore only a further *nominal* distinction is made [by you], and hence no means of knowledge are to be established *in addition* [to our three].

[The author] gives now the special definitions:

89. Perception is that cognition which results from the connection [with the objects] and represents their form.

By [the expression] 'which results from the connection' inference and testimony are excluded. 'Which represents their form' means 'which represents the form of jars [etc.]'. Such [a cognition] is perception. [This definition] includes also that perception which distinguishes the details (*savikalpaka*). The Buddhists, however, declare that perception is only that [cognition] which does not distinguish the details (*nirvikalpaka*), [and give the following definition:] "What is free from combination (*kalpanâ*) and not exposed to mistake is called perception.[3] Combination is that apprehension by which [an object] is joined with its name,

[1] *Viz.*, *abhâva* and partly *upamâna*.

[2] *Âdi* means that *arthâpatti*, *sambhava* and partly *upamâna* belong to *anumâna*, and that *aitihya* is either *s'abda* or no *pramâṇa* at all.

[3] Nyâyabindu (edited by P. Peterson in the Bibl. Ind.), first chapter, line 3.

genus etc.[1] And, since there is such [a combination] in the case of [a cognition] which distinguishes the details, this [kind of cognition] is no perception, [no] means of right knowledge." This is not [correct; for] perception is [everything] which is produced by the faultless totality of the factors required for the production of an immediate cognition. This is of both kinds: not distinguishing and distinguishing the details. The clear understanding (*saṃvid*) of name, genus etc., [is not brought about by combination, as the Buddhists suppose], but arises from memory, [and memory is roused]—through the medium of the awakening of the impressions [left previously in the internal organ]—by the likeness [of a thing perceived now to a thing perceived in former times]. Since, therefore, something additional accedes [to the *nirvikalpaka* perception through memory], the special name *savikalpaka* [is given to perception in this case]. And no fault whatever nor a defect in the totality of factors [mentioned above] is occasioned by memory.

[The Buddhist objects:] "But then, [a perception distinguishing the details] is no means of right knowledge, because it is associated with memory." [To this we reply:] Oh, how cunning! An accompanying [cause] deprives [according to your opinion] a means of right knowledge of its power! Thus it is said:

> "Though the name [of the thing we perceive] is remembered, this does not disparage the nature of the perception; for this [*viz.*, the name] is unconcerned [in the perception] and unable to veil the essence of the thing which bears the name. That apprehension, too, is [universally] considered as perception, by which the thing is afterwards determined as to its properties, its genus and the like."[2]

[1] *I. e.* with its colour, extension and other attributes; *nâma-jâty-âdi* is employed in the technical Nyâya-definitions of *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka*, cf. Nyâyakośa under the latter word.

[2] The second verse is quoted also in the Sâṃkhyatattvakaumudî to Kârikâ 27, and partly, in a different connection, in the Sâṃkhyapravachanabhâshya to aphor. II. 32.

"Your definition of perception is not [correct], because it does not extend to the perception of the Yogins [who are able to see things past and future]." To this [the author replies]:

90. There is no fault, because the perception of the Yogins is not an external one.

Our definition refers only to the external perception of daily life, but the perception of the Yogin is neither external[1] nor belonging to daily life. Therefore the fault of being not extensive enough does not [attach to our definition.

Or, even the perception of the Yogin *is* included in our definition! This other possibility of looking at the subject [the author] states [in the following aphorism]:

91. There is no fault, because he who has attained supernatural power is in connection with things being in the state of the cause.

Since products remain always existent, even that which is destroyed, *i. e.*, dissolved into its cause, exists in the state of the past; likewise, a thing to come exists in its cause in the state of the future. Now, the Yogin who has attained supernatural power is, by the assistance of the merit produced by the Yoga-praxis, in [immediate] connection with primitive Matter and therefore, with all space, all time and [all objects]. Hence the fault of being not extensive enough does not [attach to our definition].

"[But] your definition does not apply to the perception of the Lord." To this objection [made by a Naiyâyika or Vaiśeshika, the author] replies [that the remark is quite insignificant],

[1] *Kiṃ tu ântaram, antaḥkaraṇa-mâtreṇa*, Paṇḍit.

92. Because the existence of a Lord cannot be proved.

If there were a proof for the existence of a Lord, then your scruple in regard to his perception would be justified. But such [a proof] does not exist. If [the opponent declares: "The proof [for the Lord's existence] is [the conclusion] that the earth, for instance, must have a maker, because it is a product," [then we deny this and ask]: Is the [Lord whom you infer] corporeal or not [in your opinion]? Both ways he cannot be the maker. [And, besides, the argumentation] of the Vaiśeshikas by means of the notion 'product' is [only] a seeming one; [for the existence of a maker is not to be inferred from the existence of a product]. This has been explained in a very detailed manner somewhere else.[1]

[The author] states another reason [for his tenet that there is no Lord]:

93. He is not provable, because he cannot be either of the two: bound or liberated.

Is the [Lord whose existence you assume] bound or liberated? A bound [soul] cannot be the Lord, because of its association with merit and demerit; nor can a liberated [soul] be the maker, because no perception, no desire to act, and no exertion would be [possible in this case. And since every being is either bound or liberated], the existence of a Lord cannot be proved.

"Then," [the Vaiśeshika objects,] "he may be different [from both], *i. e.*, liberated in life-time (*jîvan-mukta*)." [To this we reply: If the Lord were] of such a kind, he would be unparalleled and the only specimen of a species, [in which case there is no basis whatever for argumentation].

[1] *Viz.* in the writings of the Pûrvamîmâṃsâ.

[The author] states the same [in the following aphorism]:

94. Both ways he could not be the maker of real things.

The explanation of this aphorism has [already] been given [in the preceding commentary].

"[If it were] thus, then such scriptural passages as 'For he is omniscient, the maker of all things' would be contradicted." With reference to this [objection the author] declares:

[The existence of] a Lord is inferred by our adversaries only from his being the maker of the creation. On account of [this] declaration the expression 'of real things,' [used] here [*viz.* in aph. 94], is to be understood as meaning 'of the creation.'

95. [They are] glorifications of the liberated Self or of him who has attained supernatural powers by his devotion.

'Of the liberated Self' means 'of him whose Self is, in a manner, liberated, because he is free from passions and the like,' but not 'of him who is liberated [in the highest sense],' since such [a soul] would be unable to resolve upon something, to act etc. The glorification of such [a person by Scripture] is for the purpose of supporting the ceremonial prescripts. 'Or of him who has attained supernatural powers by his devotion,' that is to say: The glorification of the Yogin who has attained supernatural powers, *i. e.*, who has acquired the faculty of assuming atomic smallness etc., by his devotion, is for the purpose of supporting [and encouraging] the [Yoga-]praxis.

"[But] non-intellectual [Matter] cannot be productive without the superintendence of an intellectual being." Even therefrom the existence of a Lord is not to be inferred, as the [author] says [in the following aphorism]:

Some passages in Scripture and tradition, having in view to state that the liberated Self, *i. e.*, the isolated Self, is what must be known, praise that [Self] as the Lord merely on account of its proximity [to Matter]; while other [passages] praise him who has attained supernatural powers by his devotion, *i. e.*, a non-eternal Lord, on account of his secondary eternity, etc., in behalf of [people's] attainment to supernatural powers through devotion directed to [such a Lord's] eternity, etc.

"Of what kind is the superintendence [of the soul]?" This [the author] declares:

96. The superintendence is [accepted] on account of the proximity thereto, as in the case of the crystal.

As, when a crystal in which a body reflects is moved, while the body does not move, there is the misconception that the body moves, just so, since the Self reflects in Matter, [*i. e.*, in the internal organ] 'on account of the proximity thereto,' the agency, experiencing and superintending of Matter is erroneously ascribed to the Self. Hence the mistake that the soul be the superintendent. And so [it is said in the Bhagavadgîtâ 3.27]:

> "The works are altogether done by the constituents of Matter; only he who is beguiled by the egotizing organ fancies: I am, [*i. e.*, my Self is] the agent."

"If the soul is not the superintendent, then there would be actions, as eating etc., [also] in the case of a dead body." To this [objection the author] replies:

97. The *empirical* souls [are the agents], in regard to individual actions, too.

The empirical soul comprises the judging organ etc., [*i. e.* the egotizing organ and the senses] and is connected with the [vital] air; but the empirical soul is not the [pure] Self. Only these empirical souls are the agents, in regard to

individual actions, as eating etc., too. For the [pure] Self is invariable.

"If there is no cognition in the Self, [there is none at all]; how can, [therefore,] an instruction [be given] for the sake of any cognition?" With reference to this [objection, made by a Naiyâyika,[1] the author] declares:

98. The instruction about the sense of the doctrines [is given], because [the internal organ] apprehends the right meaning.

The word 'the internal organ' is to be supplied from the following aphorism, or [to be actually joined with this one, so that] there is one aphorism ending with the words *vâkyârthopadeśo 'ntaḥkaraṇasya*. This way[2] [we get] the following sense: Since the internal organ [in the form of] the 'great one'—[and not the Self]—apprehends the right meaning, *i. e.*, the actual meaning, the instruction about the sense of the doctrines [is given by the teachers]. And from the fact that the soul reflects in this [internal organ] results the delusion that it be [the soul] which apprehends.

[The author] elucidates this:

99. The internal organ is the superintendent, because it is enlightened by that; as is the case with the iron.

The internal organ is the superintendent because the reflection of the soul falls upon the internal organ and, in consequence, [the latter] fancies to be intellectual on account of

[1] The Naiyâyikas hold that every cognition, perception etc., takes place in the Self, through the mediation of the atomic internal sense (*manas*). But according to the Sâṃkhyas, the Self is not cognitive, but objectless cognition or thinking. Every perception, sensation or individual cognition takes place in the internal organ mechanically and unconsciously, and is only brought to consciousness by the Self.

[2] *Tena*, i. e., *evam âvartanena* or *ekasûtratvena*, Paṇḍit.

its being enlightened by the intellectual essence of that [*viz.*, of the soul]. 'As is the case with the iron,' *i. e.*, as the magnetic iron, though inactive, attracts by its mere proximity.

[The author] gives now the definition of inference:

As the iron is made red-hot by a special connection with fire, just so the internal organ is enlightened by the soul through a special connection which is the cause of the reflection, and therefore becomes, in a manner, intellectual and distinct from [all] other non-intellectual things; as such it is the actual (*anupacharita*) superintendent through its volition etc. This is the sense.

As, however, the first creation [which proceeded from primitive Matter immediately] took place without a resolution, no actual (*mukhya*) superintendent was required for that, [but the impulse was given by the association of primitive Matter with Soul, so that this association may be regarded as a figurative (*upacharita*) superintendent]. Hence it is said in the Kûrmapurâṇa [in the last verse of the 4th Adhyâya]:

> "In this way the creation by primitive Matter has been briefly described by me; this one took place without a resolution. Learn now the creation of Brahman!"

Such [scriptural passages], however, as "That intended" (Chhândogya Upanishad 6. 2. 3) are somehow to be explained so that [primitive Matter] *was on the point* of [changing into] products, analogously to [the use of the desiderative stems], as for instance: 'The bank will fall down, [*i. e.*, is on the point of doing so].' That is the meaning.[1]

100. Inference is the knowledge of the connected on the part of him who knows the connection.

Inference is the knowledge of the invariable concomitant [*vyâpaka*, *i. e.*, according to the usual Nyâya-example 'of fire,' which knowledge] proceeds from the knowledge of the invariably concomitated [*vyâpya*, *i. e.*, 'of smoke'], on the

[1] *Cf.* Vijñânabhikshu's commentary on I. 96.

part of him who knows the inseparableness [of both]. In this [definition] are included: the positive [reason,[1] *anvayin*],[2] the excluding [reason, *vyatirekin*],[3] the [reason] which may be stated positively as well as negatively (*anvaya-vyatirekin*)[4], [besides, the inference] which is based on something previously known (*pûrvavat*), which is based on something excluded (*s'eshavat*), and which is inductive (*sâmânyato drishṭa*). Moreover, the definitions of [other] teachers are contained in that [given here]. And so [it is said]:

"What is connected with the thing to be inferred, and what is universally known as existing in that which is characterized by this [invariable concomitance, *vyâpti*], and what does not exist, when that does not exist, this is the characteristic sign (*linga*) leading to inference (*anumâpaka*)."

[The author] gives now the definition of testimony:

'Connection' means 'invariable concomitance'; 'connected' means 'what is possessed of this [invariable concomitance, *i. e.*, *vyâpya*]' as well as 'what determines the same, [*i. e.*, the *vyâpaka*].'[5]

101. Testimony is the instruction by one trustworthy.

[1] *Hetu* = *vyâpya*.

[2] F. i. *idam vâchyam, vastutvât* 'This may be named, because it is a real thing.' In this case *vastutva* is the *vyâpya*, and *vâchyatva* is the *vyâpaka*; the *vyâpti* would be: *yatra-yatra vastutvam, tatra-tatra vâchyatvam*.

[3] F. i. *prithivy anya-dravyebhyo bhinnâ, gandhavattvât* 'Earth is something distinct from all other things, because it is possessed of smell.' In this case *gandhavattva* is the *vyâpya*, by which earth is separated from everything that is not earth; *anya-dravyebhyo bheda* is the *vyâpaka*.

[4] F. i. *dhûmo vahni-jñânasya hetuḥ* 'Smoke is the reason why an invisible fire is known to exist.' This may be expressed positively as well as negatively: *yatra-yatra dhûmaḥ, tatra-tatra vahniḥ* and *yatra-yatra vahnyabhâvah, tatra-tatra dhûmâbhâvaḥ*.

[5] *Yasya vyâptiḥ, sa vyâpti-nirûpakaḥ*, (*i. e.*, *vyâpakaḥ*); *yasmin vyâptir vartate, tad vyâpyam*, Paṇḍit. Mahâdeva declares both to be *pratibaddha*, while Aniruddha regards only the *vyâpaka* as such.

Testimony is the instruction by one trustworthy, but it is not [necessarily] something *made* by a trustworthy [person], because the Veda is not the work of a person. And this fact we shall state in aphorism [46] of the fifth book: "They are not the work of a person..". *S'abda* ('testimony') is used [here] in the sense of the cause [of knowledge, that is to say: it denotes the last of the three means thereof], but *s'abda* is [also employed in the sense of] the fruit, *i. e.*, [of] the knowledge produced by *s'abda*,[1] since the effect may be figuratively denoted by [the word which expresses] the cause.

The tenets of the Buddhists, etc., [*i. e.*, of the Jainas and Chârvâkas] are not true, because they contradict the Veda, and, therefore, they are [only] seeming [testimony].

"Your doctrine has been laid down for the sake of discriminating between primitive Matter and Soul; but there is no means by which the existence of these two may be established." To this [objection raised by a Chârvâka, the author] replies:

102. Both are established by a means of knowledge; [hence] there is the instruction about them.

Primitive Matter and Soul are established, *i. e.*, [their existence is] known by a means of knowledge to be described [presently]; hence the instruction for the sake of discriminating between them is justified.

"Of what kind is this means of knowledge?" With regard to this [question the author] says:

103. Both are established by induction.

Since primitive Matter is invisible, [we must infer as follows:]

[1] In which case, however, it is better to say *śâbdam* (*jñânam*).

1. What is a product, is possessed of the qualities of the cause, [*i. e.*, the peculiarity of the product is conditionate by the qualities of the cause];[1]

2. and the product [in question, *viz.*, the whole empirical world] has the nature of the three constituents.

3. Hence follows, by means of an inductive inference,[2] the existence of primitive Matter [being the totality of the constituents].

Since the Self is likewise invisible, its existence is [to be] established [by the following inductive inference]:

1. What[ever] is combined, is for the sake of some other;

2. hence there must be something uncombined which is the 'other' [with regard to the whole material world that consists of combinations; and this is the Self].

Thus [the author] will declare [himself in I. 140:] "Because the combined is for the sake of some other."

"[But,] as Matter is eternal and active by nature [in the service of Soul], there should be always some experience, and, therefore, no liberation." To this [objection the author] replies:

104. Experience ends with thought.

'Thought' means the Self. Experience ends with the discrimination of that [from Matter]. As prior non-existence, though beginningless, perishes [when the thing previously non-existent comes into existence], so the creativeness of eternal Matter ceases with [the attainment to] discriminative knowledge. Here [somebody objects:] "This holds good [only] in the case of non-existence, but not with regard to something existent." [To this we reply:] No! Non-existence is not a necessary condition for the [cessation

[1] *Cf.* Vijñânabhikshu's commentary on I. 62: *kâraṇa-guṇa-krameṇa kârya-guṇotpatteḥ.*

[2] *Sâmânyena = sâmânyato dṛishṭenâ 'numânena.*

of something eternal], because we know that posterior non-existence does not [cease]. But if [you say:] "This will be regulated by [facts] as seen," [we answer:] This *is* so in our case, too.

"If Matter is active and Soul experiencing, then it would be the case that the *one* experiences [the results] of the work done by the *other*." To this [objection the author] replies:

105. Even another than the agent may enjoy the result, as in the case of food.

As the cook prepares the food etc., and [another] who has not prepared it, *viz.*, the master, enjoys the result, so it is also in our case. "But the master may be [regarded as] the maker, because [the action] is done *for him*, [just as the king is regarded as conqueror, while the soldiers fight for him." To this we reply: Quite right!] Also in the case in question the creativeness of Matter is intended for the Self.

Having propounded this customary doctrine, [the author] states now his own:

106. Or, since this follows from non-discrimination, there is the [wrong] notion that the fruit belongs to [the soul which is erroneously regarded as] the agent.

The soul is neither agent nor experiencer; but the delusion that [the soul] be the agent results from the fact that [the real agent, *viz.*,] the 'great principle' is reflected in it. 'Or, ... from non-discrimination' means 'from the incapacity of discriminating between Matter and Soul.' 'Since this follows' means 'since the delusion that the enjoyment of the fruit belongs to [the soul which is misconceived as] the agent follows [therefrom].'

[The author] states now the opposite of this [misconception]:

Or [the aphorism may be explained in the following manner[1]]: From non-discrimination follows [the delusion] that Soul be the agent; therefrom results the [wrong] notion that the fruit belongs to Soul as to the agent, in accordance with [the maxim] 'the experiencer is the same as the agent.'

107. Nor [do] both, when the truth is seen.

When the truth is known by discrimination, both [do] not [belong to Soul], neither agency nor experiencing.

Having described the *means* of knowledge, [the author] states now the rule regarding the *objects* of knowledge:

108. [A thing may be] an object or not an object, according as the senses fail on account of excessive distance, etc., or apply [to the thing].

[A thing] is an object, when the senses apply to it, *i. e.*, are in connection with it, [but it is] not an object, when the senses fail, *i. e.*, are not in connection with it. This want of connection results from the inadequacy [of the senses] on account of excessive distance, etc.[2] In consequence of excessive distance, a bird [flying] in the sky is not perceived; in consequence of great proximity, the collyrium applied to the eye-[lashes is not]; in consequence of interposition of objects, a thing located on the other side of a wall [is not]; in consequence of inattention, a person affected by grief, etc., does not perceive a thing placed at his side; in consequence of its subtilty, a minute particle [is not perceived]; in consequence of being overpowered, [*f. i.*] by the sound of a drum, the sound of a conch [is not], etc.

1 Differently from Vijñânabhikshu's explanation previously copied by Mahâdeva. The following interpretation has been obviously borrowed from Aniruddha's commentary.

2 *Cf.* Sâṃkhyakârikâ 7.

"For what reason is primitive Matter imperceptible?" To this [the author] replies:

'Applying' means connection; 'failing' means want of it.

109. On account of subtilty it is imperceptible.

'Subtilty' means the being difficult to conceive, but not the being of atomic extension; because primitive Matter is omnipresent.

"How, then, is [the existence of] primitive Matter ascertained?" To this [objection, made by a Vaiśeshika, the author] replies:

110. Because it is apprehended by the beholding of [its] products.

As [the Vaiśeshikas] gather [the existence of] the atoms from the beholding of jars [and the like], so we apprehend primitive matter by the beholding of the products which have the nature of the three constituents.

Some [the Vedantists] teach that Brahman is the cause of the world; others [the Vaiśeshikas and Naiyâyikas], that the atoms are its cause; [and our] ancient teachers say that primitive Matter is its cause. With reference to this [diversity of opinions the author] brings forward a doubt:

Because [the existence of] it is proved by the beholding of [its] products, *viz.*, of the 'great one' and of the other [material principles].

"But some teach that Brahman is the cause of the world; others, that the atoms are; how, then, can primitive Matter be proved [to be the cause]?" This doubt [the author] ponders [in the following aphorism]:

111. If [somebody objects:] "It is not established, because of the contradiction of [other teachers,]"—

'It is not established' means: [the existence of] primitive Matter is not established.

[The author] states his doctrine:

'It,' *i. e.*, primitive Matter.

[The author] who is of the opinion that there is no fault whatever in inferring the cause from the product, confutes [this objection]:

112. Still, the establishing of the other by the beholding of the one is not to be denied.

If my opinion were disproved simply by the contradiction of the opponents, there is [my] contradiction against the opinion of the adversaries, too; how could, therefore, *that* be established? If an opinion is proved by the inseparableness of the cognition of the invariable concomitant from the cognition of the invariably concomitated, then this holds good with my [tenet], too; hence my inference from the products [in aphorism 110] is not to be denied.

"Granted that the cause is [to be inferred] from the products; [but] how [can you prove] that this [cause] is primitive Matter?" To this [the author] replies:

[The author] states now the reason for primitive Matter's being [this] cause:

113. Because [else] there would be an incompatibility with the threefold.

'The threefold' means the constituents, *i. e.*, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. [If there were any other first cause than primitive Matter which we declare to be the aggregate of these then] there would be an incompatibility with these, *i. e.*, the world should be void of [the nature of] these [three constituents]; and it is seen not to be so.

"Does the product arise as something which [always] existed, or [is it brought forth] as something which did not exist [previously]?" This doubt [the author] removes:

There would be an incompatibility with the joyful, painful and apathetic nature which is observed in the world, if Brahman [or] the atoms were its cause.

[The author] states now that the products are already existent, before they arise:

114. Something unreal, as a man's horn, does not arise.

[With reference to this a follower of the Vaiśeshika and Nyâya systems sets forth an objection:] "A man's horn and the like is absolutely unreal,[1] ether and the like [*i. e.* Space, Time and the Self] is absolutely real, jars and the like are real as well as unreal; how, therefore, can you bring [such things] on the same level with a man's horn?" [To this we reply:] This is not [right; for] jars and the like are unreal [in your opinion] at the time of their prior non-existence, a man's horn and the like is always unreal; what difference, therefore, can there be between the two [according to your theory]? If [you say:] "The difference is the fact that the production of jars etc. is seen," [then we reply:] This very [question, how it is that jars arise and a man's horn does not] is what we are deliberating, and [you give us] this very [question] as answer! How clever!

[The author] states the reason, why products are existent [at any time]:

115. Because there must be some material cause [for every product].

[That is to say:] Because there is a connection of the product with the cause. And a connection is only [possible] between two existing things, [but not between two things of which one exists, while the other does not; hence the product must be somehow existent before the manifesta-

[1] *Asad-eka-svabhâva = yasyaikaḥ svabhâvo 'sann asti, = asan-mâtra-svabhâva,* Paṇḍit.

tion;] else, [every] product might arise always and everywhere.

[The author] says the same [in the following aphorism]:

116. Because everything is not produced everywhere and always.

[This is] clear.

"But, though there is no distinction in the character of the material cause [*i. e.* though all material causes are alike as far as they give rise to some product non-existent before the time of production], still the [cause] produces only that which it is competent [to produce]; for the thread is not the cause of the jar. Why, [therefore, do you say that, according to our opinion,] everything might be produced?" To this [objection, made by the Vaiśeshika, the author] replies:

'Because everything is not produced'; supply: for we see in daily life that everything does not arise.

117. Because [only] the competent produces the possible.

[Your remark that the cause produces only that which it is competent to produce, is quite right. But let me ask, with reference to this fact:] Does the competence of the 'competent' [cause] stand in relation to the 'possible' [product which arises from it], or not? If you admit the former, you must ascribe existence to the 'possible' [product before its production]; if you accept the latter, [the possibility of] the arising of a jar from the thread remains unaltered.

[The author] states another reason [for his theory]:

118. And because [the product] is the cause.

Because the product and the cause are the same. Though [the causal thing][1] changes into the form of the jar, it does

1 Supply *padârthaḥ*.

not abandon its nature of being clay. And two things of which one is real [*i. e.* the cause] and the other [according to the opponent's opinion] unreal [*i. e.* the product] cannot be the same.

[Objection:] "If both are the same, one might fetch water by means of a lump of clay also." [Reply:] It would be so, if an *absolute* identity existed [between cause and product]; but there is no fault whatever in the theory that diversity as well as identity exists [between them].

And so it is said:

> "If [the products] were unreal [before their production], their connection with the causes, which possess reality, would not be [possible]. And for him who accepts that [the product] arises unconnected [with the cause], there is no rule [that a special product must come from a special cause]."[1]
>
> "Reality does not fall to the non-existent, nor does un-reality to the existent; this state of these both is known to those who see the truth." (Bhagavadgîtâ 2. 16.)

[The opponent] makes a [fresh] objection:

Because the product has the nature of the cause; this is the sense. The cause and the product being identical, it is quite impossible that the cause be existent, but the product non-existent [at any time]. The proofs for the identity of the product with the cause have been taught in the Tattvakaumudî [to Kârikâ 9].

119. "If it were the connection of a reality with a reality, you could not speak [as you use to do]."

"If production were the connection of a reality, *i. e.* of an already existing product, with [another] reality, *i. e.* with the cause,[2] then such expressions as 'the jar will be, arises, has been destroyed' would be out of place."

1 This verse is also quoted, as an utterance of the Sâṃkhyavṛiddhas, in the Sâṃkhyatattvakaumudî to Kârikâ 9, with the *varia lectio—asattve nâsti.*

2 Nyâya works often exhibit the locative, instead of the instrumental case, in constructions of this kind.

[With reference to this objection, the author] states his doctrine:

If [the opponent maintains], that [the word] 'production' could not be employed, in case the reality of the product were quite the same even before the 'production,' as we use to speak only of the production of something non-existent [until then,—the author] disposes of [this view in the following aphorism]:

120. No, the employment and non-employment of such expressions depend on the manifestation.

As the whiteness of a white cloth [which has become] dirty is manifested by the washing or [by the application of drugs], so the jar is manifested by the operation of the potter, and is hidden by a stroke with the hammer. Likewise, we observe that the oil is manifested at the sesamum-seeds by pressure, the milk at the cow by milking, the grains at the corn-stalks by threshing, etc. Therefore, the differences in the employment of words as well as in the practical use depend on the manifestation.[1]

"[Granted that] production depends on manifestation; [but] whereon does destruction depend?" To this [the author] replies:

121. Destruction is dissolution into the cause.

By a stroke with the hammer the dissolution of a jar into its cause [viz. into its constituent parts, is effected]; thereon depends its destruction, and thereby the differences [in the employment] of words and in the practical use [may be occasioned as well as by the manifestation].

[Objection:] "If [destruction were only] dissolution [into the cause], a resurrection might be seen, and this is

[1] For instance: if the jar is not manifested, we speak of clay; but if it is manifested, we call it a jar (*śabda-prayoga-bhedau*); we cannot fetch water with it in the former case, but in the latter (*artha-kriyâ-bhedau*).

[really] not seen." [Reply:] It is not seen by the fools, [but] it is seen by the intelligent. For example, when thread is destroyed, it changes into the form of earth, the earth changes into the form of a cotton tree, and this changes into the form of flower, fruit and thread. So it is with all things.

"[Now,] is [your] manifestation real or unreal? If it were real [*i. e.*, always existent according to your theory], then the products ought *constantly* to be perceived; if it were unreal, [your doctrine of] the [eternal reality of the products would be set aside. [And if you try to maintain your theory by saying that] there is another manifestation of this one, and, again, another of that one, then we have a *regressus in infinitum*." To this [fresh objection of the Vaiśeshika the author] replies:

122. Because they follow one another continually, as seed and sprout.

May there be a thousand manifestations, still there is no fault, because [the manifestations] have no beginning, as [the continuous succession of] seed and sprout [is without a beginning].

[The author] states another argument:

123. Or, there is as little fault [in our theory of manifestation] as in [your theory of] production.

Is [your] production produced, or not? If it is produced, we have a *regressus in infinitum* [as well], because there must be also a production of this one [and so on]. If it is not produced, [then let us ask:] Is this the case because of its unreality, or because of its eternity? If because of its unreality, there is never any production at all; hence it could never be perceived. If, on the other hand, [you declare that production is not produced] because of its

eternity, there would be always the production of [all] products.

[Objection:] "But as production itself *is* production, to what purpose do you invent another production?" [Reply:] Then it is the same with us: as manifestation, too, *is* manifestation, to what purpose do you invent another manifestation? Your doctrine on this point [*i. e.* on production] is also ours [with regard to manifestation].

[The author] states [now] the properties which the products of primitive Matter have in common with each other:

124. [They are] caused, inconstant, moving, multitudinous, dependent, mergent.

'Caused' means: having a cause, 'inconstant:' perishable, 'moving': leaving a body assumed [formerly. But this is the sense of 'moving' only as far as the internal organs and the senses are concerned; for it is known to everybody how] earth, bodies, etc. [*i. e.* the other elements besides earth] move. 'Multitudinous' [are the products of primitive Matter] on account of the distinction of souls; [for each soul requires a separate internal organ, separate senses and a separate body]. 'Dependent,' *i. e.* on its cause; 'mergent,' *i. e.*, dissolving into its cause.

"If there are [only] twenty-five principles, [as you Sâṃkhyas teach,] do [our qualities] cognition, pleasure etc., or [our categories] generality and actions not exist? If you say so, you abandon what is taught by experience." To this [objection of the Vaiśeshika the author] replies:

'The discrete [principles]' is to be supplied in this [aphorism], as the subject of which the being caused and the other [qualities] are predicated.

125. Either because the qualities, generality and the other [categories of the Vais'eshikas] are directly identical [with our principles], they are established in them, or, because they are implied in the term 'primitive Matter.'

The qualities, generality and the other [categories of the Vaiśeshikas] are directly, *i. e.*, in their very nature, identical with [our] twenty-four [material] principles, because the definitions of these apply [also to them]. 'They are established in them,' *i. e.*, they are established, because they are contained in them.[1]

The word 'or' intimates another possible explanation. 'Or, because they are implied in the term primitive Matter,' *i. e.*, the qualities and the other [categories of the Vaiśeshikas] are established [by us], because the qualities etc. are mediately products of primitive Matter, and as such are implied in the term primitive Matter, since product and cause are identical. But it is not on account of non-existence that [the categories of the Vaiśeshikas] are not [expressly] mentioned [by us].

[The author] states [now] the properties which are common to primitive Matter and to its products:

The word 'or' means 'and' [in this aphorism].

126. Both consist of the three constituents, are non-intellectual etc.

What consists of the three constituents, is non-intellectual [as such]. By the word 'etc.' is meant that [both] are for the sake of another. 'Both,' *i. e.*, the products and the cause.

1 To explain this in detail: the *dravyâṇi* of the Vaiśeshikas (with the exception of *âtman* and *manas*) are contained in the *sthûla-bhûtâni*; the *guṇâs* and *karmâṇi* are *dravyâṇâm svarûpam*; the *sâmânyam* is *dravya-guṇa-karmaṇâm svarûpam*; the *viśeshaḥ* is contained in *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*; the *samavâyaḥ* is not acknowledged (V. 99).

[The author] says [now] by what properties the three constituents which form the parts of primitive Matter differ from each other:

127. The constituents differ from each other by pleasure, displeasure, dejectedness, etc.

'Pleasure' is joy. By the word 'etc.' is meant [in the first case], that Sattva has [besides pleasure] the properties of lightness and illumination.—'Displeasure' is pain. By the word 'etc.' is meant [in the second case], that Rajas is [not only painful, but also] inciting and unsteady.—'Dejectedness' is apathy. By the word 'etc.' is meant [in the third case], that Tamas [which causes dejectedness] is heavy and covering [besides].

Telling the differences of these [constituents, the author] states their common properties, [too], at this opportunity:

128. Through the properties of lightness etc. the constituents agree with, and differ from each other.

Through lightness, unsteadiness and heaviness: hereby the differences are taught. By the word 'etc.,' [however, not only the notions unsteadiness and heaviness, but also] the common properties [of the constituents] are intimated [in our aphorism]; and these are the being for the sake of the souls, and the having the habit of overpowering each other, of modifying each other, and of consorting with each other.[1]

In [aphorism 124] which begins '[They are] caused,' it is taught that the 'great one' and the following [principles] are products. [Now the author] gives the proof thereof:

......In this manner he [*i. e.*, Vijñânabhikshu] has explained [our aphorism]; but another [commentator, *i. e.*, Aniruddha] says:

[1] Cf. Sâṃkhyatattvakaumudî to Kârikâ 12.

[The constituents] differ by the properties of lightness etc., but they agree in having the habit of overpowering each other, of modifying each other, and of consorting with each other.

[The author] gives [now] the proof [of the tenet] that the 'great one' and the following [principles] are products:

129. Since they are different from both, the 'great one' and the following principles are products, as jars and the like.

Since they are different from the two eternal [things], primitive Matter and Soul. The rest is clear.

[The author] states another reason:

130. Because of [their] measure.

Because they are limited, [while primitive Matter and Soul are all-pervading].

[The author] gives a further argument:

131. Because of their coherency.

Because they are perfectly connected with primitive Matter, *i. e.*, because the qualities of primitive Matter are seen in all things.

[The author] states the same [in other words]:

132. And, finally, because of the power.

Since a product operates [only] through the power of the cause, the 'great one' and the following [principles] give rise to their products [only] when primitive Matter fills [them with the power of doing so], as they are weak [by themselves]. Otherwise, they would *always* produce their products, because it is their nature to operate.

[The author] argues [now] from the negative side:

133. If they were not such, they would be primitive Matter or Soul.

There is the alternative: either product or non-product. If the 'great one' and the following [principles] were not products, they would belong to primitive Matter or Soul [which are the only two non-products].

"[But] the 'great one' and the following [principles] may not fall under the [said] alternative." To this [objection the author] replies:

134. If they were distinct from these two, they would be void.

If the 'great one' and the following [principles] were distinct 'from these two,' *i. e.*, from the products as well as from the non-products, they would have the nature of the void, *i. e.*, of a non-entity.

"Why shall it be on account of their being products that the 'great one' and the following [principles] are a characteristic sign [of the existence] of primitive Matter? They may be such a sign merely because of their inseparability [from it]." To this [the author] replies:

135. The cause is inferred from the product because of the association with it.

It is so [as you say, in such cases] where the nature of the cause is not seen in the [product or] effect, as, for instance, when we infer the swelling of the sea from the rising of the moon. But, in our case, the cause is inferred from the product, because we see the nature of primitive Matter[1] in the 'great one' and in the following [principles]. 'Because of the association with it' means [what we have just stated as the basis of the inference]: because we see the nature of

1 *I. e.* the variability, the being for the sake of the soul, the properties of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, etc.

primitive Matter in the 'great one' and in the following [principles].

"Under these circumstances, the 'great' principle [itself] may simply be the cause of the world. Wherefore [do you assume] primitive Matter?" To this [the author] replies:

A cause is inferred only from the being characterized by the products [or effects], but not from the being quite unconcerned [in them], as is held by our opponents, too. This is the meaning.

136. The undeveloped [is inferred] from the mergent which has the nature of the three constituents.

Primitive Matter is to be inferred from the mergent—so called, because it dissolves—, *i. e.*, from the 'great' principle which has the nature of the three constituents. And that the 'great' principle, *i. e.*, [the organ of] determination, is discrete and perishable, we know by perception. From this we infer [a cause] into which it dissolves.

"Still, some other thing may be this cause; wherefore shall it be primitive Matter?" With reference to this [the author] declares:

137. Since its existence follows from its products, it cannot be denied.

Is the cause of this [universe] a product or not a product? If [you say:] a product, then the cause of it would also be the same, and so we have a *regressus in infinitum*. [But] if [you say: it is] the primordial product, then [we call this 'cause,' but not 'product,' and] this very thing is our [primitive Matter].—Since the existence of primitive Matter follows from its products, *i. e.*, from the products of primitive Matter, it cannot be denied.

"Granted the existence of primitive Matter, but the existence of Soul cannot be established; for it has no product, [while primitive Matter has]." To this [objection the author] replies:

138. Since there is no dispute about the notion as such, just as [the existence of] merit [is not doubted by any one, the relation aforesaid] is not the proof of it.

There is, to be sure, no dispute about there being a Self as such; for the dispute is [only] about its peculiarities, whether it be multitudinous or one,[1] omnipresent or not omnipresent,[2] etc. Just as [the existence of] merit is not disputed in any system whatever; the opinions disagree [only] as to the peculiarities of merit.—'[The relation aforesaid] is not the proof of it [*i. e.* of the Self's existence]' means: the relation of cause and product is not the proof in our case. [The author] intends to say [hereby]: I shall allege another proof.

"The Selfs are simply the bodies, senses and [internal organs]; what is the use of inventing something else?" To this [objection the author] replies:

Nobody disputes the experiencer, *i. e.*, the thing which forms the subject. Therefore proofs are required only for the sake of establishing the distinction of Soul from the body etc., the eternity and the other [peculiarities of Soul; but no proof is necessary] for the sake of establishing its mere existence, because this is considered as settled by all teachers, [even] by infidels.

139. Soul is distinct from the body, etc.

[This is] clear.

[The author] states the reason thereof:

1 The latter is only accepted by the Advaitavâdins, while the former is held by the followers of the Sâṃkhya, Yoga, Mîmâṃsâ, Nyâya and Vaiśeshika systems as well as by those Vedantists who are not Advaitavâdins.

2 The omnipresence of Soul is maintained in the Sâṃkhya, Yoga, Mîmâṃsâ, Nyâya and Vaiśeshika systems, and by the Advaitavâdins; it is denied by the other Vedantists, by the Jainas and some heretics besides.

140. Because the combined is for the sake of some other.

That which is combined is for the sake of some other thing which is not combined; if it were [again] for the sake of some other combined thing, we would have a *regressus in infinitum*. And combination is, by means of the mutual mixture of the constituents, the cause [of the existence] of the products. Or combination is, [in the secular mode of speaking,] the hardening of fluids.—This [combination], now, exists [already] latently in primitive Matter and [in the internal organs and in the senses], because else we could not observe combination in their [gross material] products.

[The author] explains the same:

141. Because there is the reverse of the three constituents, etc.

Because there is the reverse of the three constituents, etc. in Soul, *i. e.*, because [the nature of] these is not observed [in it]. By the word 'etc.' [is meant]: because the other properties of Matter, too, are not observed [in it].

[The author] mentions another reason:

By the word 'etc.' the non-intellectual nature and the other [qualities of Matter] are intended.

142. And because of the superintendence.

For the superintendent is [necessarily] intellectual, and Matter is non-intellectual. This is the sense.

[The author] gives a further argument:

And because [Soul] is the superintendent; this is the sense. Being the superintendent means being the cause of a change by means of a special connection; and a connection takes place only between two different things, [whence follows the difference between Soul and Matter]. This is the meaning.

143. Because it is the experiencer.

That which is experienced is Matter, the experiencer is Soul. Although the Self is not the experiencer [in reality] on account of its invariableness, still this is said, because the reflection of the internal organ falls on it.

"Efforts are made for the sake of liberation. Is this done for [the liberation of] the Self or [of] Matter?" To this [question the author] replies:

144. Because the efforts are for the sake of isolation.

Since the three constituents are the essential nature of Matter, this essential nature cannot depart [from it], and [besides, this is out of the question], because [Matter] would be uneternal. [Liberation of Matter from the three constituents is, therefore, impossible.] Isolation of that [alone] can take place, with regard to which the constituents have the character of Upâdhis; and this is the Self.

"What is the nature of this?" To this [question the author] replies:

145. Light [*i. e.*, intellect], because the non-intellectual and light do not belong together.

It is well known that the non-intellectual is not light. If the Self, too, were non-intellectual, another light ought to exist for it, also; and, for the sake of simplicity, let the Self have the nature of light, [*i. e.*, let the Self be nothing but light]. And Scripture [teaches the same, Bṛihadâraṇyaka Upanishad 2. 4. 14]: "By what means shall he know him by whom he knows all this? By what means, forsooth, shall he know the knower?"

"Let the Self be non-intellectual, too, [in its essence] and have intellect as an *attribute;* by means of this [attribute] it manifests the world, but it has not intellect as its essential nature." To this [objection, raised by a Vaiśeshika or a Naiyâyika, the author] replies:

146. Since it is void of qualities, it has not intellect as an attribute.

If the Self were connected with attributes, it would be changeable, and hence no liberation would be [possible].

[The author] declares now that Scripture contradicts this [opinion of the opponent]:

[Soul] has not intellect, *i. e.*, light, as an attribute, but *is* light. Why? 'since it is void of qualities,' *i. e.*, because it does not possess any qualities. The wishes, however, and other [attributes] which we observe, belong to the internal organ alone. This is the meaning.

147. What is established by Scripture is not to be denied. [This must be said], because [Scripture] would be confuted by such perceptions.[1]

Scripture teaches: "For nothing adheres to this soul" (Bṛihadâraṇyaka Upanishad 4. 3. 16), etc. Such [passages] would be confuted, if [the soul] were connected with qualities.

[The author] mentions another argument against [the opponent's view]:

Supply: the freedom [of the soul] from qualities, etc. [*i. e.*, its unchangeableness and intellectual nature] are [therefore] well-founded.

148. It would not be witness at [the time of] profound sleep, etc.

If the Self were non-intellectual, it would not be witness,

[1] As those of the Vaiśeshikas and Naiyâyikas are who erroneously see qualities in the soul.

i. e., knower, at [the time of] profound sleep, etc. And this is not the case [*i. e.*, the Self *is* witness then], because [the feeling] 'I slept well' manifests itself. By the word 'etc.' the sleep during which dreams appear is meant.

The Vedantists hold that there is only one Self. And thus [it is said]:

> "For the Self is eternal, omnipresent, unchangeable and blameless; though being one, it is made multitudinous by the power, by Mâyâ, [but] not essentially."[1]

With reference to this [the author] declares:

Some say that [only] one Self is [to be accepted] for the sake of simplicity. [The author] refutes this opinion:

149. The plurality of souls follows from the diversity of birth, etc.

If there were [only] one Self, then *all* ought to be born, when *one* is born.

[The author] ponders the view of the [Vedantistic] opponent:

Birth is the association [of the Self] with an aggregate, consisting of a new body, [new] senses and [a new internal organ]; death is the separation from this [aggregate]. Because of the diversity, stated in Scripture, of birth and death, of joy and pain, of bondage and liberation, there are many souls. The diversity of birth [is mentioned in the following scriptural passage: "One is born in a] good [existence] in consequence of good [deeds, in a] bad [existence] in consequenee of bad [deeds," cf. Bṛihadâraṇyaka Upanishad 4. 4. 5; 5. 2. 13], the diversity of bondage and liberation [in the following]:

> "Those who know this become immortal; but the others suffer pain." (Bṛihadâraṇyaka Up. 4. 4. 14; S'vetâśvatara Up. 3. 10).

[1] This verse occurs in the Liṅgapurâṇa, as is seen from the introduction of S'aṅkara's commentary to the S'vetâśvatara Upanishad.

150. "[The Self], though one, becomes many, as there is a difference of Upâdhis, just as Space [is diversified] by jars and the like."

"As there is [really only] one Space, [and, nevertheless,] on account of the difference of the Upâdhis, as jars and the like, when a jar has perished, people use to say: 'The jar's space has perished,'—just so, also on the theory of there being [only] one Self, because of the difference of corporeal determination, when this [corporeal determination] has perished, it is nothing but a familiar saying 'The Self has perished.' Otherwise, [*i. e.*, if birth and death were not dependent on the Upâdhis,] how could there be, even on the theory of there being many Selfs, a diversity of birth and death, since the Self is [considered as] eternal [by the adherents to this theory also]?"

[The author] gives his decision:

"Then let [the Self], if characterized by an Upâdhi, be something distinct." With reference to this [remark of the Vedantist the author] declares:[1]

151. [According to your opinion] the Upâdhi is different, but not its owner [*i. e.*, the Self].

[You say that only] the Upâdhi is different; but the familiar idea of the perishing of the one [*i. e.*, of the Self] cannot be [dependent, as you maintain,] on the perishing of the other [*i. e.*, of the body, simply, if there were not a diversity of Selfs], because an illegitimate extension [of the notion 'perishing' would be the inevitable consequence]. And in the theory of there being [only] one Self, some attributes which are contradictory to each other are evidently ascribed [to this]; for one and the same cannot be bound

[1] Cf. Vijñânabhikshu's commentary.

and liberated [at the same time]. But [in the illustration, used by the Vedantists, the matter is quite different; for] the [simultaneous] connection and non-connection of Space with smoke or [jars] are not contradictory, because this connection does not exist everywhere.

"What shall be [proved] hereby?" To this [the author] replies:

If the characterized [Self] were distinct [from the pure Self], this would perish through the perishing[1] of the characterizing [body]. This is the meaning.

152. Thus contradictory attributes are not ascribed to [a Self] omnipresent as one.

[In our system] contradictory attributes are not ascribed [to the Self, as is done in the Vedânta system].

"[But] it is known that even the attribute of one is ascribed to another, as, for instance, the agency of Matter is to another, *viz.*, to Soul." With regard to this [remark the author] declares:

The imputation of joy and pain, *i. e.* the entering of these [two opposites], which is contradictory, if referred to a [soul] everywhere present as one, is not so, if it is thus [as we teach], *i. e.*, if there is a plurality of souls.[2] This is the sense.

"But [speaking of joy and pain as entering into Soul], do you not confound [Soul with the material products], since the Self is without attributes, and joy and the like are attributes of the internal organ etc.?" To this [the author] replies:

153. Though the attribute of another be [ascrib-

1 Read °*nâśena* as one word in my edition, and cf. Vijñânabhikshu's commentary.

2 That is to say: joy and pain may be simultaneously felt by different persons, but not by one.

ed to Soul], its real existence [in Soul] does not follow from the imputation, because [Soul] is single [*i. e.*, unconnected].

The agency of Soul is a mistake; for, in this case the non-agency of Soul is true, and the imputation is untrue. And a connection of the true and the untrue [*i. e.*, here: the connection of the untrue agency with the true Soul] does not exist in reality. Birth, death etc. cannot belong to the Self, because nothing adheres to it.

"But thus [*i. e.*, on your doctrine of the plurality of souls] there would be a contradiction to Scripture. For it is said "Brahman is one only without a second" (cf. Chhândogya Up. 6. 2. 1), "Nothing is different here; from death to death he goes who sees something different here" (cf. Kaṭha Up. 4. 11)." To this [objection of the Vedantist the author] replies:

(According to Mahâdeva's explanation, aphorism 153 must be translated: *Though they are attributes of another, this [diversity] cannot be accounted for by an imputation, because [the Self] is one [only, in the Vedantists' opinion.]*)

Though joy and the like are attributes of the internal organ, the diversity [of one person's feeling joy and of the other's feeling pain] cannot [be declared on the theory of the Vedantists] by an imputation on Soul, since the recipient of the imputation is [only] one [according to them]. For, where there is [only] one crystal, a diversity of imputed [colours,] blue, yellow etc., is impossible, [so that we may not say:] 'This [crystal) is blue, [and] that is yellow.' In the case of jars' spaces, however, and of other [limited spaces] which are distinct [from each other] through the difference of the Upâdhis, a diversity of attributes, conditioned by the Upâdhis, is possible; [and, therefore, the Vedantists ought not to employ this illustration].[1] This is the meaning.

154. There is no contradiction to Scripture which

1 Cf. Aniruddha's commentary on I. 151.

teaches non-duality, because it means the genus [or sameness of all souls].

[This is] clear.

"But then, are not bondage and liberation contradictory in one and the same Self for him also who accepts many Selfs?" With regard to this [question the author] declares:

155. That state falls to him who knows the cause of bondage, on account of his understanding.

To whom the 'cause of bondage,' *i. e.*, the non-perception of the distinction between Matter and Soul, is known, to him falls 'that state,' *i. e.*, the state of isolation, 'on account of his understanding,' *i. e.*, on account of his cognition of the [said] distinction.

"Bondage [as stated by you] is not real, because it depends on the non-perception of a distinction. The reason [thereof] is that non-perception ceases in consequence of perception. And thus we see the truth in the theory of there being [only] one Self, not in that of there being many." With reference to this [remark of the Vedantist the author] says:

156. From the fact that the blind do not see does not follow non-perception on the part of those who have their eye-sight.

Because the blind does not see, shall also he who has his eye-sight not perceive? The sense is: there are many arguments in favour of the asserters of the plurality of Selfs.

[The author] declares that there are many Selfs for the following [reason] also:

157. Vâmadeva and others have been liberated; [hence] non-duality is not.

We learn from the Purâṇas and other [texts] that Vâmadeva has been liberated, that S'uka has been liberated, etc. If there were [only] one Self, all would be liberated on the liberation of one, and thus [such] scriptural passages about the diversity [of liberations] would be confuted.

"On the theory of the plurality of Selfs, since some are sometimes liberated in the beginningless flow of mundane existence, all might be gradually liberated, and then there would be a total void; but on the theory of there being [only] one Self, liberation is simply the departure of an Upâdhi." To this [objection of the Vedantist the author] replies:

158. Since [this] has not happened in the beginningless [world] until now, the future will also be thus.

Since [such] a void has not been seen in the beginningless flow of mundane existence until now, there is no proof in favour of the opinion that there will be a [universal] liberation [in future times.]

[The author] mentions another justification:

159. As [it is not] at present, there will be no absolute cessation at any time.

Because of the endless number of Selfs there might well be a gradual liberation [of them], and, yet, there would not be a cessation of mundane existence. As at present, there will be liberation 'at any time,' *i. e.*, in future times also, but, therefore, no absolute cessation, because the flow [of mundane existence] is eternal. On [your] theory, too, that liberation is the departure of an Upâdhi,[1] the question whether a total void might come, is the same. [For] as the cessation of all things would take place, if many Selfs were gradually liberated, just so the world would become void, if

[1] See the introduction to aphorism 158.

all Upâdhis perished on the cessation of all works. If then [the Vedantist remarks that] there will be no void because of the endless number of Upâdhis, the same holds good on the theory of the plurality of Selfs, also. And thus [it is said]:

"Therefore, though they who know [the truth] are continually liberated, there will be no void, because [the number of] living beings in the world is endless."

"Is the Self [essentially] bound or free? If it is bound, then its essential nature cannot depart, and, therefore, liberation is not [possible, or,] if [the essential nature departed, the Self] would [cease to exist, *i. e.,*] not be eternal. If it is free, then meditation and the other [means enjoined for the sake of liberation] are of no use." To this [objection the author] replies:

160. It is of such a kind that both states are excluded.

[The Self] is neither bound, nor is it being liberated; but it is eternally free. But the destruction of the non-cognition [of this eternal freedom] is brought about by meditation, etc.

"It is taught [in aphorism 148] that the Self is witness. If it is witness even after the attainment of discriminative knowledge, no liberation is [possible, as the perception of something means bondage]." To this [objection the author] replies:

Since, in short, according to Scripture, tradition and logical reasons, both states—that is to say: a distinction of states—are excluded, *i. e.*, are eternally absent [in the Self, this is] of such a kind.

161. In consequence of the connection with organs it is witness.

Organs, *i. e.*, senses. In consequence of the connection with these [only the Self] is witness. But where is the connection with the senses, when discrimination [and, hence, liberation is attained]?

"Of what nature, then, is the Self at any time?" To this [the author] replies:

162. It is eternally free.

[This is] perspicuous.

163. And, finally, unconcerned.

[This is] clear.

"[But] Scripture teaches the agency of the Self; how is this [to be understood]?" To this [the author] replies:

164. The agency results from the influence, because of the nearness of intellect,—because of the nearness of intellect.

The agency of the Self, *i. e.*, the delusion of its being the agent, results from the influence of Matter, [and this influence exists] because of the nearness of intellect [*i. e.*, of the Self, to Matter, *i. e.*, to the modification of Matter in the form of the internal organ]. The repetition [of the words] 'because of the nearness of intellect' indicates the end [of the book], since it is thus seen in Scripture.

Here ends the first book, that on the topic [of the system], in the commentary on Kapila's aphorisms in which the Sâṃkhya philosophy is expounded.

The second book begins now with a view to describe the products of primitive Matter, after the description of the topic [in general].

In order to notify that in this my composition there is no independence at all, the appellation 'quintessence of the commentary' has been given [to it]. Though writing the words of others, I have

elucidated their sense and made the connection [of the single aphorisms with each other] more perspicuous; thus my labour will not be fruitless.

Here ends the first book in the 'quintessence of the Sâṃkhya commentary,' composed by Mahâdeva who obtained the noble surname 'the Vedantist' from the feet of the illustrious Svayaṃprakâśatîrtha.

Thus the topic of the system has been described in the first book; but, in order to confirm the unchangeableness of Soul, the manner in which the creation proceeded from primitive Matter will be explained in the second [book] at large.

BOOK II.

1. [The agency] of primitive Matter is for the sake of the liberation of the [Self] which is [in reality] totally free, or for its own [liberation].

The Self is totally free, in its essence. In order to liberate this from the illusory bondage, primitive Matter produces the world. When pain is created [by Matter], man feels aversion [against it] quite naturally, and, therefore, certainly endeavours after liberation [from it]; when pleasure is created [by Matter], this, also, is to be reckoned among the pains, since pleasure is mixed with pain, and, therefore, aversion arises [in this case, also]. This [aversion] or indifference is of four kinds, (1) the consciousness of the effort [to restrain the senses from the objects], (2) the consciousness of the distinction [between those faults of the internal organ which have already perished, and those which are still existent], (3) the consciousness [of the sole existence] of one [*i. e.*, of the internal] sense, and (4) the consciousness of having subdued [everything].[1] One must get rid of the future pain[2] which is of twenty-one sorts, *viz.*, the body, the six senses, the six [different] objects [of these senses],[3] the

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1 The explanation of the terms *yatamâna-saṃjñâ* etc. has been taken from the Sâṃkhyatattvakaumudî to Kârikâ 23; cf. also Yogasûtra 1. 15.

2 From Yogasûtra 2. 16.

3 *I. e.*, *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rûpa*, *rasa*, *gandha* and *manaso vishayaḥ* (= *yad vastu saṃkalpanîyam 'idam icchâmîti' vikalpanîyaṃ cha 'idam ittham asti nâsti veti'*), Paṇḍit.

six perceptions [of these objects], pleasure and pain [κατ' ἐξοχήν, *i. e.*, that pain which is felt immediately]. Among these, the body is pain, because it is the site of pain; the senses, objects and perceptions [are pain], because they are what leads to pain; pleasure is [also pain], because it is followed [or accompanied] by pain; and pain [κατ' ἐξοχήν] is the chief [pain] which consists of ache, disease and sorrow. The special causes that produce it are ignorance, thirst, [*i. e.*, desire], merit and demerit. Ignorance is misconception; and the disposition to this [ignorance, which is common to all living beings who are not yet liberated] is declared by the sages to be the special cause of the thirst and [of the acquisition of merit and demerit]. Moreover, the getting rid of pain is the absolute cessation of the arising of pain; the means thereof is the cognition of the truth with regard to the Self, because in consequence of this [cognition] ignorance [which is the cause of pain] ceases to exist. And thus it is said: "Verily, the Self must be seen, heard, thought and meditated upon" (Bṛihadâraṇyaka Up. 2. 4. 5; 4. 5. 6);

> "It must be heard from the scriptural words [recited by the teacher], thought on with logical reasons, and—this having been done—continually meditated upon. These are the causes of the perception [of the Self];"[1]

"He who knows the Self overcomes grief" (Chhândogya Up. 7. 1. 3).

This [Self] is of two kinds, *viz.*, the higher and the lower one; and thus it is said: "Two Brahmans are to be known, the higher and the lower one" (cf. Maitry Up. 6. 22). The *higher* [Self] is characterized by knowledge and divine power, and does not even in the least come in contact with the attributes of mundane existence; it is the Supreme, the

1 This quotation is also found in Vijñânabhikshu's introduction to I. 1.

great God, the omniscient, the creator, because he brings forth everything. How is this to be known? Either by inference or by concentration [*i. e.*, Yoga]. The inference is as follows:

(1) The perceptible [world] which is the object of the dispute must have a cause,

(2) Since it exists after not having existed before,

(3) As is the case with a picture.

[The existence of the Self] in general having been conceived from this [inference], the cognition [of it] in particular [is obtained] by the Yoga. The existence of the *lower* [Self], *i. e.*, of the empirical soul, is established by the fact that [everybody] is sensible of it. Now, the activity of Matter is for the sake of the discriminative knowledge of these two, *i. e.*, of the higher and of the lower [Self]. As for this [activity of Matter], its being for the benefit of another [*i. e.*, of the Self] will be stated [in III. 58]. And [what is declared in our aphorism, too, *viz.*, that the agency of Matter] is for its own [liberation, must be understood as follows]: to which soul [Matter] has shown itself in its distinction, with that it has nothing to do any more. ["But," some one may ask,] "how can non-intellectual Matter be active?" [To this question we reply:] We see that non-intellectual trees, also, are active through [the production of] fruits, etc.

"But then, who are those privileged [to attain] to liberation?" With regard to this [question the author] declares:

2. Because this falls to him [only] who has become indifferent.

And thus Scripture says: "And having risen above the desire for sons, above the desire for wealth and above the desire for [other] worlds, they then wander about as mendicants" (Bṛihadâr. Up. 4. 4. 22), "Having become quiet,

subdued, satisfied, patient and collected, he sees himself in the Self only" (*l. c.* 4. 4. 23).

"If liberation takes place in consequence of indifference immediately after the hearing [of the truth], then all would be liberated immediately after the teacher's instruction; and, as we see, this is not the case." With reference to this [objection the author] says:

3. It does not take place in consequence of the mere hearing, [but] of the aptitude of the beginningless disposition.

Liberation is not [obtained] immediately after the hearing [of the truth]; but whose beginningless disposition is apt, to him [alone] liberation comes quickly [after the instruction], to another late.

[The author] mentions another reason:

4. Or, as many servants belong to a single [master].

As, among many servants of a single [master], on account of good service or offence, some are set at liberty, some enjoy the benevolence [of their master] and some are imprisoned, just so Matter is single, and Souls are many. Those who possess a clear discriminative knowledge [obtain liberation] quickly; those who practise devotion only, in the course of time; the others never.

"[But] bondage does not belong to the Self, since this is unchangeable." In regard to this [remark the author] declares:

5. And, while it is real in Matter, [only] an imputation [of it] belongs to the soul.

To whom Matter has shown itself, for him Matter is not active [any more; that is to say: this soul] is liberated; [but] for which soul it is active, on that falls a reflection [of

Matter, *i. e.*, of the internal organ; but this is] only an imputation, no real [bondage]. And thus [it is said]:

"If the Self were, in its essence, foul, impure and subject to alterations, there would be no liberation for it even after hundreds of new births." (Kûrmapurâṇa 2. 2. 12).

[The author] gives the proof thereof [*i. e.*, of the assertion that the real bondage belongs to Matter]:

......And because of the scriptural texts which teach that the souls are unchangeable and nothing but Thought, those passages in Scripture in which Soul is called 'the creator' are merely for the sake of devotion.

6. This is proved from the products.

From the perception that there is no interruption [to the arising] of the products of primitive Matter, *i. e.*, of the 'great one,' etc., it is proved that bondage belongs to Matter.

"Matter impels *all* persons to action, because it is active by nature; to what purpose [do you talk so much] about the cognition and non-cognition of the distinction [between Matter and Soul]?" To this [the author] replies:

[Supply at] the beginning of this [aphorism]: since these are fit for serving their purpose. (The purport which Mahâdeva sees in this aphorism, in accordance with Vijñânabhikshu, is a confutation of the opinion that the material world be illusory).

7. There is a restriction regarding the souls, as is the case with the escape from a thorn.

As somebody, having seen a thorn, warns some one—but not all people—: "Don't go this way!", just so there is the following restriction: [Matter] is active with regard to special souls [only], not to every one, because it is able [to influence those souls alone which have not attained to discrimination].

That bondage does not belong to the Self, was [already]. mentioned [in aphorism 5; the author] states this [again more exactly in the following]:

(According to Mahâdeva's explanation, the first part of our aphorism must be thus translated: *There is a restriction [of Matter] with regard to him who knows.*)

Chetana means [here] 'he who knows,' that is to say: 'he who possesses the immediate cognition of the distinction [between Matter and Soul]. 'With regard to him' means 'for him.'

There is a restriction—*i. e.*, non-activity—of Matter, just as there is escape, *i. e.*, non-production of pain, with reference to him who observes the thorn. For the activity of Matter must be declared to be for the sake of liberation from the pain located in it; and this [liberation] takes place, when [Matter] is in connection with a soul which discriminates. For saying that Matter has the nature of pain, we mean but this: [Matter] occasions in Soul the experience of pain, *i. e.*, a reflection of the painful internal organ. And this [doing of Matter] is at an end, when the experience of pain has ceased on the part of a discriminating soul. The sense is: [Matter] does not operate upon a liberated soul, because it has no object of its own [with that], but only upon the soul which is not yet liberated.

8. In spite of the connection with the other, this is brought about, not immediately, as in the case of the burning of iron.

Matter's operating leads to bondage; [but], in spite of the connection with Matter, [only] the delusion of Soul's [being subject to] bondage is brought about by the falling of its [*i. e.*, Matter's] reflection [on Soul]. 'Not immediately,' *i. e.*, not really.] 'As in the case of the burning of iron,' *i. e.*, as, on touching red-hot iron, one thinks that the iron burns, while [in reality] iron [itself] does not burn, but only in consequence of the connection with fire.

"To what purpose is creation?" To this [the author] replies:

9. From desire and indifference proceed concentration and creation.

Experience proceeds from desire, liberation from indifference. But, [although the author declares only that creation—and hence experience—proceeds from desire,] in reality indifference also arises from desire, because the faultiness of the object is seen during [the time of] experience; [and indifference leads to concentration].

In the first book in aphorism [61] which begins "...... Sattva, Rajas and Tamas" the twenty-five principles are enumerated; now, [the author] states the order [of creation] in detail.

10. After the great one, etc., is [that] of the five [gross] elements.[1]

['That'] *i. e.*, the creation. [The author] will teach the order [of the development of the material world in aphorisms 13, 16 and 17].

"Is [creation] for its own sake or for that of another?" To this [the author] replies:

[The author] teaches [now] the difference of the creative power belonging to the 'great one' and to the following [principles], from that creative power which belongs to primitive Matter:

11. Since creation is for the sake of the Self, the creativeness of these is not for their own sake.

Since creation is for the sake of Soul, the creativeness 'of these,' *i. e.* of the 'great one' and of the following [principles], is not for their own sake, *i. e.*, [not] egotistic. Since primitive Matter is eternal, it was correct to ascribe *to it* [in II. 1] a creativeness for its own sake; but the 'great one' and the following [principles perish dissolving in their cause, and, therefore, are [only] created [for the sake of Soul, but have no object of their own].

"Space and Time are known; why don't we find these two

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1 Which are the terminal link in the chain of creation.

in the enumeration [in I. 61]?" To this [the author] replies:

"But then, the existence of Space and Time is established by the universal conception; for what reason are they not mentioned in the enumeration?" To this [the author] replies:

12. Space and Time depend on the ether, etc.

According to the difference of this or that Upâdhi, the ether is called by the names Space or Time;[1] therefore these two are contained in the [element] ether. The word 'etc.' is added to no perceptible purpose.

The ablative [*âkâśâdibhyaḥ* is used] in the sense of the locative case.

[The author] gives [now] the definition of the 'great' [principle or] judging organ:

By the word 'etc.' the Upâdhis are meant, and so the sense [of the aphorism] is: Space and Time arise from these and those Upâdhis and from the ether. Though [in reality] Space and Time are nothing but the ether [itself], as characterized by Upâdhis, still [the author] here speaks of their arising, in accordance with [the opinion of the Vaiśeshikas who teach] that the characterized [ether] is distinct [from the pure ether] and that [the former] arises from two things, the characterizing [Upâdhis] and their subject.

[The author] describes now the 'great one' and the following [categories]:

13. The judging organ is [possessed of] ascertainment.[2]

'It is thus [and not otherwise],' such decision is meant by ascertainment.

1 That is to say: the ether is called 'Space,' when determined by limited substances (as the Dinakarî explains), and 'Time,' when determined by the motion of the sun and the moon.

2 Cf. the commentary to II. 30.

"In which [of your principles] are merit etc. included?" On this [the author] says:

14. Merit etc. are products of that.

Merit, knowledge, indifference and divine power [are intended]. By [stating] that these are products of that [*i. e.*, of the judging organ, the opinion of the Naiyâyikas and Vaiśeshikas] that they are attributes of the Self, is rejected. Since cause and products are not to be separated, it is [thus] shown that [merit etc.] are included [in our 'judging organ'].

[The author] states a peculiarity of that:

15. The 'great one' becomes the reverse in consequence of [noxious] influence.

[That is to say: it begets] demerit, ignorance, want of indifference and of divine power. For experience teaches that a diversity of products follows from a diversity of concomitant [causes]. As a reed-seed [generally] produces the sprout of a reed, but, if concomitated by the connection with fire [*i. e.*, if roasted], produces a plantain-stem,[1] so the 'great one,' if concomitated by Sattva [*i. e.*, on the co-operation of Sattva],[2] produces merit etc., if concomitated by Tamas, demerit etc.

[The author] gives [now] the definition, in appropriate order, of the egotizing organ and of the following [principles]:

16. The egotizing organ is [possessed of] delusion.[3]

1 This nonsense is also found in the Bhâmatî, as the Paṇḍit informed me.

2 The *kârya-rûpa* Sattva is intended, since the *kâraṇa-rûpa* Sattva is the material cause of the judging organ.

3 Cf. the commentary to II. 30.

The delusion that the [empirical] Ego be [the Self, is intended].

[The author] mentions the products of that:

17. The eleven and the five subtile elements are the products of that.

The eleven senses and the five subtile elements are the sixteen products of that.

"How can dead matter and light [*i. e.*, the senses as factors of cognition] come from one single cause?" On this [the author] says:

18. The eleven which consist of Sattva arise from the egotizing organ which is a product of modification.

From the egotizing organ which is a modification of the 'great one' arise the 'eleven,' *viz.*, the eleven senses which consist of Sattva, *i. e.*, are produced by the co-operation of Sattva. The subtile elements are produced by the co-operation of Tamas.

[The author] teaches that there are three kinds of senses:

19. The internal [sense together] with the faculties of action and with the faculties of perception makes eleven.

The internal [sense, called] *manas*, together with the five faculties of action, *i. e.*, of speaking etc., and with the five faculties of perception, *i. e.*, of smelling etc., makes eleven senses.[1]

[The Naiyâyikas hold that] the senses consist of the elements; in order to reject this [opinion, the author] says:

1 Literally: a sense consisting of eleven; cf., in the commentary on aphorism 17, *shoḍaśakam tat-kâryam*.

20. Because Scripture teaches that they are products of the egotizing organ, they do not consist of the elements.

And because Scripture would be contradicted in that case. This is the sense.

[The author] gives another argument:

The scriptural passage, however, which says that [the internal sense] is formed of food, etc. (Chhândogya Upanishad 6. 5. 4) is to be understood as treating of its being enabled [for its functions] by food.

21. Since Scripture teaches the dissolution [of the senses] into the deities, the creative [elements] are not—

It is a maxim that the products dissolve into their cause. [Now,] the dissolution [of the senses] into deities is taught in Scripture: "The sight, forsooth, enters into the sun" (cf. Brihadâraṇyaka Upanishad 3. 2. 13); therefore, the creative elements, *i. e.*, [the elements] which are erroneously regarded as creative [by the Naiyâyikas], are not the cause [of the senses].

Some say that the senses are eternal. In order to reject this [opinion, the author] says:

22. Their arising is taught in Scripture, and because their destruction is seen.

Their arising from the egotizing organ is taught in Scripture, and the destruction, also, of what has arisen, is necessary.

"Since we see that [the senses,] sight etc., have different

powers, the senses are [nothing but] their bodily *substrata*."[1] This [opinion the author] refutes:

23. The sense is supersensuous; [its identification] with the *substratum* belongs to mistaken people.

The idea that the sense be [identical] with its substratum, *i. e.*, with the eye-ball etc., [is entertained] by mistaken people [only]. Otherwise, [*i.* e., if this idea were true,] a man whose ears have been cut off would be unable to hear, and a man whose eyes are affected with a cataract ought to perceive the colours.

"There is [only] one single sense; the diversity depends [merely] on the difference of the Upâdhis." To this [the author] replies:

24. If the difference is established even by the difference of powers, there is no singleness.

Let the difference of the Upâdhis be conceded; but a difference of powers [also] must be necessarily stated, and this is a real [difference, not merely dependent on Upâdhis]; hence the diversity [of senses] is also real.

"[But] if something can be explained by singleness simply, the assumption of a multitude is superfluous." To this [the author] replies:

The assumption of diverse senses is not superfluous. This [the author] says [in the following aphorism]:

25. A theoretical consideration does not set aside what has been known by proofs.

[This is] clear.

[The author] gives the definition of the internal sense:

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1 *Aindriyakâṇi* = *golakâḥ*.

[The author] mentions the peculiarities [of the internal sense]:

26. And the internal sense partakesof the nature of both.

The internal sense partakes of the nature of the senses of perception and of the faculties of action, because both come into activity through its superintendence.[1]

"How can the different senses arise from the single egotizing organ?" To this [the author] replies:

Since, without the attention of the internal sense, the senses are unable to practise their functions, the internal sense itself is called 'sense of perception' as well as 'faculty of action;' for Scripture teaches: "My internal sense was elsewhere, [therefore] I did not see; my internal sense was elsewhere, [therefore] I did not hear, etc." (Bṛihadâraṇyaka Up. 1. 5. 3).

"If [all] perception has the nature of a modification of the single internal sense, how is the diversity [to be explained]?" To this [the author] replies:

27. Diversity proceeds from the difference of the modifications of the constituents, like conditions.

[There are] various [senses] because of the difference of the modifications of the constituents, Sattva etc., which are concomitant [causes] of merit and demerit.[2] 'Like conditions,' *i. e.*, as childhood, youth and old age belong to one single person.

[The author] mentions the object of both kinds of senses:

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1 Cf. aphorism 40.

2 The *causa efficiens* (*nimitta-kâraṇa*) of the arising of the senses from the egotizing organ (as well as of the production of the whole material world) are merit and demerit. The variety of the senses is conditioned by a concomitant cause or a secondary *nimitta-kâraṇa*, as stated in our aphorism, that is to say the senses of perception are produced by the co-operative influence of Sattva the faculties of action by that of Rajas.

Sight and the other [senses] are modifications of the constituents, Sattva etc. From the difference of these [senses] proceeds the diversity, *i. e.*, variety, of perceptions. Though [all] perception is nothing but a modification of the internal sense, we use the expressions '[perception] by sight, by hearing etc.' with respect to the fact that [the perceptions] are produced by sight etc., which [fact] depends on the functions of sight etc.; just as there are [different] conditions in one single person, leanness, thickness etc., which depend on the use and non-use of this or that food. This is the sense.

28. [The objects] of both begin with colour and end with the excretion of what has been taken.

'Of both,' *i. e.,* of the senses of perception and of the faculties of action. The objects of the senses of perception are colour, taste, smell, feeling and sound; the objects of the faculties of action are speaking, walking, catching, lust and excretion of what has been taken. By the last expression the excrements are meant; with these end [the sensual objects].

[The author] teaches the distinction between the Self and the senses:

"To whom do the senses render service?" To this question [the author] replies:

29. The Self is the seer etc.[1], the senses are the instruments.

[This is] clear.

[The author] states [now] the mutual distinction between the three internal organs:

30. The three possess their special characteristics.

[1] *I. e.*, the taster, smeller, feeler and hearer.

The 'great one,' the egotizing organ and the internal sense possess their special characteristics, *i. e.*, each of them its special characteristic, [*viz.*] the 'great one,' ascertainment, the egotizing, organ, delusion,[1] and the internal sense, volition.

[The author] mentions a property which is common to them:

31. A common function of the organs are the five airs, breath etc.

The five airs, breath etc., are sustained by the three [internal] organs [together].

[The author] treats of the functions of [all] organs [external as well as internal]:

32. The functions of the senses take place successively and simultaneously.

'*Successively*' [for instance in the following case]: Having perceived a thief by faint light, [a man at first] examines the object [of his perception] with his sense [*i. e.*, with sight], then he concludes with his internal sense 'This is a thief,' then he refers [the matter] to himself (*abhimanyate*) with his egotizing organ 'He takes my money away,' then he determines with his organ of resolution (*buddhi*) 'I will catch the thief.'

'*Simultaneously*' [for instance in the following case]: Seeing a tiger in the night by the flash of lightning, [a man] runs away instantly. In this case the functions of the four [organs] take place at the same time. Although [different] functions cannot arise at the same time, and hence there is a succession [of mental functions] at this [second event] also [just as at the former], still we say 'they are simultaneous,' because they appear to happen [so], as the hundred leaves of the lotus are pierced through [apparently simultaneously].[2]

[1] Cf. II. 13 and 16.

[2] The idea is this: There are one hundred petals of the lotus placed one

"How many functions [of the internal organ] are there?" To this [the author] replies:

33. The functions are fivefold [and either] painful or not painful (= Yogasûtra 1. 5).

[These are the following five:] means of right knowledge, error, doubt, sleep and memory (= Yogasûtra 1. 6). Means of right knowledge are perception, inference and [apprehension of a] testimony [= Yogasûtra 1. 7); error is misconception abiding on what is not the [real] form of the object (= Yogasûtra 1. 8); doubt is a notion which relates to both [sides of an alternative]; sleep is a notion which rests on darkness; memory is the knowledge of the past.

[All these functions are either] 'painful,' *i. e.*, affected with pain, [because] consisting of Rajas and Tamas,—or 'not painful,' *i. e.*, consisting of Sattva, in which case their pain has been burnt [or destroyed].

[The author] declares [in the following aphorism] that liberation takes place on the cessation of the functions:

34. On their cessation it is released from influences and abides in itself.

On the cessation of the functions,—ignorance, egotism, desire, aversion and attachment to life having been destroyed [by discriminative knowledge—Soul] abides in itself, *i. e.*, assumes its real nature.

[The author] gives an illustration:

35. And as the stone is with respect to the flower.

As there is redness in the crystal in consequence of the

over the other, and a needle is pushed vertically downwards. Its sharp end will pierce all the hundred petals apparently at once, but really in an imperceptible succession.

proximity of the Hibiscus-flower, and [as], on the removal of that, the crystal resumes its own nature, so this [Soul] also [is influenced by the functions of the internal organ, and abides in itself, when it is out of connection with it].

"Since the organs [of all individuals] are of the same nature, the sameness of their nature is everlasting, [and so they may cause bondage also to the liberated, again]." To this [the author] replies:

36. The organs also come into actual existence[1] for the sake of the [bound] soul, in consequence of the operation of the invisible power [of merit and demerit].

There is no [absolute] sameness, because a difference is [established] by the organs' coming and not coming into actual existence; and this difference depends on the operation of the invisible power [of merit and demerit], *i. e.*, on the fact that [this power] is mightier [in the case of a bound soul than of a liberated soul, and that only in the first case it is able to raise the organs into actual existence].

[The author] gives an illustration:

37. As the cow for [the benefit of] the calf.

As, though there is sameness with regard to the being a cow, [only] the milch cow nurses the calf, [and not the barren cow, just so, in spite of the sameness of all organs, those only which are raised by the invisible power offer the objects of experience to their soul].

"How many organs are there, the difference of the external and internal being taken into consideration?" To this [the author] replies:

As for the sake of the calf the cow—this is an elliptic expression for 'the milk of the cow'—, though non-intellectual, flows down quite spontaneously, and requires no other effort,...

1 Opposed to potential existence in the cause.

38. The organs are of thirteen kinds, on account of the subdivisions.

Internally: the judging, egotizing and perceptive organs; external are the ten senses.

"How does the nature of an organ belong to the senses?" To this [the author] replies:

There are three internal organs, the perceptive, egotizing and judging, and ten external: together thirteen organs.

"Are the judging organ and the rest, organs in the same sense, or is there any difference?" [The author] declares that there is [a difference]:

39. Because the [property of] being the most effective [instrument] belongs to the senses, as to the axe.

As the nature of an organ belongs to the axe, because this is the most effective [instrument in cleaving wood], so it does to the senses also [which are the most effective instrument of perception].

[The author] says what are the offices of the thirteen organs:[1]

Since that which is unconnected with the non-attainment of the result is a means of action, the blow itself is the chief means for cleavage; but the axe is a secondary [means], because the quality of an excellent instrument belongs to it. So the judging organ is the chief organ for Soul's aim [*i. e.*, for experience], since it is unconnected with the non-attainment of the result; but the others [*i. e.*, the egotizing organ, the internal and the external senses], because of possessing the quality of being the most effective instruments for [promoting] Soul's aim, are 'secondary organs' (*amukhyaṃ karaṇatvam*). These two [words] are to be supplied [in the aphorism]. Consequently, the judging organ is the principal instrument. This is the meaning.

1 Though not directly, since he states in the following aphorism only that the internal sense is the superintendent of the external.

"But then, the egotizing organ also, since it is distinct from the senses, [just as well] may be the chief organ, and not the judging organ alone." To this [the author] replies:

40. The chief of both is the internal sense, as [there is one] above the troops of servants in daily life.

The internal sense is the chief 'of both,' *i. e.*, of the senses of perception and of the faculties of action, because these come into activity through its superintendence only;[1] as there is a master above the servants in daily life.

[The author] gives an argument [thereof]:

(According to Mahâdeva's view, the first part of our aphorism must be translated: *The chief among the two is the thinking organ*).

The chief among the two, *i. e.*, the judging and egotizing organs, is the 'thinking,' *i. e.*, judging organ......

41. Because it is indispensable [for Soul's experience].

[This is] clear.

[The author] gives a further argument:

42. Moreover, because it is the receptacle of all impressions.

Because it is known that even [those] impressions [continue to] exist [which have been received] by senses that perished [later on].

[The author] mentions the reason [of what was stated in the preceding aphorism]:

43. And because it is inferred from memory.[2]

1 Cf. II. 26.

2 Vijñânabhikshu's opinion that *smṛiti* be here used in the exceptional meaning 'meditation,' is to be rejected.

The internal sense [as the receptacle of all impressions] is inferred from the well-known fact that memory exists even without the senses, [*i. e.*, after one has been deprived of sight, hearing etc.]

"[Let] the Self be the receptacle of the impressions." To this [the author] replies:

44. They cannot from itself.

They cannot proceed from itself, *i. e.* from Soul, since this is unchangeable and without qualities.

"The nature of an organ being the same [in all senses and internal organs], what is the cause of there being the relation of chief and secondary [organs between them]?" To this [the author] replies:

45. The relation of chief and secondary [organs] is relative, on account of the difference of their activity.

[This is] perspicuous.

"[But] the one [*i. e.*, the whole set of organs] will not operate without design for the sake of the other [*i. e.* of the Self]." To this [the author] replies:

46. Their activity is for the sake of this, because it has been acquired by the works of this, as in daily life.

The activity, *i. e.*, the operation, of the judging and the other organs is for the sake of the soul, because it has been acquired by the works of the soul which reflects in the internal organ;[1] as, in daily life, a slave does service for him by whom he has been acquired.

[The author] teaches that the judging organ is superior to all [other organs]:

[1] This explanation has been controverted by Vijñânabhikshu in his commentary on this aphorism.

47. Though the same work belongs [to them], the judging organ is superior, as in daily life—as in daily life.

As, in daily life, the prime minister of the kingdom is higher than the mayor of a village, while the king is again higher than he, so the internal sense operates for the sake of the judging organ, and, therefore, the judging organ is superior to all [other instruments of Soul]. 'Though the same work belongs [to them]' means: though activity for the sake of Soul belongs in the like manner to all [organs].

The repetition of the words 'as in daily life' indicates the end of the book.

Though all organs are equally produced [by the same *causa efficiens, viz.*] by works, the judging organ is superior [to them] for the reasons of its superiority alleged [in the commentary to aphorisms 40—43;[1]] just so as, in daily life, though the actions of marriage etc. have been equally performed [with different wives of *one* man], only a single spouse is the principal, because of the excellent qualities which procure her this superiority, and not the other [wives].

Here ends, in the commentary on Kapila's aphorisms explanatory of the Sâṃkhya system, the second book on the products of primitive Matter. After the description of the products of primitive Matter, the third book begins with a view to [produce] indifference.

Here ends the second book in the 'quintessence of the commentary on the explanation of the Sâṃkhya system,' composed by Mahâdeva the Vedantist. After the description of the products of primitive Matter, the third book begins with a view to [produce] indifference.

[1] Not printed in my edition, because borrowed from the Sâṃkhya-pravachana-bhâshya.

BOOK III.

1. The diverse arises from that which is not diverse.

The diverse—*i. e.*, the gross elements—arises from that which is not diverse, *i. e.*, from the subtile elements.

2. From that the body.

In consequence of the consideration that this consists of flesh, etc., one becomes disgusted [with it].[1]

"The origin [of the body] has been mentioned; [but] on what does [its] destruction depend?" To this [the author] replies:

Supply: [from that] arises [the body] which consists of skin, etc. [The author] states the cause of the production of bodies:

3. The flow of mundane existences depends on the cause of it.

The wandering through mundane existences, *i. e.*, the [continual] destruction [of the body], depends on the *causa* [*efficiens*] of it, *i. e.*, of its arising from the [gross] elements, that is to say: on merit and demerit.

"Since it is the essential nature of the elements to be productive,[2] there ought to be a constant production and, therefore, no liberation." With reference to this [remark the author] declares:

1 This is not an explanation of aphorism 2, but a general remark on the contents of Book III.

2 Read, with the I. O. L. manuscript, *ârambhaka-svabhâvatve.* According to the text printed in my edition, the translation should run thus: "If [this power of merit and demerit] which originates the elements is real [in the highest sense, *i. e.*, eternal]."

The flow of mundane existences—*i. e.*, the experience of pleasure and pain, determined by this and that body, etc. [*i. e.*, life in different conditions]—depends on the cause of it, *i. e.*, of the [gross] body, *viz.* on work or on the subtile [internal] body.

"But then, if the subtile elements are constantly productive [of bodies, through the medium of the gross elements], bondage must last for ever."[1] In reply to this [remark the author] states the limit:

4. And the activity of those which are not diverse [continues] till discrimination.

Productiveness which is the nature of the subtile elements ends with discriminative knowledge.

"If [the subtile elements] are productive for that [soul] which has not attained discrimination, they ought to be so for the same at [the time of] the great dissolution of the universe also." To this[2] [the author] replies:

The productiveness of the subtile elements ends with discriminative knowledge. This is the sense.

"But then, if [the subtile elements] are productive for that [soul] which has not attained discrimination, why are they not productive for the same at [the time of] the great dissolution?" To this [question the author] replies:

5. Since the other [*i. e.*, the non-discriminating soul] has consumed [the fruits of its actions].

Since the non-discriminating [soul] has [then] consumed [the fruits of its former actions] and, therefore, does not possess a body at [the time of] the great dissolution, how shall there be experience [then]? For this reason [the subtile elements] are not productive for such [a soul at this time].

"But, if [the subtile elements] are not productive [during

1 *Sarvadâ* is to be connected with the preceding as well as with the following word.

2 Read *ity ata âha* with the I. O. L. MS.

the time of the dissolution], from what special cause are they productive again for the non-discriminating [soul, when that time is over]?" With regard to this [question the author] declares:

The dissolution [of the universe takes place], when the other, *i. e.*, the non-discriminating [soul], has consumed [the fruits of its works], *i. e.*, when this consumption has been completed, and hence the former works which led to experience are annihilated. Since, therefore, there is no experience [then], of what use would be a body [at that time]? This is the meaning.

"How is it that [the subtile elements] are productive again at [the time of] creation?" To this [the author] replies:

6. It is then embraced by two things.

[*I. e.*,] by merit and demerit. [That is to say:] the Self which is [still] subject to going and coming [*i. e.*, to the flow of mundane existences] is even at [the time of] the dissolution of the universe connected with merit and demerit. Therefore [the elements] are productive again for such [a soul at the beginning and during the time of the new creation]. But it is not so, when liberation [has been attained to, the Self then being out of contact with merit and demerit].

"But as liberation is eternal, how can it be dependent on some other thing [*i. e.*, on the means enjoined for the sake of liberation]?" To this [the author] replies:[1]

'Then,' *i. e.*, at the time of creation; 'by two things,' *i. e.* by merit and demerit. *Parimukta* [as Mahâdeva reads instead of *parishvakta*] means 'bound,' since [the root *much*], also when preceded by *pari*, has the meaning 'to bind,' just as when preceded by *â*.[2]

1 The connection between this introduction and aphorism 7 is not very perspicuous, but may be thus understood: the attainment to liberation is obstructed by the association of the Self with the subtile or internal body, and depends on the definitive separation from the same.

2 This bold statement has for its object to press Aniruddha's interpretation of the aphorism into the text which has been adopted by the other commentators.

The sense [of the aphorism, therefore,] is this: Since merit and demerit, after having slept during the dissolution of the universe, rise to bear their fruits at the time of the [new] creation, a body is produced [then again]. In liberation, however, merit and demerit are [totally] annihilated.

[The author] states the difference between the gross and the subtile body:

7. The gross [body] is generally engendered by father and mother, not so the other.

'Generally' is said in accordance with experience: [for the gross bodies of the vegetable kingdom do not arise in this manner]. 'Not so the other,' *i. e.* the subtile body, because [its production] is not observed.

"To which of the two bodies does experience [of pleasure and pain] belong?" To this [the author] replies:

'Generally' is said, because some gross [bodies], too, are not engendered by father and mother. 'Not so' means: not engendered by father and mother.

[The author] states [now] which of the two is prior and which is subsequent, as well as to which of them experience is to be assigned:

8. That which arose first produces this effect, since experience belongs to the one, not to the other.

'That which arose first' is the subtile body. Since experience belongs to the one, *i. e.*, to this, [and] not to the other, *i. e.*, to the gross [body, the former] produces this effect. The gross body experiences [pleasure and pain] in a secondary sense [only], because we see that there is no experience in a dead body [*i. e.*, in a gross body from which the subtile body has parted].

"Of how many principles is the subtile body composed?" To this [the author] replies:

(According to Mahâdeva, who takes *pûrvotpatteḥ* as a Karmadhâraya and not as a Bahuvrîhi, the aphorism must be thus translated: *Since [this] arose first, [that] is a product of this; experience belongs* etc.).

Since the subtile body arose first, the gross body is a product of this. The ablative *bhogât* is [employed] in the sense of the nominative case (!). [Hence] the meaning is this: experience belongs to the one, *i. e.*, to the subtile, [and] not to the other, *i. e.*, to the gross [body], because we see that there is no experience in a dead body.

[The author] describes the nature of the internal body:

9. The internal body consists of seventeen and one (*saptadas'aikam*).

[*Saptadaśaikam* means] 'seventeen and one,' *i. e.*, eighteen. From these the internal or subtile body arises. The judging, egotizing and perceptive organs, the five subtile elements and the ten senses [are to be understood].

"Since the subtile body is the same everywhere, how can the dissimilar [gross] bodies of the termites and of the elephants arise from it?" To this [the author] replies:

[*Saptadaśaikam*] is a collective Dvandva compound, and means 'seventeen and one.' The judging, egotizing and perceptive organs, the five subtile elements and the ten senses [form an aggregate which] is called subtile or internal body.

"Since the subtile body is the same everywhere, how is the dissimilarity of the gross [bodies to be accounted for]?" To this [the author] replies:

10. The distinction of individuals depends on the difference of works [previously done].

[This is] plain.

"If the Self is different [from the body], how is [it that] the delusion of the body's being the Ego [takes place]?" To this [the author] replies:

'Individuals' means gross bodies, 'distinction' means diversity.

"How is [it that] the body is called the Ego?" To this [the author] replies:

11. Since the [subtile] body which is the site of the abiding of that, is called so, [the other] is called so [too].[1]

Since the [subtile] body which is the site of the abiding of the Self, is [figuratively] called the Self, on account of its experiencing, the [gross] body, [too,] is called the Ego in consequence of the egotizing delusion.

[The author] gives an illustration thereof:

The word 'that' (*tat*) means the Self [here just as in Vedânta writings]. From previously calling [the subtile body] the Ego it always follows that [the gross body] is subsequently called the Ego. By employing the word 'called' (*vâda*) [the author] declares that the conception of the identity of the body and the Ego is an error; for the Self is distinct from [either] body.

"[Then] let the body alone be the subject of the conception represented by the word 'Ego', because that alone is the Self." This [objection the author] refutes:

12. Not independently without that, like a shadow and like a picture.

If, without the Self, the body were [to be] conceived as the Ego, then this conception ought to exist in a dead body [also]. And it is not so. As there is no shadow without [an object] which intercepts [light, and] no picture without

[1] Vijñânabhikshu explains this aphorism quite differently from our two commentators; he accepts three distinct bodies in one individual, while Aniruddha and Mahâdeva admit only two.

a wall, so in our case also [the idea of the Ego cannot exist without the Self].

"[But] the subtile body may be the Self." To this [the author] replies:

'Without that,' *i. e.*, without there being a Self, the body by itself is not the subject of the conception represented by the word Ego, because, [if this were the case,] this conception ought to occur in a dead body [also. The idea of the Ego is impossible without the Self,] as there is no shadow without [an object] which intercepts [light, and] no picture without a wall.

[The author] refutes [the opinion] that the subtile body be the Self:

13. [The subtile body] also is not [the Self], being limited, because it possesses combination, as the sun.

[The subtile body] is limited, because it is combined; it is for the sake of something else, because it is limited; 'as the sun,' *i. e.*, as the sun, in spite of its being light, is not the Self[1] on account of its limitedness.

"[Then] the internal sense may be the Self." To this [the author] replies:

(According to Mahâdeva, the aphorism must be translated: *Though limited, [the subtile body] is not [the Self], because* etc.)

'Though limited,' *i. e.*, though active. Hereby the proof for [the existence of] the subtile body is given.—The subtile body also is not the Self, 'because it possesses combination,' *i. e.*, because it is combined, [and] because the being combined invariably implies the being for the sake of something else. The sense is, that the Self is distinct from this [subtile body].—The sun also, *i. e.*, the light which is seen [by everybody],[2] is for the sake of something else.

[The author] refutes [the opinion] that the internal sense be the Self:

1 The sun is held to be the *Paramâtman* by the Sauras or sun-worshippers.

2 *Apratyaksham pratyaksha-drishṭântena sâdhyate*, Paṇḍit.

14. It is of atomic size, because Scripture speaks of its acting.[1]

The internal sense is of atomic size, [not all-pervading], because we read in Scripture about its activity. That which is omnipresent and without Upâdhis [*i. e.*, the pure Self] is not a sense, and hence [the internal sense] must be called an Upâdhi.

[An opponent objects:] "If a special part, as *f. i.*, the auditory passage of the ear, were the [internal perceptive] Upâdhi [of the Self], then an affection would be received in that only, [but] not elsewhere, and thus [*one* sensation only], as *f. i.*, hearing, would be possible. Therefore [the internal sense cannot be of atomic size, but] the whole body must be called the [perceptive] Upâdhi [of the Self]."

[To this objection we reply:] Still, the reception of the affections by this determination [*i. e.*, by the whole of the body] contradicts the conviction of the existence of different local (*avyâpya*) affections [at the same time] as 'my head aches, while my foot is well.'

[The author] teaches the atomic nature of the internal sense [for that reason also[2] which is stated in the Nyâya Sûtra I. 16, *viz.*] because [different] sensations do not arise simultaneously. This argument [of the Nyâya philosophy] is dilated upon at some other place [*i. e.*, V. 69—71].

[The author] mentions another reason:

It, *i. e.*, the internal sense, is of atomic size, *i. e.*, small, because Scripture speaks of its acting, that is to say: because we learn its activity from Scripture, and because the Self is omnipresent [and hence cannot be active].

[The author] says [now] that the internal sense is not the Self

1 Aniruddha treats *tat-kriti* as a compound, while Vijñânabhikshu and Mahâdeva make *tat* the subject of the sentence.

2 *I. e.*, not only, 'because Scripture speaks of its acting.'

[for another reason] also, [*viz.*] because Scripture teaches that it consists of food:

15. Because Scripture teaches that it consists of food.

There is a scriptural passage (Chhândogya Up. 6. 5. 4) for its, *i. e.*, the internal sense's, consisting of food. By [stating] that it consists of food [*i. e.*, that it is strengthened by food] it is shown that [the internal sense] is [invigorated] by [the virtue of] the Soma [drink, *saumyatva*]. And being in relation to the Soma (*saumyatva*) means: having the nature of the moon, [*i. e.*, being beloved]. Now, the moon is not the Self (! !).

There is [another] passage in Scripture, too: "Food, forsooth, are the vital airs." The vital air [or life] must be known to have the nature of the moon [*i. e.*, is very dear to each individual]. The moon has been produced from the internal sense [of the supreme being]. Therefore, the internal sense is atomic, and [hence] not the Self (! !).

"Why do the 'great' and the following [principles] operate or transmigrate for the sake of the souls?"[1] To this [the author] replies:

This scriptural passage is (Chhândogya Up. 6. 5. 4): "For the internal sense, my dear, consists of food."

[The author] teaches [now] that the activity of the subtile elements also, just as that of primitive Matter, is for the sake of the souls only:

16. The transmigration of the internal bodies (*linga*) is for the sake of the souls, as that of the king's cooks.

1 The answer to this question is to be taken from the commentary to the following aphorism: *vairâgyârtham* "in order to produce indifference (with regard to worldly pleasure and pain)."

As the activity [of the internal bodies], so is their transmigration [for the same purpose]. And since, as long as transmigration lasts, death and pain continue, [on discerning this] one becomes disgusted [with mundane existence].—'As that of the king's cooks;' [the illustration shows merely that every] activity is for the sake of something else.

As there is a diversity of opinions [with regard to the composition of the gross body, the author] states his own view:

'Transmigration' means activity, '*linga*' the subtile elements.

17. The [gross] body consists of the five elements.

[This is] plain.

"What diversity of opinions is there [on this point]?" To this [the author] replies:

18. Others say that it consists of four elements.

Others except the ether and say that the [gross] body consists of four elements.

[The author] mentions a further opinion:

19. Others, that it consists of one element.

I. e., that the [gross] body is [formed] of earth [only].

[The author] refutes [now the view] that the body be [possessed] of intellectual nature:

[These three aphorisms, 17—19, are] plain. In the latter two [the word] *śarîram* is [to be supplied as] the subject.[1]

[The author] refutes [now the Chârvâkas] who say: "Intellect is [nothing but] a property of the elements modified into the form of the body."

1 As *châturbhautikam* and *aikabhautikam* require a neuter, while *dehaḥ* in aphorism 17 is masculine.

20. Intellect is not natural, because it is not seen in the single [elements].

Since intellect is not seen in the single [constitutive elements], when they are separated, there is no intellect essential [to them]. Therefore it is also not to be supposed that intellect belongs to the [elements], when they are united. For [the example by which the Chârvâkas try to support their opinion, *viz.*,] 'Animals who have severally the power of controlling small animals, control even an elephant, when they are united' [does not apply to the case in question]; for the elements are not so, [*i. e.*, not even a minimum of intellectual power is seen in them severally; hence] there is no intellect of the body.

[The author] mentions another argument against [the opinion of the Chârvâkas]:

['Natural' means] essential [to the body, or] being a property [of it]. For [intellect] might then belong to the united [elements], if something [of it] were seen in them severally.

21. And there would be no defunction, etc.

If the body were intellectual, there would be no defunction (*prapañchatva* = *pañchatva*) or death, because intellect is eternal; and then liberation would be the death of intellect also.[1]

[The author] mentions another argument against [the Chârvâkas]:

(According to the reading of Mahâdeva the aphorism must be translated: *And there would be no death etc., of the beings of the empirical world.*)

If the body were intellectual, and if [therefore] it alone were the Self, there would result, for the beings of the empirical world, the impossibility of death—which is [caused] by merit and de-

[1] This is to explain the *âdi*, 'etc.,' of the aphorism.

merit—*i. e.*, of the separation from the bodies, and—on account of the word 'etc.' [in the aphorism]—of the conjunction with other bodies [also]. And [so] we arrive at [a state of things] which cannot be accepted [by you]; for all [this, *i. e.*, death and birth] is proved [by the perception of the whole world].

"As the many substances composing the intoxicating [drink], though without power severally, produce the intoxicating power, [when they are united], so the united elements become intellectual." To this [objection of the Chârvâkas the author] replies:

22. If [you say: "It is] like the intoxicating power," [I reply:] This arises in the compound, because it is observed in the single [ingredients] in a subtile state.

As the incited power is seen in each single man[1] in a subtile state, while having joined they carry even a huge rock, in consequence of the arising of a great power, [so it is the case with the ingredients of the intoxicating drink]. But a subtile intellect is not likewise observed in the elements severally, so that intellect might exist in the compound, *i. e.*, in the body.

What has been denied in aphorism [20, "Intellect is] not natural," is declared [there] in a negative form [of argument]; a positive form [is stated] in our aphorism;[2] therefore it is not a [superfluous] repetition.

Indifference etc. [*i. e.*, hearing and meditating] have been taught as indirect means of liberation; [now the author] teaches the direct means of liberation:

As there [in the example] a subtile power is observed in the single [ingredients], the intoxicating power arises, *i. e.*, is augmented, when a compound, *i. e.*, a unition, is [formed of them].

[The author] teaches [now] the direct means of liberation:

[1] The unusual locative case *pratipurushe* (instead of *pratipurusham*) is evidently employed by Aniruddha with regard to *drishṭâ*.

[2] Notice *pratyekâdrishṭeḥ* and *pratyeka-paridrishṭe*.

23. From knowledge liberation.

[This is] clear.

[The author] states the reverse:

[The author] mentions the cause of bondage:

24. Bondage from error.

I. e., from ignorance.

"[But] liberation does not result from knowledge alone, since [religious] works, too, are a means of liberation. And thus Scripture says: 'His knowledge and his works take hold of him, and his acquaintance with former things' (Bṛihadâraṇyaka Up. 4. 4. 2)." To this [the author] replies:

'From error' means: from ignorance.

[The author] states [now] the distinction between [the effects of] knowledge and [those of] works:

25. Because of the special causality there is neither combination nor alternativeness.

[Either of the two] is but a *special* cause: from knowledge proceeds liberation, from works experience. Even where a combination [of knowledge] with disinterested works is mentioned in Scripture, there, too, [the latter are recommended simply] for the sake of [promoting] knowledge, [and hence are only indirect means of liberation]; therefore, [in reality,] there is no [such] combination; nor does the alternative exist, that [liberation] results sometimes from knowledge, sometimes from works. And [to this effect] Scripture [declares]:

"I know that great being of sunlike colour beyond darkness. Only he who knows this passes over death; there is no other path to go" (S'vetâśvatara Up. 3. 8).

[The author] mentions another argument against [the opinion of those who regard religious works as a direct means of liberation]:

Knowledge is the cause of liberation, works are not. Therefore on behalf of liberation there is neither combination of knowledge and works, nor alternativeness.

"Let there be no combination [of knowledge] with works, performed with the desire of gaining some advantage, still there may be [combination] with the *indispensable* [religious duties, performed without any desire]." To this [the author] replies:

26. The liberation of the soul does not proceed from both, as [nothing can be attained] from dreaming and waking [together], of which the one is illusory and the other not illusory.

Dreaming is illusory, waking is not illusory; works are like dreaming, knowledge is like waking. Now, two things arising at the same time may be combined, but dreaming and waking are not simultaneous. Therefore, there is no combination of knowledge and works.

"[But] apprehension in the waking state, too, will be unreal like apprehension in dreams, because [both] come under the [same] notion 'apprehension'." With reference to this [objection the author] declares:

Works are illusory, knowledge is not illusory. By these two, [together,] which belong to different times as dreaming and waking, liberation is not [effected]. Both are never simultaneous, so that there might be a combination [of them]. Indispensable religious works also serve only the purpose of the purification of the thinking organ, but not that of liberation [directly].

[The author] states [now] that the illusory nature of works does not mean their unreality. It simply means that [works] do not produce everlasting results:

27. Even that of the other is not absolute.

Even the unreality of apprehension in dreams is not absolute like that of a flower in the sky, nor is [such apprehension absolutely] unreal even in the respective Self [into which

the visions of the internal organ are reflected]; else the notion of [there having been] a dream would not exist. Nor does a dream consist of absolutely unseen [things], but of such objects which have been seen [beforehand] in the waking state.

All supernatural powers, [too,] do not fall to the Yogins in consequence of their mere will only, without a visible cause; [for the cause is the Yoga-praxis]. About this [the author] remarks:

(Mahâdeva takes *api* in the sense of 'moreover').

Moreover, the result 'of the other,' *i. e.*, of works, is not absolute [or everlasting]; hence they are called illusory. Hereby it is explained that knowledge is not illusory.

[The author] declares [now] that unreality does not belong even to a thing brought about by the mere will of the Yogin:

28. Just so even in the case of what is created by the will.

Since people who are like us do not bring about anything by their will [alone], this is impossible to be accomplished by [Yogins] also who are possessed of the merit arising from the Yoga-praxis. Therefore [what the Yogins produce or obtain by their will is really caused by the merit just mentioned, and hence] not unreal.

[The author] states the same [in the following aphorism]:

'There is no unreality' has been kept [by the author] in his mind.

"But, when there is no well-known or visible cause, how can the unreality of that which is produced [by the will of the Yogin] be denied?" To this [the author] replies:

29. Everything falls to the purified,[1] in consequence of the intensity of his contemplation, as is the case with primitive Matter.

[1] *I. e.*, to the Yogin whose internal organ has been purified by meditation.

As the 'great one' and the following [principles] bring about their products in dependence upon the [next] precedent [principle], primitive Matter, however, is independent of anything in bringing about its products, so everything is accomplished by the Yogins in consequence of the intensity of their contemplation, even when there is no [other] visible cause [of the production].

[The author] states [now] that meditation is for the sake of [this] contemplation:

To the Yogin who is purified [internally], that is, by restraint of breath, etc. 'Contemplation' means meditation, 'intensity' excess. In consequence of this [powerful meditation] everything is accomplished [by the Yogin, and] no visible cause [besides that] is required for the purpose; that is to say: the Yogin is not, like us and our equals, a man whose will is not fulfilled. 'As is the case with primitive Matter' means: so as primitive Matter brings forth the 'great one' and its other products, quite independently of [any] preceding cause.

[The author] describes [now] meditation:

30. Meditation is the removal of desire.

From desire, *i. e.*, from the constituent Rajas, proceeds unsteadiness. The removal of this implies steadiness or meditation.

"How is this to be effected?" To this [the author] replies:

It is the destruction of desire, *i. e.*, of the constituent Rajas, in short: steadiness.

[The author] mentions the means thereof:

31. This is effected by the suppression of the functions.

The functions [of the internal organ] are the five [enumerated in the commentary to II. 33, *viz.*] means of right knowledge, etc. By the suppression of these 'this is effected,' *i. e.*, meditation is effected.

"How are these suppressed?" To this [the author] replies:

The functions are means of right knowledge, etc. By the suppression of these meditation is effected.

[The author] mentions the means of the suppression of the functions:

32. This is effected by collectedness, posture and observance of the duties.

'Collectedness' is keeping the mind steadily directed to the navel or to some other place [as to the nose or to the brow]. 'Posture' is sitting straight with the feet placed under the opposite thighs (*svastika*), or in some other way [according to the prescription of the Yoga S'âstra]. Hereby restraint, obligation, regulation of breath and abstraction [of the senses from the objects][1] are implied. 'Observance of the duties' is performance of those acts which are enjoined for the respective caste.[2] By these [means] the suppression of the functions is effected.

[The author] describes [now] that posture which he approves himself among the various postures:

'Collectedness' is keeping the mind steadily directed to the navel or to some other place.

[The author] describes posture:

33. The posture [must be] steady and pleasant.

Such posture must be chosen, by which steadiness and pleasure are [caused].

1 Cf. Yogasûtra 2. 29 *seq.*

2 This sentence anticipates the content of aphorism 35.

[The author] mentions another means of the suppression [of the functions of the internal organ]:

[This is] clear.

[The author] states a further means of the suppression of the functions:

34. The suppression is [promoted] by expulsion and retention.

'Expulsion' is emitting the breath, 'retention' is stopping it. These [two] are mentioned elliptically; [for] filling the lungs with breath is to be understood besides.

"What is that observance of the duties, [mentioned in aphorism 32]?" To this [the author] replies:

[Supply at] the beginning [of the aphorism: The suppression] of the functions.—'Expulsion' is emitting the breath, 'retention' is stopping it; filling the lungs with breath, too, is implied. The meaning is: by [different] regulations of the breath.

[The author] explains [now] what observance of the duties is:

35. Observance of the duties is performance of those acts which are enjoined for the respective religious periods of life.

[This is] clear.

[The author] mentions another means of the suppression of the functions:

36. Also by indifference and practice.

'By indifference' which is twofold, *viz.*, the lower one, *i. e.*, the idea "Enough [of all worldly objects]!" and the higher one which is nothing but clearness of [discriminative] knowledge. 'By practice' means: by constantly repeated meditation. [The word] 'also' indicates that [both things] are to be combined [with the means mentioned above].[1]

1 Cf. the words *cha-kâras' cha dhâraṇâ-samuchchayâyeti* in Vijñânabhikshu's commentary on this aphorism.

[The author] states [now] the subdivisions of the functions:

'By indifference,' *i. e.*, by the idea "Enough!", and by the practice of it.

37. The kinds of error are five.

[*Viz.*] ignorance or misapprehension, egotism or egotizing delusion, desire or love, hatred or wrath, attachment [to one's property and to life] or fear [of danger and death]. Here by the object the [conscious] cognition of the object is implied.[1]

[The author] describes inability:

38. Inability is twenty-eightfold.

[The author] describes acquiescence:

39. Acquiescence is ninefold.

[The author] describes perfection:

40. Perfection is eightfold.

Of [these] four [the author] describes [at first] the varieties of error.

Of [these] four [the author] describes [at first] the subdivisions of error:

41. The subdivisions are as formerly.[2]

The expression 'as formerly' means: [they are to be understood as] they have been stated by the ancient teachers. There are [altogether] sixty-two varieties of error.

Ignorance, [called also] 'obscurity,' is the notion that primitive Matter, the 'great one,' the egotizing organ or the

[1] That is to say, ignorance, egotism, desire, hate and attachment are *per se vritti's* or mechanical functions (affections) of the internal organ and, as such, objects of the cognition of the Self by which they are brought to consciousness.

[2] Enumerated, for instance, in Bhojarâja's commentary on Yogasûtra 3. 45.

five subtile elements be the Self; this is eightfold, because it refers to eight [different] objects.

The gods, forsooth, are under the delusion that the faculty of assuming atomic magnitude and the other [seven supernatural powers[1]] belong to the Self. This is *egotism*, [called also] 'illusion,' and eightfold, because referring to eight [different] objects.

The *desire* for the five elements [or objects of sense], sounds etc., is [also called] 'great illusion,' and is tenfold, because it has ten objects, [the elements] being either celestial or not celestial.

[The objects of sense,] sounds etc., are ten [by themselves; but] they are [to be] combined with the eight supernatural powers,—*viz.*, with the faculty of assuming atomic magnitude, etc.—which are the condition[2] [of enjoying the elements in their subtile state]. Now, when these are marred by somebody else, *hatred* [also called] 'darkness' [arises], which is eighteenfold, because it refers to eighteen objects.

Since, forsooth, the gods, while enjoying these [eighteen objects], are disparaged by the demons, [they feel] *attachment* [to these objects] or fear [of being bereaved of them. This is also called] 'utter darkness,' and is eighteenfold, because referring to eighteen objects. Thus [results the number] sixty-two.

[The author] describes the varieties of inability:

The subdivisions of error are to be so understood as they have been stated by the ancient teachers. This is as follows. The names of the five [general] kinds of error, [mentioned in aphorism 37], *viz.* ignorance, egotism, desire, hatred and attachment,

[1] Enumerated, for instance, in Bhojarâja's commentary on Yogasûtra 3. 45.

[2] *Upadhâna* is a synonyme of *upâdhi* which is used by Mahâdeva in the same connection p. 128, l. 13 of my edition.

are 'obscurity, illusion, great illusion, darkness and utter darkness,' given in order.

Ignorance or 'obscurity' is the notion that the indistinct [primitive Matter], the 'great one,' the egotizing organ or the five subtile elements, [all of] which are not the Self, be the Self; and this is eightfold, because it refers to eight different objects.

The gods who, having obtained the eightfold divine power, are under the delusion of being immortal consider these supernatural faculties of assuming atomic magnitude, etc., as properties of the Self and, [therefore,] as eternal. This is *egotism* or illusion, and eightfold, because its object is the eightfold divine power.

The *desire* or affection for the five [objects of sense], sounds etc., which are tenfold on account of being either celestial or not celestial, is called 'great illusion'; it is tenfold, because it has ten different objects.

The [objects of sense], sounds etc., are ten and the [supernatural powers], the faculty of assuming atomic magnitude, etc., are eight; since these, when they are obstructed by each other, excite wrath, the *hatred* which refers to this fact, [also called] 'darkness,' is eighteen-fold, because it has eighteen different objects.

The gods who, having obtained the faculty of assuming atomic magnitude and the other divine powers, enjoy the objects of sense, sounds etc., are afraid that "The objects of our enjoyment, sounds etc., and our supernatural faculties of assuming atomic magnitude, etc., which are the conditions of [enjoying] the former [in their subtile state], might perhaps be disparaged by the demons." This fear or *attachment* is called 'utter darkness,' and is eighteenfold, because it refers to eighteen different objects. These varieties of error, summed up, are sixty-two.

[The author] describes the varieties of inability:

42. So are those of the other.

'Of the other,' *i. e.*, of inability; 'so' means: [the varieties] are multifarious, *i. e.*, twenty-eightfold, [as has been stated in aphorism 38]. The defects of the eleven senses are:

"Deafness, leprosy, blindness, want of taste and smell, dumbness, lameness of hands and feet, impotence, constipation and insanity."

[Hence] there are, with reference to these, eleven [inabilities] of the internal organ; [moreover, since] there are nine acquiescences and eight perfections, we have, by inversion of these, seventeen [further inabilities] of the internal organ. Thus there are [altogether] twenty-eight.

[The author] describes the varieties of acquiescence:

The varieties of inability are to be understood just as they have been stated by the ancient teachers. They are: [firstly] the defects of the eleven senses, deafness etc., [secondly, since] there are nine acquiescences and eight perfections, by inversion of these seventeen [direct] defects of the internal organ. Thus the inability of the internal organ is of twenty-eight sorts.

'Want of taste' means insensibility to taste, 'lameness of hands' incapability of catching, 'constipation' incapability of secretion, 'insanity' non-perception of [any] objects.

[The author] describes the varieties of acquiescence:

43. Acquiescence is ninefold, because of the difference of the subjective and the rest.

There are four subjective [acquiescences], produced by the notion that what is not the Self be the Self. By the word 'the rest' the five objective [forms of acquiescence] are intended.

The first of the [four *subjective*] acquiescences, named 'Matter,' is the following conception: "If liberation results from the discriminative knowledge of Matter, this alone is to be worshipped; what is the use of [discerning] the Self?" This is [also] called 'water' (*ambhas*).

The second acquiescence, named 'engagement', is the conception: "Even from discriminative knowledge [liberation] does not result immediately, since this is not confirmed by experience; but it will be [effected] by engaging in the

observance [of renouncing the world]." This is [also] called 'wave' (*salila*).

The third acquiescence, named 'Time,' is the conception: "Even from the [said] observance [liberation] does not result immediately, but it comes in time." This is [also] called 'flood' (*ogha*).

The fourth acquiescence, named 'luck,' is the conception: "Even by the force of Time all do not attain to liberation, but only by good luck [some do]." This is [also] called 'rain' (*vrishti*). [These forms of acquiescence are] subjective, because they refer to the Self.

The [following] five are *objective*, since they are [caused] by the fivefold abstinence from the objects.

The first acquiescence [of this kind, which takes place], when abstinence results from the pain of acquiring objects, is called 'crossing' (*pâra*). The second acquiescence [which takes place], when abstinence results from the pain of preservation, is called 'happy crossing' (*supâra*). The third acquiescence [which takes place], when abstinence results from the pain, felt by one who apprehends the transitoriness [of all worldly objects] is called 'perfect crossing' (*pâra-pâra*). The fourth acquiescence [which takes place], when abstinence results from the pain, felt by one who apprehends the evils of enjoyment, is called 'most excellent water' (*anuttamâmbhas*). The fifth acquiescence [which takes place], when abstinence results from the pain [of the cognition] that no enjoyment is brought about without the destruction of living beings, is called 'excellent water' (*uttamâmbhas*). Thus [acquiescence] is ninefold.

[The author] describes the varieties of perfection:

The acquiescences are of two different sorts, subjective and objective. Of these [two], the *subjective*, *i. e.*, those which arise with reference to the Self as distinct from Matter, are four [in number], 'Matter, engagement, Time and luck' by name[1].

[1] *Nâman* in a Bahuvrîhi compound may serve as a feminine stem, according to Pâṇini 4. 1. 12; cf. *pramoda-mudita-modamâna-nâmânaḥ* p. 134, l. 12 of Mahâdeva's text.

Of these, aquiescence [named] 'Matter' is as follows. When the disciple has learned [in a general way] that the Self is distinct from Matter, there is an acquiescence on his part in consequence of the following instruction given by somebody: "The immediate cognition of the distinction verily is a modification of Matter, and Matter alone will effect this. For this reason there is no need of your practising meditation for the purpose; therefore remain simply waiting." This [acquiescence] is called 'water.'

Acquiescence [named] engagement is that acquiescence which results from the following instruction: "The cognition of the distinction, though [a] material [process], does not proceed from Matter alone—lest it should occur to everybody and always; for Matter as such is the same with regard to all. But this [cognition] is caused by renouncing the world; therefore you are to engage in renouncing it. There is no need of your practising meditation." This acquiescence is called 'wave.'

Acquiescence [named] 'Time' is that acquiescence which results from the following instruction: "Even the renouncement of the world does not lead to salvation at once, but it must wait its time. Therefore in time success will come to you. There is no need of your anxiety." This [acquiescence] is called 'flood.'

Acquiescence [named] 'luck' is that acquiescence which results from the following instruction: "Even in time all do not attain to liberation, but only by good luck some one or other does. For this reason liberation was obtained by the sons of Madâlasâ even in their childhood, because they acquired discriminative knowledge merely through their mother's teaching. Therefore good luck alone is the cause [of liberation, and] there is no other [cause besides]." This [acquiescence] is called 'rain.'

The five *objective* [forms of acquiescence] arise, when there is abstinence from the objects on the part of one who is under the delusion that primitive Matter, the 'great one,' the egotizing organ and the following [principles, all of] which are not the Self, be the Self. For there are five kinds of abstinence regarding the

objects which are five also, *viz.*, sounds etc., [and these kinds of abstinence] proceed from the cognition of the following [five] evils, *viz.* the difficulty of their acquisition and preservation, their perishable nature, the evils of their enjoyment and of cruelty [which such enjoyment entails]. On these the [following] five acquiescences are [dependent].

The first acquiescence takes place, when there is abstinence from the objects on the part of one who takes into consideration the great pain [implied] in the acquiring of garlands of flowers, perfumes of sandal wood, lovely women and other [objects of enjoyment].

The second acquiescence takes place, when there is abstinence from the objects on the part of one who is under the following apprehension: "Since wealth etc., though acquired, may be lost by the actions of kings, etc., great pain is [required] to preserve it."

The third acquiescence takes place, when there is abstinence from the objects on the part of one who apprehends transitoriness in this manner: "What has been acquired and preserved with extraordinary efforts perishes when it is enjoyed."

The fourth acquiescence takes place, when there is abstinence from the objects on the part of one who apprehends the evils of enjoyment thus: "As it is declared [by Manu 2. 94]:

> "Desire is by no means appeased by satisfying the desires, just as fire increases only the more by butter [poured into it],"

the desires increase in consequence of practising enjoyment, and they cause pain to the desirous one, if the objects [of enjoyment] are not obtained."

The fifth acquiescence takes place, when there is abstinence from the objects through the cognition of the evil of cruelty [when somebody understands] that no enjoyment is possible without the destruction of living beings.

These [acquiescences] are called, in order, 'crossing, happy crossing, perfect crossing, most excellent water and excellent water.' Thus there are [altogether] nine acquiescences.

[The author] describes the varieties of perfection:

44. On account of reasoning, etc., perfection is eightfold.

The first perfection, *i. e.*, reasoning, reflecting or thinking logically,[1] is called 'passing' (*târa*). The second perfection, *i. e.*, learning the words [of the philosophical texts], is called 'happy passing' (*sutâra*). The third perfection, *i. e.*, study [of the sense], is called 'perfect passing' (*târatâra*). The fourth perfection, *i. e.*, intercourse with teachers and religious students, is called 'pleasure' (*ramyaka*). The fifth perfection, *i. e.*, outward and inward purification,[2] is called 'perpetual joy' (*sadâmudita*). The sixth perfection, *i. e.*, prevention of pain due to one's self, is called 'joyance' (*pramoda*). The seventh perfection, *i. e.*, prevention of pain due to the beings, is called 'joy' (*mudita*). The eighth perfection, *i. e.*, prevention of pain due to supernatural influences,[3] is called 'joyousness' (*modamâna*). Thus [perfection] is eightfold.

Error, inability, acquiescence and perfection, being four in the main, become fifty through their subdivisions.

[The author] teaches that perfection is [realized] by abandoning, [in order], the preceding by [getting hold of] the subsequent:

On account of the varieties, reasoning etc., perfection is eightfold. This is the sense. These [varieties] are: reasoning, oral instruction, study, the three preventions [of pain], intercourse with friends and purification. They will now be explained in a different order, since the *real* order of things is considered to be of [more] consequence than the order taught in Scripture, [*i. e.*,

[1] The resolution of devoting one's self to philosophy seems to be intended, though the other commentators explain *ûha* in a different way.

[2] The word *Dâna* in other Sâṃkhya texts;—some interpreters, as Gauḍapâda and Vâchaspatimiśra to Kârikâ 51 and Vijñânabhikshu in his comment on our aphorism, take *dâna* in the sense of giving.

[3] Cf. the commentary to I. 1.

in Kârikâ 51]. The first of these perfections truly is *study*, *i. e.*, learning the mere words of the spiritual sciences from the mouth of the teacher conformably to the established rules; this is called 'passing.'—The second perfection is *oral instruction;* and oral instruction means the knowledge of the sense which is produced by the same; it is called 'happy passing.'—The third is *reasoning* or reflecting, *i. e.*, examining the sense of tradition on the method of reasoning, not contradictory to tradition, [in short] what they denominate 'thinking logically'; this is called 'perfect crossing.'—The fourth is *intercourse with friends.* One does not believe in a thing, though it be examined logically, as long as one's opinion is not in accordance with that of teachers, disciples and fellow-students; therefore intercourse with friends, *i. e.*, with teachers etc., is necessary; it is called 'pleasure.'—The fifth perfection is purification; and purification (*dâna*) means the clearing of discriminative knowledge, since the word *dâna* is derived from the [root] *dâ* (*daip*) which means 'to clear'; as Patañjali teaches [in Yogasûtra 2. 26]: "The means of liberation is the undistracted discriminative knowledge." [For] undistractedness is clearness, and this is [to be understood as] the abiding on the clear stream of discriminative knowledge, while [all] doubts and errors together with the impressions [which they leave in the internal organ] are abandoned. This [clearness], however, is not [obtained] without the ripeness of study practised devotedly, uninterruptedly and a long time. Therefore this [study] also is implied in purification [which is] its product. This [fifth perfection] is called 'perpetual joy.'

These five are inferior perfections, being the causes [of the remaining three]; but [those] three are the principal ones, because they are the fruit [of the others], *viz.*, *prevention of pain due to one's self*, *prevention of pain due to the beings*, and *prevention of pain due to supernatural influences.* These are named, in order, 'joyance, joy and joyousness.'

Thus, the varieties of error being five, inability being of twenty-eight sorts, acquiescence being ninefold and perfection being eightfold, there are fifty classes [of mental condition].

[The author] teaches that error, inability and acquiescence are to be abandoned:

45. Not from the other without abandonment of the former.

'From the other,' *i. e.*, from inability, perfection does not arise, 'without abandonment of the former,' *i. e.*, without abandonment of error. Likewise, perfection does not arise from acquiescence without abandonment of inability. Similarly, [perfection does not take place] without abandonment of that, [*i. e.*, of acquiescence].

"Indifference is conditioned by the existence of creation, [because it would otherwise be without an object. Now,] how many different creations are there?" To this [the author] replies:

'Without abandonment of the former,' *i. e.*, of error, inability and acquiescence; 'from the other' (*itarât* = *itarasmât*) means: from non-abandonment.[1] Supply: the perfections do not arise; because those [mental conditions] are antagonistic to the perfections. This is the meaning.—*itarât* is a vedic form [for *itarasmât*. The masculine ending] of *itara* appears [in the compound *itara-hâna* in the sense of the feminine stem, according to the rule] that a pronoun [which is to express a feminine sense] assumes the masculine form in all dissolvable words (*vritti*).[2]

[The author] states the difference of creations:

46. It is subdivided into the divine, etc.

By the word 'etc.' [it is indicated that] there are [altogether] six different [creations]. And thus [it is said]:

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[1] Mahâdeva strangely ascribes the same sense to the first part of the aphorism (*netarât*) as to the latter (*itara-hânena vinâ*).

[2] These *vritti's* are 1, *krid-anta* 2, *taddhitânta* (*f. i.*, *itara-maya*), 3, *samâsa* (*f. i.*, the case in question), 4, *ekaśesha* (*f. i.*, *itarau* = *itarâ itaraś cha*), 5 *sannâdy-anta-dhâtu* (*f. i.*, *itarati* = *itarâvad âcharati*). Cf. the commentary to Pâṇini 2, 1, 3. The above passage *sarvanâmno vritti-mâtre pumvad-bhâvaḥ* is taken from the Mahâbhâshya to Pâṇini 2, 2, 28, as Professor Kielhorn kindly informs me, (Vol. I, p. 429, l. 9 of his edition).

"In the [world] which begins with the divine [class], mundane existence, caused by works, is sixfold; god, demon, man, goblin, infernal and beast.[1]"

The vegetables are included in the infernals, [as existence in these two forms is the consequence of former sins].

"Since Matter has the habit of being active, it will always be creative, and hence there is no liberation." To this [the author] replies:

'Creation' is to be supplied. By the word 'etc.' [the two classes] beasts and mankind are meant. The divine [class] is eightfold, since it consists of the beings [in the worlds] of Brahman, Prajâpati and Indra, of the Manes, Gandharvas, Yakshas, Râkshasas and Piśâchas; that of the beasts is fivefold: domestic and wild beasts, birds, reptiles and vegetables (!); mankind is single in its class, if the varieties of the different castes, Brahmanhood etc., are not taken into consideration, as the bodily structure is the same in all four castes. This is, in short, the creation of animated beings.

"Since Matter has the habit of being active, it will always be creative; how, then, is liberation [possible]?" To this [the author] replies:

47. From Brahman down to the grass-blade, creation is for its benefit till discrimination.

Creation is for its benefit, *i. e.*, for the soul's benefit, [that is to say:] for the sake of liberation. 'Till discrimination' means: that habit of Matter holds good up to [the time of] discriminative knowledge, [and continues further with regard to all non-discriminating souls], since the essential nature is imperishable.

"Where and how is creation?" To this [the author] replies:

[1] The plural form *tiryañchas* or a trisyllabical *tiriak* (the reading of MS. B) may be conjectured.

Matter is active, by nature, only up to [the time of] discriminative knowledge.

"Where and how is creation?" This [the author] states:

48. On high it is abundant in Sattva.

[*I. e.*] in the world of the gods.

[The author] describes the creation in the world of the snake-demons:

49. It is abundant in Tamas underneath.

[*I. e.*] in the nether world.

[The author] describes the creation in the world of mortals:

50. In the midst it is abundant in Rajas.

'Abundant in—' means: principally consisting of—.

"But then, for what reason does the *variety* of creation proceed from primitive Matter through the mutual copulation of its single constituents?" To this [the author] replies:

[Creation] from the aërial world up to that of truth [*i. e.*, to Brahman's world] is abundant in Sattva; creation 'underneath,' *i. e.*, from the tame beasts down to the vegetables, is abundant in Tamas; in the midst it is abundant in Rajas, because [mankind] engages in performing good and bad deeds, and because it is full of pain.

"For what reason does the *variety* of creation arise from primitive Matter which is *one* [only]?" This [the author] states:

51. Because of the variety of works the behaviour of primitive Matter is like [that of] a born slave.

As an intelligent born slave does various work for the sake of his master, so primitive Matter produces the various creation for the sake of the souls 'because of the variety of

works,' *i. e.*, because it appropriates the [diverse] works [of all souls as *causæ efficientes* of its activity].

"Since [man] has accomplished his end by ascending to higher and higher worlds, what need is there of liberation [for him]?" To this [the author] replies:

Just so as a born slave does various work for the sake of his master.

"But then, since by the variety [and constant improvement] of works one ascends to higher and higher worlds, what need is there of liberation?" To this [the author] replies:

52. Return is even there; because of the being subject to successive births it is to be abandoned.

Even when higher and higher glorious states of existence have been attained to, there is return to mundane life; therefore, mundane life is to be abandoned.

[The author] states the same:

Since there is return, even when higher and higher glorious states of existence have been attained to, for this reason mundane life is to be abandoned.

53. The pain which is produced by old age, death, etc. is the same.

From Brahman down to the grass-blade.[1]

"Since [man] has accomplished his end already by dissolution into the cause, *i. e.*, into primitive Matter, what need is there of liberation?" To this [the author] replies:

[This is] plain.

[The author] refutes [the opinion] that the end be accomplished by dissolution into primitive Matter:

54. The end is not accomplished by dissolution

[1] Cf. aphorism 47.

into the cause, since there is a rising [again], as in the case of one having plunged.

It would be so, [as the opponent thinks], if there were no return [to new existences] for him who has dissolved into primitive Matter. But this is not the case, as we hear of his returning. Thus [it is said]:

> "Those whose meditation is devoted to the senses remain here ten Manu-periods, the worshippers of the elements a full hundred [of such periods], those of the egotizing organ a thousand, those of the judging organ[1] ten thousand, free from sorrow, those whose meditation is devoted to the indistinct [primitive Matter] a full hundred of thousands. But if one has advanced [in meditation] to the soul which is devoid of qualities, there is no computation of time [at all]."

As somebody who has plunged [into water] for the sake of bathing rises again, so does he who has dissolved into primitive Matter. This is the sense.

"As bondage does not belong to the Self, because this is eternal, for the same reason it [cannot belong] to primitive Matter, too." To this [objection the author] replies:

Since from the passage "Those whose meditation is devoted to the indistinct [primitive Matter] remain a full hundred of thousands [of Manu-periods]" we learn that he who has dissolved into the cause rises again, like one who has plunged [into water]. But from the passage "If one has advanced [in meditation] to the soul which is devoid of qualities, there is no computation of time [at all" follows that] there is no returning again [to mundane existence], when liberation is [attained].

"But then, the eternity of primitive Matter and Soul being without any difference, for what reason does creativeness belong to primitive Matter alone [and not to Soul, too]?" To this [the author] replies:

[1] *Bauddha* is used here in the sense of *buddhy-upâsaka*, but by no means in that of 'Buddhist.'

55. Though not being a product, it is subject to that, because it is dependent on another.

The fact that [primitive Matter] is not a product, [but eternal], is no matter; but [the principal thing is] the dependence on another; and this exists in the case of primitive Matter. Therefore, since [primitive Matter] is subject to this [dependence on another], it is [also] subject to bondage.

"Of what nature is this other, *i. e.*, the Self?" To this [the author] replies:

'Though not being a product,' *i. e.*, though being eternal, 'it is subject to that,' *i. e.*, [primitive Matter] is subject to creativeness, 'because it is dependent on another,' *i. e.*, because it is for the sake of another.

[The author] refutes the opinion that there be some intellectual superintendent of non-intellectual primitive Matter, and that he be omniscient and omnipotent:

56. For he is omniscient and omnipotent.

Such is the egotizing delusion [of the supreme being], because [its Self] is reflected in Matter [*i. e.*, in its internal organ which is of a universal character and possessed of all power belonging to Matter].

"But the agency [of the supreme being] will be *real;* what is the use of inventing a reflection? And thus an [independent] Lord is accepted in the Nyâya philosophy." To this [objection the author] replies:

By the words 'for he' simply the category 'primitive Matter' is meant. For primitive Matter [may be called omniscient, because it] can, on account of its changeableness, change into the form of the perceptive functions.[1] This is the meaning.

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1 Of course, the perceptive functions of the internal organ which is a product of primitive Matter are intended.

[The author] states that this alone is the purport of the scriptural and [traditional] passages, too, which teach that the Lord is the cause [of the world]:

57. The existence of such a Lord is established.

If the Lord is [declared to be such] a Self as *we* accept, we grant his existence; but for [a Lord] as accepted in the Nyâya philosophy there is no proof. This has been explained in [the commentary to] aphorism [92] of the first book: "Because the existence of a Lord cannot be proved." In aphorism [1] of the second book "[The agency of primitive Matter is] for the sake of the liberation of the [Self] which is [in reality] totally free [etc.]" it has been declared that the activity of Matter is for its own sake as well as for that of another [*i. e.*, of Soul; but] here the being for its own sake is [to be understood] in the figurative sense, [stated in the commentary to II 1].

[Now the author] declares that [this activity is merely for the sake of another:

'Existence' means 'conviction [of the existence]'; 'established' means 'produced by proofs.'

"To what purpose is Matter active?" To this [question the author] replies:

58. Matter's creating is for the benefit of another, because it does not experience by itself alone, —as the camel carries saffron.

We see that even an intellectual being is [sometimes active for the benefit of another, as the camel carries saffron; but non-intellectual Matter is *merely* active for the sake of another [*i. e.*, of Soul], because it does not experience [by itself].

"[But] the activity of an intellectual being [only] is seen, not [that] of non-intellectual [Matter]." To this [remark the author] replies :

'For the benefit of another' means 'for the benefit of Soul.' *Api* is [used] in the sense of *eva* 'alone,' [so that] the sense is: 'because it does not experience by itself alone.'

Apprehending [the declaration of an opponent] that by the example 'as the camel [carries] saffron' the activity of an intellectual being only is [proved, the author] says:

59. Though non-intellectual, Matter is active, like milk.

As non-intellectual milk comes forth for the benefit of the calf, so Matter [in general] is active for the benefit of Soul.

[The author] gives another example:

As milk comes forth for the sake of the calf's growth.

[The author] gives another example:

60. Or as works—what is well known—depend on Time, etc.

As the work done by the husbandman, the sowing of corn, etc., bears its fruit only after some time, and [since] plants are not conscious beings,[1] [this example is not open to the same censure as that of the camel]. By the word 'etc.' the invisible power [of merit and demerit][2] is to be understood.

"[But], as we know, the camel works, because it considers the danger of being beaten, etc., too, while non-intellectual Matter is void of [all] consideration." To this [objection the author] replies:

[1] Plants are called *acetana* here and in the comm. to aph. 62 in contrast with the camel (aph. 58); else the vegetable kingdom is considered as *cetana* or animated.

[2] This is the real cause of the fructescence of works. If the husbandman has accumulated a store of good deeds, his crops thrive, while a bad harvest is the consequence of a preponderance of bad deeds. So the activity of primitive Matter, too, or of Matter in general is dependent on Time and on the souls' merit and demerit.

(According to Mahâdeva's reading our aphorism must be translated: *As work depends on rain or Time, etc.*).

'Work' means [rural] action, *i. e.*, sowing. Seeds and the like, sown by the husbandman, change into the form of trees and the like in dependence on rain or in dependence on Time and on the invisible power [of the husbandman's merit and demerit]. So Matter [in general] also [is dependent on Time and on merit and demerit].

"[But] the camel's carrying saffron takes place for the fear of being beaten, too; Matter, however, is not intellectual, and therefore it cannot consider any objects of its own." To this [objection the author] replies:

61. The activity is by nature, not with a motive, like that of a servant.

As a servant who is a born-slave does his work for his master without any motive merely by nature, so does Matter.

[The author] mentions another alternative:

For it is well known that a born-slave manages the affairs of his master merely by nature, not with a view to any object of his own.

62. Or, because of the attraction of works, which is without beginning.

Since mundane existence [and hence the accumulation of merit and demerit] is without beginning, Matter is active in consequence of the attraction of merit and demerit,[1] as trees, though void of consciousness, bear fruit by the power of men's work [*i. e.*, merit].

Repeating [arguments] on account of the great number of arguments does not involve the fault of superfluous repetition. Therefore [the author] says:

[1] Cf. the commentary to aph. 60.

Since mundane existence is without beginning, Matter, urged by merit and demerit, is active. This is the sense.

What is advantageous may be repeated even a hundred times. With this view [the author] declares :

63. In consequence of discriminative cognition Matter's creation ceases, as [that of] the cook after the cooking.

Creation is for the sake of Soul. This ceases in consequence of the knowledge of the distinction between Matter and Soul, as the cook desists [from his work], when he has completed his cooking.

"[But] we don't see that liberation takes place, even when discriminative knowledge has been [acquired] by instruction." To this [the author] replies :

As the cook desists [from his work], when he has completed his cooking.

Apprehending [the question]: "Why [is it that] liberation [very often] does not take place, even when discriminative knowledge has been [attained ?," the author] declares :

64. The one which is distinct abandons the other, on account of its fault.

Liberation does not take place merely by an occasional cognition, but [then only, when] the Self which is distinct from the senses abandons—*i. e.*, sets apart by meditation, etc.—the other, *i. e.*, Matter ; 'on account of its fault,' that is to say : on account of the perception of the unsteadiness and the other faults of Matter.

[The author] describes the nature of liberation :

(According to Mahâdeva's reading our aphorism must be translated : *The one [may be] like the other, on account of its fault*).

'The one,' *i. e.*, even he who possesses the discriminative knowledge, [may be] 'like the other,' *i. e.*, like him who is destitute of

discriminative knowledge, 'on account of its [fault]' *i. e.*, of the fault of discriminative knowledge—which consists in doubts and errors. And thus the meaning is: in order to purify discriminative knowledge, one ought to persevere in the study of truth.

[The author] describes the nature of liberation :

65. The unconcernedness of both or of the one is salvation.

'Of both,' *i. e.*, of Matter and Soul. The unconcernedness of Matter is the not being active for the discriminating [soul] ; the unconcernedness of Soul is the not being attached to Matter. 'Of the one' means : of the Self, because this is the principal [of the two].

"[But,] if Matter which has the habit of being active could become unconcerned, the liberation of all ought to take place." To this [the author] replies :

The unconcernedness of Matter is the not being active for the discriminating [soul], that of Soul is the not being attached to Matter. 'Of the one' means : of the Self, because this is the principal [of the two].

"[But,] if Matter could become unconcerned [in activity], there would result the liberation of all." To this [the author] replies :

66. It does not desist, in the like manner, from influencing others by creation, as the snake does in the case of him who has discerned the real character of the rope.

[Matter] which has the habit of being active does not become unconcerned [about *all* souls], because the abandonment of the essential nature is a logical impossibility. But, when [Matter] becomes inactive with reference to the discriminating [soul], it does not desist, in the like manner,

from influencing creatively, *i. e.*, from creation with reference to the ignorant. [To desist, *virajyate*, means:] not to engage in creation. As, where a rope has become [similar to] a snake [in appearance], the snake, *i. e.*, the error that there be a snake, ceases in the case of him who has discerned the real character of the rope, but not in the case of him to whom the real character of the rope is [still] unknown.

[The author] states the reason thereof:

'Influencing' means producing. Though [Matter] is unconcerned about the knowing [soul], it is [still] active for those which are ignorant. The example is plain.

67. And because of the connection with work which is the motive.

Because[1] in the case of the discriminating [soul] there is no work [that is: no] motive [of Matter's agency; for] without a seed a sprout is not produced. Scripture also [says, Muṇḍaka Up. 2. 2. 8]:

> "The fetter of the heart is severed, all doubts are solved, and his works perish, when that is known which is high and low [*i. e.*, all-pervading]."

"Since the invisible [power of merit and demerit] is a product of the judging organ, there may be the assistance of this invisible [power] in the production of the egotizing organ and of the following [principles; but] how is a co-operation of the invisible [power possible], when *primitive Matter* sets forth its products?" To this [the author] replies:

For work is also the motive of creation; this is declared [in the aphorism]. And this [*i. e.*, work] belongs to the ignorant, not to the knowing [soul], as Scripture teaches: "And his works perish" (Muṇḍaka Up. 2. 2. 8).

[1] The following commentary does not explain, but complete the aphorism.

[The author] maintains [his doctrine], though the invisible [power] be not the cause [of the activity of primitive Matter]:

68. Though it be unconcerned, non-discrimination is the motive of the service of primitive Matter.

Though primitive Matter be unconcerned about the invisible [power of merit and demerit], non-discrimination is the co-operative [cause, *i. e.*, the *causa efficiens* of creation].

[The author] explains the cessation [of the activity] of Matter by an example:

Though [primitive Matter] be unconcerned about the invisible [power], non-discrimination is indispensable [as the motive] of the activity of primitive Matter.

[The author] explains the cessation [of the activity] of Matter by an example:

69. As a dancing girl, so also active [Matter][1] ceases after the accomplishment of the end.

As a dancing girl ceases [from dancing] after the accomplishment of the wishes of the spectators, so also Matter ceases [from creation] after the accomplishment of Soul's end by discrimination.

"[But,] though having ceased, Matter will begin [again] to be active from some cause or other." To this [the author] replies:

As a dancing girl, when she has shown herself to the assembled spectators, ceases from dancing, so does Matter also.

"[But] like the dancing girl it will begin again to act at some [other] time." [The author] denies [this]:

70. Likewise, Matter does not approach, when its fault has been perceived, like a woman of good family.

[1] Supply *pradhânasya*.

When its fault has been known through discrimination, Matter does not approach [Soul] again; as a woman of good family who has been beheld by a man, not akin to her, thinks, [being ashamed] "He shall not behold me again" and conceals herself.

"[But] liberation [can only come] to one who is in bondage; and both [states] cannot belong to Soul." To this [objection the author] replies:

And when in consequence of discriminative knowledge its fault has been perceived, [Matter] does not approach [Soul any more]. This is the sense. As a woman of good family who is aware "I have been beheld by a man not akin to me" does not approach that [man].

"Bondage and liberation belong to Soul merely through non-discrimination, but not essentially." This [the author] states:

71. Bondage and liberation do not belong to Soul in reality without non-discrimination.

That is to say: [the existence of] bondage and liberation [in Soul] is merely a delusion which arises from non-discrimination of Matter and Soul.

"As the illusory must be based on something real,[1] to whom do bondage and liberation belong in reality?" To this [the author] replies:

'In reality' means: essentially.

[The author] states that both are essential to Matter:

72. [They belong] to Matter directly, because it is subject to association, like a beast.

'Directly' means: really, 'because it is subject to association'; because it has connection with qualities (*guṇa-yogât*); as a beast is bound 'by association,' *i. e.*, by connection with

[1] As f. i. the illusion that mother of pearl be silver presupposes the existence of real silver.

ropes (*guṇa-yogât*). Therefore bondage and liberation belong to Matter in reality. Bondage is nothing but activity with regard to the non-discriminating; liberation, however, is non-activity with regard to the discriminating [soul]. Hence the logical impossibility of losing the essential nature is not [accepted by us].[1]

"In what way does Matter bind itself, and how does it liberate itself?" To this [the author] replies:

'Directly' means: really, 'because it is subject to association': because of the connection with qualities peculiar to it. Though bondage and liberation pertain to Matter, they are in conjunction with Soul in consequence of the non-cognition of the distinction. This is the meaning.

"In how many ways does Matter bind itself?" This [the author] states:

73. In seven ways Matter binds itself, like the silk-worm; it liberates itself in one way.

In seven ways, *i. e.*, by merit, indifference, divine power, demerit, ignorance, want of indifference and want of divine power, [Matter] binds [itself]; it liberates [itself] in one way, *i. e.*, by knowledge.

"[We are taught by the Karmamîmâṃsâ] that experience is [produced] by interested, and liberation by disinterested works. If these are given up, revelation [*dṛishṭa*, *i, e.*, the revealed fruit] is lost." To this [the author] replies:

'In seven [ways],' *i. e.*, by merit, indifference, divine power, ignorance, demerit, want of indifference and want of divine power; 'in one [way],' *i. e.*, by knowledge.

"But then, if meditation is practised uninterruptedly for the sake of discriminative knowledge, and if the works which are the cause of liberation are given up, liberation will not take place." To this [objection, made by a Mîmâṃsaka, the author] replies:

[1] Cf. *svabhâva-tyâga-doshât* in the commentary to aph. 66.

74. Non-discrimination is the cause; therefore revelation is not lost.

The invisible [power of merit] is a cause of liberation [only] indirectly through the medium of knowledge; the cause of mundane existence, however, [*i. e.*, of bondage] is non-discrimination, [and by the cessation thereof liberation is attained at once]. Therefore [by giving up all works enjoined in the Karmamîmâṃsâ] revelation [*i. e.*, the revealed fruit, liberation] is not lost.

"And how is discrimination [effected]?" To this [the author] replies:

The cause of mundane existence is non-discrimination; for the sake of the cessation thereof one must endeavour after discriminative knowledge. Thus there will be no loss of the revealed fruit, *i. e.*, of liberation. The fruit [promised in the Karmamîmâṃsâ] is liberation by means of the purification of the thinking organ through works. This is called 'revealed' [or 'revelation'].

"How is discrimination [effected]?" To this [the author] replies:

75. Discrimination results from the study of the principles by 'Not so! Not so!' [and] from abandoning.

[This is] plain. And [so] Scripture [says, Bṛihadâraṇyaka Up. 3. 9. 26 and elsewhere]: "That Self is not so, not so; it is incomprehensible, for it is not [to be] comprehended; it is indestructible; for it is not [to be] destroyed, etc."

"If liberation were [effected] by the study of the principles and [by abandoning all material objects], liberation would come to all disciples immediately after the instruction, because study is alike [with all disciples]." To this [the author] replies:

'Not so! Not so!' From such 'study of the principles,' *i. e.*, from repeatedly considering the Self in its difference from the body, the senses and the other [material principles], and 'from abandoning,' *i. e.*, from renouncing the world, 'discrimination results,' *i. e.*, the distinction [between Matter and Soul] becomes manifest. And thus Scripture says: "Now follows the teaching 'Not so! Not so!'" (Bṛihadâr. Up. 2. 3. 6), and "Only by renouncing [the world] some attained to immortality." (Taittirîya Áraṇyaka, 10. 10. 3).

"But then, if liberation were [effected] by study through the medium of the arising of discriminative knowledge, it would come to all disciples simultaneously, because there is no difference of study." To this [the author] replies:

76. On account of the difference of the capable there is no necessity.

On account of the difference of [mental] power on the part of the excellent, mediocre and inferior, there is no necessity that [all should be liberated] simultaneously.

"If liberation results from discrimination, how is it that, as we see, the discriminating still experiences?" To this [the author] replies:

77. In consequence of the continuance after the removal, experience follows from mediocre discrimination also.

There is no experience in the case of him whose discrimination is acute [or first-rate; but] there is experience [not only on the part of the inferior, but] of him also whose discrimination is mediocre; [that is to say: in the case of the mediocre] the impressions [of former experience] alone continue, since in consequence of want of [all] desires [real experience] has been removed by the cognition 'Enough [of the objects!' Thus the mediocre] experiences [only] with the

sensation 'I am consuming by my experience that work the fructescence of which has [already] begun.'[1]

[The author] describes the nature of him whose discrimination is mediocre:

Mediocrity means: being possessed of some residuum of works which have begun to bear fruit and are obstructive to the *definitive liberation* [for which death is necessary]. From the discrimination of him who possesses such [a residuum of works, follows not only *liberation in life-time*, but] experience also. Thus [the aphorism] is to be construed. 'In consequence of the continuance' means: because [experience], though 'removed' [or obstructed] by the absence of desire and aversion, *i. e.*, though not occasioning delight or distress nor producing any wishes, is necessarily existing as the fruit of those works the fructescence of which has [already] begun. And thus there is a great difference between the experience of the discriminating and that of the non-discriminating. This is the meaning.

[The author] describes the nature of him whose discrimination is mediocre:

78. And he is liberated in life-time.

He is liberated [just] as well as he who is [definitively] liberated [after death], because there is neither desire nor the arising of [fresh] merit [in his case]. Scripture also says (Bṛihadâr. Up. 4. 4. 12):

"If a man knows the [highest] Self so that he says 'I am that,' what wishing [or] from desire for what will he grieve at the body?"

To the [objection] that the liberation of a living [individual] cannot be proved, [the author] replies what follows:

Though [still] living, he is as if [he were] liberated.

[The author] gives the proof [of the existence] of one liberated in life-time:

79. This results from the fact that there are instructed and instructors.

[1] *upârûḍha* is a synonym of *prârabdha*.

He whose discrimination is acute cannot be instructor, because he is not conscious of external [objects any more]; nor can he whose discrimination is inferior be instructor, on account of his ignorance; but the latter is to be instructed. [Only] he whose discrimination is mediocre can be instructor. Hence 'this results,' *i. e.*, [the existence of individuals,] liberated in life-time, results.

[The author] adduces a testimony for this:

He who is liberated in life-time cannot be one of those who are to be instructed, because he has no desire or the like; but he [only] whose discrimination is inferior is to be instructed. And thus from the fact that the latter must have an instructor follows [the existence of] liberation in life-time.

[The author] adduces a testimony for this:

80. And Scripture

has declared: "For the wise, though [still] living, is liberated from delight and distress."

"[But] he also whose discrimination is inferior may be instructor." To this [the author] replies:

There are scriptural texts also declaratory of the fact that [only] the wise can be instructor: "Holding fuel in his hand, [he may go to a teacher] who is learned and abiding in Brahman", "To that [disciple] who has approached him reverentially, the wise [teacher told the knowledge of Brahman] correctly" (Muṇḍaka Up. 1. 2. 12, 13).

[The author] refutes the opposite opinion:

81. Else there would be a tradition [comparable to a row] of blind men [leading each other].

[If a man whose discrimination is inferior could be instructor], the teacher would be ignorant and the disciple, too, not knowing!

"As liberation results from knowledge, when there is instruction, one ought to be liberated immediately after

instruction. To what purpose is the delay?" To this [the author] replies:

How is an ignorant person to be instructed by another ignorant person?

"For what reason does the body of the knowing last?" This [the author] states:

82. Like the whirling of the wheel, he retains the body.

As, [even] after the removal of the stick, the [potter's] wheel goes on whirling in consequence of the impulse [given to it formerly], so the discriminating also do not attain liberation in that moment, [when they are instructed], because their work, [*i. e.*, the merit and demerit, accumulated by them,] which causes the retention of the body, has not been consumed [then]; but [liberation comes to them not sooner than] after consumption of [all] works by experience and [meditation]. And thus Scripture says:

> "By devoting himself [to an ascetic life] man is liberated, but he remains, though liberated, in the body; a jar [also], standing on the middle of the potter's wheel, goes on whirling, though it is cut off [from the lump of clay]."

Therefore such a person exists who is liberated in life-time. This [the author] declares:

As the wheel which is whirled round by the stick goes on whirling, even when the stick has been removed, so even when Matter has ceased from its activity with regard to the discriminating, his body, produced by former work, lasts. This is the sense.

"But then, the whirling [of the wheel] may be occasioned by the impulse [given to it formerly,] even when there is no operation with the stick; but [this example does not help to decide the question:] how can there be experience, when there is no desire or the like?" To this [objection the author] replies:

83. This results from a minimum of impulse.

I. e., liberation in life-time [or mundane existence of a liberated person] results.

"When does the highest [or absolute] liberation take place?" To this [the author] replies:

The impulse by desire or the like [is to be understood; and] this is [only] a minimum, that is to say: a seeming desire or the like. From that 'this results,' *i. e.*, experience results [in the case of one liberated]. Therefore, though [we think we] observe [something like] desire etc. in discriminating persons, this is not [real] desire or the like, but only a seeming desire or the like. This is the meaning.

[The author] describes the [definitive] liberation after death:

84. When the cessation of all pain results from discrimination, [man] has accomplished his end; by no other [means]—by no other [means].

When the absolute cessation of the threefold pain has taken place, so that no rest is left, [man] has accomplished his end, since he has [then] attained to the highest [or definitive] liberation. 'By no other [means],' *i. e.*, [not] by work [can this be effected]. The repetition of the words 'by no other [means]' indicates the end of the book.

When those works the fructescence of which has begun are consumed by experience, [and hence] the absolute cessation of the threefold pain, mentioned [in aphorism I. 1], has taken place, [man] has accomplished his end, *i. e.*, is liberated. That work is not the cause of liberation, [the author] recapitulates [saying]: 'by [no] other [means,' *i. e.*, not] by work.

The form *itarât* [instead of the regular *itarasmât*] is to be accounted for either by the fact that the rule [about the formation of the cases] is not fixed with regard to pronouns, or by the assumption of a vedic anomaly. The repetition [of the last words] is for the sake of [indicating] the end of the book.

Here ends, in the commentary on Kapila's aphorisms explanatory of the Sâṃkhya system, the third book which

treats of indifference. After indifference [having been explained], the fourth book begins with a view to narratives conducive to the understanding of the disciples.

Here ends the third book in the quintessence of the commentary, composed by Mahâdeva the Vedantist. After indifference [having been explained], the fourth book treats chiefly of narratives conducive to the understanding of the disciples.

BOOK IV.

1. As in the case of the king's son, [discrimination results] from instruction about the truth.

A certain king's son who, being born at the time of [the unlucky constellation] Gaṇḍa, had been banished and adopted as a son by the lord of the foresters, knew only their way of life. Now, after the death of the childless king, having been brought (to the capital) and informed by the ministers: "You are not a forester, you are the king's son," he assumed at once, on these words, the behaviour of a king's son in conequence of his former disposition. Thus instruction is to be given for the sake of the understanding of those also who are [mentally] inferior.

[The author] mentions another narrative:

'As a king's son ceases to be a forester, when recollection comes to him, so does [the ignorance] of him who does not know the Self.... '; in consequence of instruction about the truth, given by the teachers in this way, the end is necessarily accomplished. And [so] it is said in the Garuḍapurâṇa:

> "As some Brâhmaṇa who is seized upon by a demon thinks 'I am a S'ûdra,' [but,] when the demoniac possession is gone, knows again that he is a Brâhmaṇa, so the soul which is seized upon by Mâyâ thinks 'I am the body,' [but,] when Mâyâ is gone, knows again its nature 'I am Brahman.'"

[The author] teaches that liberation arises even from knowledge of the Self [attained] by the way:

2. As in the case of the imp, even when instruction is for the benefit of another.

A certain teacher took his pupil (along with him), saying: "Receive the instruction in a solitary place," entered the forest and gave him the instruction [there]. This was over-

heard by an imp hidden in the bush, [and so] he also was liberated.—The purport of the passage is that liberation arises even from knowledge of the Self [attained] by the way.

[The author] mentions some difference as to [the effect of] this [instruction]:

There is the following narrative. While a pupil was being instructed by a certain teacher in a solitary place, his instruction was overheard by some hidden imp, and [so] he, [too,] was liberated. Thus another also becomes liberated in consequence of instruction [given] for the benefit of somebody else.

[The author] mentions some difference as to [the effect of] this [instruction]:

3. Repetition [is necessary, because some attain to liberation only] in consequence of frequent instruction.

Liberation may come to those who are of acute indifference, merely through hearing [the instruction *once*; but,] as the inferior require uninterrupted instruction, repetition is to be made [for their sake].

[The author] mentions another narrative:

Liberation is attained by those who are of acute indifference, through hearing the instruction *once* only, but by the inferior, in consequence of *frequent* instruction; [therefore the latter] must care for repetition, *i. e.*, for repeated reception [of the instruction].

And for the sake of instruction a [professional] teacher is not indispensable. This [the author] states [in the following aphorism]:

4. As in the case of father and son, because it is apparent to both.

A certain Brâhmaṇa who had, because of his poverty, delivered his pregnant wife to her father's house and had repaired to another country for the acceptance of gifts, returned home after a long time and, seeing his son, did not know him. The mother of the latter made her husband and her son acquainted [with one another]; hence knowledge came to both of them.—The sense [of this story] is that the knowledge of truth arises without a [professional] teacher even from the instruction given by a friend.

[The author] mentions another narrative:

'Because it is apparent,' *i. e.*, because the true state of things may be apparent, 'to both,' *i. e.*, to the teacher and to the pupil [as well]. There is no restriction about [professional] teachers as regards this knowledge, but instruction may be given by any one who is not mistaken, [and] the fruit [*i. e.*, the knowledge of truth] may be obtained by [everybody] who is capable [thereof].

An example of this is 'the case of father and son.' The narrative runs as follows. A certain poor Brâhmaṇa who, having removed his pregnant wife to her father's house, had repaired to another country, returned after a long time. Seeing his son, he did not know 'This is my own son,' nor did the son, seeing his father, [know] 'This is my father.' Then the husband and the son were informed by the mother in the following way: "This is your son, this is your father." After that both became happy.

[The author] teaches that the joy of mundane existence is to be abandoned, because it is mixed with pain:

5. Like the hawk, one becomes happy by release and afflicted by separation.

A young hawk was caught by a certain man and reared with regular food, pieces of sugar, molasses and the like. In time he grew up and was set free in the forest by the man who thought: "Why should I make him afflicted?" and so the hawk became happy by his release from captivity, [but at the same time] afflicted by his separation from the man. Since in this way joy is intermixed with pain, both are to be abandoned.

[The author] mentions another narrative:

All people are happy and afflicted, that is to say: possessed of

joy mixed with pain. 'By release and by separation, like the hawk.' A young hawk was caught by somebody who went a-hunting, and was reared with food and drink. In time he grew up. Then the hawk was set free in the forest by that [man] who thought: "Why should I make him afflicted by captivity?" [Now,] as this [hawk] became happy by his release from captivity, and [at the same time] afflicted by his separation from the man who had reared him, so everybody who derives joy from objects, is afflicted [too]. This is the sense.

[The author] states that selfishness, affection, etc. lead to mischief:

6. As in the case of the snake's skin.

'Skin' means 'slough.'—A certain snake, having, at the entrance of its hole, stripped off its slough, and seeing this defiled with dust and mud, was grieved thinking 'This is mine,' and did not abandon it through affection. [The snake] was [then] captured by some snake-charmer[1] because of the slough [which attracted attention].—The purport [of this story] is that one should not indulge in selfishness, affection, etc.

[The author] mentions another narrative:

'The snake's skin' means 'the slough of the serpent,'—'as in the case of this'; that is to say: As a serpent, though having stripped off its slough at the entrance of its hole, does not abandon its interest for that through affection, but is grieved at seeing it defiled with dust and mud, and is, just because of that [slough], captured by some snake-charmer and becomes subject to much suffering,—so does that man [also] who feels affection to the objects.

An improper act is by no means to be committed, and, if it be committed inconsiderately, an atonement is necessarily to be rendered. This [the author] states [in the following aphorism]:

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1 *Âhituṇḍika* literally 'he who makes sport with the snake's mouth,' the well known performance of the Indian snake-charmer.

7. Or, as in the case of the man whose hands were cut off.

A certain ascetic entered the hermitage of his brother and took away fruit and some other things. He was then accosted by his brother: "You are a thief." He said: "Mention the penance." The brother replied: "There is no other penance than the cutting off of the hands." Then [the culprit] informed the king [of his crime], and had his hands cut off. Therefore an improper act is not to be committed, and, if it be committed inconsiderately, an atonement is necessarily to be rendered for it.

[The author] mentions another narrative:

Thus goes the story:

> A certain ascetic entered the hermitage of his brother and took away fruit, flowers and some other things. Then having been accosted by his brother: "You are a thief," he replied to him: "Mention the penance." Thereon [the latter] declared the cutting off of the hands to be the penance. [The culprit] informed the king quickly, and had his hands cut off.

8. Thinking of what is no means [of liberation] is conducive to bondage, as in the case of Bharata.

A king, named Bharata, though he was on the point of being liberated, saw an antelope bringing forth its young that very moment, and reared the young antelope. [Since then] his mind was directed to this and to nothing else, [and] at the hour of death he breathed his last with his mind fixed upon it. Because of his affection to this [animal] he did not attain to liberation.—The purport [of this story] is that one should not indulge in thinking of what is noxious [to salvation].

[The author] teaches that one should not keep company with many:

To wit: Bharata reared a young antelope; his mind was directed

to this, and to nothing else and he died, thinking only of this even at the hour of death. Therefore he did not attain to liberation, but became subject to [a new] mundane existence. This is clear from the Purâṇas.

One should not keep company with many :

9. With many, concentration is hindered, through passion, etc., as in the case of the shells of a girl.

[Association with] many brings about quarrel as a necessary consequence, as the shells [on the bracelet] of a girl rattle at each other in consequence of their mutual rubbing.

[The author] teaches that one should not keep [company] even with two :

As the shell-bracelets of a girl rattle in consequence of their mutual rubbing, so, when there is association with many, quarrel with each other necessarily arises through passion, etc. Therefore one should not cultivate the society of many.

10. Likewise even by [the association with] two.

Because of the faults of conversation, etc.

[The author] mentions another narrative :

Because the faults of conversation, etc., are possible even in that case. This is the meaning.

11. The hopeless is happy, like Piṅgalâ.

A courtesan, named Piṅgalâ, was sleepless and suffering pain, because she was waiting [in vain] for the visit of some paramour for the sake of enjoyment. Once, however, repenting on account of endless suffering she felt disgusted [with her former life] and vowed 'I shall not do so again.' Being hopeless, she slept well [henceforward].

[The author] says that the building of a house leads to pain [too] :

> "For hope is the greatest pain, hopelessness the greatest bliss. Hence Piṅgalâ slept well, as she had given up her hope for a lover."

(Cf. Mahâbhârata 12. 6520, 6647).

12. Even without effort [one may be] happy in another's house, like a snake.

[This is] plain.

In the institutes there are to be found criticisms with regard to the explanations [of other teachers] and similar things of minor importance. Such [parts] must be passed over. This [the author] says [in the following aphorism] :

> "The building of a house does never cause happiness to men; the snake fares well which enters the house built by another [animal]." (Cf. Mahâbhârata 12. 6649).

13. Though devoting one's self to many institutes and teachers, one should take the quintessence [only], like the bee.

As the bee takes [only] the honey and not the flower, so ignorance is to be passed over by him who endeavours after liberation.

"To whom does [real] contemplation belong?" To this [the author] replies :

> "One should take the quintessence from everything, as gold out of rocks,"

according to this rule one should accept from the institutes also the quintessence only but should not be bent upon conquering opponents; moreover, one ought to aim only at the calm and at other [virtues], found in the teacher, but not at his occasional passion, hatred and the like. This is the sense. Hence it is said in the Mârkaṇḍeya [Purâṇa 41. 19] :

> "He who wanders [now to this, now to that] thirsting "This is to be known, that is to be known" will not obtain knowledge in thousands of mundane periods."

[The author] teaches that one should aim at concentrated attention :

14. He whose mind is absorbed in one thing does not forfeit contemplation, like the maker of arrows.

As the maker of arrows, whose mind was fixed on the arrow [in his hand], did not notice the king passing hard by, so he whose mind is intent upon one thing does not forfeit contemplation.

[The author] says that observances and the like are not to be broken, [because such things are] for the sake of purifying the Sattva [of the internal organ]:

As the maker of arrows whose mind is fixed on the arrow does not perceive the king passing with an army on the road close by him, so he whose mind is absorbed in one thing does not forfeit contemplation, but another necessarily does. Therefore one should aim at concentrated attention of the mind for the sake of the knowledge of truth.

15. By violation of the observances and obligations uselessness [is effected], as in daily life.

As in daily life all repudiate the violation of agreements made with many, so by violation of the observances, etc. one becomes destitute [of the understanding] of the sense of the Vedas.

[The author] states that pain necessarily arises [even] from forgetting the knowledge of truth:

(According to Mahâdeva's reading the beginning of the aphorism is to be translated: *By violation of the enjoined obligations....*)

'By violation,' *i. e.*, by non-performance, 'of the enjoined,' *i. e.*, acknowledged 'obligations,' such as ablutions and the like, 'uselessness,' *i. e.*, inefficacy, [is effected]. Supply: of all factors required for the knowledge of truth. The performance of ablutions and the like is an *accompanying* [cause] of the knowledge of truth which is to be produced [*directly*] by the means of the knowledge of truth. This is the meaning. 'As in daily life,' *i. e.*, in the same way as in daily life, when the obligations or stipulations agreed on are violated, even sovereignty and other causes of pleasure become ineffective; [for,] when the stipulations are violated, even sovereignty does not give pleasure because of the sedition of the subjects.

[The author] states that pain arises, when the knowledge of truth is forgotten:

16. Even, when this is forgotten, as in the case of the female frog.

A certain king who went a-hunting saw a beautiful girl in the forest and asked her: "Who are you?" She replied: "I am a king's daughter." The king said: "Yield yourself to me." She replied: "Well, but agree to the stipulation that no water shall be shown to me by you." Having answered: "So it be," he married her. Thus some time having passed, she, [once on a time] fatigued by sport, asked the king: "Where is water?" The king, too, forgetting the stipulation through confusion, showed her water. And she who was the daughter of the king of the frogs became a frog by contact with water. And the king who did not recover her, though he sought her with nets, etc., suffered much pain. Therefore the study of truth is not to be interrupted.

[The author] mentions another narrative:

By [the word] 'this' the knowledge of truth is intended, this having been kept in mind. Thus the following narrative is reported: A certain king who went a-hunting saw a beautiful girl, and having, at the [mere] sight of her, fallen in love with her, asked: "Who are you?" She replied: "I am a king's daughter." The king said: "Yield yourself to me." And the king was accepted as husband by her on condition that no water should be shown to her. Thus some time having passed, she, once on a time, being fatigued by sport, said to the king: "Where is water?" But the king, since he had forgotten the stipulation, showed her

water. And she, becoming a frog by contact with water, entered the same. The king, however, fell into pain on account of the separation from her.

[The author] states that the end is not accomplished by the mere hearing of the instruction, but [that it is accomplished] only by him who, living near the teacher, practises reflection, etc.

17. Though the instruction be heard, one does not accomplish the end without deliberation, like Virochana.

Liberation does not follow from the mere hearing, but only from reflection; as [according to Chhândogya Up. 8. 7. 2 seq.] Indra and Virochana went to Brahman's world for the sake of the knowledge of truth and were instructed by Brahman; Virochana returned home after having heard the knowledge of truth and did not practise reflection, etc.; therefore he was not liberated; Indra, however, worshipping Brahman, practised reflection for a long time.

"And what happened to Indra?" To this [the author] replies:

'Deliberation' means reflection and [constant meditation, *nididhyâsana*]. For Virochana, having heard the instruction, went home and did not practise reflection, etc.; therefore he was not liberated.

18. Of these two, it is known [to have come] to Indra.

Among these two, the [liberating] knowledge is known [to have come] to Indra. The success resulted, through permanent study, from service done to Brahman, reflection, constant meditation, and immediate perception.

"And how is [this] knowledge obtained?" To this [the author] replies:

'Of these two,' *i. e.*, Indra and Virochana, 'it is known [to have come] to Indra.' Supply: the accomplishment of the end.

"How was the end accomplished by Indra?" To this [the author] replies:

19. Having practised reverence, the disciple's duties and attendance, one succeeds after a long time, like him.

He who is not reverential and does not perform the disciple's duties is incompetent [to obtain the liberating knowledge]. 'Like him' means 'like Indra'; [that is to say:] as knowledge was attained by Indra through devotion to Brahman, so [it may be] by another also through devotion to the teacher.

"Does liberation depend on a regulation of [the duration of] time and place? In that case the question of quick or dilatory [accomplishment] becomes impossible." With reference to this [remark the author] declares:

'Attendance' means 'living near [the teacher].' 'Like him' [*i. e.*, like Indra], another also [may succeed]; this is to be supplied.

20. There is no regulation of time as in the case of Vâmadeva.

There is a regulation of time for devotion, [but] not for liberation, since we know that Vâmadeva was liberated quickly after [the attainment of] the knowledge of truth.

"When [an object] has been perceived, one may certainly meditate upon it; but the Self has not been seen by anybody; [and] if it were seen, what need is [there] for meditation?" To this [objection the author] replies:

As to [the effect of] the means [employed], there is no regulation of time, whether [it will take place] in this existence or in a future one. For Scripture teaches [Aitareya Up. 4. 5] that Vâmadeva, even while in the womb, obtained the knowledge in consequence of means, employed in other existences.

"But then, there may be meditation upon a [thing] seen; but the Self has not been seen by anybody; [and] if it were what need is [there] for meditation?" With regard to this [the author] replies:

21. Mediately in consequence of worshipping it under an imputed form, as in the case of the sacrificing worshippers.

And, [pray,] by whom has merit been seen? Still, worship by means of sacrifices is [done] for the acquisition of merit, because [at the sacrifices] clarified butter is offered for the gods *mediately*.[1] In our case also, what form may be imputed [to the Self] by the teacher, [*i. e.*, whether this be the form of Brahman, Vishṇu, Śiva, etc.], in consequence of a worship which corresponds to this [form] mediately [by degrees] the [real] form of that [Self] becomes apparent. And the recollection of things similar to things meditated upon is a fact. And thus [it is said]:

"(1) Something similar [to the thing remembered], (2) the invisible [power of merit and demerit], (3) thought, and [(4) the perception of something which is in connection with the thing remembered[2]] awaken the seeds of memory; hence dreams or [visions] are no exception [to this rule] because these are [produced] by the force of [former] impressions."[3]

"What need is there for the knowledge of the Self for him who has accomplished his end by arriving at the world of Brahman or at some other [divine world]?" To this [the author] replies:

[1] While it is offered immediately into the fire.

[2] Thus *âdya* was explained to me by the Paṇḍit: *tat-sambandhi jñânam, yathâ putra-darśanena mâtâ smaryatê.*

[3] There would be an *atiprasanga* with regard to the rule just stated, if one dreamt something destitute of any similarity or connection with things perceived, thought of, or experienced formerly.—*bhâvanâ* is used in the sense of *vâsanâ*.

As those who perform sacrifices obtain merit which is invisible, so 'in consequence of worshipping the form' or nature which is 'imputed'—*i. e.*, taught—'mediately,' *i. e.*, by the succession of teachers, the cognition of the real nature of the Self [arises]; this is to be supplied. Perception [of the object] is not required, for the sake of meditation but [only] knowledge; and this [knowledge of the Self's existence] is easily obtained through the succession of teachers. This is the meaning.

"But then, enough of the knowledge of truth which causes liberation, since the end is accomplished by arriving at Brahman's world also!" To this [the author] replies:

22. There is return, though one may have arrived at other [places] in consequence of the connection with the five [sacrificial] fires,[1] because of the scriptural texts about birth.

By means of the Agnihotra and other [ceremonies] one arrives at Brahman's world, but [every object][2] attained to by works perishes. Therefore there is return [from Brahman's world]. To this 'the scriptural texts about birth' refer: "As here on earth the abode which is acquired by works perishes, so does in the other world the abode which is acquired by good deeds." (Chhândogya Up. 8. 1. 6.),

"Not by works nor by offspring [nor] by wealth, only by renouncement few attained to immortality." (Taittirîya Âraṇyaka 10. 10. 3).

"What is the essential nature of him who has become indifferent?" To this [the author] replies:

[1] This unnatural construction of the aphorism by Aniruddha and Mahâdeva is caused by their misunderstanding of the term *pañchâgni*, about which Chhândogya Up. 5. 4-9 is to be compared. Vijñânabhikshu has rightly connected *pañchâgni-yogato* with *janma-śruteḥ*.

[2] Supply *padârthaḥ*.

'In consequence of the connection with the five [sacrificial] fires,' *i. e.*, in consequence of devotion by means of these five fires. 'Though one may have arrived at other [places],' *i. e.*, though one may have arrived at Brahman's world, 'there is return.' For what reason? 'Because of the scriptural text about birth,' *i. e.*, because in the scriptural text "They do not return into this whirl of human existence" (Chhândogya Up. 4. 15. 6) we learn from the apposition 'this', that they are born [again] in another human form.

And this knowledge of truth[1] comes only to him who has become indifferent. This [the author] states:

23. He who has become indifferent abandons what is to be abandoned and takes what is to be taken, as is the case with the flamingo and the milk.

Though all abandon what is to be abandoned and take what is to be taken, still on account of the special object [of our disquisition] mundane existence must be understood as 'what is to be abandoned,' and liberation as 'what is to be taken.'

[The author] gives the reason thereof:

'What is to be abandoned' is mundane existence, 'what is to be taken' is liberation.

"For what reason?" To this [the author] replies:

24. Because of the connection with the obtained superiority, like the same.

[*I. e.*] like the flamingo. [For] the flamingo only [and no other animal] possesses a superior faculty, since it drinks the milk [alone], even when this is mixed [with water], and leaves the latter. So by that person who has obtained superiority, mundane existence is to be abandoned, and liberation is to be taken.

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[1] This is said with reference to the introduction to aphorism 22.

"[But] liberation will come to him also who has passions." To this [the author] replies:

'Like the same', *i. e.*, like the flamingo. The meaning [of the aphorism] is this: because, as the flamingo only possesses the faculty of discriminating milk and water, he only who has become indifferent obtains the connection with that superiority by which one discriminates what is to be abandoned and what is to be taken.— The word 'or' (*vâ*, which is read by Mahâdeva after *yogât*) [is used] in the sense of 'only,' [and so] 'of him only who has become indifferent' is [to be supplied at] the beginning [of the aphorism].

25. He who is affected with passions cannot move according to his inclination,—like S'uka.

He who is affected with passions cannot even move according to his inclination,[1] much less obtain liberation; just as Vyâsa who had passions did not reach liberation, while it came to his son S'uka, since he was free from passions.

"Whence is bondage?" To this [the author] replies:

He who is affected with passions cannot even move according to his inclination, much less obtain liberation; this is to be supplied. To him, however, who is free from passions, liberation comes, as to S'ukadeva.

"Whence is bondage?" To this [the author] replies:

26. Bondage results from the connection with the constituents, as is the case with the parrot.

As the bird,[2] [called] *śuka* 'parrot,' incurs bondage on account of the virtues which it possesses (*guṇa-yogât*), so the soul also incurs bondage through its connection with the constituents (*guṇa-yogât*).

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[1] As a man who would like to travel to a distant country is kept back by his love to wife, children, etc., Paṇḍit.

[2] *Pakshî* is added, because our commentators take *śuka* as a proper name in the preceding aphorism.

"[But] the [liberating] indifference will proceed in time merely from enjoyment; what need is there of knowledge?" To this [the author] replies:

The word *guṇa* has a double meaning. As the bird, [called] parrot, is bound [*i. e.*, caught] on account of the virtues which it possesses (*guṇa-yogât*), *viz.*, sweet voice and [beauty], so the Self is bound through its connection with the constituents, (*guṇa-yogât*), that is to say: with Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. This is the meaning.

Indifference does not proceed from enjoyment [simply], but from the cognition of defects. This [the author] states in the [following] two aphorisms:

27. Appeasement of desires does not follow from enjoyment, as in the case of the holy sages.

The desires even of a holy sage are not appeased by enjoyment, not to say of others! [Such saints] as Kaṇva, Saubhari, and others [are to be understood].

"How will indifference arise in people devoted to the objects of sense?" To this [the author] replies:

28. From the cognition of the defects of both.

'Of both,' *i. e.*, of the [empirical] Self and of the objects. The defect of the Self which depends on its attachment [to worldly pleasures] is the going to hell and the staying in the womb, etc., [*i. e.*, the coming out of the same to new human or animal existence]; the defect of the objects is their liability to change, their causing disgust, etc.

[The author] describes that man who is incapable of being instructed:

Even in the case of such holy sages as Saubhari and others appeasement of desires did not follow from enjoyment; leave aside therefore the question of people like us! 'Of both,' *i. e.*, of the [empirical] Self and of the objects. The defects of the Self depend on its attachment [to worldly pleasures], the going to hell, the staying in the womb, etc.; those of the objects are liability to change, the causing disgust, etc.

29. The seed of instruction does not shoot in a foul mind, as [it did not] in that of Aja.

As the seed does not shoot in a field which is unprepared, so the seed of instruction does not shoot in a mind which is foul on account of desires and the like. 'As [it did not] in that of Aja,' *i. e.*, as in [the mind of] the king, named Aja, who was affected with grief at [the death of] his wife, the instruction given by Vasishṭha did not make any impression.

[The author] states that not even a seeming knowledge [arises] in a mind which is foul on account of desires and the like:

The shooting of the seed—that is, of instruction—which is the cause [of the knowledge of truth] means the bearing fruit. 'As [it did not] in that of Aja,' *i. e.*, as in the case of the king, named Aja, who was affected with grief at [the death of] his wife, Vasishṭha's instruction was not capable of [producing] its effect.

[The author] states that not even a semblance of knowledge [arises] in a mind which is extremely foul:

30. Not even a mere semblance, as in a foul mirror.

As not even something like a semblance of a face[1] is reflected in a foul mirror, so [it is the case with] the knowledge of the Self, which is produced by Matter, since the Self is reflected in Matter [*i. e.*, in the internal organ].

"But then, let simply the 'great one' be the Self, because this has the nature of the cause." To this [the author] replies:

"As the elements, the bodies formed of the elements (*bhautika*), the agency [of the internal organ], and others are products

[1] *Mukhâbhâsam* is a Bahuvrîhi compound.

of Matter and as such belong to mundane existence, so should liberation too, as it is [also] a product thereof [*i. e.*, of Matter].[1]" To this [the author] replies:

31. Though it is produced by that, it has not the nature of that; like the lotus, etc.[2]

The product is not the cause, since they are distinct [from one another]; for the lotus is not the clay.

[The author] states that even he who has attained to the possession of supernatural powers, *viz.*, of the faculty of assuming atomic magnitude, etc., has not [yet] accomplished his end:

As [the lotus], though sprung from the clay, has not the nature of the clay, so [liberation], although produced by Matter, [*i. e.*, by knowledge which is an affection of the internal organ], has not the nature of mundane existence, because it is distinct [from that], as it is untouched by pain.

"Well, the state of being untouched by pain exists, when the faculty of assuming atomic magnitude and the other supernatural powers are attained." To this [the author] replies:

32. The end is not accomplished on the attainment of supernatural glory, as [it is not] on the success of those who are to be revered—as [it is not] on the success of those who are to be revered.

He who has become perfect through the knowledge of truth, produced by devotion to the teacher, has accomplished

[1] *Prakṛitiḥ prathamato bhogaṃ sampâdya tato viveka-dvârâ mokshaṃ prayojayati*, Paṇḍit.

[2] *I. e.*, in the opinion of Aniruddha: though the Self is the *causa efficiens* of the 'great one,' the latter has not the nature of the Self, as the lotus has not the nature of the clay from which it has sprung. The 'etc.' may be understood, *f. i.*, as the fact that the jar has not the nature of the potter who produces it.

his end, for he is not bound to return [to another existence]; but it is not so on the attainment of supernatural glory, since [in this case] there is a return again.

The repetition of the words 'as [it is not] on the success of those who are to be revered' indicates the end of the book.

Because these are bound to return; this is the meaning.—As [the end is not accomplished] on the success, [gained] by kings or other people who are to be revered, *i. e.*, on the attainment of a high office, etc. For such [success] is perishable and, therefore, does not imply accomplishment of the end.

The repetition [of the last words] manifests the end of the book.

Here ends, in the commentary on Kapila's aphorisms explanatory of the Sâṃkhya system, the fourth book which contains the narratives. After the narratives the fifth book begins with a view to confute the opinions of the opponents.

Here ends the fourth book in the quintessence of the Sâṃkhya commentary, composed by Mahâdeva. The fifth book begins with a view to turn over the opinions of the opponents.

BOOK V.

There, [*i. e.* at the beginning of this new book, some one objects:] "An auspicious word is not to be put at the beginning of a literary composition, because it is to no purpose. And this [purposelessness] follows from [the fact] that a composition may not be completed, though an auspicious word be prefixed, and that it may be completed, though [such a word] be not prefixed." This [the author] refutes:

1. The utterance of an auspicious word [is required], because of the custom of the authorities, because the fruit is seen, and because [a book consecrated in this way] succeeds.

By this is confuted the opinion of those who say: "Since a composition may not be completed, though an auspicious word be prefixed, [and] since it may be completed, though [such a word] be not prefixed, what need is there of an auspicious word?"

The non-existence of a Lord has been established above [I. 92]; now [the author] gives the argument [thereof]:

'Because of Scripture,'[1] *i. e.*, because of scriptural passages [enjoining the practice, the existence of] which [passages] is inferred from the custom of the [ancient] authorities. This is the sense.— [The objection, made by the opponent, is of no importance], since it may be disposed of in the following way. The want of completion [of a composition, in spite of the auspicious word being prefixed], is a consequence of some deficiency in the means requisite [for its completion]; the completion [of a composition, though the auspicious word is missing], is the consequence of some

[1] Mahâdeva reads *śrutitaḥ* in the aphorism instead of *bhûtitaḥ*.

auspicious action, performed [by the author] in a previous existence. Much power has been displayed by the sages on [the elucidation of] this point.

"The products arise from the [material] cause [*i. e.*, from primitive Matter], guided by the Lord; for we see, for example, that jars arise from the clay, guided by the potter." This [the author] refutes:

2. The fruit does not proceed from [the cause], guided by the Lord, since this results from work.

If the Lord were an independent creator, he would create even without work, [*i. e.*, regardless of merit and demerit,— which will not be maintained even by the theistic Naiyâyika opponent]. "But he creates with the co-operation of work, [*i. e.*, with regard to merit and demerit." Then] let work alone be [the *causa efficiens* of the fruit]; what need is there of a Lord? "But a co-operative factor does not set aside the force of the chief cause!" [This maxim is not applicable to our case], because the independence [of the Lord] would be annihilated. Moreover, we know by experience that [all activity] is either egotistic or for the sake of others. Now, the Lord has no egotistic aim;[1] [and] if [you declare that his activity] is for the sake of others, [we reply that] it is unfit to ascribe the painful creation to a benign [Lord]. Besides, an activity which is [exclusively] for the sake of others does not exist, because even by service or the like, bestowed on others, one attains egotistic objects and is active for this reason. Therefore, let work, [*i. e.*, merit and demerit] alone be the *causa* [*efficiens*] of the world.

This [the author] declares [in the following aphorism]:

Does the Lord [in your opinion] create with or without regard to the work [done by man]? In the former case let work alone

[1] Supply *kiṃchit.*

[and] not the Lord be the cause; in the latter the independence [of man, *i. e.*, his responsibility for his actions] would be null and void[1]; [man would not be the maker of his fortune,—which is a logical nonsense for the Hindoo]. Moreover, is the Lord's activity [according to your doctrine] egotistic or for the sake of others? Not the former, because he is considered as one who has obtained [all] his wishes [and is, therefore, without desires]; nor the latter, because it is unfit to accept that a benign [Lord] engages in creating pain.

Moreover, he who guides a [material] cause [does so] merely for his own benefit; this would be true in the case of the Lord also. This the author states:

3. His guidance [would be] on account of his own benefit, as in daily life.

And, in the case of one who is eternal, his own benefit is not possible.

"[But] let there be some benefit of his own! [What harm is there?]" To this [the author] replies:

The ablative case *svopakārāt* denotes the result [or] the reason.

"But let there be some personal benefit even in the case of the Lord." To this [the author] replies:

4. Otherwise [he would be] like the worldly rulers.

That is to say, not omniscient.

[The author] mentions another argument against [the opponent]:

'Otherwise,' *i. e.*, on the [opponent's] supposition that there be some personal benefit [even in the case of God]. 'Like the worldly rulers,' supply: he would happen to be in the condition of one who has not obtained [all] his wishes.

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[1] This is the sense of *svātantrya-vighātaḥ* here, as the context shows, though the same expression was just found in Aniruddha's commentary to refer to the Lord.

[And] if he were different in character from the worldly rulers, the Lord would be merely nominal. This [the author] states:

5. Or nominal.

Since the reflection of Matter, [*i. e.*, of the internal organ] falls [on the Self], on account of the former's agency the *Self* is [commonly regarded as] the agent; if, therefore, the name 'Lord' [is given] to that, this is a [mere] term.

[The author] states another reason:

'Or' (*vā*) [is here used] in the sense of 'merely' (*eva*).

"For what reason nominal?" To this [the author] replies:

6. Without desire it is not possible, because this is the constant cause.

If inseparableness[1] which is the cause [of inference] had exceptions, there would never be reliance [on conclusions of any kind]. Now, desire is the [determinate] *causa* [*efficiens*] of activity; therefore, how can there be a creator of the world without that? And one who is liberated [—as such the Lord must be regarded by you—] has no desire.

"[But] there will be desire [even in the case of the Lord]." To this [the author] replies:

It is not possible that there be a creator, etc., [*i. e.*, a preserver or destroyer] of the world without desire, because creating and desire are in the relation of effect and cause. This is the sense.

[The author] states the argument against the supposition of there being desire [in the Lord]:

7. If even he were affected with that, [he would] not [be] liberated for ever.

[*I. e.*] if even he were affected with desire.

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[1] In our case: of desire and activity. *Avinābhāva* is practically the same as *vyāpti* (*yatra-yatra pravṛittis, tatra-tatra rāgitvam*).

"[Then] he will be the maker on account of the connection with the power of primitive Matter." To this [objection, made by a follower of the Yoga-system, the author] replies:

'Even' (*api*) [is here used] in the sense of 'but' (*tu*). "He would be" is to be supplied.

8. If on account of the connection with the power of primitive Matter, there would happen to be a contact.

This would happen to be contradictory to [the scriptural passage, Bṛihadâraṇyaka Up. 4. 3. 16]: "For this Soul is void of contact."

"[May there be] no *contact* with primitive Matter; but [the Lord] will be the maker on account of the mere existence, [*i. e.*, of the mere proximity] of primitive Matter." To this [the author] replies:

If [the Lord] were the maker on account of the connection with that creative power which resides in primitive Matter, then there would be a contact with primitive Matter; [and] this Scripture contradicts: "For this Soul is void of contact" (Bṛihadâraṇyaka Up. 4. 3. 16).

With reference, however, to [the opinion that the Lord] be the maker on account of the mere existence of primitive Matter, [the author] declares:

9. If on account of the mere existence, Lordship would belong to all.

As the existence of primitive Matter is without distinction [the same] with regard to all Selfs, Lordship would belong to all Selfs.

"[But] there are proofs of the Lord's existence. Therefore, how [can you deny it]?" To this [the author] replies:

As the existence of primitive Matter is without distinction [the same] with regard to all Selfs, Lordship would belong to all Selfs.

10. Since there is no proof, it is not established.

I. e., Since there is no proof by perception.

"[But] there will be inference." To this [the author] replies:

'It is [not] established,' *i. e.*, the Lord's existence is [not] established, since it is well known that there is no proof [of it] by perception.

[The author] refutes [the assertion that it may be proved by] inference:

11. Because of the want of a connection there is no inference.

Since [every] invariable concomitance (*vyâpti*) is based on a perception and such [perception] does not exist [in the case in question], whence shall there be the apprehension of the connection, [termed technically 'invariable concomitance,' which is the necessary foundation of any inference]? Besides, the apprehension of [such a] connection is not [possible] in the case of [an object] which is single in its kind.[1]

"[But] there will be the proof by authoritative testimony." To this [the author] replies:

'Because of the want of a connection,' *i. e.*, because of the want of an invariable concomitance.

There is no scriptural text teaching that the world be produced by a Lord; on the contrary, there is a passage teaching that it is nothing but a product of primitive Matter, *viz.*, "The one goat...." [and simultaneously "the one unborn ..."] (S'vetâśvatara Up. 4. 5). This [the author] states:

12. Even Scripture is [declaratory] of [the world's being] a product of primitive Matter.

There is [the following passage in] Scripture: "The

[1] *I. e.*, inference is based on experience. Therefore, a thing which is invisible and single in its kind, can be no object of inference at all.

world arises from primitive Matter." Therefore, [all] proofs establishing [the existence of] a Lord are [only] seeming.[1]

Some, [*i. e.*, the followers of S'aṅkarâchâryya] say: "The Self is the maker on account of the connection with ignorance." With reference to this [the author] declares:

Supply 'declaratory.'

Some say: "[The Self] is the maker on account of the connection with the power of ignorance." This [the author] confutes:

13. What is void of contact cannot have any connection with the power of ignorance.

[This is] plain.

[The author] mentions another argument against [those Vedantists]:

[This is] clear.

Moreover:

14. If on the connection [of Soul] with the one the other is established, there is a *circulus vitiosus*.

There is the following *circulus vitiosus*: no creation without ignorance, no ignorance without creation.

"Since [the continuity of ignorance and creation] is without beginning like that [which exists] between seed and sprout, [our theory is] not [to be charged with] a *circulus vitiosus*." To this [the author] replies[2]:

If [in your opinion] the connection [of Soul] with the one, *i. e.*, the connection with activity, is founded on the fact that the connection [of Soul] with ignorance is established, there is a *circulus*

[1] *Âbhâsa* is here used as an adjective, what the Paṇḍit declared to be in accordance with the grammatical rule: *âbhâsaḥ doshârthe puṃ-liṅgaḥ, dushṭârthe viśeshya-nighnaḥ*; but he was not able to verify this rule. The Sanskrit dictionaries denote *âbhâsa* as a substantive only.

[2] Read *ity atrâha* with the I. O. L. manuscript.

vitiosus, because [according to your theory] the connection [of Soul] with ignorance is founded on the fact that its activity is established. This is the sense.

And [the interdependence of] activity and ignorance is not without beginning. This [the author] declares:

15. Not like the seed and the sprout, because Scripture teaches that mundane existence has a beginning.

It would be so [as you declare], if mundane existence were without beginning; but mundane existence has a beginning [after the end of each dissolution of the universe].[1] And [thus] Scripture [says]:

> "The one God whose eyes and month, arms and feet are everywhere, who produces heaven and earth, blows at them with his arms and with the wings.[2]" (Ṛigveda. 10. 81. 3).

Therefore, there is an interruption to the continuity [of mundane existence] at the [time of the periodical] dissolution.

[The author] describes the nature of ignorance:

Since from such scriptural texts as "Existent, O beloved ore, was that in the beginning, one only, without a second" (Chhândogya Up. 6. 2. 1) we learn that there is no mundane existence at the [time of the] dissolution, mundane existence has a beginning.

[The author] mentions the argument against [the doctrine of the followers of S'aṅkarâchârya who hold] that ignorance is different from Brahman:

16. Since, if [ignorance were everything] that is other than knowledge, Brahman would happen to be disproved, [ignorance is not what the Vedantists declare it to be].

[1] *Absolutely*, mundane existence is without beginning in the opinion of the Sâṃkhyas also.

[2] Used to blow ot the fire in the forge of creation.

If [ignorance were everything] that is other than knowledge, even Brahman, because of its being other than knowledge (!), would be ignorance; and hence the character of Brahman would be disproved.

[The author] mentions another reason:

(According to Mahâdeva's reading and interpretation, the aphorism must be translated: *If [ignorance] is other than knowledge, Brahman would happen to be disproved.*)

If [what you call] ignorance is other than knowledge, *i. e.*, than Brahman which is knowledge in its essence, Brahman [itself] would happen to be disproved, because you accept that Brahman is void of the threefold distinction.[1] If ignorance is different from Brahman, and Brahman also different from ignorance, there happens to be a distinction between the things, *i. e.*, there is, with regard to this difference, one thing which is to be distinguished (*pratiyogin*) and another from which it is to be distinguished (*anuyogin*)[2]; [in short, in that case there is a duality]. This is the meaning.

Moreover, is ignorance not disproved by knowledge, or is it disproved? With regard to the first [part of this alternative, the author] says:

17. If it is not disproved, there would be fruitlessness.

If ignorance is not disproved by knowledge, there would be simply no knowledge.

"[But] it is disproved!" To this [remark of the Vedantist the author] replies:

Knowledge would happen to be fruitless. This is the sense.

With regard to the other [part of the alternative mentioned above, the author] says:

[1] *I. e.*, the distinction which exists in the homogeneous (*sajâtîya*), in the heterogeneous (*vijâtîya*) and in the thing itself (*svagata*).

[2] *Yasya prithak-karaṇaṃ sa pratiyogî, yasmât prithak-karaṇaṃ so 'nuyogî*, Paṇḍit. Cf. Vijñânabhikshu's introduction to I. 61.

18. If it is disproved by knowledge, the world, too, would be so.

The world, too, would belong to ignorance, [because, in your opinion, the world is disproved by knowledge].

"[This is quite right:] the world, too, belongs to ignorance." To this [remark of the Vedantist the author] replies:

Like ignorance, the world, too, would be disproved. Accordingly, the world would not be perceived. This is the meaning.

19. If that had the nature of it, it would have a beginning.

This ignorance, [*i. e.*, not the ignorance of the every day life] is without beginning. [Now,] if the world had the nature of it, ignorance, [too,] would have a beginning.

"Work is not the *causa* [*efficiens*] of the world;[1] merely in consequence of its own nature the world arises." To this [objection, made by a Chârvâka, the author] replies:

Besides, if [the world] had the nature of it, [then], on the supposition that a new world arises [regularly after the time of the dissolution has elapsed], the arising of a new ignorance, too, must be admitted. And hence ignorance would have a beginning. In that case definitive liberation would be impossible. This is the meaning.

Now [the author] teaches that merit is the *causa* [*efficiens*] of creation:

20. Merit is not to be denied, because of the diversity of the products of Matter.

Since Matter is eternal and its essential nature one, the diverse products could not arise, if there were no merit. Therefore, the diversity of the products depends on the difference of merit, [and hence] merit is not to be denied.

[1] Work is regarded as such by all orthodox systems.

[The author] gives the proofs of the existence of merit:

The diversity of the products is not brought about by Matter alone, because its essential nature is one, but by the diversity of merit. By the word 'merit' the invisible [power of merit] is here intended.

And proofs [of the existence] of merit are not wanting. This [the author] states:

21. Its existence follows from Scripture, characteristic signs, etc.

By 'Scripture' the proof, founded on authoritative testimony, is intimated, by 'characteristic signs' inference[1] [is meant], by the word 'etc.' the perception of the Yogin is intimated. From these [proofs] follows the existence of merit.

"If Place and Time are not the causes, for what reason [does] saffron [grow] in Kaśmîr [and not in Madhyadeśa, and why] do the buds of the mango come forth in the spring?" This [the author] declares:

'Characteristic sign' is inference. By the word 'etc.' the perception of the Yogin [is intended].

[The author] states that Place, Time, etc. may be [*causae efficientes*]:

22. There is no restriction, because other proofs come into consideration.

There is no [such] restriction that the invisible [power of merit] alone be the *causa* [*efficiens*]; but [though this] invisible [power] is accompanying cause [with regard to the arising of *all* products], other things, too, are causes, since there are proofs [thereof].

"As we see that mundane existence is painful, the invisible [power] of *sin* alone may exist." To this [the author] replies:

[1] *I. e.*, some pleasure, taken as *vivâdâspada*, must have a cause, since it is a product. This cause can be nothing else but merit, acquired formerly.

There is no [such] restriction that the invisible [power of merit] alone be the *causa* [*efficiens*]; but other things, too, [are to be regarded as such], because the causal character of other things also comes into consideration through other proofs which acquaint us with the causal character of them.

23. In regard to both, too, it is the same.

As we see pleasure also, the invisible [power] of good [works] must [likewise] exist.

"Since in the absence of pain we are under the delusion that there be pleasure, the word 'invisible [power]' is [at least] *chiefly* used with reference to that [*i. e.*, in the sense of demerit or cause of pain, and only] secondarily in the sense of cause of pleasure." To this [the author] replies:

['In regard to both,' *i. e.*,] in this world and in the other world, 'it is the same,' *i. e.*, the pleasure, produced by the invisible power, is pain, or—in other words—pleasure mixed [with pain].

24. If this follows from the thing,[1] it is the same in regard to both.

Since this may [simply] be inverted, the case is the same in regard to both.

[The author] denies that merit, etc., [*i. e.*, demerit and impressions] be properties of the Self:

If pleasure 'follows,' *i. e.*, arises, 'from the thing,' *i. e.*, from superhuman objects, as there are celestial women, etc.—supply: in the other world—, and if, moreover, it is [admitted] that [all] pleasure is mixed with pain, the case 'is the same in regard to both,' *i. e.*, in regard to this world and to the other world. For in *this* world also there are objects existent which are causes of pleasure, but the [invariable] cause as to [the enjoyment of] pleasure is merit; and this, because of its being mixed with [the demerit of] the destruction [of animals], etc., is not able to produce such pleasure which is not mixed with pain, but only such that is mixed with pain. This is the meaning.

[1] That is, in the opinion of Aniruddha: if the opponent considers pleasure's being the negation of pain as self-evident.

[The author] refutes [the opinion of the Naiyâyikas] that merit, etc. be properties of the Self:

25. Merit, etc. are properties of the internal organ.

I. e., properties of the judging organ. To [the opinion] that they be properties of the Self, Scripture is contradictory which teaches that [the latter] is void of contact.

"Since we don't see that the property of one produces something in another, [*i. e.*, since experience forbids to accept that merit and demerit, being properties of the internal organ, can produce pleasure and pain in the Self], it is better [to assume] the non-existence of merit, etc." To this [the author] replies:

Because of the scriptural passage: "For this soul is void of contact" (Bṛihadâraṇyaka Up. 4. 3. 16). This is the meaning.

Some teachers say: "Does the quality reside in the [thing] possessed of the quality or void of the same? In the former case there would be [the logical fault of] explaining a thing by itself (*âtmâśraya*),[1] in the latter a quality could be found also in qualities or [motions].[2] Therefore, [the notion] quality is simply disproved, thus also motion, etc." This [the author] refutes:

26. Qualities, etc. are not disproved absolutely.

As earth and the like, because of their being seen, are not disproved absolutely, so also qualities, etc., *i. e.*, properties, etc.[3] [are not to be denied absolutely].—That even the property of one causes a product in another, [—which is declared by the opponent to be impossible—] has been

[1] *Guṇavân kena guṇena guṇavân iti praśne svâtmaka-guṇena guṇavân ity uttaram dâtavyam, tadâ 'tmâśrayaḥ* (Paṇḍit), an *âtmâśraya*, of course, which is not acknowledged as such by the Sâṃkhyas.

[2] Which is confuted in the writings of the Vaiśeshikas and Naiyâyikas; cf., *f. i.*, Bhâshâparichheda 85.

[3] *Dharmâdînâm* has been added, lest *guṇa* be taken in the sense of 'constituents.'

[already] explained [with regard to the case in question] by the falling of a reflection of the soul [on the internal organ].

In order to deny the tenet that pleasure be [merely] absence of pain, [the author] says:

Supply: because they are seen.

[The author] mentions the proof [of the existence] of pleasure:

27. The cognition of pleasure results from the connection of the five parts.

Although pleasure is established as being of a positive nature by the [immediate] perception of the internal sense, still proof also is given for the understanding of our adversaries.—By the words 'from the connection of the five parts' that [kind of] inference which consists of two parts[1] [and which is used by the later Naiyâyikas] is set aside. [The five parts of the syllogism are:] proposition, reason, instance, application [of the reason], conclusion.[2] By means of [a syllogism construed in] this [manner] we discern (1) that [the invariably concomitated *vyâpya*] is an attribute of the subject of the conclusion (*paksha-dharmatva*),[3] (2) that [the *vyâpya*] exists in those things in which the invariable concomitant (*vyâpaka*) undoubtedly exists (*sapaksha-sattva*[4]), (3) that [the *vyâpya*] is excluded from those things from which the *vyâpaka* is also excluded (*vipak-*

[1] For example: 1, *parvato vahni-vyâpya-dhûmavân asti*, 2, *tasmâd vahnimân.*

[2] A syllogism leading to the cognition of the reality of pleasure is given by Vijñânabhikshu in his commentary to our aphorism.

[3] *Cf.* the two explanations of the term *paksha-dharmatâ* in the Nyâyakośa. My Paṇḍit gave the definition *pakshe vartamânatvaṃ hetoḥ* (= *vyâpyasya*) which comes to the same thing. As a reason of the reality of pleasure the fact that it is perceived (*pratîyamânatvaṃ*) may be stated, and so the *paksha-dharmatva* is in our case: *sukhe pratîyamânatvam.*

[4] In our case: *yatra-yatra pratîyamânatvaṃ, tatra-tatra sattvaṃ* (reality), *yathâ ghaṭâdau. Ghaṭâdi* is *sapaksha* of *sukha*, as *mahânasa* is of *parvata*, when the existence of fire is proved by the smoke.

shâd vyâvrittiḥ),[1] (4) that no equally strong reason can be adduced againss the reason which proves the proposition (*asatpratipakshatva*),[2] (5) that the *vyâpya* is not such that its object does not exist in the subject of the conclusion (*abâdhita-vishayatva*).[3]

[The author] states that invariable concomitance does not follow from once perceiving:

The cognition of pleasure, *i. e.*, the knowledge [of the existence] of pleasure, results from the connection or contact of the internal sense, the parts of which are, as it were, the five [external] senses, [with pleasure];[4] and, accordingly, pleasure is an object of the perception of the internal sense. This is the meaning.

Some [*i. e.*, the Chârvâkas] say: "Is [what you call] 'invariable concomitance' (*vyâpti*) apprehended by perceiving co-existence once or repeatedly? In the first case the invariable concomitance even of fire and donkey could be apprehended, [if these two were, by chance, seen once close to one another], and, accordingly, it would be possible to infer [the existence of] fire also from [the perception of] a donkey. Nor is the other [side of the alternative true]; for, though the belonging to [the element] earth and the being scratched by iron are co-existent in a hundred cases, they keep asunder in [the case of] the diamond. Therefore, inference cannot be well called a means of right knowledge." This [the author] refutes:

28. The [constant] connection is not established by once apprehending.

[1] *Yathâ jala-hrade dhûmasyâ 'vartamânatvam;* in our case: *śaśa-vishâṇâdau pratîyamânatvasyâ 'vartamânatvam.*

[2] *Yena hetunâ yat sâdhyate, tad-viparîtârtha-sâdhakam hetv-antaram vidyate, sa hetuḥ sat-pratipakshaḥ; tad-bhinnaḥ asat-pratipakshaḥ; tattvam asat-pratipakshatvam,* Paṇḍit.

[3] Supply *hetoḥ*. The object of the reason is that what is to be proved (*sâdhya*), *yathâ dhûmasya vishayo vahniḥ*, or in our case: *pratîyamânatvasya vishayo 'stitvam* 'reality is the object of the fact (adduced as reason) that pleasure is perceived.'

[4] This original interpretation of *pañchâvayava-yogât* is at least as probable as that given by Aniruddha and adopted by Vijñânabhikshu.

Because one's own conviction is contradictory [to this]. And in that case an inference might be drawn from the fact that fire and a donkey were once seen [close together]. [But] a conviction of this nature is never formed.

"What, [then,] is this invariable concomitance?" To this [the author] replies:

The perception of the coexistence [of two things], accompanied with the non-perception of [their] keeping asunder, causes the apprehension of invariable concomitance; and whether this perception is single or repeated is no matter. This is the meaning. 'The [constant] connection is established' means: invariable concomitance is apprehended.

[The author] describes the nature of invariable concomitance:

29. Invariable concomitance is the constant association with a characteristic property [and belongs either] to both or to the one.

'To both,' [*i. e.*, to that which proves (*sâdhana*) and to that which is to be proved (*sâdhya*), as, *f. i.*,] to the state of being produced and transitoriness which give an example of reciprocal invariable concomitance (*sama-vyâptika*).[1] ['Or] to the one,' *i. e.*, to that which proves, as, *f. i.*,] to the smoke which gives an example of one-sided invariable concomitance (*vishama-vyâptika*).[2] And thus [it is said]:

"And how can the reason have any convincing power (*gamanikâ-*

[1] If transitoriness (*sâdhya*) is inferred from the state of being produced (*sâdhana*), the relation may be as well inverted; either of the two is 'invariably concomitated' with the other, and so we have the *sama-vyâpti: yatra-yatra kritakatvam, tatra-tatrâ' nityatvam; yatra-yatrâ' nityatvam, tatra-tatra kritakatvam.*

[2] For, the existence of fire is inferred from the smoke, but not that of the smoke from fire, because there are fires without smoke. We have in this case an instance of the *vishama-vyâpti; yatra-yatra dhûmaḥ, tatra-tatra vahniḥ*, the *vyâpti* resides in the *sâdhana* only, and not in the *sâdhya.*

bala) as long as the correctness (*avyatirekitva*) of a counter-argument (*vipaksha*) is supposed even in a hundredth part?"

"Invariable concomitance is then a new principle [in addition to your twenty-five principles]." This objection [the author] refutes:

'Characteristic property' means attribute (*âdheya*).[1] Invariable concomitance is the constant association with an attribute: such is the [grammatical] connection. And this [constant association with an attribute] belongs, in the case of a reciprocal invariable concomitance, to 'both,' *i. e.*, [to the *sâdhana* and to the *sâdhya*, *f. i.*,] to the property of being discernible (*prameyatva*) and to the property of being denominable (*abhidheyatva*)[2]; while, in [the case of] a one-sided invariable concomitance, this invariable concomitance belongs to 'the one,' *i. e.*, [to the *sâdhana*,] *f. i.* to the smoke.

[The author] refutes the opinion that [invariable concomitance] be a new category:

30. It is not a new principle, because there would happen to be the fiction of a thing.

Even on the assumption that [invariable concomitance] be a new principle, the fact must be stated that it is [merely] non-separation [from the *sâdhana*. Therefore] let this [fact] alone be [invariable concomitance]; what is the use of the fiction of a thing?

[The author] mentions his own opinion:

Even if invariable concomitance [is declared to] be a new principle still, that to which invariable concomitance belongs, is necessarily never separated [from the thing to be proved]. Why shall this alone, [*i. e.*, the being never separated] not be invariable concomitance? This is the meaning.

1 For a somewhat different meaning of *âdheya* see aph. 32 *seq*.

2 Between these two notions the same relation exists as between the two, mentioned by Aniruddha, *viz.*, *kritakatva* and *anityatva*.

31. The teachers, [*i. e.*, I] declare it to be the becoming manifest[1] of an innate power.

There exists a power which is innate to [*f. i.*,] fire and smoke. This is apprehended by the perception of both. This alone is invariable concomitance.

[The author] mentions the opinion of a single [teacher]:

(According to Mahâdeva's interpretation the aphorism must be translated: *The teachers declare it to be resulting from an innate power*).

The teachers say: the constant association with fire, [*i. e.*, the invariable concomitance] which belongs to smoke, results from an innate, *i. e.*, inherent, power [of the latter].—By the plural ['the teachers' the author] indicates that this is his own opinion.

32. Pañchaśikha declares it to be the connection with a power imposed [on the things].[2]

[Pañchaśikha teaches:] If [invariable concomitance] were a power innate [to the things, then] on the perception of an object even [a man] who is not acquainted [with it] ought to possess the knowledge 'this[3] is efficient in this [or that respect].' But it is not thus [in reality]. Therefore [invariable concomitance] must be declared to be a power imposed [by us on the things].

[Pañchaśikha, or the author from Pañchaśikha's standpoint,] gives an argument [thereof]:[4]

1 Aniruddha interprets *udbhavam* by *grihyate*; cf. the conclusion of his commentary on aphorism 36.

2 This is the sense which our two commentators give to the term *âdheya-śakti*, differently from—and better than—Vijñânabhikshu. Cf. especially Mahâdeva to aphorism 36. The individuals apprehending a *vyâpti* impose the connection on the two things in question, as the *pitâ-putra-sambandha* is imposed on two persons by him who is aware of the relation.

3 *Ayam*, supply *padârthaḥ*.

4 Both commentators accept, like Vijñânabhikshu, that aphorisms 33-35 have been composed, if not by Pañchaśikha directly, at least for the sake of the *pratishṭhâpana* of the definition given in aphorism 32.

When there is the connection or conjunction with a power imposed [by us on the things, that] association exists [which is technically termed 'invariable concomitance']; this is to be supplied. And, accordingly, [this] association results [not from an innate power (*cf.* aph. 31), but from a power imposed [by us].—By the singular 'Pañchaśikha' [the author] intimates that this is [only] the opinion of that other [teacher].

On this occasion [Pañchaśikha, or the author from Pañchaśikha's standpoint,] refutes [the opinion] that power be the essential nature of the thing possessed of power:

33. There is no [such] rule that power be the essential nature, because there would happen to be a tautology.

If power were the essential nature, the expression 'a powerful wrestler' would be tautological.[1]

[Pañchaśikha, or the author from his standpoint,] gives another argument:

(Mahâdeva sees the following sense in the aphorism: *There is no regularity [of coherence] based on an essential power, etc.*)

Svarûpa-śakti 'essential power' is [a Karmadhâraya compound:] what is essential nature as well as power. Regularity [of coherence], *i. e.*, invariable concomitance, is not based on that, but on some power which is different [from the essential nature]. With regard to [the opinion] that power be not different [from the essential nature, the author] mentions a refutation [with the words] 'because there would happen to be a tautology.' The sense is: because [on that theory] a tautology would inhere in such expressions as 'a powerful incantation,' etc.

34. Because the adjective [powerful[2]] would prove unmeaning.

[1] *I. e.*, if powerfulness were the essential nature of the wrestler, the adjective 'powerful' would be superfluous, as the adjectives are in such expressions as 'wet water, hot fire,' where wet and hot do not denote a power, but the essential nature.

[2] *Śakta* or other adjectives which are *śakti-vâchaka*.

There could be no [such] notion as 'the powerful Devadatta,' but [only the notion] 'Devadatta Devadatta.'

[Pañchaśikha, or the author from his standpoint] gives a further argument:

In [such expressions as] 'the powerful incantation' the adjective would be unmeaning, like [the repetition] 'Devadatta Devadatta.'

35. Because this would not suit to leaves and the like.[1]

Since, in leaves and the like, the essential nature remains [always] in the same condition, the poison could [on the theory controverted here] be expelled [from the infected limb by putting such remedies on it] even without the employment of the incantation [which in reality confers the healing power on the remedy in the commentator's opinion].

[The author] reconciles [Pañchaśikha's definition with his own, given in aphorism 31]:

Since the essential nature of leaves and the like is already existent before the employment of the incantation, the poison could be expelled, for example, even without the employment of the incantation.

If then [somebody objects:] "Let there be only the power imposed [on the things]! What is the use of [stating] an inherent power?", [the author] replies to this:

36. If it were established that it is a power imposed [on the things, the same applies to our definition that it is] the connection with an innate power, because of the same reason.

[Pañchaśikha is not right in identifying the notions 'innate power' and 'essential nature'; for our expression] 'innate

[1] *I. e.*, if power were the essential nature, no power could be imposed on leaves or the like by incantations.

power' means [only what the word as Karmadhâraya compound signifies]: that which is innate as well as power; but '[innate] power' is not simply 'essential nature.' And, accordingly, if it were established that [invariable concomitance] is a power imposed [on the things, the same applies to the definition, given by us in aphorism 31, that it is] the connection with an innate power, because the reason is the same. And thus, since the notion 'power' is not specified, the same reason [may be alleged in both cases,] whether [invariable concomitance is declared to be] the connection with a power imposed [on the things] or the connection with a power innate [to them]. And, [to refute Pañchaśikha's argument in the commentary on aphorism 32,] if some [property] is not apprehended directly on the apprehension of an object, this follows from the fact that the things have manifold powers; as, *f. i.*, the relation between father and son, though constant, is not apprehended without instruction. Therefore we have said [in aphorism 31] 'the becoming manifest of an innate power.'

[The author] denies the identity of word and meaning:

(According to Mahâdeva the aphorism is to be translated: *If the power imposed [on the things] is established, the connection with an innate power [is also established], for the same reason.*)

As it is established by positive and negative argumentation[1] and by the institutes, that a power may be imposed on leaves and the like, or on rice and the like,[2] so it is established by positive and negative argumentation,[3] that an [innate] power inheres in all these objects, and [likewise it is established] by the institutes [that an innate power inheres] in all these special actions, [*f. i.*, in the action of employing an incantation].

[1] *F. i., yatra-yatra (na) mantra-prayogaḥ, tatra-tatra pallavâdînâṃ (na) vishâpanodakatvam.*

[2] The healing power is imposed on leaves, etc., by incantations, the germinating power on rice, etc. by earth and humidity.

[3] *F. i., yatra-yatra (na) mantra-sahakṛita-pallavaḥ, tatra-tatra (na) vishâpanodanam.*

[The author] denies the identity of word and meaning:

37. The relation of signified and signifying exists between word and meaning.

On the theory of the identity [of word and meaning] even a jar ought to be apprehended by hearing, [like the word 'jar,' and] even the word ought to be visible for the eye, [like the jar itself, and,] for example, on pronouncing [the word] 'fire' a singe of the mouth should take place.

[The author] gives the argument thereof:

For in the case of the identity even a jar ought to be apprehended by hearing, or the word ['jar'] by sight, and on pronouncing the word 'fire' a singe of the mouth should take place, etc.

[The author] states the means of learning the sense:

38. Because this relation is established by three [means].

Because the connection between word and meaning (*vyutpatti*) is learned in three ways. (1) From the instruction by one competent, as "This is a jar." (2) From the language and practice (*vyavahâra*) of the expert, as "Drive the white cow hither with a stick." In this case [the knowledge] of the child[1] [arises], when it has seen how the expert who got the order acts in consequence of the word of the expert who gave the order. (3) From the occurring [of a word, hitherto unknown], together with familiar words in the same sentence; as [a child that] knows [already] the sense of [the words] 'mango' and 'to eat,' when it hears [the sentence] "The bird eats the mango," then understands the word 'bird' [too].

[The author] disposes of [the opinion] that [the apprehension of] the connection between word and meaning be restricted to something to be done:

[1] Grammatically, *bâlasya* is to be connected with *vyutpatti-grahaṇât.*

By the instruction given by one competent, as "This is a jar;" by the language and practice of the expert, as, *f. i.*, "Drive the cow hither;" by the occurring [of an unknown word] together with familiar words in the same sentence, as *f. i.*, "The cuckoo sings sweetly on the mango tree."

[The author] refutes the opinion that the sense of the words [becomes manifest only] in things connected with something to be done:

39. There is no restriction on what is to be done, because it is seen in both cases.

The [apprehension of the] connection between word and meaning is seen in the case of something to be done, as "Day after day he shall perform the Saṃdhyâ ceremony"; [but] it is likewise seen in the case of an established fact, as "Hari [Vishṇu] is the supreme god among the gods." For thus the Vedas consist of prescriptions, declarations of the objects, and hymns. (1) The [vedic] prescription is a means of right knowledge (*vidhau prâmâṇyam*) with regard to the fact that [a work to be done] procures something desired,—which [fact of procuring something desired] together with the necessity of the performance inheres to one and the same thing.[1] (2) The [vedic] declaration of the object also is a means of right knowledge, because it supports the power of the prescription and thus mediately incites [us to the performance of the ceremony]. (3) The hymn also is a means of right knowledge, because it reminds [us] of what is prescribed.[2] What, however, [is said by the opponent]: "Hymns and declarations of the objects are means of right knowledge [only], because they are the *causae efficientes* of the [human] activity, but they do not teach [facts]," is not [right]; in their origin, they have the object of [inciting to] activity, but as regards the understanding, they intend stating established facts.[1] Therefore, declarations of the objects and hymns are means of right knowledge also, because they teach established facts.

[1] *I. e.*, the prescription teaches that the *kârya*, *f. i.*, the Saṃdhyâ ceremony, procures something desired, and that this *ishṭasâdhanatâ* together with the *kâryatâ* inheres in that ceremony.

[2] *F. i.*, the beginning of the Ṛigveda, *agnim île*, reminds us of the Agnihotra.

"Since the sense of the Veda is transcendent, how can the connection between the [vedic] words and their meaning be apprehended in both [those] cases?" To this [the author] replies:

'On what is to be done' means: on things connected with something to be done; 'restriction' means: restriction with regard to the sense,—in other words, [the assumption] that the sense [becomes manifest] only in such cases. [This is not right,] for we see that [words] are employed in the case of an established fact as well as in that of something to be done.

"But then, as regards the Veda, let the sense [become manifest only] in things connected with something to be done." To this [the author] replies:

40. For he who is conversant with the secular [meanings] understands the sense of the Veda.

[It is a maxim of the Pûrvamîmâṃsâ] that the secular [meanings of the words] are [also] those of the Veda. On account of this equality the connection between word and meaning [is apprehended] here [*i. e.*, in the Veda,] too.

"It would be so, if the Veda were the work of a person; but this is not the case." This [an opponent] declares:

Because of the maxim that the secular [meanings] are [also] those of the Veda. This is the sense.

[The author] now states the authority of the Veda:

[1] *F. i.*, the *arthavâda* '*yo' gnihotreṇa yajate, svargaṃ lokaṃ jayati* has, in the first place, the object of recommending the performance of the Agnihotra; but, since a man will not perform it, unless he has understood the purport, the sentence is also declaratory of the latter.

41. Because the Veda is not the work of a person, for three [reasons], and its sense also is transcendent.[1]

[The Veda cannot be compiled by a person], because [the existence of] a Lord has been refuted [I. 92, V. 2 seq.], because somebody else could not be [the author, and] because—error being a property of [all] persons—there would not be the conviction of [the Veda's] being trustworthy, *i. e.*, because the Veda would prove to be destitute of authority. [And] if the Veda were destitute of authority, there would be no confidence in [the efficiency of] sacrifices, etc.

[The author] says [the following] in order to teach the authority of the Veda:

The Veda is not destitute of authority, because it is not the work of a person; and this [is so] for three reasons: because [the existence of] a Lord has been refuted, because somebody else could not be [the author, and] because—error being a property of [all] persons—there would not be the conviction of [the Veda's] being trustworthy. "But then, let some special empirical soul be the maker [of the Veda]." To this [objection the author] replies: [No,] because 'its sense,' *i. e.*, the sense of the Veda, which teaches that the relation of object and means exists between heaven and sacrifice, etc., is beyond the reach of the senses and [beyond inference].

"But then, it is merit of what the Veda treats. And this is not transcendent, since it has the nature of [action, substance and quality, as,] *f. i.*, of sacrifice, curds and white colour." To this [the author] replies:[2]

42. Sacrifices and the like are not merit *per se*, [but] because of their peculiarity.

[1] This is understood *śaṇkâ-prakâreṇa* by Aniruddha and Vijñânabhikshu, but *siddhânta-prakâreṇa* by Mahâdeva.

[2] Aphorism 42 proves, according to Mahâdeva,—but refutes, according to Vijñânabhikshu—the *atîndriyatva* of the *vedârtha*.

The peculiarity [of sacrifices and worship] depends on time, place and persons; apart therefrom, they are not merit *per se*; otherwise, sacrifices and the like would be causes of merit, [even] if they were performed by great sinners at an inauspicious time in the country of the barbarians. And this is not the case.

"[But] the authority of the Veda follows from the perception that [even] he who is ignorant [of the meaning of the vedic words] obtains the [desired] fruit [by sacrifices, etc.]. What, therefore, is effected by the conversance [with the meaning of the vedic words]?" To this [the author] replies:

Sacrifices and the like as such are not merit, because [in that case] even sacrifices, etc., performed by S'ûdras, would happen to be merit; but [merit is only that] which is characterized as being a means of [attaining] heaven. And this is transcendent indeed. For what reason? 'Because of their peculiarity.' For the peculiarity [of the sacrifices] as to competent persons, place, time and [proper performance][1] is of consequence only in the respect (*aṃśe*) that they are means of [attaining] heaven, but not with regard to their being sacrifices, etc., as such.

[The author] teaches the use of the conversance [with the meaning of the vedic words]:

43. The innate sense is discriminated by conversance.

'This word is [used] here in its principal meaning, because it denotes [this or that, and] there in a secondary meaning'; this is discriminated [by the said conversance].[2]

"How is the existence of the connection between word and meaning known?" To this [the author] replies:

[1] *A'di = iti-kartavyatâ*, Paṇḍit.

[2] *I. e.*, simply: the right sense of the Veda is apprehended by a correct understanding of the meaning of the vedic words.

The inherent sense of a word, *i. e.*, its power of arousing the conception [of something, *bodhakatâ*] 'is discriminated'—*i. e.*, determined as being either principal or secondary—'by conversance,' *i. e.*, by the understanding of the sense. For [a word manifests] its principal reminding power (*bodhakatâ*) with regard to that [object] the conception of which [takes place] directly [after the pronunciation of the word]; but [it manifests] its secondary reminding power with regard to that [object the conception] of which [takes place only] through the medium of the original [meaning, *śakya* = *mukhya*]. And this [discrimination of the principal and secondary sense] is of practical importance in the case of such rules as "A vedic verse [or formula] is to be employed only in the principal sense, not in the secondary."

The existence, however, of the sense [innate to words] is to be inferred from the effect [of the employment of words], *i. e.*, from the conception of the objects.[1] This [the author] states:

44. Its existence follows from the fact that [words] produce conceptions, whether [the objects] are evident or not.[2]

The existence of the connection between word and meaning follows from the fact that [words] produce notions, whether the objects are known before or not, *i. e.*, whether they are secular or vedic.

[The author] refutes the eternity of the Vedas:

'Whether [the objects] are evident or not,' *i. e.*, whether they are secular or vedic; 'its existence,' *i. e.*, the existence of the sense [innate to words].

45. The Vedas are not eternal, because Scripture teaches that they are produced.

At first Scripture says: "There was neither day nor

[1] *I. e.*, from the conception of a book after the pronunciation of the word 'book.'

[2] *Ayogya* in the same sense in Aniruddha's commentary on aphorism 49.

night [then]," "He practised austerity; from him, having practised austerity, the three Vedas proceeded." And [besides, the non-eternity of the Vedas may be proved by] inference from the fact that they are artificial [and must, therefore, have arisen at some time], etc.[1] By perception also, [*i. e.*, by hearing,] the letters which are pronounced and perish are apprehended as such (*iti*) [*i. e.*, as non-eternal]. The conception, however, "This is the same letter *ka* [as that heard beforehand]" refers to the genus.[2]

"[But], being not eternal, the Vedas must be the work of a person." To this [the author] replies:

Because their non-eternity is inferred from their artificialness which follows from the scriptural passage "The three Vedas proceeded"; and because of the perception of production and perishing in the letters. This [latter also] is to be understood.

"[But,] if [the Vedas] are not eternal, they must be the work of a person." To this [the author] replies:

46. They are not the work of a person, because there is no [such] person [who could be] their maker.

The intention [of the author] is: [because the existence of] a Lord has been refuted [I. 92, V. 2 seq.].

"[Then] somebody else will be the maker." To this [the author] replies:

Because [the existence of] a Lord has been refuted. This is the meaning.

"[Then] let somebody else be the maker." To this [the author] replies:

47. No, because neither a liberated nor an unliberated would be competent.

[1] The *âdi* may be thus interpreted: *Vedâ anityâḥ, śabdamayatvât, Mahâbhâratâdivat.*

[2] *I. e.*, the same individual *ka* is not produced again, but another individual *ka* which belongs to the genus *ka*.

Because a liberated [person] is free from contact and would, therefore, not be competent to be the maker [of the Vedas]; and because an unliberated [person] does not know simultaneously [all things] of which [the Vedas] consist.

"[But,] if [the Vedas] are not the work of a person, then they must be eternal." To this [the author] replies:

Because a liberated [person] is free from contact, and an unliberated [person] does not know merit and [all] the other [constituent parts of the Vedas], and, therefore, [both] are not competent to be their maker.

48. From the fact that something is not the work of a person, its eternity does not follow, as in the case of sprouts and the like.

[This is] clear.

"[But] since we must accept (*pakshe*) that sprouts and the like, also, [*i. e.*, streams, clouds, etc.,] have a maker, because they are products, a *liberated* [person] must be their maker." To this [the author] replies:

For [the relation of] invariable concomitance does not exist between the not being the work of a person and eternity, because [these two properties] are not found together in sprouts and the like [which are not the work of a person and, still, perishable].

[The author] replies [the following] to him who maintains that sprouts and the like, also, must have a maker, because they are products:

49. If these also had one, there would happen to be a contradiction to experience, etc.

Since a maker of sprouts and the like is not perceptible, there would be a contradiction to experience. And it is a tenet [of our school] that there is no invisible[1] maker. By the word 'etc.' is indicated that [the relation of] invariable

[1] *Ayogya = apratyaksha*, as in aphorism 44.

concomitance does not exist [between non-eternity and the being produced].

[The author] teaches [now directly] that there is no invariable concomitance in the case of non-eternity and of the being made by a person:

'If [these also] had one,' *i. e.*, a maker, it would contradict the fact known by experience, that they are not produced by a maker. By the word 'etc.' [the following counter-argument is intended]: we had to assume, [in that case,] that the being produced by a maker could refer to an imperceptible [creator, an assumption which is not allowed according to the Sâṃkhya view]. The meaning, however, is that the argumentation by means of the notion 'product' is of no use.

"What, then, is produced by a maker?" To this [the author] replies:

50. That is the work of a person, with regard to which the notion arises that it has been made, though he be not seen.

As is the case with jars and the like, but not with trees and the like. 'Though he be not seen' means: though the maker be not seen. [Hence we declare:] all products are not originated by a [personal] maker, but [only] some special products.

[The author] refutes [now the opinion of the Naiyâyikas] that the being productive of right knowledge (*prâmâṇya*) depends on something external:

Though 'he,' *i. e.*, the maker, be not seen. But in the case of sprouts and the like, the notion that they have been made does not exist, but [the notion] that they have arisen. 'The work of a person' means that which is produced by a maker.

51. [Perceptions, conclusions and Scripture][1] are

[1] Vijñânabhikshu restricts the subject of this aphorism to Scripture.

productive of right knowledge by themselves, because this is manifested by the innate power.

The being productive of right knowledge depends entirely on the totality of factors generating a cognition, *i. e.*, on the power innate [to perceptions, conclusions and Scripture], and does not require a further auxiliary factor.[1] [This is said] in view of the *arising* [of the faculty in question. But] also in view of its *cognition*,[2] a power by which the being productive of right knowledge is apperceived necessarily belongs (*autsargikî*) to the apprehenders[3] of the cognition; [that is to say: in this case also there exists an innate power]. Since the being productive of right knowledge is manifested by this [power], it is self-dependent; and [so it is for another reason also, *viz.*,] because man engages in action immediately [after the cognition].[4] Even where we look for proofs in order to test the being productive of right knowledge for the sake of the destruction of doubts, [this is done only] to remove [eventual] faults, existing in the causes,[5] [but] not to [obtain] an auxiliary factor. Therefore it is [not the being productive of right knowledge, but

[1] As the Naiyâyikas hold who declare that the *prâmâṇya* requires regularly, even in the case of conclusions, the following inference: *mamo' tpannaṃ jñânaṃ pramâ-rûpam asti, saphala-pravṛitti-janakatvât.* This is taught in many Nyâya books, and this is what Aniruddha calls *parataḥ prâmâṇyam* in the introduction to our aphorism.

[2] *Svataḥ prâmâṇyam utpadyate, utpatty-anantaraṃ ca jñâyate*, Paṇḍit.

[3] The plural is used on account of the different opinions entertained about this apprehender who is the *purusha* according to the Sâṃkhya, the *sâkshin* according to the Vedânta, the *saṃvid* according to the Prâbhâkara and the *anuvyavasâya* according to the Nyâya system.

[4] *I. e.*, if the accessory inference, accepted by the Naiyâyikas, were really drawn, some time ought always to elapse between the cognition and the action based on the same.

[5] *I. e.*, in the senses in case of perception, and in the characteristic signs (*liṅga*) in case of inference.

the contrary, *i. e.*,] the not being productive of right knowledge which depends on something external [or something different from the totality of factors, generating a cognition], because in the latter case [not only these factors, but] also some fault[1] is the cause.

[The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the Buddhists:

Because this—supply 'being right knowledge'—is manifested merely by the innate power, *i. e.*, merely by the power innate to the factors generating a cognition. The being productive of right knowledge, *i. e.*, the generation of anything characterized as right knowledge, depends on itself [*i. e.*, on its own factors], but not on an auxiliary factor, by which [latter opinion] in order to [establish] the fact that the Veda is productive of right knowledge, [the objectionable theory of] the Vedas having a competent maker would be necessitated. The having an incompetent maker, however, implies, as a consequence, the not being productive of right knowledge. More [about this subject is to be found] in the great standard works (*âkara*).

[The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the Buddhists with regard to such errors as 'this [mother of pearl] is silver':

52. There is no conception of the unreal, as f. i., of a man's horn.

[The opinion of the Buddhists is that in the case of somebody saying about a piece of mother of pearl] 'this is silver,' the unreal identity of the mother of pearl with the silver is conceived.[2] This is not [right], because the unreal, as, f. i., a man's horn, is destitute of any practical efficiency and, therefore, incapable of producing a conception.

[The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the followers of [the Mîmâṃsâ teacher] Prabhâkara:

What [the Buddhists] teach, *viz.*, that the unreal identity of

[1] For a fault in the senses or in the characteristic signs is the *para*, *i. e.*, the *jñâna-janaka-sâmagrî-bhinna*.

[2] *Pratibhâti* 'shines forth' = *jñâyate*.

the mother of pearl with the silver is conceived, is not [right], because the unreal, as, f. i., a man's horn, is destitute of any practical efficiency and, therefore, incapable of producing a conception.

[The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the Prâbhâkaras:

53. [The tenet of the Prâbhâkaras[1] is] not [right], because the disproof of a real [perception] would be seen.

[The Prâbhâkaras declare: "If somebody says with regard to a piece of mother of pearl] 'this is silver,' [the part] 'this' [signifies a right perception] the object of which is before our eyes, [while the part] 'silver' [expresses] a recollection [of some silver seen formerly]. These are two [different] apprehensions; [and] since the distinction [between the present object of perception and the object of recollection] is not understood, [the deluded person] acts [*i. e.*, seizes the supposititious silver." This is] not [right], because we see that the action [of seizing] follows from an apprehension of the non-distinction [and not from the non-understanding of the distinction], and because [the conception 'this is silver'] is disproved by [the later conception] 'this is not silver.' Now, a right perception cannot be disproved; [for,] if this were [possible,] the perception 'this is not a jar' might take place, after the perception 'this is a jar' has arisen. [Hence the idea of a right perception is out of place in the case in question.]

[The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the Vedantists:

The Prâbhâkaras say: "The words 'this' and 'silver' express two apprehensions, the former [of which] is a perception and the other a recollection. The action [of seizing the supposititious

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[1] According to which the case under discussion is not to be regarded as an apprehension of an unreal state of things but as a combination of two different true conceptions.

silver] follows from the non-understanding of the distinction, [and does] not [take place], when the distinction is understood." [This is] not [right], because the disproof by means of [the cognition] 'this is not silver' is seen. More [about this subject may be looked for] elsewhere [*i. e.*, in Nyâya works].

[The author] confutes [now] the doctrine of the Vedantists:

54. [There is] no [conception] of the indescribable, because such a thing does not exist.

[The Vedantists declare:] "Since, if [the supposititious silver] were unreal, there could not be the immediate perception 'this is silver,' [and] since, if it were real, there could be no disproof [of this perception], for these [two] reasons [the supposed silver] is different from the real as well as from the unreal, *i. e.*, it is indescribable. And in this sense [it is said]:

> "If [an imaginary object] were real, the apprehension by which it is disproved could not take place, nor could its perception, if it were unreal. [Moreover], it cannot have the nature of both [reality and unreality], because these two are opposites. Whence, therefore, [shall we get] another principle [besides reality, unreality and simultaneous reality and unreality]?[1]
>
> But as the illusory nature of the empirical world has been established by the means of knowledge, the authority of these means, perception, etc., is phenomenal [itself].
>
> The scriptural declaration of non-duality, however, which has the character of an instruction about truth, possesses the nature of a means of right knowledge, because of the want of a confutation.
>
> Therefore, though being [a part of the] illusory [world], the scriptural passages teaching non-duality possess the power of producing a right knowledge of Brahman[2]. So much has been settled."

This [doctrine and argumentation of the Vedantists] is not [right], because [the imaginary silver] is describable by

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[1] *I. e.* the imaginary object is, according to the Vedantistic view, neither real nor unreal, nor both simultaneously. As a fourth possibility does not exist, the Vedantist declares that nothing can be predicated of that which is imaginary.

[2] *Mânatâ = prâmâṇyam.*

the very expression 'this is silver,' and because it is [in fact] *described* as indescribable [by the Vedantists who declare: 'The object[1] is] neither real nor unreal.'

[The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the Nyâya system:

'Because such a thing does not exist' means: because [the imaginary object] is *described* as indescribable [by the Vedantists who declare:] 'It is neither real nor unreal,' and, therefore, an indescribable thing does not exist.

[The author] confutes [now] the doctrine of the Naiyâyikas:

55. The theory that things may appear in a manner different [from their real nature] is not [right], because your own declaration is opposed [to this].

[The Naiyâyikas teach: "If somebody thinks of a piece of mother of pearl] 'this is silver,' the mother of pearl simply appears under the character of silver." [This is] not [right], because [the idea] that one thing appears under the character of another is contradicted by the acknowledged doctrine [of the Naiyâyikas] that it is silver superimposed [by the deluded person] which appears in the case [under discussion].[2]

[The author] states his own doctrine:

Because your two declarations are contradictory to one another, *viz*, "The mother of pearl appears under the character of silver" and "Superimposed silver appears in that case."

[The author] states his own doctrine:

56. There is the apprehension of something real and unreal, because it is disproved and not disproved.

[1] Supply *vishayaḥ* or *padârthaḥ*.

[2] The interpunctuation is to be altered in my edition according to this translation.

[The erroneous notion] 'this is silver' is real, as far as its object is something present before our eyes, because it cannot be disproved [as such][1]; but it is unreal, as far as its object is silver, because it is disproved [in this respect by the subsequent cognition 'this is not silver']. The truth, therefore, is that there are two [notions, the one of which is] real and [the other] unreal.

[The author] refutes [the doctrine of the Yoga philosophy that there is] a 'discloser' (*sphoṭa*)[2]:

[The erroneous notion] 'this is silver' has [also] a real and [not only] an unreal character; for the silver [alone] and not the object present before our eyes is disproved by [the cognition] 'this is not silver.'

[The author] refutes [the existence of] the 'discloser':

57. Because of conception and non-conception a word having the nature of the 'discloser' does not exist.

Letters are conceived, [but] a 'discloser' is not conceived; hence a word having the nature of the 'discloser' does not exist. If the letters do not manifest anything whatever [by themselves], how can the 'discloser' manifest something? And if the letters [are supposed to] manifest [something], of what use is the superfluous 'discloser'? Let [then] the letters alone manifest [the sense of the words]. Nor does the existence of the 'discloser' follow from the variety [of meanings exhibited by the letters in their diverse arrangement].

The non-eternity of the Veda has been stated [in aphorism 45] for the reason that [its eternity] is disproved by percep-

[1] *Purovarti-vishayatâ-'ṃçe kiṃchij jñânaṃ na bâdhyate*, Paṇḍit.

[2] Or a verbal unit residing in every word as something distinct from its component letters. The followers of the Yoga system hold that by this *sphoṭa* the meaning of every particular word is disclosed to the hearer.

tion.[1] [Now the author] teaches [in contrast with the Mîmâṃsakas] that the letters [too] are not eternal:

Letters are conceived, [but] a 'discloser,' distinct from the letters, is not conceived; hence no such [internal] word as a 'discloser' exists, but the letters alone are [the word].

And these are not eternal. This [the author] says [in the following aphorism]:

58. Sounds are not eternal, because we know that they are produced.

Because we know from perception [*i. e.*, hearing] and [by inference] that a sound does not exist [any more] immediately after it has been heard. Otherwise [*i. e.*, if this argument were not cogent,] a jar, too, would be eternal.

In order to teach that all things, except primitive Matter and Soul, are products, [the author] ponders the [following] doubt:

Because we know that [the sound of] the letter *ga* is produced, etc.

[The author] ponders a doubt:

59. "[Sound], being a previously existing entity[2], is manifested as a jar by a lamp."

"As a jar, standing in darkness, is manifested by a lamp, so the letters are manifested by tones. In the absence of these [the letters] seem not to exist, but [they do] not [so] on account of [real] non-existence."

[The author] sets [this doctrine of the Mîmâṃsakas] aright:

[The author] refutes [this]:

[1] This argument is not given in the aphorism, but in the commentary on it.

[2] *Pûrva-siddha-sattva* is better regarded as a Karmadhâraya, though Vijñânabhikshu explains it as a Bahuvrîhi.

60. If the tenet of the [constant] reality of the products [is meant hereby], you prove what has already been proved.

If the eternity [of letters or sounds] is taught [by you], while you have recourse to [the idea of] manifestation, and [if] hence [our] tenet of the [constant] reality of the products [is accepted by you], then you prove what has already been proved.

[The Vedantists declare:] "There is only one Self; and in this sense [it is said]:

'As the sky, though being one, appears to be different, as white, blue, etc., so the Self, though being one, [is regarded] as separated individually by misapprehending people' (Vishṇupurâṇa 2. 16. 22).

This [the author] confutes:

What is the purport of your declaring [the letters or sounds] to be eternal, while you have recourse to [the idea of] manifestation? [Do you mean that all] products are [constantly] real and never unreal, or, [that] the letters are eternal in the same way as primitive Matter and Soul? The former cannot [be your opinion], because this would happen to be [our] doctrine; [and] against the latter [side of the question aphorism 72] will be produced.

[The author] opposes against the [Vedantistic] theory that there is only one Self:

61. The Self's non-duality is not, because its multiplicity is known through signs.

Because such [specializing] signs, as old age, death, etc., are ascertained. The multiplicity [of souls] has been stated above [I. 149] as an established fact, [but] now it is *proved*, and therefore [our aphorism contains] no superfluous repetition.

"Granted that there is no non-duality of homogeneous Selfs, *i. e.*, granted that there are many individual Selfs; but jars and similar things, [declared by you Sâṃkhyas

to be] not Self, will have the nature of the Self, and so there will be [such] non-duality, [that besides the Selfs nothing] heterogeneous exists." To this [objection the author] replies:

'The Self's non-duality,' *i. e.*, unity, 'is not.' Why [not]? Because the multiplicity of Selfs follows from the [specializing] signs, as old age, death, etc. The multiplicity [of souls] has been stated above [I. 149] as a fact, but here it is proved, and therefore there is no superfluous repetition [offered in our aphorism].

62. [The Self is] also not [identical] with the non-Self, because this is disproved by perception.

The Self is not one with the non-Self, *i. e.*, with jars and the like, because jars and the like are seen, as external objects, to be different [from the internal Self]. If [both] were one, jars, etc., would be Selfs, and the Self would be subject to change.

"[Then] there will be an [absolute] non-duality, [so that there are neither] homogeneous nor heterogeneous [entities besides the one Self]."[1] To this [fresh objection the author] replies:

The Self is also not one with the non-Self, *i. e.*, with jars and the like, because this is disproved by perception.

Moreover:

63. There is no [oneness] with both, for the same reason.

I. e., Because the difference is seen by an irrefutable perception.

"[But even] then [does] the contradiction of Scripture [remain] which teaches non-duality." To this [last objection of the opponent the author] replies:

[1] The opponent retracts the concession made in the introduction to our aphorism, and means that, if such arguments are produced against the *vijâtîyâdvaita*, it is safer to retain the absolute *advaita*.

'For the same reason,' *i. e.*, because this is excluded by perception. There is no oneness [of the Self] with both, *i. e.*, neither with the [other] Selfs nor with what is non-Self. The meaning is that such irrefutable perceptions as 'you are happy,' 'I am afflicted,' 'this is a jar,' etc., refute the oneness of the Self.

"But then, what would be the fate of those scriptural texts which teach non-duality?" To this [the author] replies:

64. Another sense [appears] there to the undiscriminating.

[It is only] to the blind [that] those scriptural passages [appear to] have another sense [than the one ascribed to them by us Sâṃkhyas; in fact] they mean the homogeneousness [of the Selfs].

[The author] teaches [now] that for the asserters of one Self there can also not be a material cause of the world:

There, *i. e.*, in the scriptural passages about the unity of the Selfs which [passages really] teach that the nature of the Selfs is one [and the same everywhere], another sense appears to the undiscriminating, *viz.*, to the fools, *i. e.*, [to them these passages seem to] mean the [absolute] oneness of the Self. This is to be supplied. And so Scripture does not contradict [our doctrine]. This is the meaning.

Moreover, for the asserters of one Self it is also impossible to accept a material cause of the world. This [the author] teaches [in the following aphorism]:

65. Neither the Self, [nor] ignorance, nor both can be the material cause of the world, because nothing adheres [to the Self].

The Self cannot be [this] cause on account of its invariableness. Ignorance cannot be the cause, since it is unreal; [and] if [the Vedantists declared it to] be real, they would abandon [their doctrine of] non-duality. Both [together, the Self and ignorance,] cannot be the cause, as no connec-

tion exists [between the two, the one being real, the other unreal].

With reference to [the Vedantistic doctrine] that the Self be, in its essence, thought and delight, [the author] declares:

The Self cannot be [the cause] on account of its invariableness. If ignorance were real, there would happen to be a duality [which is opposed to the theory of the Vedantists]; if it is unreal, it cannot be the cause, as the son of a barren wife [or other non-entities are unable to produce anything]. For this very reason both [united] also can not be [the material cause].

[The author] refutes the doctrine that the Self has the nature of thought and delight:

66. One thing cannot have the two natures of delight and thought, because these two are different.

Delight means joy, [and] thought knowledge. If [the Self] had the nature of delight and thought, there would happen to be a duality [which contradicts the doctrine of the Vedantists]. And you cannot say: "Delight [as understood by us Vedantists] is no joy springing from objects, nor is thought that knowledge which depends on an affection [of the internal organ], but [both are] something different, *viz.*, something supernatural"; for, if [these two things] were supernatural, they could not be proved; [and] if they could be proved, there would be a duality because of the existence of the proof. Moreover, is delight [in your opinion] the nature or a property of the Self? If [you declare] delight [to] be its property, there would happen to be a duality, and a contradiction to Scripture which teaches that [the Self] is void of qualities, etc. [*i. e.*, invariable and indifferent; and] if [you declare] delight [to] be the nature [of the Self, we must ask:] Why is [this] delight [which you describe as something supernatural] not felt during the state of mundane

existence? If [you reply: "It is not felt then,] because it is covered by ignorance," [we gainsay to this:] Since ignorance is incorporeal, nothing can be covered by it, as [for instance] by walls. "But" [the Vedantist declares] "the sense of the word 'to cover' is 'to overpower,' [and thus the supernatural delight which is the essential nature of the Self is overpowered by ignorance, as the beaming of the stars is overpowered by sunshine." To this we reply:] An eternal and all-pervading thing [as the Self or its essential nature] cannot be overpowered. [Besides,] as ignorance is illusory and the Self real, no connection can exist between these two, because there is no connection between an entity and a non-entity, or because, if such a connection did exist, Scripture which teaches that nothing adheres [to the Self], etc., would be contradicted. And if [you maintain that supernatural] delight be felt [sometimes by the Self which is itself such delight in your opinion], you would be in contradiction with the logical rule that the same thing cannot be object and subject simultaneously.[1] Moreover, what proof is there of the existence of a Self consisting of delight? If [you reply:] "What is the use of searching for a proof, as the soul itself has the character of a proof?"; this is not [right], for in order to establish a proof, you must [be able to] state something which is to be proved [by it]; if there is nothing to be proved, what can be ascertained by the proof? And since [the Self] is not the basis of any act of proving, it is certainly not a proof.

Besides, that which has the nature of thought, has not the nature of delight, because these two [things] are different. Nor [can you say] that the identity of the two is to be proved by their supernatural character, because, if they were supernatural, their invariable concomitance could not be apprehend-

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[1] Because the Self would then be feeler and felt at the same time.

ed, [and hence there would be no means of discerning their identity]. For these reasons the Self has not a twofold nature. And if delight is not felt at [the time of] liberation [as we hold], what is the use of [ascribing] this [delight to the Self? But] if it is felt [by the liberated Self according to your opinion], you must accept [three different things, *viz.*] the feeler, the feeling and the felt, [*i. e.*, you must give up your doctrine of non-duality]. And as [the word] 'contemplation' (*samâdhi*) is also employed [by you Vedantists] on account of [*i. e.*, to denote] the immediate cognition of the Self, this being only possible as long as the body lasts, how can contemplation exist [at the time of liberation], since the Self [alone] continues to be after the decease of the body? Hence it is a delusion [on your part to believe] that [eternal and supernatural] delight is gained in contemplation in consequence of the cessation of all pains; [for] how can delight be felt, when there is no body and, therefore, contemplation is at an end? And so it is an error to hold that delight be felt at [the time of] liberation.

"But what is then the matter with Scripture which speaks of the delight [of the Self]? Thus [it is said]:

> 'He is not afraid of anything who knows the delight of Brahman, before which words, together with the thinking organ turn back, without reaching at it'[1] (*cf.* Taitt. Up. 2. 4)."

To this [the author] replies:

Delight means joy, [and] thought knowledge. 'Because these two are different,' *viz.*, in daily life. If [you say] that these [two] are something supernatural, [we reply:] As no proof exists [thereof, the Self's consisting of both delight and thought] cannot be made out [in this manner]. Moreover, if thought [or intelligence] has the nature of delight, why is this not felt during the state of

[1] *I. e.* which is not to be described by words nor to be apprehended by thoughts.

mundane existence? If [you declare:] "Because it is covered by ignorance," [let us ask again:] How can this, being unconnected [with the Self,] cover [the same? And] if [you are of the opinion that ignorance] is connected [with the Self], you are in contradiction with Scripture which teaches that nothing adheres [to Soul]. Moreover, is delight felt at [the time of] liberation, or not? In the first case [we must ask:] By whom is it felt? If [you say]: "By the Self," you are guilty of the logical fault of making the same thing, [*viz.*, the Self] subject and object simultaneously. If, [however, delight is] not [felt by the liberated Self according to your opinion], what is the use of asserting that [the Self] has the nature of delight?

"But what is then the fate of the scriptural passage 'He is not afraid of anything who knows the delight of Brahman' (*cf.* Taitt. Up. 2. 4)?" To this [the author] replies:

67. [The word 'delight' is] figurative, to denote the cessation of pain.

[This is] clear.

[The author] mentions another mode [of explanation]:

Supply: the appellation 'delight.'

[The author] mentions another mode [of explanation]:

68. It is a commendation of liberation for the sake of the inferior.

'For the sake of the inferior,' *i. e.*, of those who are under the influence of Tamas. 'A commendation of liberation,' *i. e.*, an incitement to activity [*viz.*, to endeavouring after the means of liberation].

[The author] refutes [the opinion] that the internal sense pervades [the whole body]:

'For the sake of the inferior,' *i. e.*, of those who are under the influence of Rajas and Tamas. 'A commendation of liberation' means an incitement to activity.

[The author] refutes [the opinion] that the internal sense be pervading:

69. The internal sense is not pervading, because it is an instrument or a sense, like an axe, etc., and the sight, etc.

The [simultaneous] sensation 'my head aches, my foot is at ease,' which [apparently] intimates that the internal sense pervades [the whole body],[1] is [really] occasioned by the fact that the succession [of such sensations] is not apprehended on account of the swift moving [of the internal sense]. It does not follow therefrom that [the internal sense] is pervading.[2]

[The author] gives another argument against [that theory]:

Such a sensation, however, as 'my head aches, my foot is at ease' which, as some [teachers] maintain, proves [by the apparent simultaneousness] that the internal sense pervades [the body], is [really] occasioned by the fact that the succession is not apprehended on account of the swift moving of the internal sense; hence it does not follow therefrom that [the internal sense] is pervading.

70. Because it is moveable, [and] because Scripture speaks of its wandering.

By the words 'because it is moveable' [the proof by] inference is given [for the internal sense's being not pervading]; by the words 'because Scripture speaks of its wandering' [the proof by] testimony is given.

"[But,] as [the internal sense] is only an atom, it will

[1] Cf. the commentary on III. 14.

[2] The Sâṃkhyas hold that the *manas* is *madhya-parimâṇakam*, while the Naiyâyikas and Vaiśeshikas declare it to be an atom.

have no cause and, therefore, be eternal." To this objection [of a Naiyâyika or Vaiśeshika the author] replies:

By the words 'because it is moveable' [the proof by] inference is given [for the internal sense's being not pervading]; by the words 'because Scripture speaks of its wandering' the proof is given for its moveableness.

71. It is not without parts, since it possesses some, like jars, etc.

'It is not without parts,' *i. e.*, it is not without a cause, 'since it possesses some,' *i. e.*, since it possesses parts. What is its cause? The egotizing organ. As [even] the [so-called] atoms have six [divisions, *viz.*, the upper, under, right, left, front and back] at the same time, it follows that they [too] consist of parts. Therefore the internal sense is, like jars, etc., not eternal, [as eternity belongs only to the indivisible].

[The author] teaches [now], how the eternal and non-eternal things are to be distinguished:

The internal sense is not without a cause, since it possesses one. If [you ask:] "What is its cause?", understand, that it is the egotizing organ.

Moreover:

72. Everything save primitive Matter and Soul is uneternal.

[This is] plain.

"Since Space, Time, etc. [*i. e.*, ether] are eternal, how [can you say] that everything [save primitive Matter and Soul] is uneternal, [and for what reason do you ascribe eternity to primitive Matter]?" To this [objection of the Vaiśeshika the author] replies:

"Why is primitive Matter eternal?" To this [the author] replies:

73. Parts are not to be found in the whole, since Scripture teaches that it is without parts.

Causes[1] of the whole, *i. e.*, of primitive Matter which is the cause of the world are not to be found, 'since Scripture teaches that it is without parts,' *i. e.*, since Scripture says that it, being the principal cause, has no other cause.

"Liberation is a manifestation of delight." This [declaration of a Vedantist the author] refutes:

Whereof there are no parts, *i. e.*, with regard to which there are no causes of the being produced, of that, *i. e.*, of primitive Matter, no causes are to be found; 'since Scripture teaches that it is without parts,' *i. e.*, since the scriptural passage "Know the Mâyâ as the primitive cause" (S'vetâśv. Up. 4. 10) testifies to the existence of a universal primitive cause, and since in [accepting] a cause of primitive Matter we would have a *regressus in infinitum.*

[The author] refutes [now] the opinion that liberation be a manifestation of delight:

74. Liberation is not a manifestation of delight, because there are no properties.

Because there is not the relation of property and proprietor at [the time of] liberation, [*i. e.* because the liberated Self has no properties. And] does this manifestation [which you accept] exist at all times? Then liberation would obtain also during the state of mundane existence. Or is it effected in liberation? Then, on the other hand, there could be no absolute liberation, because [every] positive thing which is an effect [or a product] necessarily perishes.

[The author] refutes [now the doctrine of the Naiyâyikas and Vaiśeshikas] that liberation is the destruction of the special qualities [ascribed to the soul by those systems, *viz.* intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, merit, demerit and memory[1]]:

[1] To explain the word 'parts,' as parts are the material causes of the whole.

Is [that] delight [the manifestation of which you declare to be liberation] the essential nature of the Self, or something different? In the first case liberation would obtain during the state of mundane existence, in the latter no absolute liberation could take place, because [every] positive thing which is an effect necessarily perishes.

[The author] disposes [now] of the opinion that liberation is the destruction of the special qualities [of the soul]:

75. Likewise not the destruction of the special qualities.

If you say that the *special* [qualities of the soul] do not exist [in liberation], you acknowledge [thereby that] the *general* qualities, [*viz.*, number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction, etc.,[2] continue even then to belong to the soul]. And thus [the liberated Self] would be associated with qualities, and hence there would be no absolute liberation.

"The Self is of the same extension as the body; its departure from all that is called body [*i. e.*, from the subtile as well as from the gross body] is liberation." This [doctrine of the Jainas the author] refutes:

'Likewise' means: Liberation is not [etc]. Because there is no proof for the opinion that the general qualities [continue to exist at the time of liberation]. This is the sense.

[The author] refutes [now] the opinion of the outcasts [*i. e.*, of the Jainas] that the Self has the same extension as the body and that liberation is the constant going upwards of the Self which has departed from the body:

76. Not a special wandering of that which is immovable.

[1] Cf. Bhâshâpariccheda 89, 90.

[2] Cf. Bhâshâpariccheda 90, 91.

29

Liberation is not [effected] by wandering upwards, because Scripture teaches that the Self is void of qualities, motion and properties. [But] how [can you talk of] liberation? [On your doctrine the Self] cannot even be eternal, since, if changing into [the extension of] the body of an elephant or a worm, it must contract or expand and, therefore, consist of parts.

[The author] disposes [now] of liberation as explained by the Buddhists [or more specially, by the Vijñânavâdins]:

For if the Self had the extension of the body, it ought, on entering the body of an elephant or a worm, to increase or decrease and, therefore, necessarily to be declared to consist of parts; and hence it would not be eternal. For this reason it is proper to accept that the Self is all-pervading. Since it is, as such, immovable, it cannot wander upwards. This is the meaning.

[The author] disposes [now] of liberation as explained by the Buddhists:

77. Not the destruction of the influence of forms, because of the fault of momentariness, etc.

Is that [what you call the] 'form'[1] [of thought] the essential nature of cognition? In this case cognition, too, [the continuity of which is considered by you as the Self] would be destroyed [in liberation, if liberation were what you declare it to be; and] who would [then] be liberated? Or is [the 'form'] an attribute [of cognition]? Then it would constantly perish on account of its momentariness, and even those who are subject to mundane existence would be liberated. And if [you say that the Self] is not liberated *then* [*i. e.*, at the time of mundane existence] because of the power of the [previous] impressions, [we reply: In this case] let liberation be simply the destruction of [these previous] impressions; what is the use of [defining it as] the destruction of the influence of forms? By the word, 'etc.' [the following is intended]: as [in your opinion] the continuity of *pure* cognitions [*i. e.*, of those cognitions which have not the form of an empirical object] is also perishable, [of] whose liberation [can you talk]?

[1] *Nîla-pîta-ghaṭa-paṭâdi-samasta-vastu-rûpa âkâraḥ*, Paṇḍit.

[The author] refutes [now the explanation of] liberation, [given] by [another] sect of the Buddhists:

'The influence of forms' means: the connection with the objects.[1] The destruction thereof is not liberation for the following among other counter-arguments: because the destruction of each previous connection [of thought] with objects is, on account of the momentariness of all [objects, accepted by you], easily obtainable [or rather a matter of fact] even in mundane existence, [while liberation must naturally be difficult to obtain]; and because even the Self must be momentary [in your opinion], as the continuity of *pure* cognitions, too, is momentary [according to your doctrine; of] whose liberation, [therefore, can you talk]?

[The author] refutes [now] the opinion that liberation is the destruction of everything except the Self:

78. Not the destruction of everything [except the Self], because this is not Soul's aim, and because of other faults.[2]

[This is] plain.

[The author] refutes [now the Nihilistic doctrine] that the void is liberation:

For what sin has the universe committed, so that its destruction were to be sought for [by those who endeavour after liberation]? Besides [that theory must be rejected] on account of its impossibility.

[1] 'Form' is here equalized to 'object,' because the Vijñânavâdins acknowledge no external objects, but only notions.

[2] *I. e.*, because the Saṃsâra is eternal, and because there is no reason for the destruction of everything.

79. For the same reasons the void [is] also [not liberation].

[*I. e.*] because this is not Soul's aim, etc. By the word 'etc.' the impossibility is intimated that anybody will betake himself [to the means of his own destruction. Here the Nihilist who denies even the existence of the Self makes the following objection:] "If a Self is accepted, then aversion [must naturally be felt] against that which is antagonistic to it, and affection for that which is favourable to it; therefore, as these two are causes of bondage, there would be no liberation." Don't say so! For bondage does not result from affection and aversion as such, but from a species of them, [*i. e.*, from that affection and aversion alone the object of which is an empirical one]. As according to the doctrine of the Buddhists bondage does not result from the continuity of cognitions as such, since the continuity of pure cognitions [*i. e.*, of cognitions which have no relation to the empirical world] is [in their opinion] a means of liberation, so bondage does not result from the aversion against that which is antagonistic to the isolation of the Self nor from the affection for the permanent freedom of the Self from Upâdhis; on the contrary, [such aversion and affection] are means of liberation.

[Some Taushṭikas[1] teach:] "Liberation is dependent on a certain time, place, or work." This [the author] refutes:

Because this is not Soul's aim, and because of other faults; also on account of the [absolute] impossibility. This is the sense.

[The author] refutes now [the opinion of worldly people] that liberation is the gaining of excellent garlands of flowers, sandalwood[2] and beloved women at some excellent place:

[1] Cf. Sâṃkhya-kârikâ 50.

[2] The powder of which, mixed with water and perfumes, is used to anoint the body and has a cooling effect.

80. Nor the gaining of some place, etc., since conjunctions lead to disjunctions.

Since the conjunction with a place terminates in disjunction, there would be mundane existence again. By the word 'etc.' time and work are also comprised. The conjunction with a [certain] time, too, [must] likewise [come to an end; that is to say: the same refutation holds good with regard to those who mean that liberation will come at a certain time of its own accord.] And [if liberation were the fruit] of works, then, since this is perishable, there would be mundane existence again.

[The followers of S'aṅkarâchârya teach:] "Liberation is the conjunction of the part, *i. e.*, of the individual Self, with the whole, *i. e.*, with Brahman." This [the author] refutes:

[This is] clear.

[The author] refutes [now the opinion] that liberation is the conjunction of the part, *i. e.*, of the individual soul, with the whole, *i. e.*, with Brahman:

81. That which is without parts cannot be in conjunction with parts.

The individual Self is not a part of Brahman, because Brahman has no parts [according to your doctrine. And if a conjunction of the individual Self with Brahman were possible, this] conjunction [also] would terminate in disjunction, and hence bondage would take place again. But if [you say: "After the dissolution of the individual soul in Brahman] no disjunction [is possible], as there is no longer a cause of mundane existence," then let this [non-existence of such a cause] be [liberation];[1] what need is there of inventing the conjunction of the part [with the whole]?

[1] This is Sâṃkhya doctrine, according to which, however, the cause of mundane existence is only annihilated by discriminative knowledge.

"Liberation is [the acquisition of] the faculty of assuming atomic size [or invisibility] and of other supernatural powers." With reference to this [opinion the author] declares:

(According to Mahâdeva's reading our aphorism is to be translated: [*Liberation*] *is not the conjunction of the part with the whole.*)

Because no proof exists for the theory that Brahman and the individual soul stand in the relation of whole and part; and because [such a] conjunction, [if possible,] would terminate in disjunction.

82. Nor [is liberation] the possession of the faculty of assuming atomic size, etc., because its loss is inevitable, like the disjunction from [all] other [possessions].

These [supernatural powers], too, [which can be obtained by the Yoga-praxis] are not eternal, because they are products. By the word 'etc.' are intended the powers of assuming extreme lightness [or incorporeality] and extreme heaviness, of reaching at anything,[1] of an irresistible will, of mastering all beings, of changing the course of nature, and of resorting to any place at one's mere will.

"Liberation results from the acquisition of the supreme divine power and rank." With regard to this [current belief the author] declares:

83. Nor the attainment of the rank of Indra or of another [god], for the same reason.

[*I. e.*] because this is [likewise] not eternal.

"The senses consist of the elements." This [objection, made by a Naiyâyika or Vaiśeshika with reference to the Sâṃkhya doctrine propounded in I. 61, the author] refutes:

[1] As touching the moon with the end of one's finger.

[These] two aphorisms [82 and 83] are clear.

The author refutes [now the opinion] that the senses consist of the elements:

84. The senses have not their origin in the elements, since Scripture teaches that they spring from the egotizing organ.

Thus [it is said, Muṇḍ. Up. 2. 1. 3.]:

"From this[1] are produced the vital air, the internal and all external senses, ether, air, light, water and the earth, the supporter of all."

[The Naiyâyikas,] however, say that [the senses] have their origin in the elements, because they are under the delusion that that sense by which the cause of a [gross] element, *i. e.* a [particular] rudiment, is apprehended [by a god or a Yogin], has its origin in that [element].

"Liberation results from the knowledge of the six categories." With regard to this [doctrine of the Vaiśeshikas the author] declares:

In the word *bhûta-prakṛititvam* the suffix *tva* is added to a Bahuvrîhi-compound.

For we learn from the Purâṇas and other [writings] that the senses are the product of that egotizing organ which has the nature of Sattva. The current saying, however, that [the senses] have their origin in the elements, is brought about by the delusion that that sense by which the cause of a [gross] element, *i. e.*, a [particular] rudiment, is apprehended, has its origin in that [element].

The two [following] aphorisms are [intended] for the refutation of the doctrine of the Vaiśeshikas that there are six categories and that liberation results from the knowledge of them, and of the

[1] Aniruddha misrepresents the purport of the Upanishad which does not here speak of the egotizing organ, but of Brahman.

doctrine of the Naiyâyikas that there are sixteen categories and that liberation results from the knowledge of these :

85. The restriction on six categories is not [correct, nor] does liberation result from the cognition of them.

[The categories of the Vaiśeshikas are :] substance, quality, action [or motion], generality, particularity and inherence. [These are explained by them in the following manner :] Substances are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, the Self and the internal sense. Qualities are colour, taste, smell and touch, number, dimensions, individuality, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, notions, joy and pain, desire and aversion, effort, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, impulse [or faculty of reproduction or elasticity], merit, demerit and sound. Actions [or motions] are throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding and going. (Cf. Vaiś. Sûtra 1. 1. 4-7, Bhâshâpariccheda 1-5). Generality is [two-fold], higher [extensive] and lower [non-extensive] (cf. Bhâshâpar. 7-9 and the Upaskâra and Vivṛiti to Vaiś. S. 1. 2. 3). Particularities are [called only] the ultimate [distinctions] abiding in the eternal substances [*i. e.*, in space, time, ether, soul, and in the atoms of earth, water, fire and air.][1] (Cf. Bhâshâp. 9, and the Upaskâra and Vivṛiti to Vaiś. S. 1. 2. 6). Inherence is that conjunction of things, known to be never separated, which is the cause of the conviction 'here [is this or that inherent].'[2]

This restriction [of the Vaiśeshikas] is not [correct in our opinion], as we Sâṃkhyas do not acknowledge a restricted number of categories. Nor does liberation result from the cognition of these [six categories], because liberation proceeds only from the knowledge of the Self.

[1] While for all other distinctions different expressions, as *bheda*, *bhinnatva*, etc., are used.

[2] *Cf.* the quotation in the Upaskâra to Vaiś. Sûtra 7. 2. 26.

"Liberation results from the knowledge of the sixteen categories." With regard to this [doctrine of the Naiyâyikas the author] declares :

86. The same it is also with the sixteen etc.

[The Naiyâyikas teach :[1]] "Final beatitude is attained by the knowledge of the truth about [the following sixteen things :] means of right knowledge, object of right knowledge, doubt, motive, example, tenet, the members [of a syllogism], argumentation, ascertainment, discussion, wrangling, cavil, semblance of a reason, unfairness, futility and reason of rebuke (Nyâya Sûtra 1. 1). 'Means of right knowledge' are perception, inference, analogy and testimony (Ny. S. 1. 3). 'Objects of right knowledge' are soul, body, sense, [sense]-object, cognition, the internal sense, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain and emancipation (Ny. S. 1. 9). 'Doubt' is an uncertain judgment with regard to the particularity [of an object, and arises] 1, from the appearance of properties which are common [and therefore not distinctive] or several [such as cannot belong to the same thing], 2, from discrepant opinions, and 3, from unsteadiness of apprehension or non-apprehension (Ny. S. 1. 23). 'Motive' is that thing for the attainment of which one engages in action (Ny. S. 1. 24). 'Example' is that thing with regard to which ordinary people and the investigator entertain the same opinion (Ny. S. 1. 25). 'Tenet' is that, the steadiness of the acceptance of which, rests on an [authoritative] treatise (Ny. S. 1. 26). This is of four kinds (end of Vâtsyâyana's commentary on Ny. S. 1. 26), because there is the following difference : 1, dogma of all systems, 2, dogma peculiar to some system, 3, hypothetical dogma and 4, implied dogma (Ny. S. 1. 27). The 'members [of a syllo-

[1] In translating the following Nyâya Sûtras I have made critical use of Dr. Ballantyne's translation. Unfortunately, this translation does not extend to the fifth book of the Sûtras which is very difficult.

30

gism]' are 1, proposition, 2, reason, 3, example, 4, application [of the reason], and 5, conclusion (Ny. S. 1. 32). 'Argumentation' is reasoning from a demonstration of the cause, for the sake of the knowledge of the truth with regard to an object, the real nature of which is not accurately apprehended (Ny. S. 1. 40). 'Ascertainment' is the determination of an object by pondering on both what is to be said for and against it (Ny. S. 1. 41). 'Discussion' is the maintenance [by two parties] of one side and of the other—based on five-membered [syllogisms],—and consists in the defence [of the proposition] by proofs [on the part of the one disputant] and in the assailing it by reasoning [on the part of the other], while there is no discordance in respect of their [general] tenets (Ny. S. 1. 42). 'Wrangling' consists in defending or attacking [a proposition] with unfairness, futility, or in a way such as deserves rebuke, while all declarations hold good which have [just] been given [with regard to 'discussion'] (Ny. S. 1. 43). 'Cavil' is called this [wrangling], when devoid of [any attempt made for] the establishing of the opposite side of the question (Ny. S. 1. 44). The 'semblances of a reason' are 1, the erratic, 2, the contradictory, 3, the equally available on both sides,[1] 4, that which is in the same case with what is to be proved, and 5, the mistimed (Ny. S. 1. 45). 'Unfairness' is opposing a proposition by means of assuming a different sense (Ny. S. 1. 51). This is of three kinds: 1, unfairness in respect of a term, 2, unfairness in respect of a genus, and 3, unfairness in respect of a metaphor (Ny. S. 1. 52). 'Futility' is opposition based on similarity or difference of qualities [without regard to the invariableness of association or dissociation] (Ny. S. 1. 59). [There are the following 24 subdivisions of futility:] 1, sophistic objection founded on similarity of qualities (*sâdharmya-sama*), 2, on difference of qualities

[1] *Prakaraṇa-sama*, the same semblance of a reason which is called *sat-pratipaksha* in later Nyâya writings.

(*vaidharmya-sama*), 3, the sophism that, if two things have one quality in common, their other qualities are also the same (*utkarsha-sama*), 4, the sophism that, if two things have one quality in common, a different quality missing in one is missed in the other also (*apakarsha-sama*), 5, the sophism that the qualities of the example belong to the subject of the proposition (*varṇya-sama*), 6, sophistic objection based on confounding the qualities of the example with those of the subject of the proposition (*avarṇya-sama*), 7, the sophism that, if two things possessing a certain quality admit of alternativeness in one respect, they are subject to alternativeness in other respects also (*vikalpa-sama*), 8, sophistic objection founded on an example which is in the same predicament with what is to be proved (*sâdhya-sama*), 9, that sophism in which the reason coincides with what is to be proved (*prâpti-sama*), 10, that sophism in which there is no connection between the reason and what is to be proved (*aprâpti-sama*), 11, the sophism that even the proof is to be proved (*prasaṅga-sama*), 12, the sophistic procedure of setting a counter-example without taking notice of the opponent's example (*pratidṛishṭânta-sama*), 13, sophistic objection founded on the not having an origin (*anutpatti-sama*), 14, that sophism in which a doubt is founded on a special quality common to two things (*saṃchaya-sama*), 15, that sophism in which an object is characterized by a quality that is, as a proof, of the same weight *pro et contra* (*prakaraṇa-sama*), 16, that sophism in which the validity of a reason is disputed, because it does not hold good at the three times (*ahetu-sama*),[1] 17, sophistic objection based on self-evidence (*arthâpatti-sama*), 18, the sophistic objection that everything would be void of distinction, if homogeneousness were in-

[1] Read °*prakaraṇâhetu*° in my edition with the MSS. AC and the I. O. L. MS. I have been misled to adopt the wrong reading of MS. B by the misprint in the edition of the Nyâya Darśana (Calcutta 1865) page 265.

ferred from the accordance of two things in one quality (*aviśesha-sama*), 19, the sophism that either of two essentially different qualities may belong to one thing, if the difference is founded in the cause of the thing (*upapatti-sama*), 20, the sophistic objection that the phenomenon has not always the same cause (*upalabdhi-sama*), 21, sophistic objection founded on the notion of imperceptibleness (*anupalabdhi-sama*), 22, of eternity (*nitya-sama*), 23, of non-eternity (*anitya-sama*), and 24, that sophistic objection in which the fact is passed over that the same effects may take place in consequence of different circumstances (*kárya-sama*, Ny. S. 5. 1. 1). 'Reasons of rebuke' are misunderstanding and not understanding at all (Ny. S. 1. 60). [Or, more specially,] there are the following [22] reasons of rebuke: 1, the abandoning of a proposed thesis (*pratijñá-háni*), 2, the changing of the thesis (*pratijñántaram*), 3, the contradiction between thesis and argument (*pratijñá-virodha*), 4, the abandoning of one's own thesis, after having heard the opponent's argument (*pratijñá-saṃnyása*), 5, the alleging of an argument which is different from the required (*hetv-antaram*), 6, the mentioning of something which is not connected with the object under discussion (*arthántaram*), 7, an unmeaning objection (*nirarthakam*), 8, the non-understanding of the sense of the opponent's words (*avijñátártham*), 9, the talking nonsense (*apárthakam*), 10, the neglect of the proper order in construing a syllogism (*aprápta-kálam*), 11, the omission of a member in a syllogism (*nyúnam*), 12, the mentioning of more than one reason or example in a syllogism (*adhikam*), 13, superfluous repetition (*punar-uktam*), 14, the being silent, though an argument has been formally uttered three times by the opponent (*ananubhâshaṇam*), 15, the non-comprehending of a sentence, though this has been comprehended by the assembly and formally uttered three times by the opponent (*ajñánam*), 16, the being puzzled (*apratibhá*), 17, flightiness (*vikshepa*), 18, the acknowledging of a fault in

one's own arguing with the remark that the opponent also is guilty of such a fault (*matánujñá*), 19, the neglecting to censure an argument of the opponent which ought to be censured (*paryanuyojyopekshaṇam*), 20, the censuring of a faultless argument of the opponent (*niranuyojyánuyoga*), 21, an assertion which is in contradiction with one's own doctrine (*apasiddhánta*), and 22, the semblances of a reason (*hetv-ábhása*, Ny. S. 5. 2. 1).

This restriction [of the Naiyâyikas] that there are [only] so many [categories] is not [correct], nor does liberation result from the cognition of these [sixteen categories]. By the word 'etc.' [it must be understood that] other asserters of a restricted number of categories[1] are also to be refuted.

"There are eternal atoms of four[2] kinds. As the gross elements have their origin in these, what need is there of [accepting a] primitive Matter?" To this objection [of a Vaiśeshika the author] replies:

By the word 'etc.' [it must be understood that] other asserters of a restricted number of categories are also to be refuted.

[The author now] disposes of [the opinion] that the world has its origin in eternal atoms of four kinds:

87. The atoms are not eternal, since Scripture teaches that they are products.

Since Scripture teaches that everything arose from primitive Matter and that anything except primitive Matter and Soul is not eternal, the [so-called] atoms are products and, therefore, neither eternal nor cause [of the world].

And so there are no real atoms. This [the author] says [in the following aphorism]:

Because, having learned from Scripture that only primitive Mat-

[1] As, *f. i.*, the Pâśupatas about whom the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha may be consulted.

[2] The atoms of ether are excluded here, because ether does not develop into gross matter.

ter and Soul are eternal, we know that all other things are products. This is the sense.

[The author] says [now] that the [so-called] atom is not without parts for the same reason, *i. e.*, because it is a product:

88. They are not without parts, because they are products.

That which is a product is not without parts, like a cloth.

"Something is apprehended by perception, if it has a manifest colour. [Now,] as the Self is not so, how is it to be apprehended[1] [and, therefore, to be acknowledged]?" To this [materialistic] objection [the author] replies:

Supply: the [so-called] atoms. That which is a product is not without parts, like a jar.

[The author] refutes [now the doctrine] that the perceptibleness of a substance depends on a manifest colour:

89. Perceptibleness does not necessarily depend on colour.

Since, when you say 'This bird is here,' [the expression 'here' shows that] space is perceived and hence [this case] disagrees [with the opponent's rule], perceptibleness does not necessarily depend on a manifest colour. And there is no application [of this rule] to the supernatural perception of the Yogins, which arises from the power of contemplation.

[The author] teaches [now] that dimension is not of four kinds, *viz.*, small, great, long, and short, [as the Vaiśeshikas hold]:

Because space is perceived, when you say 'This bird is here.'

[The author] refutes [now the opinion] that dimension is fourfold, *viz.*, small, great, long, and short:

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1 Read, with the I. O. L. MS., in my edition: *udbhûta-rûpavattvâc ca pratyaksham, nâ 'tmâ tathe 'ti, katham pratyaksha? ity ata âha.*

90. Dimension is not of four kinds, because these can be brought together in two.

Because [all] current ideas [about dimension] are accounted for, if the product is declared to be great and the cause to be small.[1] The other varieties of dimension [long, short, big, thin, etc.] are only subdivisions of these [two].

"[You have declared in aph. 72 that everything save primitive Matter and Soul is non-eternal. But] genus is eternal, though different from primitive Matter and Soul."[2] With reference to this [remark of a Naiyâyika or Vaiśeshika the author] declares:

Because 'these,' *i. e.*, product and cause, can be explained as great and small, [respectively, and] the other dimensions may simply be defined as varieties of great and small.

"Genus, though different from primitive Matter and Soul, is eternal." This [objection the author] refutes:

91. Though genus is not eternal, it possesses constancy[3] and, therefore, is recognized.

As the recognition 'This is the same Devadatta [whom I have seen before,' which] does not refer to a genus, [but to an individual, is to be accounted for by the constancy of the individual Devadatta], so the genus [too], though not eternal, is recognized in the case of the flame [which is always homogeneous] or of similar things [*f. i.*, water, houses, etc.] on account of its long lasting constancy. [That is to say: the recognition of a genus is quite parallel to that of an individual].

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1 *I. e.*, the product is always of greater extension than the material cause, as *f. i.*, the jar is bigger than its raw material, the clay.

2 Neither *prakṛiti* nor *purusha* are a *sâmânya* (or *jâti*), but *prakṛititvam* and *purushatvam* are.

3 *sthira = chira-kâlam samâna-rûpeṇa sthâyin, nitya = na kadâpi dhvaṃsin*, Paṇḍit.—Every genus perishes in the Pralaya in which only primitive Matter and the souls continue to exist.

[The author] sets [the opinion of the Buddhists] aside that no genus exists:

As the recognition 'This is the same Devadatta [whom I have seen before, which] does not refer to a genus, but to an individual, depends on the constancy of the individual, so the recognition of the genus, too, is dependent on constancy and not on eternity.

92. It is not to be denied for this reason.

Genus is not to be denied, because it is recognized, *i. e.*, because the argument brought forward by the opposing [Buddhist, *viz.*, "there is no genus, as it is nothing but similarity what we apprehend in different individuals"] is contradicted by sense-evidence; [that is to say: the word 'house' *f. i.* is heard to be used, even when the house seen just now is totally different in appearance from those which have been seen formerly].

"[Genus] is a uniform notion which means exclusion of [all] different things." To this objection [of a Naiyâyika the author] replies:

For this reason, *i. e.*, because of sense-evidence, it is not to be denied, *i. e.*, genus is not to be denied. The meaning is: because irrefutable sense-evidence proves [the existence of] the object [under discussion, *i. e.*, of genus].

[The author] refutes [now the doctrine] that genus is the exclusion of [all] different things:

93. It has not the nature of the exclusion of [all] different things, because it is apprehended as positive.

If [genus] were of negative nature, a conception ought to be formed, dependent on the recollection of what [the special genus] is not (*pratiyogin*), but not in a positive manner, [as it is really done. That is to say: seeing *f. i.* a cow and forming the idea of its genus, I ought, according to

Nyâya doctrine, to think of everything what is not cow and to exclude this]. And so [it is said]:

"That which is non-cow can be excluded [only] when it is established,[1] and this is nothing but the negation of [the notion] cow. [In order to compass this negation, however, the notion] cow must be stated at first, which is [simply] denied by the negative particle. But if [the notion] cow is not established, [the notion] non-cow is [also] not; and if the latter is not [known], whence can [the notion] cow be?"

"Recognition will [not] depend [on homogeneousness, but] on similarity." To this objection [of the Buddhist the author] replies:

The genus cow, *f. i.*, has not the nature of the being different from what is non-cow. Why [not]? Because it is apprehended as positive, *i. e.*, because it is apprehended as being of positive nature, without the recollection of its antithetic, *viz.*, of what is non-cow. Therefore it is said: (follow the same verses as in Aniruddha's Commentary).

[The author] refutes [now the opinion of the Prâbhâkaras] that similarity is a principle different [from genus or sameness]:

94. Similarity is not a different principle, as is apprehended by perception.

Similarity is the possession of sameness in the greater number of parts, [and] not a principle different [from sameness], because the conception 'this [thing] is similar to that' arises from apprehending, by perception, [an object] which has the greater number of parts just [as another object.]

[The author] mentions another mode [of explanation]:

Because [similarity] is apprehended by perception in the form of these or those substances, qualities etc. This is the sense.

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[1] *I. e.*, We must have arrived at this negative notion, before we can make use of it; and, as it is shown in the following line, the negative notion is not to be had without the previous establishment of the positive.

95. Or [similarity] is the manifestation of an innate quality, because it is apprehended on account of the particularity [of the similar thing].[1]

Things have a peculiarity innate [to them].[2] This [peculiarity] which becomes manifest, *i. e.*, which appears as something particular, at the sight of another similar body, is the cause of the apprehension of similarity [expressed in the words] 'this is similar.' But similarity is not a principle different [from sameness].

"Similarity is the reason for the cognition of the connection between name and named.[3] Thus it is to be explained." With reference to this [remark made by a Naiyâyika, the author] declares:

'The manifestation of an innate peculiarity' means: a manifested innate peculiarity; 'manifested': known as adapted to this or that business; 'on account of the particularity [of the similar thing]': on account of its connection with such a peculiar quality; 'because it is apprehended': because similarity is apprehended. And thus the meaning [of the aphorism] is this: nothing but the peculiarity which abides in this or that thing is the object of the perception of similarity [*i. e.*, brings about the perception of similarity].

[1] Vijñânabhikshu ascribes a totally different but better sense to this Sûtra, as he supplies *na* from the preceding aphorism. Our two commentators consider it as a definition of similarity *siddhânta-prakâreṇa*, while Vijñânabhikshu declares it to be the refutation of a wrong definition.

[2] The *nijâ s'akti* of *go* f. i. is *gotvam.*

[3] The Paṇḍit gave me the following example, frequently used in Nyâya works: *kaśchid grâmîṇaḥ purusho go-pada-tad-arthaṃ gavaya-padaṃ cha jânâti, kiṃ tu gavaya-padârthaṃ na jânâti. atha kasmâch-chid âraṇyaka-purushâch chrutavân 'go-sadṛiśo bhavati gavaya' iti. anantaraṃ vanaṃ gachchhati go-sadṛiśaṃ cha dehaṃ paśyati, tadâ tad-vâkyârthaṃ smarati pratipadyate cha 'asty ayaṃ go-sadṛis'a' iti, niśchinoti cha, yad etaj-jâtîyo gavaya-padasyâ 'rthaḥ.*

96. Nor is [similarity that by which] the connection between name and named [is established].[1]

Similarity is not the reason for the cognition of [this] connection, because [many cases] disagree [with that rule laid down by the Naiyâyikas]; for the connection between name and named is ascertained elsewhere also [*i. e.*, where no similarity exists], from instruction etc. [*i. e.*, from dictionaries or colloquial use].

Since [the compound *saṃjñâ-saṃjñi-saṃbandhaḥ* is not to be understood as a Tatpurusha in the sense of *saṃjñâ-saṃjñinoḥ saṃbandhaḥ*,[2] but to be] analyzed as an instrumental [Bahuvrîhi in the sense of *saṃjñâ-saṃjñinau parasparaṃ saṃbadhyete yena*], the cognition which apprehends the object [under discussion, *i. e.*, similarity,] is elliptically denoted [by that compound].

[The author] refutes [the opinion] that the connection between word and meaning is eternal.

(According to the curious interpretation of Mahâdeva, our aphorism is to be translated: *Nor is the connection between name and named*—)

Supply 'eternal.'

What need is there of many [words]? The connection between word and meaning is not eternal. This [the author] states [in the following aphorism]:

97. The connection is not eternal, because the two things are perishable.

As both, word and meaning, are perishable, how can their connection be eternal?

[The author] refutes [now] the beginninglessness of [*any*] connection:

[1] This explanation of the aphorism is inferior to that given by Vijñânabhikshu.

[2] Which, however, Vijñânabhikshu has every right to do.

[This is] plain.

[The author] confutes [now] the theory of the beginninglessness of [*any*] connection:

98. No connection is beginningless, because this is excluded by that means of knowledge which acquaints us with the thing [connected].

A present connection can [only] have its origin in motion, and there is no motion of that which is eternal and all-pervading. The 'great' and [all] other [material principles] are not eternal; how can their connection [with one another] be eternal? And the Selfs have no connection with these [principles], *i. e.*, with Matter [altogether], because they are void of qualities. Moreover, the connection [of things] will be apprehended by the same means of knowledge [be it perception or inference] by which the things are apprehended; [*i. e.*, as the things themselves, so their connection also—discerned by the same means—must be perishable]. In this manner [the eternity of all connections] is excluded by that means of knowledge which acquaints us with the thing [connected].

[The author] refutes [the existence of] inherence [which forms a special category with the Vaiśeshikas]:

Since by a distinct perception[1] only that connection is established which depends on the characterizing [*f. i.*, colour and form] and on the characterized [*f. i.*, jar], and since such [a connection] is not possible, when there is no characterizing nor characterized thing, it is not proper to accept the eternity of any connection.

[The author] refutes [the existence of] inherence:

99. Inherence is not, because there is no proof [of its existence].

Is [what you Vaiśeshikas call] inherence connected or not

[1] *Viśishṭa-pratīti = savikalpaka-jñâna*, Paṇḍit.

connected [with those objects to which you ascribe inherence]? If it is not connected, how could it bring some other thing[1] [*f. i.*, colour] in connection [with a jar, *f. i.*,]? If it is connected, inherence must be declared [to be this very connection], as no other connection is possible. Since for this [inherence which you assume] another [inherence, connecting the first with the respective thing, must be accepted] again, and for this [second] another again, [etc.], and since thus there would be a *regressus in infinitum*, there is no inherence. But [in reality] the conception (*sampratibhâsa*) [of two things] as inseparable results from the variety of special connections, as [for instance of the connection] of fire with a lump of red-hot iron.

"If there is no inherence, how are [such] conceptions [of characterized things possible, as] 'a white cloth,' 'the horse runs,' 'this is a cow[2]'?" To this [question of the Vaiśeshika the author] replies:

[The author] demonstrates [now] that there is no proof [of the existence of inherence]:

100. Since with reference to both alike [the relation] is to be explained otherwise, perception or inference [are the causes of such conceptions].

Since with reference to both [notions] alike [*i. e.*, to that of the subject and to that of the predicate, the relation] is to be accounted for simply by the fact that this is the nature of the thing (*tâdâtmya*). Else [those two notions] would not have a common substratum; [*f. i.*, else the jar could not be the common substratum of the being a jar and of the being blue].

"Motion is to be inferred [from conjunction and disjunction]." With regard to this [remark the author] declares:

[1] *Anyam*, supply *padârtham*.

[2] In which according to the doctrine of the Vaiśeshikas the *gotvam* inheres.

(According to the reading of Mahâdeva our aphorism must be translated: *Since in both cases alike [the matter] is to be explained otherwise, neither perception nor inference [prove the existence of inherence].*)

[The Vaiśeshikas maintain that] there are [two] proofs for [the existence of] inherence, (1) such perceptions as 'the white jar' and (2) the [following] inference:

(*a*) a distinct conception has as its object the connection of both, the characterizing and the characterized thing,

(*b*) because [the conception of this connection] is the distinct conception,

(*c*) as, *f. i.*, the conception 'the man with the staff.'

In both cases alike [the matter] is to be explained otherwise, *i. e.*, simply by the fact that this is the nature of the thing. Such a conception, however, as 'the cloth is here in the threads, [—which conception is mentioned as an example of inherence by the Vaiśeshikas—] is formed by their own imagination alone, [and] does, [therefore,] not prove [the existence of] the thing, [*i. e.*, of inherence; for that idea is wrong, as the cloth is not in the threads, but the threads are the cloth].

Moreover, [we must ask[1]]: Is [what you call] inherence connected [with the respective objects] and does it bring in connection two things which are connected [with one another], or is it disconnected? In the first case another connection must be assumed for this [connection] also, and thus there would be a *regressus in infinitum*. [And] if [the Vaiśeshika objects:] "The connection [with the things] is the essential natureof inherence," [then we reply:] Why [have you] not [given] this [explanation] before [with regard to the connection between the characterizing and the characterized thing? That is to say: why have you not declared already *that* connection as the essential nature of the thing?] But [as regards the other side of the alternative just propounded, *viz.*, that inherence] be disconnected [with the respective objects], this is [simply] illogical.

"Motion is to be inferred from conjunction with and disjunction

[1] Cf. Aniruddha's commentary on aphorism 99.

from another place, [but it is] not a matter of sense-evidence, as [we learn from the case of] the motion of the sun." This opinion [the author] refutes [in the following aphorism]:

101. Motion is not to be inferred, because he who is very near has the direct perception of it and of that to which it belongs.

Because he who stands near has the direct perception of motion and of that to which motion belongs, [and] because otherwise, [*i. e.*, if this were not averring], the established [proof of] sense-evidence would be contradicted.[1] If motion were inferred from conjunction and disjunction, then motion ought to be attributed by inference [not only] to the man who climbs from the root of the tree to its top, [but] to the tree also, since those two, [*viz.*, conjunction and disjunction] adhere to both [man and tree, alike]. "But," [the opponent objects,] "since conjunction and disjunction result merely from the motion of the man, why should motion be attributed to the tree?" [To this we reply:] This may [appear to] be true in the beginning, [when we see the man rushing to the tree]; but since [the reason] is not erratic, [*i. e.* since there is no case of the production of motion in the tree without conjunction and disjunction], the attribution of motion to the tree by inference from conjunction and disjunction is not excluded [by a mere statement of the fact]. Moreover, if there is such [a sensation] as 'my hand trembles' in the dark, the sensation of the trembling alone[2] must be an error [in your opinion; for conjunction and disjunction by the observation of which alone you mean to be able to state motion are not perceived in the dark]. The motion of the sun, however, [which is mentioned by the opponent as an example of motion known only by inference] is not ap-

[1] A stroke of interpunction is to be inserted after *bâdhât*.

[2] *Kampa-mâtra-jñânam, na tu saṃyoga-vibhâga-jñânam*, Paṇḍit.

prehended [by perception] on account of the fault of excessive distance or [interposition of other objects].[1]

"The body is formed of the five elements." With reference to this [opinion the author] declares:

'He who is very near' means: he who stands quite near at hand; 'of it and of that to which it belongs' means: of motion and of that to which motion belongs. And so it is not proper to deny the apprehension [of motion by perception]. This is the sense. The motion of the sun, however, is not a matter of sense-evidence, because it is too far off.

[The author] refutes [now the opinion] that the body is formed of the five elements:

102. The body does not consist of the five elements, because several things cannot be the material cause.

'Several,' *i. e.*, heterogeneous. [In reality], however, [the body consists only of one element, *viz.*, earth, and] the four [others] are nothing but instrumental causes, as they bring about the stability [of the body]. And for this reason it is said [in daily life] that [the body] consists of the five elements.

"A subtile body does not exist, because there is no proof [of its existence]." With regard to this [materialistic opinion the author] declares:

Because [several things] cannot have the character of a material cause. This is the sense. Moreover, if the body consisted of the five elements, it ought to be invisible, as the connection of ether with a jar; [just so, in the case of the body also, the connection of ether with earth, water, etc., would be invisible]; for perceptibleness is restricted to those things which are mixed with what is capable [of being seen].

[The author] states [now] that the body is of two kinds:

[1] Cf. Sâṃkhyakârikâ 7.

103. The restriction that there be [only] the gross one is not [correct], because there exists the transporting one, too.

Since the thinking organ cannot transmigrate without a substratum, we must attribute a substratum to the thinking organ for the sake of getting to [another body] at [the time of] death. This [substratum] is [called] the transporting (*âtivâhika*) or subtile body. Scripture[1] also [declares]: "Yama pulled out by force the soul being as big as a thumb" (Mahâbh. 3. 16763). [The word] *purusha* 'soul' [implies here] the subtle body, in accordance with [its etymology]: in the town (*puri*), *i. e.*, in the gross body, he is lying (*śete*).[2]

"The senses bring [even] that to cognition which they do not reach to, because a sound is perceived at a distance, and because [even] that which is separated by glass, clouds or crystal, is perceived." With reference to this [opinion the author] declares:

Since the thinking organ cannot transmigrate without a substratum, a substratum must be assumed with regard to its wandering into another body. This [substratum] is called the transporting and subtile body. In the passage "Yama pulled out by force the soul being as big as a thumb" (Mahâbh. 3. 16763) this [subtile body] is also intended by the word *purusha* 'soul,' in accordance with its etymology: in the town (*puri*), *i. e.*, in the gross body, he is lying (*śete*).

"The restriction that the senses become [only] then active when they reach to [their objects] is not [correct]; for, though sight is able to go to the place of its objects, because it has the nature of light, this is not the case with hearing and the other [senses]. But sound comes to the seat of hearing in the same manner as the undulating waves [of water,] or as the anthers of a [globulous]

[1] Aniruddha has already shown in his commentary on I. 48 that he is mistaken as to the character of the following quotation.

[2] The usual dreadful Indian etymology of *purusha*.

Kadamba-flower, and is thus apprehended by the ear. Likewise, the odour which abides in a substratum [*f. i.* in farina] comes to the seat of smelling and is thus [apprehended] by the nose. The same is the case with the other [senses,] too. Such a conception, however, as 'the sound exists at a distance' [which seems to intimate that hearing wanders to the place of the sound] is simply an error, or it refers [only] to the sound in its causal form, [but not to the expanding sound]." These and similar opinions [of the Naiyâyikas, the author] refutes [in the following aphorism]:

104. The senses do not bring to cognition what they do not reach to, because of their not reaching, or because they would reach to everything.

[The senses] do not bring to cognition those objects which they do not reach to, because[1] they have the nature of bringing to cognition [only] what they reach to. The sense of hearing is connected with sound by means of a function. Glass, however, and the other [substances mentioned by the opponent] do not obstruct the proceeding of sight, because they are transparent. And [so] things are apprehended at a distance by means of [proceeding] functions. If, [as we accept, the sense] does not apprehend [an object,] when it does not reach [to it, the facts are explained correctly; for then,] like something separated by walls, that also which is not separated [in this way, but too far removed from the senses,] cannot be apprehended, because there is no difference between the not reaching on account of [excessive] distance [and the not reaching on account of separation]. But if, [as the opponent assumes, the sense] apprehends [an object] even when it does not reach to it, [the sense] would apprehend everything which exists within the universe, because [the not reaching] is the same [with regard to all things].

[1] *Yat = yasmât*, Paṇḍit.

"If sight is proceeding, then it has the nature of light." With reference to this [remark of the Naiyâyikas, the author] replies:

When the senses do not reach to—*i. e.*, are not in connection with—an object, they do not bring it to cognition, just 'because of their not reaching,' *i. e.*, because of their disconnection. "But" [some one objects] "since the senses are all-pervading, such a connection exists [throughout]." To this [our aphorism] answers: 'Because they would reach to everything,' and so they would apprehend everything which exists within the universe. Therefore, a connection of another kind [between the senses and their objects] is necessarily [to be accepted]. This is the meaning.

"But, if sight goes as far as the object, then it must have the nature of light, because it possesses excessive velocity." To this [the author] replies:

105. Not because light glides away, has sight the nature of light, since this is to be explained by the function.

[The opinion of the Naiyâyikas] that [sight] has the nature of light, because it glides away and reveals [things] even at a distance like light, is a delusion. In reality, however, 'this is to be explained,'—*i. e.*, that which [is under discussion and which] we are to understand, [*i. e.*, the proceeding of sight] is to be explained—by a connection mediated through the function [of sight].

"As the function is imperceptible, how is [the existence of] the function established?" To this [the author] replies:

From the fact that [sight] 'glides away,' *i. e.*, goes far, like light, [it does] not [follow that] sight [has the nature of light].

"The functions [of sight] proceed according to their nature and reveal those objects with which they come in connection, to him who opens his eyes, [and] at that place where [they energize] because of the co-operation of the invisible [power of merit]."

And the [connection, mentioned at the end of Mahâdeva's commentary on aphorism 104[1]] is [what we call] 'function.' This [the author] says [in the following aphorism]:

106. The cognition of the objects reached to is the characteristic sign by which [the existence of] the function is established.

[This is] clear.

"Has the function the nature of a part [of the sense], as the flame [is a part] of the lamp, or is it some other quality?" To this [the author] replies:

[This is] clear.

[The author] describes [now] the nature of the function:

107. The function is a principle different from part and quality, because it wanders for the sake of connection.

The function which is to be inferred from the effect, [*i. e.*, from the acknowledged fact that the senses apprehend distant objects] is a different principle, [*i. e.*, it is neither a part disjoined from, nor a quality of the sense, and it is] produced by the egotizing organ, [the material cause of the senses]; for [according to our doctrine] there is no restricted number of categories. Since a disconnected [object] cannot be apprehended, [the function of the sense] wanders [to it] for that purpose. And so [it is said]:

> "The functions [of sight] proceed according to their nature and reveal those objects with which they come in connection, to him who opens his eyes, [and] at that place where [they energize] because of the co-operation of the invisible [power of merit]."

"How can the motion of wandering belong to the incorporeal function?" To this [the author] replies:

[1] Which is followed immediately by aphorism 106 in Mahâdeva's arrangement.

The function which is to be inferred from the effect is a different principle produced by the egotizing organ, [but it is] not a part [of the sense] nor a quality either. For we Sâṃkhyas are not asserters of a restricted number of categories. Since that which is brought in connection [only] by means of words[1] [and not by the senses] cannot be apprehended, the expression 'it wanders' [has been used in the aphorism] in order to [explain] how the apprehension is brought about.

"How can the incorporeal function wander?" To this [the author] replies:

108. It is not restricted to substances, because [it depends] on the conjunction therewith.

As things are not restricted [in this manner], motion is not restricted to substances only; but where a proof [of the existence of motion] appears, there we acknowledge it. And in the functions motion is recognized [by inference]; for otherwise there would be no apprehension of things.

"The senses [may be products of the egotizing organ in this world, but they] will be formed of the elements, [when the individual transmigrates] to other worlds, as a man bitten by a scorpion dies in some country, [and not in others]." To this [objection the author] replies:

The restriction that motion belongs to substances only is not [correct]; but where 'the conjunction therewith,' *i. e.*, the conjunction with motion exists, motion is necessarily to be stated. That is to say: where a proof [thereof] appears, there is motion. And the motion of the functions is vouched by the cognition of the objects. This is the meaning.

"The senses will be formed of the elements at other places, as the death of a man bitten by a scorpion [occurs at some place, and not in others]." To this [the author] replies:

[1] And by words all things may be combined; but this is no reason of apprehension.

109. Even at other places they have not a different material cause; they are necessarily such as with us and with those who are like us.

The invariable rule that the senses are products of the egotizing organ is understood [by every one] in his own person. If there were an exception to this rule, then smoke also might exist without fire, [*i. e.*, no other invariable rule would hold good].

[The author] mentions the reason why [the senses] are spoken of as consisting of the five elements:

'They have [not] a different material cause' means: they have [not] their origin in the elements. Supply: the senses. But 'they are necessarily such as with us and with those who are like us,' *i. e.*, they are entirely products of the egotizing organ like our senses and those of our equals. [And] that the senses are products of the egotizing organ, is an invariable rule which is understood [by every one] in his own person. If there were an exception to this rule, then smoke might also exist without fire. This is the meaning.

"If the body[1] has not its origin in the five elements, how is it then that it is spoken of as consisting of the five elements?" To this [the author] replies:

110. This denotation [is employed], because the concomitant causes are denoted.

It is [only] denied that the five [elements] are the *material* cause [of the senses, but] not, that they are *concomitant* causes. For this reason, [the senses] are spoken of as consisting of the five elements.

"How many varieties of the body are there?" To this [the author] replies:

[1] Mahâdeva refers the following aphorism to the whole body and not to the senses alone, as the other commentators do; but he is hardly right, since the *pâñchabhautikatvam* of the body has already been denied in aphorism 102.

Because the five elements are denoted as concomitant causes, 'this denotation [is employed],' *i. e.*, the denotation [of the body] as something consisting of the five elements refers [merely] to the concomitant causes. It is [only] denied that [the elements] are the material cause, [but] not, that they are concomitant causes. This is the meaning.

[The author] mentions [now] the varieties of the body:

111. Since [there are bodies] arising from the heat, from eggs, from the womb, from sprouts, and such as are produced by the [mere] will and by supernatural powers, too, the [usual] restriction is not [correct].

From heat arise mosquitos, etc., from eggs, birds, snakes, etc., from the womb, men, etc., from sprouts, trees, etc.; by the [mere] will were produced Manu and others, by supernatural powers are produced those [bodies] which are originated by the secret powers of spells, drugs, etc. [Therefore] the [usual] restriction that there exist the [first] four [kinds] only, is not [correct].

"Which element is the chief constituent in the body?" To this [the author] replies:

[There are, in addition to those bodies which everyone knows,] such as are produced by the [mere] will, *i. e.*, the bodies of Manu and others, [and] such as are produced by supernatural powers, *i. e.*, those which are originated by the secret powers of spells, drugs, etc. For this reason, the restriction that only four [kinds] exist is not [correct].

112. In all [bodies] earth is the material cause on account of its special nature. That [other] designation is [to be understood] as before.

'In all [bodies]' means: for the most part; for we learn from Scripture that, *e. g.*, in the world of the sun the bodies consist of light. [But] even there [the luminous parts serve

only to] support the greater quantity of earthy parts, because there would be no experiencing, if [the earthy parts] were less in quantity. 'As before' means that all this has [already] been taught [in aphorism 110].

[The author] removes [now] the supposition that, since the vital air is seen in the body, this originates the body:

In all bodies the earthy [element is the material cause]. From this special [distinct] declaration it follows that light, for instance, serves only to support the earthy parts in the luminous bodies, too, which exist in the world of the sun, etc.; for the earthy parts alone enable [the body] to experience. 'That [other] designation,' *i. e.*, the declaration that the [four] other elements [are causes of the body, too,] is [to be understood] as before, [*i. e.*, as in aphorism 110]; that is to say: [the other elements are to be regarded] as concomitant causes.

[The author] refutes [now] the opinion that the vital air is elemental air:

113. That which originates the body is not the vital air,[1] because this exists through the power of the senses.

The elemental air originates the body, but the vital air is not elemental, because Scripture says: "Everything arose from the vital air." Since [the vital air] lasts as long as the body, the error is [current] that it originates [the body]. The vital air is [in reality] supported by the power of all senses, and hence 'this exists,' *i. e.*, the supportance of the vital air exists, as long as the senses [last].

"Does the superintendence of the Self take place, when the body has been produced, or is the production of the body [brought about], when this has begun to be superintended by the Self?" [Of this alternative the author] gives the decision [in the following aphorism]:

[1] The confused explanation which our two commentators give of this aphorism is decidedly inferior to that offered by Vijñânabhikshu.

The air which calls the body into existence is not the vital air, 'because this exists,' *i. e.*, because the vital air exists, 'through the power of all senses', *i. e.*, in the form of the power of all senses. The meaning is that the vital air is the common function of the organs.[1]

114. The abode of experience, [*i. e.*, the body] is formed [only] in consequence of the superintendence of the experiencer, because otherwise putrescence would take place.

[This is] plain.

"As the body has its origin in primitive Matter, [the Self's] superintendence will be through that." With reference to this [remark the author] says [in the affirmative]:

[Supply at] the beginning [of the aphorism]: from the time [of the effusion] of the sperma into the womb. 'In consequence of the superintendence' means: in consequence of a special connection; 'putrescence' is stinking.

"Primitive Matter is like a servant of Soul. [Therfore] let the superintendence be through that—and not independent—from the time of generation." With reference to this [remark the author] says [in the affirmative]:

115. The superintendence of the master is through the servant, not immediately.

As the rank [of the master] is always dependent on non-intellectual servants [or servants having no will of their own, but as these are not able to accomplish works of their own accord], so [in our case also the ruling of Soul over primitive Matter is indispensable; for] by the [mere] superintendence of non-intellectual primitive Matter the putrescence [of the growing body] could not be withheld.

[1] Cf. II. 31.

With a view to describe the nature of Brahman, [the author] mentions the analogous state of other [conditions] :

The superintendence of Soul is [practised] through primitive Matter, not immediately; for [Soul] is not confined [to the interior of the body], that is to say : it is existent everywhere. Supply [in the aphorism : the superintendence of Soul alone is] exclusive of putrescence.

In order to teach by the example of profound sleep that no pain exists in liberation, [the author] says :

116. In contemplation, profound sleep and liberation there is the state of Brahman.

[This is not to be understood verbally, but thus:] there is a state analogous to that of Brahman, as no consciousness of external things exists in all these [three conditions], but the state of Brahman is not [arrived at in them alike].

[The author] describes [now] the essential nature of Brahman :

'The state of Brahman' means the being unconscious of pain.

[The author] states [now] the difference of liberation [from the two other conditions] :

117. The [first] two are affected by the seeds, in the other they are annihilated.

The [first] two, *i. e.*, contemplation and profound sleep, are affected by the seeds, *i. e.*, by the impressions [left in the internal organ]; the other, *i. e.*, liberation, is free from these seeds.

"It is known [indeed by perception] that one's object is accomplished, [*i. e.*, that freedom from pain is attained] in contemplation and profound sleep, as the functions [of the organs] are oppressed then ; but this is not the case with liberation." To this [objection the author] replies :

'They are affected by the seeds' means: by the impressions

[left in the internal organ] which bring on pain again. 'They are annihilated' means : those impressions are annihilated.

[The author] says [in the following aphorism] that there are proofs for [the existence of] liberation :

118. But not [those] two [only] exist, since all three just as the two are apparent.

Since all three are apparent, *i. e.*, since liberation also is ascertained by Scripture and inference, one's end is accomplished [by liberation, too]. 'But not [those] two [only] exist,' *viz.*, profound sleep and contemplation. As these two are affected by the seeds, the object [of Soul] is accomplished [by them] in a secondary sense [only, while definitive absence of pain is attained in liberation alone].

"As desire and the like are causes of bondage, of what use is [your] arguing with [the notion of] disposition (*vâsanâ*, or impression, *saṃskâra*) ?" To this [question the author] replies :

As profound sleep is established by perception, or as contemplation is established by scriptural testimony, so liberation also is established by the philosophical institutes. And among these, two, *viz.*, profound sleep and contemplation, are no absolute aims of Soul, because they are affected by the seeds ; but only liberation is, because it is free from the seeds. This is the meaning.

"As desire and the like alone are the causes of bondage, why do you speak of disposition which is only a different, [but] synonymous word for impression ?" To this [the author] replies :

119. There is the revealment of unreal things by the disposition, in spite of the connection between the faults [and bondage; therefore] not [these alone are causes of bondage]; the efficient cause is obstructive to the principal thing.[1]

[1] Aniruddha and Mahâdeva explain this aphorism in a manner which is totally different from the interpretation of Vijñânabhikshu.

You should not say that bondage arises from the faults [desire, aversion, etc.] alone; [on the contrary, there is] the revealment of unreal things by the disposition [of the internal organ, and thus a misconception is produced. This revealment of unreal things or misconception] is necessarily to be considered [a cause of bondage.[1] The said disposition which is] the efficient cause of the faults must be declared to be obstructive to the principal thing, *i. e.*, to liberation. And [among these two causes of bondage,] disposition [and faults, the former] is the chief one.

"In shooting an arrow or the like, motion arises from that impression (*saṃskâra*) which is called impulse, and by motion [another] impulse is [brought about again]. Thus there are many [or a continuance of] impulses." This [opinion the author] sets aside:

'In spite of the connection with the faults' means: though the connection between desire, etc., [and bondage] is [not to be denied]. 'The revealment of unreal things by the disposition' [of the internal organ] is the [current] apprehension of [the objects'] agreeableness and disagreeableness. Supply [here: this is the chief] cause [of bondage]. Therefore not only desire and the like are the causes of bondage, but 'the efficient cause,' *i. e.*, the disposition which is also the efficient cause of desire and the like, is obstructive to the principal thing, *i. e.*, obstructive to liberation. For this reason one must endeavour after the destruction of the disposition. This is the meaning.

"In shooting an arrow or the like, motion arises from that impression which is called impulse, and that [again] from motion." [This opinion] that [thus] there are many [continuous] impressions [the author] sets aside:

[1] For there are no faults at the time of profound sleep or contemplation, but still liberation is not then attained; hence another cause of bondage must be at work during these states, and this is the faulty disposition of the internal organ. According to the Sâṃkhya doctrine this disposition is the chief impediment to liberation even in the normal waking state.

120. A single impression brings about motion, but there are not different impressions in the case of each motion, because the assumption of many would result.

On [our] theory that a single impression [effectuates the motion of a missile from beginning to end, we can account for the fact that] an arrow hits the man [aimed at]. This is stated [in the aphorism]. But on the [opponent's] theory that there is a change [of impulse into motion and of motion into impulse], the one [arrow] hits [its aim] in consequence of a change [of motion] which is now slower, now [quicker]. In this assumption of many [impulses we see] a superfluous complication.

"[But] there is [only] one object, because there is [only] one perception; for [all] conceptions are indiscriminate '[this is] existent, [that is] existent'." To this [objection, made by a Vijñânavâdin, the author] replies:

[This is] clear.

"But there is the perception in daily life that from a single impulse there arises a single motion, [and] therefrom [another] impulse [again]." To this [objection the author] replies:

121. There is no restriction with regard to the perception of the external.

As the conception '[this is] existent' is irrefutable, just so is also the conception of a jar, of a cloth and of [all] other [*individual* things]. The conception '[this is] existent' refers [only] to the *general* character. Therefore the restriction that there be only one [object][1] for the perception of the external is not [correct].

"The body of living beings consists of the five elements.

[1] Supply *vishayatvam*.

Of how many elements is the vegetable [body] formed?" To this [question the author] replies:

There is just as well the perception that many motions arise from a single [impulse]. Hence only a single impulse is [accepted by us] for the sake of simplicity.

[The author] extends [now] the rule which holds good with the moving body to the vegetable one:

122. Trees with remarkable flowers, bushes, creepers, annual plants, trees without remarkable flowers, grasses, climbers, etc., are also abodes of experience for an experiencer, as before.

'As before' means: since they are abodes of experience [just as the moving bodies, spoken of in aphorism 114], they consist of the five elements.[1] And that [vegetables] are abodes of experience, is a consequence of special [bad] works, [done] in former existences; for Scripture teaches that the empirical souls come into the condition of residing in vegetables.

For this there is also [the testimony of] tradition. This [the author] states [in the following aphorism]:

A climber is a creeper which spreads quickly over the tree.

[The author] gives the proof thereof:

123. And because of tradition.

[This is] clear. And thus [it is said]:

"The Brâhmaṇa who, having been saluted, does not give the benediction, is born [again] as a tree, inhabited by vultures and herons, on a cemetary."

"A man becomes a vegetable through sins done by the body, a bird or beast through those of speech, an outcast through mental [sins]." (Manu 12. 9).

[1] But it deserves notice that the *pâñchabhautikatvam* of the moving body has been expressly denied in aphorism 102.

"If trees and the like were bodies, they ought to be capable of [performing meritorious] acts." To this [objection the author] replies:

Because from the two traditional passages, mentioned in Aniruddha's commentary, and from others we learn that these [vegetables], too, are bodies.

[The author] refutes [now the objection] that trees and the like, if they were bodies, would happen to be capable of [performing meritorious] acts:

124. Not simply on the body as such depends the being capable of [performing meritorious] acts, because Scripture teaches the particularity.

Even bodies of living beings such as Chândâlas, etc., are not capable of [performing meritorious] acts; how much less are vegetables! For [only] particular bodies are capable of [performing such] acts.

[The author] mentions [now] the difference of bodies:

The meaning [of scriptural passages treating of this subject] is, that [only] he is capable [of performing ceremonies] who has the desire, power and knowledge [that are required] and who is not excluded [by the sacred law].

[The author] mentions [now] the difference of bodies:

125. There is a threefold distribution with regard to the three: there are acting bodies, experiencing bodies,[1] and bodies of both kinds.

The acting body belongs to those who are free from desire, because they practise [good] work without bringing the fruit into consideration; the experiencing body belongs to beasts and [plants which suffer most pain]; the acting and experiencing body belongs to those who are given to experience as well as capable of [performing meritorious] acts.

[1] *I. e.*, bodies which *chiefly* either act, *i. e.*, accumulate merit, or experience.

[The author] mentions a fourth body which is not capable of [either, acting or experiencing]:

The acting body belongs to those who are free from desire and practising [good] work without regarding the fruit; the experiencing body belongs to beasts and [plants], the body of both kinds to those who are given to experiencing as well as to [good] work.

[The author] mentions a fourth body:

126. Nothing whatever is [to be ascribed] to the Anus'ayin.

"Know that *anuśaya* means hatred, repentance, and residue," says S'âśvata, [the lexicographer, *v.* 320]. To the Anuśayin [or to him of whose works only a residue has remained], *i. e.*, to the Yogin, nothing whatever is [to be ascribed], because he is incapable of anything.

[The author] confutes [the opinion] that understanding may be eternal:

Anuśaya means a rest of works which have begun [to bear fruit]; to whom such [a rest only] belongs, is called Anuśayin. 'To him,'[1] that is: to one knowing, no work whatever is [to be ascribed]. In this manner [our aphorism] must be supplied. One knowing, *i. e.*, a man who consumes the rest [of his merit and demerit] which have begun [to bear fruit], is not capable [of doing any work], be it enjoined or forbidden. This is the meaning.

Though the knowledge, desire and action belonging to the empirical souls are not eternal, still they may be eternal somewhere [else]." To this [theistic objection the author] replies:

127. Understanding, etc., are not eternal even in the particular site, [*i. e.*, in the eternal organ of the supposed Lord], like fire.

If something which has the nature of an invariable rule

[1] *Tasya* takes up the *anuśayinaḥ* of the aphorism.

[as the non-eternity of understanding, etc.,] could [occasionally] not hold good,[1] there would be no reliance on anything. And thus fire might not be hot in a particular site, [as *f. i.*] when taking rise in sandal wood.

[The author] mentions another argument against [that opinion]:

Even if such a particular site [as the Lord's internal organ] could be established, still knowledge, etc., would not be eternal there, because from our own knowledge, etc., we learn the invariable rule [that all these internal functions are transitory]. Otherwise, [*i. e.*, if exceptions to such rules were possible], fire also, when taking rise in sandal wood, may not be hot. This is the meaning.

[The author] states [now] that even [such] a site does not exist:

128. And because [such] a site cannot be established.

[For the following four reasons:] (1) there is no Lord; (2) the Selfs have no properties [and can, therefore, not be the sites of an eternal understanding, etc.]; (3) the properties of Matter are changeable; (4) the 'great one' and the other [forms of the internal organ] are not eternal. And properties the site of which is not eternal cannot be eternal [themselves]. For [all] these reasons there is no site of an eternal understanding.

"[The attainment of] supernatural excellence from the power of gems, spells, herbs and austerity is known; but the [attainment of] supernatural powers from the Yoga-praxis is not known [by experience]." To this [objection the author] replies:

I. e., because [the existence of] the Lord has been refuted [in aphorisms I. 92, V. 2].

[1] Or more technically and specially: if the invariable concomitant (*vyâpaka*) 'non-eternity' could deviate from the concomitated (*vyâpya*) 'understanding, etc.'

"Supernatural excellences produced by the power of gems, spells, herbs and austerity, are known [by experience], but those by the Yoga-praxis are not." To this [the author] replies :

129. The supernatural excellences from the Yoga-praxis are as little to be denied as those from drugs, etc.

The supernatural excellence of making one's self invisible, etc., the faculty of assuming a number of bodies at the same time (*kâya-vyûha*), of entering the body of some one else (*para-pura-praveśa*) and the like are known. And since these cannot be got from spells or other things which procure [only] inferior faculties, they are dependent on the Yoga-praxis alone. Hence [the supernatural excellences arising from the Yoga] are not to be denied.

"Though intellect is not seen in the single elements, they may, when combined and made into a body, assume intellectual nature." To this [materialistic objection the author replies :

"Though intellect is not seen in the single elements, it may be [produced], when [the elements] have been changed into the form of a body." To this [the author] replies:

130. Intellect is not [a property] of the elements, because it is not observed in them severally, [and, therefore, it does not belong] to the combination, too—to the combination, too.

A great power arises, through the association of those things which [singly] possess [only] a very small power, as we see in the case of the association of threads which, though [singly] possessing a very small power, can fetter elephants, [when combined. But, a small quantity of] intellect is not thus [as in the above instance] seen in the elements severally, whereby the production of [the perspicuous] intellect in the

combination might be [accounted for. On the theory of the materialistic opponent] intellect ought to be found in the dead body also, because there is no difference with regard to the combination [of the elements in the case of a dead and of a living body]. Therefore intellect is distinct [from the body]. Though this subject has been [already] discussed [in aphorism III. 20], it is called to memory [here], because it has been treated of at such a distant place, as an opportunity has arisen. Therefore [our aphorism] is not a superfluous repetition.—The re-iteration of the words 'to the combination, too' indicates the end of the book.

For where [only] a very small power is seen in the individual [constituents], there arises a superior power in the combination, as in the case of the association of threads which, though [singly] possessing a very small power, can fetter elephants, [when combined]. In this manner, however, [a small quantity of] intellect is not seen in the elements severally, whereby the production of [the perspicuous] intellect in the combination might be [accounted for]. Though this subject has been [already] discussed [III. 20], it is called [here] to memory again, because it has been treated of at such a distant place.—The repetition [of the last words] serves to [indicate] the end of the book.

Here ends, in the commentary on Kapila's aphorisms explanatory of the Sâṃkhya philosophy, the fifth book in which the opinions of the adversaries have been knocked down. The whole contents of the system having [now] been propounded, the sixth book is begun, after the refutation of the opinions of the adversaries, in order to resume those very contents and to exhibit them in the form of a recapitulation of the essential points.

Here ends the fifth book in the quintessence of the commentary on the explanation of the Sâṃkhya system, composed by Mahâdeva the Vedantist. The sixth book is a recapitulation of the essential points.

BOOK VI.

In this [book] the subjects treated of beforehand are mostly given in a summarised form. The aphorisms are also mostly clear, [but] sometimes they are commented on.

1. The Self exists, because there is no proof of its non-existence.

[This is] clear. About [the existence of] the Self in a general way there is no difference of opinion.

[The author] establishes its particular nature:

2. It is distinct from the body and from the other [material things], on account of the variety [of births].

On the supposition of the identity [of the Self] with the body [a single individual] ought to have several Selfs, because of the difference of bodies in childhood, in youth, in manhood and in old age. [And] since [in this case the Self] would perish at the death of the body, the variety of other births could not be ascribed to it. And Scripture [says]:

"Without hands and feet he runs and takes, without eyes he sees, without ears he hears. He knows everything, but nobody knows him. They call him the supreme, primordial soul" (cf. S'vetâsv. Up. 3. 19).

[The author] mentions another reason:

3. Also on account of the use of the genitive case.

There is the [universal] conception '*my* (*mama gen.*) body,' and we hear [that] the genitive case [is only employed] where the difference [of the possessor and the possessed] exists. If [the materialist objects: But] there is co-ordination [of the body and the soul] in the notion '*I* am thick'," [then we reply:] No, [for], since the experiencing [of the Self] depends on the body, that apprehension is occasioned by [the fact of] such [experience] and [to be understood] in a figurative sense.

"[But] there is no difference [between the possessor and possessed], since we hear [that] the genitive case [is being employed] also in [expressions like] 'the body of the statue,' where there is no difference [between the statue and its body, as there is no soul in the statue]." To this [objection the author] replies:

This means: on account of the well-considered employment of the words '*my* body.'

4. The comparison with the case of the statue is not [right], because this is excluded by that means of knowledge which acquaints us with the thing.

[Your remark is] not [right]; for, since there, [*i. e.*, in the case of the statue] we apprehend the identity [of the statue with its body] by mere sense-evidence, [the difference which is, as a rule, expressed by] the genitive is excluded, and hence the use [of that case] is [to be understood] in a figurative sense. [But] in our case [the genitive] is not employed figuratively, as its primary [meaning] is acceptable.

"The object [of human exertion] may be attained, when an excess of joy is [secured; why shall we endeavour after liberation?]" To this [the author] replies:

The denotation of the difference [between the Self and the body by way of the employment of the genitive] is not figurative, as it is in the expression 'the body of the statue,' but it [must be taken]

in its primary sense. For the figurative sense is excluded [in our case] by perception, inference and scriptural testimony, *i. e.*, by evidences which acquaint us with the thing, *i. e.*, with the Self, or which acquaint us with the difference [of the Self] from the body and [from all] other [material things]; but as for the expression 'the body of the statue,' the identity [of the statue with its body] is known by mere sense-evidence. Such [a conception], however, as '*I* am thin' [which seems to indicate that thinness or other qualities of the body belong to the Ego or Self] is [only] a delusive supposition of [the Self's] identity [with the body, produced] by affection [for the latter]. This is the meaning.

5. The object is attained on the absolute cessation of pain.

Since even an excess of joy is perishable, this does not constitute the attainment of [Soul's] object; but the absolute cessation of pain does, because there is no recurrence [of pain after that].

"[What! Will absolute cessation of pain be] Soul's aim, in spite of the existence of the want of joy?" With regard to this [question the author] declares:

But not through an excess of joy, since this is perishable.

6. Not so much longing exists with regard to joy, as affliction is [felt] by Soul through pain.

Because pain necessarily exists in joy. [And] if pain necessarily exists when there is joy, who will long for joy? Therefore, [joy] being greatly mixed with pain, nothing but the cessation of pain is Soul's aim.

[The author] says [now] that [even] joy is to be given up:

As there is aversion to pain, *i. e.*, to the necessary presence of pain even in joy, so much longing does not exist with regard to that little bit of joy which is found even in pain. For joy is

mixed with more pain, and therefore there is [really] no longing for joy. This is the meaning.

"But joy not mixed with pain may belong to somebody at least!" To this [objection the author] replies:

7. Nobody is happy anywhere.

You may reflect yourself [and you will come to the conclusion that you are not happy].

"[But] we know through perception that beloved women and the like are causes of joy." To this [objection the author] replies:

[Supply at] the beginning[1] [of our aphorism]: 'As no joy exists which is not mixed with pain, therefore.'

"Granted that there is an admixture of pain, but joy is an object of our desire [nevertheless]." To this [the author] replies:

8. Since this [joy] also is mingled with pain, the discriminative reckon it as pain.

Our own consciousness is the proof that pain is inherent to the acquisition, loss or [preservation] of wreaths of flowers and other [means of pleasure].

"Joy alone is the highest aim of Soul, but not non-existence [of pain]." To this [materialistic objection the author] replies:

Pain surely arises from the acquisition of objects, such as the heavenly paradise, etc., and from fear of their loss. This is the meaning.

"But experience teaches in daily life that joy alone is Soul's aim, not non-existence of pain." To this [objection the author] replies:

9. If [you declare] that [non-existence of pain] is not Soul's aim, unless there is the gaining of joy

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[1] The whole sentence is a Bahuvrîhi compound and forms the predicate to the omitted subject *sûtram*.

[implied], then this is not so; for [the aim] is of two kinds.

[The aim] of people affected with desires is joy, that of people free from desires is non-existence of pain.

"Liberation is the destruction of the special qualities [of the soul]."[1] With regard to this [opinion of the Naiyâyikas and Vaiśeshikas the author] declares:

With people affected with desires joy is Soul's aim, but with people free from desires it is non-existence of pain.

10. The Self is void of qualities, because Scripture teaches that nothing adheres to it, etc.

If you say that the *special* qualities [of the Self] do not exist [in liberation], you acknowledge [thereby that] the *general* qualities [continue even then to belong to the Self];[2] and so you would be in contradiction with Scripture which teaches that nothing adheres [to the Self], etc., (cf. Bṛih. Up. 4. 3. 16).

"If nothing adheres to the soul, how is [it to be understood that] heaven is the reward for merit, and hell, for demerit?" To this [question the author] replies:

On the theory that liberation is the destruction of the *special* qualities you would be bound to acknowledge [that] the *general* qualities [continue to belong to the Self even in liberation]: and this [acknowledgment] is in contradiction with Scripture.

"But then, if nothing adheres to the soul, how is it [to be understood] that heaven is the reward for merit, and hell, for demerit?" To this [the author] replies:

11. Though these are properties of another, they are imputed to that [*i. e.*, to Soul] in consequence of non-discrimination.

[1] Cf. Aniruddha's introduction to aph. V. 75.

[2] Cf. Aniruddha's commentary on aph. V. 75.

Though [the delight of heaven and the pain of hell] are properties of Matter [*i. e.*, of the internal body which goes to heaven or hell], still in consequence of non-discrimination between Matter and Soul the reflection of the former falls [on the latter], and so the delusion arises that [it be] the Self [which] goes to heaven or [hell].

"Has non-discrimination a beginning or is it without beginning?" To this [question the author] replies:

12. Non-discrimination is without beginning, because otherwise two counter-arguments would offer.

If non-discrimination had a beginning, liberation would obtain before its arising, and bondage after its arising, so that bondage would befall the liberated. This is the first counter-argument. Moreover, as liberation would exist [of itself], when there is prior non-existence of non-discrimination, [every] effort for the sake of the destruction of non-discrimination would be useless. This is the second counter-argument.

"Being without beginning, is non-discrimination eternal or not eternal?" To this [question the author] replies:

If non-discrimination had a beginning, then liberation would obtain before its arising, and bondage after its arising, so that bondage would fall upon the liberated again. [This is] the first counter-argument. Moreover, as liberation would exist [of itself], when there is non-existence of non-discrimination, [every] exertion for the sake of the destruction of non-discrimination would be useless. This is the second counter-argument.

13. It cannot be eternal like the Self; otherwise it would be indestructible.

[A thing may be] eternal in two ways, [for] the Self is invariable and eternal, [but] primitive Matter is changeable and eternal. Non-discrimination is neither of the two, but

not eternal, because it perishes. Otherwise, *i. e.*, if it were eternal, it would be indestructible. 'Like the Self' is an elliptical comparison; [for] 'like primitive Matter' is also to be understood.

"Whereby is non-discrimination annihilated?" To this [question the author] replies:

It is neither invariable and eternal, as the Self is, nor changeable and eternal, as primitive Matter is. Otherwise, *i. e.*, if it were eternal, it would be indestructible.

14. It is to be annihilated by a fixed cause, like darkness.

I. e., as light annihilates darkness.

"What is the annihilating factor in our case?" To this [question the author] replies:

As light annihilates darkness, so [it is the case] with that.

[The author] mentions [now] the factor which annihilates non-discrimination.

15. In our case also the fixed rule follows from positive and negative argumentation.

Without any exception [or restriction, *avyabhichârât*] discrimination alone is the annihilating factor.

"Is the Self bound through non-discrimination [alone], or are there other causes of bondage, too?" To this [question the author] replies:

Supply: [the fixed rule that] discriminative knowledge [alone annihilates non-discrimination].

16. Since it cannot be [explained] in any other way, non-discrimination alone is bondage.

[This is] clear.

"[But] since liberation is a product [*viz.*, of discrimination], it may perish, and so bondage may take place again." To this [objection the author] replies:

Bondage, *i. e.*, mundane existence, is declared [here] to be non-discrimination, since the product and the cause may be, figuratively, considered identical. [Non-discrimination is, however, properly speaking, the principal cause of bondage;] but merit, etc., [*i. e.*, demerit, desire, aversion and the dispositions of the internal organ] are accompanying causes. This is the meaning.

With reference to the presumption that liberation, being a product, may perish [again, the author] declares:

17. The liberated is not exposed to a renewed bondage also on account of Scripture which teaches that he does not return.

Scripture says: "The Self is to be known, *i. e.*, to be distinguished from Matter; he [who has attained to this discrimination] does not return again [to new mundane existences]"[1]; and there is a logical argument as well, *viz.*, because [only] a positive product perishes. The cessation of pain, however, has a negative character.

[The author] mentions a reason against the opposite opinion:

By the word 'also' is brought in [the notion of] liberation produced by discrimination; for the scriptural passages about non-returning, as *f. i.* "The Self is to be known, *i. e.*, to be distinguished from Matter; he [who has attained to this discrimination] does not return again,"[1] [serve as a proof] for both [what was stated in aphorism 15 and what is stated in our aphorism]. Only a positive product is subject to the necessity of perishing. This is the meaning.

[The author] mentions a reason against the opposite opinion:

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[1] This is not a literal quotation from Scripture, but a combination and abridgment of the well-known passages Bṛih. Up. 2. 4. 5 and Chhând. Up. 8. 15, with a gloss on the former (*prakṛitito vivektavyo*). The composition is evidently dependent on the Sâṃkhya-tattva-kaumudî, Vṛitti to Kârikâ 2. Cf. Aph. [3] 182 note 4, 429 note 4.

18. Else it could not be Soul's aim.

Discrimination [could not be] Soul's aim, [if bondage might take place again].

[The author] mentions another refutation :

[Else liberation could not be Soul's aim], because it would come to the level of profound sleep and contemplation.

[The author] elucidates this :

19. Because there would happen to be no difference between the two.

Because the transmigrating and the liberated [soul] would be equally exposed to bondage.

"Sickness, etc.," are the impediments to concentration. And so [says] Patañjali: "Sickness, apathy, doubt, carelessness, sloth, attachment, erroneous conception, non-attainment to any stage, and instability; these distract the thinking organ and are [therefore] impediments [to concentration]" (Yogasûtra 1. 30). Sickness is fever etc. Apathy is the being incapable of activity. Doubt is the mental state of wavering between the two sides of an alternative. Carelessness is inattention to contemplation. Sloth is heaviness of the body. Attachment is thirst for objects [of worldly pleasures]. Erroneous conception is wrong notion. Non-attainment to any stage is the not attaining to any stage of contemplation. Instability is the missing in the internal sense of such a stage after having attained to it. Do [now] these [conditions] simply cease to exist in liberation, or do [the liberated] get other conditions?" To this [question the author] replies:

'Between the two,' *i. e.*, between mundane existence and liberation.

"Do the impediments [to concentration] simply cease to exist in liberation, or do [the liberated] get other conditions?" To this [the author] replies :

20. Liberation is nothing else but the cessation of the impediments.

Because on the theory that another condition [is attained in liberation] the invariableness [of the free Self] would be abolished.

[The author] concedes also [the admissibility of that theory] and says :

The impediments simply cease to exist in liberation, 'nothing else'; supply: [no other] condition [is arrived at]. Because with the theory that there is another condition [in liberation] the invariableness [of the free soul] would be in contradiction; this is the meaning. Those impediments, however, are enumerated by Patañjali [in Yogasûtra 1. 30].

[The author] maintains [his theory] in a bold declaration, even in case that another condition [be attained in liberation]:

21. Even therewith [our doctrine] is not inconsistent.

Granted that conditions be attained [in liberation]; still this does no harm whatever [to our doctrine. For] it is taught [by Scripture] that in liberation there is no return [to mundane life,] and this [exemption from transmigration] holds good even in case that other conditions [be attained by the liberated soul].

"Are hearing, thinking and continuous meditation [to be engaged in] by all people alike or not?" To this [question the author] replies :

Because Scripture teaches that [the liberated soul] does not return. This is the meaning.

[The author] says [now] that there is no such rule that hearing, thinking and continuous meditation must be practised by all :

22. Since the capable are of three kinds, there is no rule.

Those who are capable [of reaching salvation] are, indeed, of three kinds, *viz.*, weak, mediocre and prominent. The prominent is liberated in consequence of the mere hearing [of the truth], the mediocre in consequence of both [hearing and thinking], the weak by [practising all] three [means; but] all are not [required] for everybody.

[The author] mentions another opinion:

The capable are either weak, mediocre or prominent. Among these the prominent is liberated in consequence of the mere hearing, the mediocre in consequence of both [hearing and thinking], the weak by [practising all] three [means].

[The author] confirms this:

23. They are for the sake of strengthening the last.

The three means are prescribed for the sake of strengthening the last, *i. e.*, the weak. Scripture also [says]: "The Self, forsooth, must be seen, heard, thought on, and continually meditated upon" (Bṛih. Up. 2. 4. 5; 4. 5. 6).

"Which posture is to be chosen among the salvation-posture (*svastika*) and the others [recommended in the Yoga institutes]?" To this [question the author] replies:

The last, *i. e.*, the weak. Supply: thinking and continuous meditation [are for the] sake of etc.

24. The posture must be steady and pleasant; so there is no restriction.

A posture is to be chosen for the sake of steadiness and pleasure. Let it only be of this kind; for there are plenty [of such postures].

"Is meditation the concentrated thinking of an object, or is meditation the internal sense without any object?" To this [question the author] replies:

'So' [is said] to denote [the preceding sentence as] the reason. There is no restriction on the salvation-posture or the like.

[The author] gives [now] the definition of contemplation:

25. Meditation is the internal sense without any object.

The word 'meditation' is used here in the sense of contemplation.

"As profound sleep and contemplation are both alike, inasmuch as the functions [of the internal organ] are suppressed [in them], what difference is there [between the two]?" To this [question the author] replies:

'Meditation' means contemplation.

[The author] mentions [now] the difference of contemplation from profound sleep:

26. If [you declare that] there is no difference in both cases, this is not so; the difference follows from the suppression of the influence.

The influence consists in the impressions left by the objects [in the internal organ]. The suppression of this [influence] is [effected] in contemplation, [but not in profound sleep]. This is to be supplied.

"[But] since nothing adheres to the Self and, therefore, no influence can be [exercised on the same], liberation must obtain at all times." To this [objection the author] replies:

Though the functions [of the internal organ] are suppressed in both [states] alike, the difference follows from the fact that the impressions left by the objects [in the internal organ]—which [impressions] are [in short] called influence—are suppressed in contemplation, [but not in profound sleep].

27. Though nothing adheres [to that], the influence results from non-discrimination.

From non-discrimination of Matter and Soul the delusion that the Self be influenced results, through the influence

which is [in reality] exercised on Matter, [*i. e.*, on the internal organ].

"[Then] does not even the influence really exist?" To this [question the author] replies :

[This is] clear.

"Of what kind is the influence?" This [the author] explains [in the following aphorism] :

28. No such influence exists [here] as in the case of the Hibiscus flower and the crystal, but [only] a delusion.

As there is a contact between those two [things], a proper influence is [exercised by the Hibiscus flower on the crystal]. But as the Self is free from contact, there is no influence as to that, but [only] a delusion; [that is to say :] Since the nature of the egotizing organ is erroneously attributed to the Self, the influence [also, which is really practised on this organ] is ascribed to that.

"How is this delusion destroyed?" To this [question the author] replies :

For, as there is a contact between those two things, a proper influence [exists in that case]; but as the Self is free from contact, there is no influence with regard to that, but [only] a delusion.

29. It is suppressed by meditation, collectedness, constant practice, indifference [to worldly pleasures and pains], etc.

By the word 'etc.' contemplation is to be understood.

Having [thus] mentioned the individual opinion of some teachers, [the author] states his own doctrine :

'It is suppressed,' *i. e.*, the influence exercised by the objects is suppressed. By the word 'etc.' contemplation is meant.

[The author] says [now] up to what time meditation, etc., are [required] :

30. We, the teachers, declare : By the removal of rest and distraction.

'Rest' is profound sleep, 'distraction' is waking. By the removal of these two [conditions] the egotizing delusion is destroyed.

"Are meditation, etc., to be practised in places such as caves etc.?" To this [question the author] replies :

'Rest' is profound sleep, 'distraction' is slumber and waking. Till the removal of these three conditions, meditation, etc., are to be engaged in.

And for this [purpose] there is no restriction of places. This [the author] says [in the following aphorism] :

31. There is no restriction of places, because [the success depends only] on the tranquillity of the thinking organ.

Where there is no tranquillity of the thinking organ, there the engagement [in meditation, etc.] is not to be undertaken.

"Let the egotizing organ and the following [principles] be the material causes [of the visible world]. We don't stand in need of primitive Matter." To this [objection the author] replies :

Wherever there is tranquillity of the thinking organ, there alone meditation, etc., may be engaged in. There is no restriction of river-banks or other [localities].

32. Primitive Matter is the primordial material cause; for Scripture teaches that the others are products.

Since Scripture teaches that the egotizing organ and the following [principles] are products, [there must be] a cause of these, too; [and this] is primitive Matter, as we have declared several times.

"Since there is no difference between primitive Matter and Soul, inasmuch as both are precedent in time [to all products], which [of the two] is the cause?" To this [question the author] replies:

'The others,' *i. e.*, the 'great one' and the following [principles].

33. Not the Self, though it is eternal, because it is not capable [thereof].

The capability of [being material] cause consists in the possession of qualities and in the being in contact with [something]. Now, such [a capability] does not belong to the Self, and therefore primitive Matter is the cause.

"Since the Self is the intellectual principle, it is proper to ascribe [direct] experiencing and [agency] to that [and] not to non-intellectual Matter." To this [objection the author] replies:

The Self is not the material cause; for it does not possess qualities nor is it in contact [with anything]. This is the sense.

"The Self is agent and experiencer of its own accord; what is the use of [stating] an influence [exercised] on Matter [*i. e.*, on the material internal organ]?" This [opinion the author] refutes:

34. Being in contradiction with Scripture, the mean opinionate does not understand the Self.

[This is] clear.

"As we know that the gross elements are products of the rudiments, for what reason is primitive Matter [declared to be] the cause?" To this [question the author] replies:

(Mahâdeva discovers a locative *apasadasi* in our aphorism; according to this objectionable interpretation the latter part of the aphorism is to be translated: *There is no understanding of the Self in the low assembly of opinionate people*).

'The low assembly,' *i. e.*, the vile society, consisting 'of opinionate people. In that the cognition of the Self cannot take place, because [those opinionate people] are in contradiction with Scripture, and because no liberation would be possible, [if their doctrine were true, *i. e.*,] if [the Self] were agent and [experiencer] of its own accord. For it is said:

> "If the Self had the nature of the agent, etc., then you may not strive for liberation; for the essential nature of things, as the heat of the sun, cannot be abolished."

35. Though mediately, primitive Matter is operating throughout, like the atoms.

As [in the opinion of the Vaiśeshikas] the atoms are mediately the material cause of jars and the like, although these are [directly] products of a lump of clay, so it is also in our [doctrine].

"Is primitive Matter omnipresent or not?" To this [question the author] replies:

As [the Vaiśeshikas declare] the atoms [to be] mediately the material cause of jars and the like, although these are [directly] products of a lump of clay, so primitive Matter is [the principal cause in our opinion]. This is the sense.

36. It is omnipresent, because its products are known to exist everywhere.

[This is] clear.

[The author] mentions an argument against the opposite opinion:

Supply: primitive Matter [is].

[The author] gives a refutation of the opposite opinion:

37. Moreover, if it were subject to wandering, it would be deprived of the character of the primordial cause, like the atoms.

'Wandering' means motion; what is subject to it is not omnipresent. If primitive Matter were wandering, it would be a product, as the [so-called] atoms are, but it would not be the primordial cause.

"If primitive Matter is the material cause, then it must be one of the [nine substances stated by us], because [it is known from daily life that only] a substance is material cause." To this [objection of a Naiyâyika the author] replies:

'Wandering' means motion. If [primitive Matter] possessed limitedness which is a [necessary] condition for that, [*i. e.*, for motion], it would be a product, like the [so-called] atoms. And that the atoms are products, is ascertained somewhere else [*viz.*, V. 87].

38. Primitive Matter exists in addition to the notorious; there is no restriction.

Primitive Matter exists in addition to the notorious [nine] substances, because there is no restricted number of categories. And material cause is not [what you call] inherent cause, but principal cause; for we do not acknowledge inherence [which is one of the categories] of the Vaiśeshikas.

"Does primitive Matter consist of the constituents, or are the constituents properties of it?" To this [question the author] replies:

We hold that [primitive Matter] is something in addition to the notorious [substances], because in our opinion there is no such restriction as that [only nine] substances, earth, etc., exist.

Sattva and the other [two constituents] are not properties of primitive Matter, but primitive Matter consists of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. This [the author] states [in the following aphorism]:

39. Sattva and the others are not properties of it, because it consists of them.

I. e., because [primitive Matter] is identical [with them].

"[Every] activity is known to be for the sake of the [actor's] enjoyment, but what is non-intellectual cannot enjoy [anything; still you maintain that non-intellectual Matter is active]." To this [objection the author] replies:

'Because it consists of,' *i. e.*, because it is identical with—'Sattva and the others,' *i. e.*, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

Since liberation could not take place, if a purposeless activity were to be assumed,

40. Matter though not enjoying, creates for the benefit of Soul,—as the camel carries saffron.

The explanation of this has been given in the third book in [the commentary on] aphorism [58] which begins "Matter's [creating ....]."

"Primitive Matter being one, how is the variety of creation [to be accounted for]?" To this [question the author] replies:

41. From the variety of work follows the variety of creation.

Though no difference exists with regard to the *causa materialis*, there is a diversity [of products] in consequence of the diversity of the *causae efficientes*, as, though no difference exists with regard to the gold, there is the diversity of diadems, collars, etc.

"How are creation and dissolution [brought about]?" To this [question the author] replies:

[These two aphorisms are] clear.

42. The two effects depend on equipoise, and want of equipoise.

Dissolution results from equipoise, *i. e.*, from the changing of [developed] Matter into the state in which [Sattva, Rajas and Tamas] are equal; creation results from want of equipoise, *i. e.*, from the changing of [undeveloped] Matter into the state in which [the constituents] are unequal, [which changing takes place] through the arising of the 'great one' and of the following [principles].

[The author] explains dissolution:

Dissolution results from the changing of Matter into the state

of equality, creation from its changing into the state of unequalness through the arising of the 'great one' and of the following [principles].

43. Having understood that [one] is liberated, Matter does not create [any more], as in daily life.

As some one in daily life exerts himself for the sake of liberation from bondage, and, when he is released from bondage, becomes indifferent, because he has accomplished his purpose, so does Matter also [with regard to the liberated soul].

"[But,] since Matter and Soul are [both] omnipresent, there must be a connection [between the two], and therefore experience might occur even in liberation." To this [objection the author] replies:

'Having understood that [one] is liberated,' *i. e.*, having, as it were, understood that this or that one is liberated, Matter does not create, *i. e.*, operate, [any more] with regard to the liberated [soul]. 'As in daily life;' for, [as] somebody exerts himself in daily life for the sake of liberating some one from bondage and becomes indifferent, when [this] liberation has been effected, so does Matter [also].

44. In spite of the other's approaching the liberated does not experience, because there is no occasion.

It would be so [as you suppose], if the mere approaching of the other, *i. e.*, of Matter, did occasion experience. But this is not the case, on the contrary experience is occasioned by something which is to be experienced; and such [a thing] does not exist in liberation.

"There is only one Self; and so [it is said]:

"Only one, *viz.*, the highest Brahman, is real; [everything] else is imaginary. What delusion, what grief can then befall a man, when he perceives the unity!" (Prabodha-chandrodaya 5. v. 15)."

This [objection, made by a follower of S'aṅkarâchârya, the author] refutes:

(According to Mahâdeva's interpretation the beginning of our aphorism must be translated: *Although [matter] approaches to the other, etc.*)

'Although [Matter] approaches to the other,' *i. e.*, to the bound soul, [that is to say:] although [Matter still] engages in creating for the sake of that. 'Because there is no occasion' means: because non-discrimination does not exist [in the case of the liberated].

45. The plurality of souls follows from the diversity].

This has [already] been expounded in the first book in [the commentary on] aphorism [149] which begins "... from [the diversity of] birth, etc." And so [it is said]:

"One male goat [and at the same time: one unborn, *i. e.*, the bound soul] covers with lust the one female goat [and at the same time: the one unborn Matter] which is red, white and black, and which produces manifold offspring resembling herself, while another male goat [or unborn, *i. e.*, the liberated soul] abandons her after having enjoyed her." (Svetâśv. Up. 4. 5).

"The diversity [of empirical existence] will depend on the difference of Upâdhis." To this [fresh objection of the Vedantist the author] replies:

[This is] clear.

46. If there is an Upâdhi, this being established, a duality is given again.

'This being established,' *i. e.*, a difference being established. If the Upâdhi is [declared by you to be] illusory, how can the difference [of Upâdhis] exist [by which you will account for the diversity of empirical existence]? But if [you consider the Upâdhi] real, on that very account a duality is given again.

[The author] mentions another refutation:

'This being established,' *i. e.*, a difference being established.

47. The proofs are incompatible with both.

I. e., with the reality and unreality [of the Upâdhi]. If [you say that the Upâdhi] is real, [you are in contradiction with the scriptural passages which you allege as a proof, and] must give up your doctrine of non-duality. [But] if [you say that the Upâdhi] is unreal, how can the diversity [of empirical existence which is proved by sense-evidence] be regulated [by the Upâdhis]?

[But we who profess the Sâṃkhya doctrine] are neither in contradiction with the scriptural passages about non-duality, nor must we give up duality. [This the author] says[1] [in the following aphorism]:

'With both,' *i. e.*, with reality and unreality. If [you say that] the Upâdhi is real, this is incompatible with your [own] proof [*i. e.*, with Scripture] which teaches non-duality. But if [you say that] the Upâdhi is unreal, it [*viz.*, the Upâdhi] cannot be the regulator of the [actual] diversity, and therefore [this opinion of yours] is incompatible with sense-evidence and [inference, both of] which acquaint us with [the empirical] diversity.

With regard to his own opinion, however, [the author] declares:

48. As [our doctrine] is not incompatible with both, there is neither the one nor the other; for no proof exists.

The scriptural passages about non-duality have another sense [than that which you ascribe to them], because they mean the homogeneousness [of souls] or are intended for a eulogy, and so [our doctrine of the multiplicity of souls] is not incompatible with them. And as [we accept that] the Upâdhis are real, we must not give up duality, and hence [our doctrine] is not incompatible [with the facts known by

1 Read *ce 'ty âha* in my edition with B and the I. O. L. manuscript.

sense-evidence]. Therefore, 'there is neither the one,' *i. e.*, the oneness of the Self, 'nor the other,' *i. e.*, contradiction between [our doctrine and] Scripture. Since no proof exists for non-duality, this is not [to be regarded as] established, and, therefore, [each Self] is distinct [from the others]. This is the sense.

"[Such] a proof is not missing, [because] the proof [for non-duality] is manifest by itself." To this [fresh objection of the Vedantist the author] replies:

'There is neither the one,' *i. e.*, the oneness of the Self, 'nor the other,' *i. e.*, the dependence of the [empirical] diversity on the difference of Upâdhis; for no proof exists for either of these two [Vedantistic tenets]. On the contrary, the real multitude of Selfs is [evident] *per se*; for the *scriptural passages* declaring the oneness of the Self refer [only] to the sameness of the nature of [all] Selfs, while the *perception* of the multitude [of Selfs] apprehends a real multitude and not one which depends on [the connection with] Upâdhis, and hence '[our doctrine] is not incompatible [with both],' either Scripture or perception.

49. If this [non-duality] were established by self-evidence, we would be in contradiction with the logical rule that the same thing cannot be object and subject simultaneously.

[This is] plain.

[The author] mentions another refutation:

How shall non-duality be known [in your opinion]? By that which is non-Self, or by the Self? The former cannot be, because [that which is non-Self] is non-intellectual; [and] in the latter case the same thing would be manifested and manifesting, which is a logical impossibility.

50. Being distinct from the non-intellectual,

[the Self] which has the nature of thought manifests the non-intellectual.

[The Self] which is different from the non-intellectual and has the nature of thought manifests the non-intellectual. [Only] because of its distinction from the non-intellectual it is [declared by the author] to have the nature of [thought or] light, but it is not said that light be its property. Therefore [the Self] is described [by Gauḍapâda in his Mâṇḍûkya Kârikâ 3. 26]: "This is not so, not so," [*viz.*, in a purely negative,] but not in a positive form. "But then [it is your opinion that the Self] has the nature of *supernatural* light?" [To this question of the Vedantist we reply: No, for] in that case, [supernatural light being unknown,] the apprehension of the invariable concomitance [of the Self and light] would be impossible,[1] and hence no example [or base of arguing] could be found. "But" [the Vedantist objects] "this [nature of supernatural light] is perceptible to the Yogin." [Reply:] The Yogin who has attained to that stage of concentration in which consciousness is lost does not exhibit any bodily functions caused by knowledge [as speaking *f. i.*,], and so there is no mark [from which we could conclude that the Yogin possesses such a knowledge, and much less there is any possibility of obtaining such a knowledge from him]; and that Yogin in whose concentration there is still consciousness exhibits [it is true] the function of speaking and other marks [of knowledge], but from these [very marks] it is [to be] concluded that only mundane [and no supernatural] things [are objects of his knowledge]. And so even he cannot [say: 'I have perceived by immediate cognition that the Self consists of supernatural light,' nor can he] describe [positively] intellect, *i. e.*, thinking. In this sense [it is said]:

[1] *Alaukika-prakâśa-rûpatve 'yo-ya âtmâ, sa-sa prakâśa-rûpa' iti vyâptir na kena-chit pramâṇena nirṇîtâ 'sti*, Paṇḍit.

"Between sugar-cane, milk, molasses, etc., a great difference of sweetness exists; still this cannot be described even by Sarasvatî[1]" (Kâvyâdarśa 1, 102).

So [the Self] is called 'intellectual' [only] because it is distinct from [all] which is non-intellectual; not, however, is the [Self's] intimate connection with intellect nor its being of intellectual nature [to be inferred from that denotation]. For the customary expression 'supernatural intellectual nature' is also to be accounted for otherwise, *viz.*, by the fact that in the state of unconsciousness [all] affections are suppressed, [and hence the Yogin does no longer perceive then any mundane objects. Since, therefore, the Self of the Yogin is *not* mundane or natural intellect in this stage of concentration, it is denoted as having the nature of supernatural intellect]. In that state [of concentration], however, where consciousness still exists, there is thinking in the form of the affections [of the internal organ], and only for this reason the expression 'intellectual nature' is used [to describe the Self].[2]

In the same way, the declaration that [the Self] has the nature of delight is used in the [purely negative] sense of cessation of pain. If the attribution of the nature of delight [to the Self] had a positive meaning, [as the Vedantists maintain, then we must ask:] Is this [expression] employed in the sense of joy *in general*? If this were the case, then there ought to be (1) joy, (2) its experiencing, and (3) an expe-

[1] *I. e.*, as in this case something which is known to everybody cannot be described, so also he who knows the Self is not able to explain how it is.

[2] Aniruddha means that the two definitions of the Self as 'supernatural intellect' and 'intellect' refer to the unconscious and conscious stage of concentration respectively, but that both are not meant verbally. His surprising annotations to this aphorism become more and more materialistic.—In the following portion he turns *prasaṅgât* against a tenet of the Vedânta philosophy which is objected to by all Sâṃkhyas, *viz.*, that the Self be delight as well as intellect.

riencer, because joy which is not experienced is not known [to exist]; hence how could there be non-duality [even in liberation[1]]? Or does 'delight' denote *a particular kind* of joy, [*i. e.*, supernatural joy, in your opinion? In this case we reply:] It is never found that [one and the same thing] be joyful as well as of intellectual nature. This is [the opinion] of undiscriminating people only; but the discriminating are of the following opinion: since [the employment of the word 'delight'] may, in accordance with experience[2] (*dṛishṭenaiva*), be accounted for by [declaring] that it means 'exclusion [of pain],' the invention of something supernatural which is not known by experience (*adṛishṭa*) would be a superfluous complication (*gurvî*).

[Objection:] "If [Soul] were not intellect, there would be no perception of objects." [Reply:] Not so! As a special combination of gourd, bamboo and strings [called 'lute,' *vînâ*] is the cause of sounds, but nothing, except this combination of the three, [is in the cause of their production], so intellect arises from such a [special] combination of material objects, modified into the form of living beings, though these are equally [with others] formed of the five elements.[3] And if the Self were light, it would also consist

[1] This complement is taken from the commentary of Mahâdeva who says that in this case the *dvaitam* would hold good (not only in mundane existence, but also) in liberation. Although the Vedantists do not acknowledge a *dvaitam* even in mundane existence, there is at least, in this respect, a discrepancy of opinions between the Vedantists and the other schools; as regards liberation, however, no orthodox philosophical school admits a *dvaita*.

[2] As, for example, a man who has been deprived of a burden says: "I have become joyful," and means thereby that his pain has ceased (Paṇḍit).

[3] This declaration is totally materialistic and in direct contradiction with aphorisms III. 20, 22, V. 130. Though Aniruddha, when commenting on these and other aphorisms concerning the nature of Soul, has placed himself on the standpoint of a true Sâṃkhya, he betrays his personal belief at the occasion of this lengthy discussion and shows that he is in fact a Chârvâka.

of parts [as, for instance, the light of the sun] and hence be non-intellectual.

"And thus Scripture would be contradicted, which teaches [in the Nṛisiṃhatâpanîya and Râmatâpanîya Upanishad *passim*] that [Soul] manifests itself through its own light." To this [objection the author] replies:

'Having the nature of thought' means only 'being distinct from the non-intellectual,' but not 'possessing light as a property.' Therefore [the Self] is described by the words "Not so, not so" (Bṛih. Up. 2. 3. 6), [and] not in a positive form. Likewise, the attribution of delight [to the Self] also means only exclusion of non-delight, but no joy of a positive nature; for [otherwise], since we do not know of any joy which is not being experienced, there would necessarily be an experiencer, etc., [*i. e.*, the act of experiencing and delight itself], whence a duality [or plurality] would happen to exist even in liberation. [And] if you [Vedantists] say that there is some supernatural joy in liberation and that this is manifest, [*i. e.*, felt] by itself, no proof exists for these [assertions].

"But then, scriptural passages [as, for example, Bṛih. Up. 3. 9. 28] are found [as a testimony] for [the Self's] having the nature of delight," [says the Vedantist, but the author] denies this:

51. We are not in contradiction with Scripture, because this is declared in order to [promote] indifference in those who are affected with desires.

Since the non-intellectual, having the nature of the three constituents, is the cause of desires, even the means of right knowledge and the other [logical categories, enumerated in Nyâya Sûtra 1. 1, *viz.*, objects of right knowledge, doubt, etc.] must be given up, because they belong to the three constituents; and [thus] the [complete] destruction of desires is to be effected.[1] 'Because this is declared [etc.]'

[1] For he who has given up even those things has attained to the highest indifference, to that stage of concentration in which consciousness is lost.

means: because those scriptural passages which teach that [Soul] manifests itself through its own light, are to be explained in [this] other way.

"[But], the world being illusory, how can [that scriptural testimony] be explained in this other way?" To this [fresh objection of the Vedantist the author] replies:

For those who are affected with desires feel desire for joy and indifference to liberation. [We are not in contradiction with Scripture], because for the reason just mentioned 'this is declared,' *i. e.*, because the Self, though it is [really] not delight, is said—supply: in Scripture—to be delight, in order to [promote] indifference to [worldly] objects. The scriptural passages about the delight [of Soul] are figurative and mean in reality absence of pain. This is the sense.

[The author] declares the world to be real:

52. The world is real, because it is not the result of a faulty cause, and because there is no confutation.[1]

The result of a faulty cause is, for example, the perception of a [white] conch-shell as yellow, [which is caused by the fault of jaundice]. And a confutation is, [for example, in the case of the wrong notion that a piece of mother-of-pearl be silver,] the [subsequent correct] notion 'this is not silver.' Now, this [world] is not so [as the imaginary yellowness of a conch-shell], because primitive Matter and the following [material principles] are not faulty, nor is there any confutation, because the conception 'this world is not [real]' does not exist.

The world is [now] briefly described. Above [the earth] there are [in ascending order seven worlds, called] Bhûr, Bhuvas, Svar, Mahar, Janas, Tapas, and Satya; below [the earth] there are [in descending order seven lower regions,

[1] Cf. I. 79.

called] Mahâtala, Rasâtala, Talâtala, Pâtâla, Sutala, Vitala, and Atala. In the middle [of the earth] lies the Jambu island; in the middle thereof [the mount] Sumeru; on this border, in the four quarters, east etc., the [so-called] supporting mounts, named Mandara, Gandhamâdana, Vipula, and Supârśva. To the south of [the mount Sumeru or] Meru lie the Himâlaya mountains [bounding] the Bhârata division [or India], the Hemakûṭa mountains [bounding] the Kiṃpurusha division, and the Nishadha mountains [bounding] the Hari division. To the north of the Meru lie the Sṛiṅgin mountains [bounding] the Kuru division, the S'veta mountains [bounding] the Hiraṇyaka division, and the Nîla mountains [bounding] the Ramyaka division. To the east of the Meru lie the Mâlyavant mountains [bounding] the Bhadrâśva division. To the west of the Meru lie the Gandhamâdana mountains [bounding] the Ketumâla division. Below the Meru, [*i. e.*, close to it] lies the Ilâvṛita division. The Jambu island is 100,000 Yojana [in circuit]. This is surrounded by the salt sea which is of the same extent as that. This is surrounded by the S'âka island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the sea of sugar-cane juice which is of the same extent as that. This is surrounded by the Kuśa island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the liquor sea which is of the same extent as that. This is surrounded by the Krauñcha island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the sea of clarified butter which is of the same extent as that. This is surrounded by the S'âlmali island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the curd sea which is of the same extent as that. This is surrounded by the Plaksha island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the milk sea which is of the same extent as that. This is surrounded by the Pushkara island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the fresh water sea which is of the same extent as that. The [whole]

world is [at last] bounded on all sides by the wall of the Lokâloka mountains which is the shell of Brahman's egg, [*i. e.*, of the world].

Although [the purport of the following aphorism] has been stated above [I. 114, the author] teaches it again, because this is useful to the disciples:

For the [wrong] perception 'the conch-shell is yellow' is, for example, the result of a faulty cause, [*i. e.*, of jaundice], and is to be confuted by the subsequent correct] perception 'the conch-shell is not yellow.' The object of that [first perception] is unreal, but it is not so in the case of the world. This is the meaning.

53. Since the other mode [of explanation] is impossible, there is [only] the production of what is [always] real.

And the other mode [of explanation, that the unreal comes into existence] has been refuted above [in our commentary on I. 114].

"[The word *ahaṃkâra*, 'egotizing organ'] being evidently derived from *ahaṃ karomi*, '*I* am active,' is the egotizing organ the agent, or is the Self denoted by the word *ahaṃkâra*, and is *this* the agent?" To this [question the author] replies:

And the other mode [of explanation] has been set aside above.

54. The egotizing organ, not Soul, is the agent.

Because Soul is invariable. [The assertion] that action [or motion] and intellect belong to the same subject proves fallacious in such cases as 'the tree stands, [shakes,]' etc.; [for motion belongs to the tree, but not intellect].

"Though [the fruit of] one work has been consumed, other works will be continually produced, because works arise as long as the body lasts; and so there will be no definitive liberation." To this [objection the author] replies:

[By the word] 'egotizing organ' the [general] internal organ is [here intended].

"But then, even when discriminative knowledge is [attained], the experiencing of joy, etc., is [still] seen. How is this [to be accounted for]?" To this [question the author] replies:

55. Experience ends with thought, because it is acquired by its works.[1]

From non-discrimination results the acquisition of works [or rather: of merit and demerit], and thereby experience is [brought about]. This 'ends with thought,' *i. e.*, it ends with the cognition of the Self [in its distinction from Matter]. When discrimination has taken place, how can other works be acquired [after that? And] when no [works, *i. e.*, neither merit nor demerit,] exist [any longer], how can there be experience? [All] works [previously] done are annihilated through [discriminative] knowledge, [and through that] alone. And so [it is said:]

"As a kindled fire reduces the fuel to ashes, O Arjuna, so the fire of cognition reduces all works to ashes" (Bhagavadgîtâ 4. 37).

"Only the attainment of the world of the moon or of other [celestial worlds] will be Soul's aim, because this implies an excess [of happiness]." To this [objection the author] replies:

(According to Mahâdeva's interpretation our aphorism must be translated: *Experience lasts to the end of thought, because it is acquired by those works*].

[*Chid-avasânâ* means that] which 'lasts to the end,' *i. e.*, during the time, 'of thought,' *i. e.*, of thinking [that] the body, etc., [*i. e.*, the internal organ and the senses, be the Self].[2] This means: experience continues as long as the body, etc., appears [to be the Self]. By the word 'those' [that kind of works] is intended,

[1] *I. e.*, by the works of the [empirical] soul. Cf. I. 104 and II. 46.

[2] This explanation is hardly correct, as *chit* is not used elsewhere in the sense of *sâṃsârika-jñâna*.

which have begun to bear fruit; for these are present to [the author's] mind. Since there is, among others, the following scriptural passage: "So long only is the delay [of emancipation] for him [who knows the Self], as [he thinks] 'I shall not be liberated nor attain to salvation'" (Chhând. Up. 6. 14. 2), even he who knows [the truth] necessarily experiences the consequences of those works which have begun to bear fruit. This is the meaning.

56. Even in the world of the moon, etc., one returns [to new mundane existences,] since the efficient causes exist [even there].

By the word 'etc.' Brahman's and other worlds are to be understood.

"Liberation will come to him who has repaired to a teacher, in consequence of the mere hearing of the words [of the instruction]; what need is there of thinking, etc.?" To this [objection the author] replies:

The efficient causes are non-discrimination and the other [faults of the internal organ, affection, aversion, etc.]

57. This does not come to people in consequence of instruction, as [has been stated] before.

Only what has been already declared above [I. 70, VI. 22] is declared [here]. 'Liberation does not fall to the share of the weak in consequence of the mere hearing, but through thinking, etc. Here by restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, abstraction, collectedness, meditation and contemplation are implied (cf. Yogasûtra 2. 29).

"How is [it] then [that] liberation [is] declared in Scripture to result from mere instruction?" To this [question the author] replies:

Liberation does not come to people who are of weak capability in consequence of instruction, *i. e.*, of the mere hearing; but it must be understood that this takes place so as it has been stated before. The sense is that thinking and constant meditation are [also] required [for that purpose].

"How then is [the scriptural declaration] 'Having heard [the truth] he becomes liberated' to be accounted for?" To this question the author] replies:

58. The scriptural passages treating of liberation refer to its being effective mediately.

Since hearing is the first [means of liberation], the scriptural passages treating of liberation [through hearing] refer to its being effective as a *mediate* cause.

"As Matter is omnipresent and as such the cause of the world, so the Self [also] is omnipresent. Therefore, [these two being in the relation of experienced and experiencer, [the Self] ought to experience at all places [and always]." To this [objection the author] replies:

The scriptural passages treating of liberation [as taking place], 'when there is this,'[1] *i. e.*, when there is hearing alone, are [to be accounted for by hearing's being effective] mediately, or they refer to those who are capable in the highest degree.

59. And as Scripture speaks of its wandering, it reaches place and time of experience, in consequence of its connection with the Upâdhi, in spite of its omnipresence, as is the case with Space.

As [only] in consequence of the connection with such an Upâdhi as a jar or the like the conception arises that the *space* within a jar moves, when the jar moves, so the [imaginary] wandering of the Self which depends on its being determined by the body is effected by the wandering of that. To that place the body goes, where something is to be experienced in consequence of the power of works [previously done], and hence the Self reaches experience [there]. "[But] if the Self is [declared by you] to be omnipresent and having the nature of thought, cognition ought to obtain

[1] *Tat-siddhau* is taken by Mahâdeva in a different sense and construction.

always, everywhere and with regard to all objects simultaneously; and we see [that it is] not so [in reality." To this objection we reply:] This [remark] is not [right]. It would be so [as you say], if the Self *in its omnipresent nature* caused the cognition of affections; this, however, is not the case, but [the Self causes cognitions] only *as being determined by the body, etc.*, [*i. e.*, by the internal organ and by the senses], just as the sun, though light is its essential nature, does not, when standing to the south of the Meru, shed light on its northern part, nor on the southern part, when standing to the north of it, because [the light of the sun] is not omnipresent. But when the accumulation of works has been consumed by knowledge and by the other [means of liberation] and thereby [the Self] has got rid of the aggregate consisting of the body, etc., then it becomes free from Rajas and Tamas, and omnipresent; and then it does not cause [any longer] the cognition of affections, because it is not subject to changes, but of itself it is [then], in its essence, knowledge of the [whole] universe. And as Space is omnipresent and does not become foul through the local connection with smoke or [soot], but what is determined by the jar or the like, *i. e.*, everything being inside the jar or the like, is [erroneously] considered foul,[1] while [in reality] even there, [*i. e.*, inside the jar] Space is not foul, because dirt does not adhere to this, but this is only a misconception of undiscriminating people, since, when the jar is broken, [Space] is not seen to be so, [*i. e.*, foul],—just so the Self [as such] is omnipresent, [and] neither connection with attributes or [qualities] nor cognition [of affections] belongs to it; but [only], when determined by the body, it is called ['living or] empirical Self,' because it is then con-

[1] This refers to the Indian custom of preserving a fire by covering it with a jar turned upside down.

nected with life, possessed of air and fire,[1] and hence in association with the internal sense. Since Matter is inseparable from the internal sense, it appears as if [the Self, on account of its association with the internal sense,] possesses what belongs to Matter [in reality], *viz.*, merit and demerit, [empirical] knowledge and ignorance, joy and pain, etc., [*i. e.*, apathy, desire and so on, moreover] egotism, the senses and their objects, birth, etc., [*i. e.*, childhood, youth, old age and death]. Because of Matter's being, in its Sattva part, [*i. e.*, as internal organ], clear [as a mirror], the Self is reflected in it and [therefore erroneously] attributes to itself agency and the other [qualities] of Matter. [This] delusion, moreover, inheres [only] in that Self which is reflected in Matter, but not in the Self [as such]; as, though the moon does not tremble, in consequence of the water's trembling the wrong notion arises that [the moon] trembles, when it is reflected in the water; or as a face which is not foul is nevertheless erroneously considered foul, when it is reflected in a foul mirror.

The discriminating, however, who are aware of the isolation [of the Self] discern [at first] that the agency, etc., of the Self is illusory, because this is not subject to changes and because nothing adheres to it. But when in consequence of the ripening of meditation the impressions [left in the internal organ] decrease and in this manner the internal sense is dissolved, and then after the [complete] annihilation of those impressions the body perishes and no other body is produced, then the empirical Self is omnipresent, because it has become one and the same with the highest [or pure] Self.

[1] Cf. Aniruddha's commentary on VI. 63. The vital airs and the metaphorical fire of the stomach are intended. Paṇḍit Râmmiśra explained this passage to me in the following way: *kiṃ tu yatrâ 'tmâ śarîreṇâ 'vachchhidyate, tatra vâyor vahneś cha saṃyogaḥ; etat-saṃyogavân yo jîvas, tat-saṃbandhena manaḥ-saṃyogaḥ; tasmâd viśishṭâtmâ jîvâtme 'ty uchyate.*

How, therefore, can it then be associated with merit and demerit, or possess agency and the like? On the contrary, [the emancipated Self] cannot be described with words, and for this reason it is said [in the commentary on aphorism 50] that it has not the nature of supernatural thought and delight; for it is impossible to teach anything else.

"Since [the Self] is without a substratum before the production of the body, it cannot superintend [the formation of the embryo]; and so the superintendence of the Self [begins], after the production [of the body is completed]." To this [objection the author] replies:

'In spite of its omnipresence' the Self attains to the 'place and time of experience in consequence of its connection with the Upâdhi', *i. e.*, in consequence of its connection with the body, etc., [*viz.*, with the internal organ and with the senses]. As Space moves *apparently*, when a jar or the like moves, so the Self also moves *apparently*, when it is determined by the body, and in this way it becomes possessed of experience which is connected with special places and times. Whence [does this follow]? 'As Scripture speaks of the wandering' [of the Self], for example in the passage: "Those who abide in Sattva wander upwards" (Bhagavadgîtâ 14. 18).

60. Since that which is not superintended is subject to putrescence, this is not to be established.

Since antecedence and succession do not bear upon that which is omnipresent and eternal, the superintendence [of the Self] begins simultaneously with [the first stage of] the production of the body. Therefore 'this is not to be established,' *i. e.*, want of superintendence is not to be established, [with regard to any stage of the formation of the body]. And hence putrescence does not affect [the embryo].

"That putrescence does not take place will be merely a consequence of the invisible power [of merit]." To this [objection the author] replies:

'This is not to be established,' *i. e.*, want of superintendence is not to be established.

"That putrescence does not take place will be merely a consequence of the invisible power [of merit]." To this [the author] replies:

61. If [you say:] "Through the invisible power," [then we declare that] the unconnected is incapable thereof, as water, etc., is with regard to a sprout.

Since the invisible power [of merit] without a substratum is incompetent [to exercise any influence], it cannot produce an effect, if it is unconnected with the body;[1] just as water does not bring forth a sprout, [if it is out of connection therewith]. By the word 'etc.' warmth is to be understood.

"On what substratum do merit and the like abide, so that they [are able to] produce effects?" To this [question the author] replies:

If [you say:] "The Self does not superintend [the formation of the body] from that stage in which this is [mere] sperma; but [the superintendence is effected] through the invisible power [of merit]", then we declare:] No, for 'the unconnected' invisible power 'is incapable thereof,' *i. e.*, is incapable of being [efficient] cause. The sense is this. A connection of the invisible power with that, [*i. e.*, with the body which is being formed] is necessarily to be stated; but this [connection] has only the character of a special association, existing between [the invisible power] itself and its substratum, [*i. e.*, the Self], or of something like it.[2] The words 'as water, etc.' exhibit an example: as water, etc., though [able to] bring forth a sprout, does not bring forth a sprout, if it is un-connected with the seed.

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[1] And this connection can be mediated by the Self alone; cf. Vijñânabhikshu's and Mahâdeva's commentaries on our aphorism.

[2] *âdi* means *sva-svâmi-bhâva*, in which case *sva* again represents the invisible power and *svâmin* the Self.

62. These are properties of the egotizing organ, because [the Self] is void of qualities and they cannot, therefore, belong to this.

These, *i. e.*, merit and the like, [*viz.*, demerit, desire, aversion, etc.], are properties of the egotizing organ, because the Self is void of qualities and they cannot, therefore, be properties of this. As product and cause are identic, the properties of the [general] internal organ are [here] called properties of the egotizing organ.

"Is the Self in its essence empirical soul? or in some other way?" To this [question the author] replies:

These, *i. e.*, merit and the like, are properties of the egotizing organ, 'because the Self is void of qualities and they cannot, therefore, belong to this,' *i. e.*, they cannot abide in this. As product and cause are identic, the properties of the [general] internal organ are [here] called properties of the egotizing organ.

63. The characterized [Self] is empirical soul, as follows from positive and negative argumentation.

If [the Self] in its essence were empirical soul, its invariableness would be given up, because [the empirical soul] is agent and experiencer. 'As follows from positive and negative argumentation,' *i. e.*, [—to explain only the positive view—] when there is, in consequence of [the Self's] being determined by the body, a connection with air and fire[1], then [the Self] is characterized by the connection with the senses and then it is [called 'living or] empirical soul'.

"An empirical soul, having got possession of divine power [through concentration for instance], is [called] the Lord; this will be the former of the world. And so [it is said:]

"The lord o Arjuna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, whirling round all beings through his wonderful power [on the wheel of mundane existence, as the manager of a puppet-show does with the puppets] mounted on his apparatus" (Bhagavadgîtâ 18. 61).

[1] Cf. the parallel passage in Aniruddha's commentary on VI. 59 and note 1 on page 301.

To this [theistic objection the author] replies:

Empirical soul is [that Self] which is characterized by agency and experiencing, *i. e.*, which is characterized by the body, etc., but it is not [the Self] in its essence, because the invariableness [of the pure Self] would be given up, and because [our doctrine] 'follows from positive and negative argumentation'; for we perceive that [only he] is agent and experiencer who is under the delusion that his body is his Self.

64. The egotizing organ is the agent on whom the arising of the products depends; it is not dependent on a Lord, because there is no proof [thereof].

'Because there is no proof [thereof]' means: because there is no knowledge which could be the material [cause] of the world. Moreover, [if the Lord were an empirical soul characterized by the possession of divine power, as the opponent maintains, then] he would not be omnipresent [nor able to bring forth alone all products constitutive of the universe], and hence several Lords ought to be assumed; [thus there would be a state of things which is desired not even by the opponent].

[That reason,] too, [by means of which the theistic opponent attempts to prove that the Lord is the maker of the world,—*viz.*,] that this must be the work of an intelligent being, because it is a product,—does not always hold good. This [the author] declares [in the following aphorism]:

"From primitive Matter [proceeds] the 'great one'; from the 'great one,' the egotizing organ." With these words the egotizing organ has been described [in aphorism I. 61]. The agent on whom the arising of the products, *i. e.*, of the rudiments and of the following [material principles], depends, is identical with that. It is not

dependent on a Lord, because there is no proof of the assertion that every product without exception must be the work of an intelligent being.

[The author] elucidates this:

65. It is the same as with the arising of the invisible power [of merit and demerit].

Because [the world], like the arising of the invisible power, has not an [intelligent] maker. [For,] if this [invisible power], too, had a maker, another [and prior] arising of invisible power ought to be [accepted as] the accompanying [or efficient cause by which the maker could have been induced to effectuate the arising of the present invisible cause], and for that [prior arising] another [prior arising ought to be accepted] again, and so on. In this way there would be a *regressus in infinitum.* By the fact that mundane existence [considered individually] has a beginning,[1] its being without a beginning [in consideration of the continuity] is not set aside.[2]

"If the egotizing organ is the cause [of the material principles], is it the cause with regard to the 'great one' also?" To this [question the author] replies:

(According to Mahâdeva's interpretation the aphorism must be translated: *It is the same as with the arising of that with regard to which [a maker] is not seen).*

The non-existence of an intelligent maker [of the world] is in the same predicament as the arising, *i. e.*, production, of that with regard to which a maker is not seen, *i. e.*, of sprouts which come out of the earth, and the like, [*i. e.*, of streams, clouds, etc.]. For in the case of sprouts which come out of the earth, and the like, there is no intelligent maker, because none is perceived. So it is also in the case of the rudiments [and the following material principles].

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[1] Cf. Aniruddha's and Mahâdeva's commentaries on V. 15.

[2] Cf. the parallel passage in the comm. on VI. 67 and, as regards the *anâdità* of the *saṃsâra*, the annotations to I. 17, 157, 158, III. 62.

66. That [only] which is different from the 'great one' [is produced by the egotizing organ].

[For] the cause of a thing cannot be the product of the same.

"Matter is the possessed, Soul is the possessor. Is the connection of these two essential or occasioned by something else? If it were essential, there could be no liberation, because the essential nature does never depart." With reference to this [remark the author] declares:

That [only] which is different from the 'great one' is produced by the egotizing organ; for the cause of a thing cannot be the product of the same.

67. Even if the relation of the possessed and the possessor [which exists] in the case of Matter is occasioned by work, still it is without a beginning, like that of seed and sprout.

['Which exists] in the case of Matter' is an elliptical expression; [for 'and] of Soul' is also to be understood. If work is the cause of the connection between the possessed and the possessor, liberation results from the cessation of this connection between the possessed and the possessor,[1] when [the invisible power of] work has been destroyed by discrimination. By the fact that the uneternal [considered individually] has a beginning, its being without a beginning [in consideration of the continuity] is not set aside,[2] while the eternal is [of course] without a beginning; hence it is said [in the aphorism] that [the relation of Matter and Soul] is without a beginning.

[The author] mentions another opinion:

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[1] Read *sva-svâmi-saṃbandhâbhâvân* with B and the I. O. L. manuscript.

[2] Cf. the parallel passage in the commentary on VI. 65.

'[And] of Soul' is to be supplied. The rest is clear.

68. Or it is occasioned by non-discrimination, according to Pañchas'ikha.

'The relation of the possessed and the possessor' follows from [the preceding aphorism.]

[The author] mentions the individual opinion of [another] teacher:

[The word] *aviveka-nimitta* is a Bahuvrîhi compound.

[The author] mentions the individual opinion of [another] teacher:

69. According to Sanandanâchârya it is occasioned by the internal body.

[The internal body] which is called *liṅga*, because it dissolves (*layanât*), is the subtile or transporting body. As long as the subtile body enters into a gross body, [*i. e.* as transmigration lasts], so long [Soul] is called 'bound' in consequence of the connection between the possessed and the possessor.

[The author] states [now] his own opinion:

As long as there is a subtile body within a gross body, so long are Matter and Soul in that connection which exists between the possessed and the possessor.

[The author] states [now] his own opinion:

70. Be it this or that, its destruction is Soul's aim —its destruction is Soul's aim.

'Be it this or that,'—*i. e.*, be it [effected] by the wearing off of [the invisible power of] work or by knowledge or in some other way—it is by the destruction of the connection between the possessed and the possessor that the destruction of mundane existence [is brought about; this] is Soul's aim.—The repetition of the words 'its destruction is Soul's aim' indicates the end of the book.

This doctrine of the [eternal] reality of the products has been, it is true, exposed above [in the first book]. Since it is, [however,] taught [here] in the form of a recapitulation of the essential points, this is not a superfluous repetition.

The indeclinable words 'this or that' refer to the cause. Be the relation of the possessed and the possessor between Matter and Soul owing to this or that cause, it is, at any rate, the cause of bondage, and, therefore its destruction is Soul's aim. This is my opinion.—The repetition [of the last words] serves to [indicate] the end of the book.

Here ends the sixth book in the commentary on Kapila's aphorisms explanatory of the Sâṃkhya system; and this work is now complete.

[This] commentary on the Sâṃkhya aphorisms has been composed by the wise Aniruddha, in order to [effect] discrimination in the foolish beings and liberation of the Self.

Here ends, in the quintessence of the commentary on the aphorisms explanatory of the Sâṃkhya system, composed by Mahâdeva the Vedantist, the sixth book which contains a recapitulation of the essential points.

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QUOTATIONS IN ANIRUDDHA'S AND MAHÂDEVA'S COMMENTARIES THAT HAVE BEEN VERIFIED.

Passages not cited literally have been marked cf.

Bhagavadgîtâ.

2. 16 An. I. 118.
2. 24 Mah. I. 51.
3. 27 An. I. 96.
4. 37 An. VI. 55.
14. 18 Mah. VI. 59.
18. 61 An. VI. 63.

Brahmabindu Upanishad.

13 Mah. I. 51.

Brihadâranyaka Upanishad.

1. 5. 3 Mah. II. 26.
2. 3. 6 Mah. III. 75, VI. 50.
2. 4. 5 (4. 5. 6.) An. II. 1, VI. 23; cf. An. Mah. VI. 17.
2. 4. 14 An. I. 145.
3. 2. 13 cf. An. II. 21.
3. 9. 26 An. III. 75.
4. 3. 16 An. I. 53, 147, An. Mah. V. 8, Mah. V. 25; cf. An. I. 15, VI. 10.
4. 4. 2 An. III. 24.
4. 4. 5 (5. 2. 13) cf. Mah. I. 149.
4. 4. 12 An. III. 78.
4. 4. 14 Mah. I. 149.
4. 4. 22, 23 An. II. 2.

Chhândogya Upanishad.

4. 15. 6 Mah. IV. 22.
6. 2. 1 Mah. V. 15; cf. An. I. 153.
6. 2. 3 Mah. I. 99.
6. 5. 4 An. Mah. III. 15; cf. Mah. II. 20.
6. 14. 2 Mah. VI. 55.
7. 1. 3 An. II. 1.
8. 1. 6 An. IV. 22.
8. 15. 1 An. I. 83; cf. An. Mah. VI. 17.

Garuda Purâna.

One verse Mah. IV. 1.

Jâbâla Upanishad.

4. An. introd. to I. 1 and in I. 1 (यदहरेव विरज्येत्तदहरेव प्रव्रजेत्, not verified in my translation).

Katha Upanishad.

4. 11 cf. An. I. 153.

Kâvyâdars'a.

1. 102 An. VI. 50.

Kûrma Purâna.

1. 4. 66 Mah. I. 99.
2. 2. 12 An II. 5.

Linga Purâna.

One verse An. I. 148.

Mahâbhârata.

3. 16763 An. I. 48, An. Mah. V. 103.
12. 6520, 6647 cf. Mah. IV. 11.
12. 6649 cf. Mah. IV. 12.
12. 11307*b*, 11308*a* Mah. I. 51.
See also under Bhagavadgîtâ.

Mahâbhâshya.

I. p. 429, l. 9. of Professor Kielhorn's edition Mah. III. 45.

Maitrî Upanishad.

6. 22 cf. An. II. 1.

Mândûkya Kârikâ.

3. 26 An. VI. 50.

Manu.

2. 94 Mah. III. 43.
12. 9 An. V. 123.

Mârkandeya Purâna.

41. 19 Mah. IV. 13.

Mundaka Upanishad.

1. 2. 12, 13 Mah. III. 80.
2. 1. 3 An. V. 84.
2. 2. 8 An. Mah. III. 67.

Nyâyabindu.

1, line 3 of Professor Peterson's edition An. I. 89.

Nyâya Sûtras.

I. 16 An. III. 14.
A number of Sûtras An. V. 86.

Prabodhachandrodaya.

Act. 5, verse 15 An. VI. 44.

Rigveda.

10. 81. 3 An. V. 15.

S'âsvata's glossary.

320 An. V. 126.

S'vetâsvatara Upanishad.

3. 8 An. III. 25.
3. 10 Mah. I. 149.
3. 19 cf. An. VI. 1.
4. 5 Mah. V. 11, An. VI. 45.
4. 10 Mah. V. 73.

Taittirîya Âranyaka.

10. 10. 3 An. IV. 22, Mah. III. 75.

Taittirîya Upanishad.

2. 4 cf. An. Mah. V. 66.

Vaiseshika Sûtras.

Some of the principal Sûtras An. V. 85.

Vishnu Purâna.

2. 16. 22 An. V. 60.

Yoga Sûtras.

1. 5–8 cf. An. II. 33.
1. 15, 16 An. introd. to. I. 1.
1. 30 An. VI. 19, Mah. VI. 20.
2. 26 Mah. III. 44.

QUOTATIONS WHICH I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO VERIFY.[1]

The numbers refer to the pages and lines of my edition.

ओंकारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ etc. 2. 13.

आत्मलाभान्न परं विद्यते S'ruti, 7. 14.

यश्चोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारो etc. 8. 3.

वस्तुस्थित्या न बन्धो ऽस्ति etc. 8. 13.

न ह्याप्तवादान्नभसो निपतन्ति etc. 16. 1.

पापेन नरकं याति, पुण्येन स्वर्याति, ज्ञानेन ब्रह्मलोकं याति S'ruti, 27. 11.

न च भासामभावस्य तमस्त्वं etc. 32. 1.

तमः खलु चलन्नीलं परापरविभागवत् etc. 32. 12.

प्रधानाज्जगज्जायते S'ruti, 41. 3.

ब्रह्मणा सह ते सर्वे संप्राप्ते प्रतिसंचरे etc. S'ruti, 44. 3.

कर्मभिर्मृत्युमृषयो निषेदुः etc. S'ruti, 44. 15. (cf. Sâṃkhya-tattva-kaumudí to Kârikâ 2).

संज्ञा हि स्मर्यमाणापि प्रत्यक्षत्वं etc. 48. 13.

स हि सर्ववित्सर्वस्य कर्ता S'ruti, 51. 1.

अनुमेयेन संबद्धं प्रसिद्धं च etc. 55. 3.

अत एव हि विद्वत्सु मुच्यमानेषु etc. 84. 4.

आदित्यं वै चक्षुर्गच्छति S'ruti, 97. 2.

अन्नं वै प्राणाः S'ruti, 115. 10. (cf. Taitt. Up. 3. 7. 1).

दैवादौ षड्विधस्य स्यात्संसारः etc. 135. 9.

दश मन्वन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तकाः etc. 139. 3.

1. Among the following passages, those which are said to have been taken from S'ruti are also not found in Colonel Jacob's Concordance which has lately appeared. It may, therefore, be concluded that these passages are not real quotations, but statements of scriptural ideas.

जीवन्नेव हि विद्वान्हर्षायासाभ्यां विमुच्यते S'ruti, 154. 9.

दीक्षयैव नरो मुच्येत्तिष्ठेन्मुक्तो ऽपि etc. S'ruti, 155. 9.

सर्वतः सारमादद्यादश्मभ्य इव काञ्चनम् 166. 7.

सदृशादृष्टचिन्ताद्याः स्मृतिबीजस्य etc. 172. 4.

प्रधानाज्जगदुत्पद्यते S'ruti, 184. 6.

यावत्त्वाव्यतिरेकित्वं शतांशेनापि etc. 193. 7.

नाहरासीन्न रात्रीरासीत् S'ruti, 202. 11.

स तपो ऽतप्यत, तस्मात्तपस्तेपानात्त्रयो वेदा अजायन्त S'ruti, 202. 11.

न सत्त्वे बाधसंवित्तिर्न भानमसतो ऽपि च etc. 208. 3.

सिद्धस्यागौरपोह्येत, गोनिषेधात्मकस्य सः etc. 234. 11.

वृत्तयः प्रसरद्रूपाः स्फुरिताक्षस्य (or स्फारिताक्षस्य) etc. 243. 6 ; 244. 4.

प्राणात्सर्वमजायत S'ruti, 248. 3.

अभिवादितस्य यो विप्र आशिषं etc. 254. 9.

आत्मा कर्त्रादिरूपश्चेन्मा काङ्क्षीस्तर्हि etc. 276. 9.

श्रुत्वा मुच्यते S'ruti (?), 291. 1.

READINGS IN THE INDIA OFFICE LIBRARY MANUSCRIPT OF THE ANIRUDDHAVṚITTI, DIFFERING FROM THE TEXT OF MY EDITION.

Page 1, line 2 व्यक्तनिदानाय omitted. 1.5 साधन added with B. 1.6 द्विधा. 1.7 विरजेत॰ with A. 2.11 ॰नन्तयोर्थस्य मङ्गलाप्र॰ with B. 2.12 तथा च add. with A. 2.14 विनिःक्रान्तौ with B, तेन मा॰ with B. 3.1 द्वि॰ instead of द्विच॰. 3.6 सुखत्वाद्वा with A. 3.10 ॰परंपरया॰ with B. 3.12 चक्रे with AB. 5.4 दुःखानि॰ with AC, ना i. o. न. 6.10 ॰यो वसन्ति with B. 6.11 वा add. with B. 7.12 भविष्यतीत्याह. 8.3 वासन i. o. तादृशः 8.4 पर्यनुयोज्यः स्यात्॰ with B. 9.5 ॰त्यचाह with B. 10.4 ननु om. with AC. 10.5 ॰त्यचाह with B. 10.11 ॰त्यचाह with B. 10.14 ॰त्यचाह. 11.3 ॰त्यचाह with B. 11.5 असङ्गो ऽयं पुरुष इति om. with BC. 11.12 मुक्तानामपि i. o. मुक्तात्मनामपि. 12.7 ॰त्यचाह. 12.14 ॰त्यच सिद्धान्तमाह with B. 17.1, 2 उपरागः i. o. उपरज्योपरञ्जकभावः with B. 17.4 संतानि with AC. 17.8 वासनाया with AC. 18.1 प्रसज्यते. 19.3 ॰बोधः सिद्धिः ॥ तचाह. 19.6 च चणिके with B. 19.9 न om. with AC. 20.1 जन्मान्तरफलोपभोक्ता with BC. 20.16 ॰त्यचाह with B. 21.12 इति add. with AC. 22.6 चेपानन्तरमपस्मारादिना मरणात् i. o. चेपानन्तरं मच्छिद्यादिमरणं. 22.7 मरणे i. o. मरण॰ and मरण॰ i. o. मरणे. 22.14 चेत् i. o. चेन्न. 23.4 बाह्यार्थः with B. 23.4, 5 अवयव्यभावात् i. o. अवयवातिरिक्तस्यावयविनो ऽभावात्. 23.6. एकत्वे प्रतीते. 23.7 चलतीति with B. 23.12 तदभावात्तानुमानं with B. 24.2 च om. with B. 24.10, 11 कर्मकर्तृविरोध. 25.11, 12 तस्याप्रख्यवाद॰ i. o. तस्य सद्भावाद॰. 25.14 ॰हेतुत्वं i. o. हेतुः. 26.6 कर्तुम् i. o. वक्तुम्. 26.8 ॰द्भविष्यति with B. 26.12 ॰तुल्ययोगचेमा॰ i. o. तुल्यचेमा॰. 27.2 हि add. with BC, शून्यसद्भावः with B, अभावाय i. o. ऽभावाय 27.6 शून्यवादिनं निराकर्तुं om. with A. 30.7 ॰त्यचाह. 30.13 ॰द्वद्वः i. o. ॰द्वन्द्वः. 30.13, 14 धर्मस्वीकरणात्तुल्यं with B. 30.14 बद्धः with B. 31.6 भाभावत्तम i. o. अभावत्तम. 31.8 तर्हि om. 32.5 भाभावत्तम i. o. भावत्तम, भाभावे i. o. भावे with B. 32.7 सति om. with A. 33.2 इत्यचाह with B. 35.6 ॰प्राणानि i. o. ॰प्राणाख्यानि. 35.8 च om. with C. 35.11 ॰नुमानं with B, प्रातिलोम्येनाह with B. 36.11 संहत॰ with AC. 37.10 तथास्या॰ i. o. तस्या॰. 37.12 ॰द॰ om. with B. 38.7 पुरुषविवेक॰ with C. 38.12 वीर्या॰ i. o. ऽविद्या॰. 38.13 ॰माचादैवं i. o. ॰माचादिति न. 39.10

पारंपर्यं ऽप्यणुवत् with B. 40.3 द्वयोर्मध्ये. 41.7 यद्यभा॰ with B, कार्यं i. o. कार्यं. 43.8 इत्यनु॰ i. o. इत्यानु॰ 44.9 तत्कार्यो om. 44.11 ॰विमोको. 45.2 चदययो om. with B, परं om. 45.7 ॰श्रुतिः with AB. 46.3 न समत्वम् i. o. समानत्वम्. 46.6 वाप्य॰ with B. 46.9 चानु॰ with A. 46.12 ॰व॰ with B. 47.14 घटाद्याका॰ i. o. घटाका॰. 47.14, 48.1 सविकल्पमपि. 48.2 इति om. 48.6 सविकल्पकं निर्विकल्पकं च. 48.10 व्यवहि॰ with B. 48.14 तथावस्थाहि corrected into तटस्था हि. 49.12, 13 नाव्यापकत्वादिदोषः. 50.3 तु om. with B. 50.5 न्द॰ add. before कर्तृत्वा॰. 51.8 वेति om. 52.11 नित्यशः with BC. 53.7 ॰करणस्येतीदमावर्तनीयम् with B. 53.8 the parenthesis om. with BC. 54.1 बुद्धेः i. o. बुद्धौ. 55.8 युक्तोपदेशः. 55.9, 10 नापौरुषेयमिति i. o. न पौरुषेयत्वमिति. 55.11 ज्ञानं शब्दशब्दः i. o. ज्ञानं शब्दः. 55.12 युक्ता इति add. before शाक्या॰. 56.6 ॰गुणकं i. o. ॰गुणपूर्वकं. 56.7 वा i. o. च. 56.15 प्रसरः with B, एवं altered into एव. 57.2 तथाऽदर्शनात्. 57.4 ॰कर्मणा with B. 59.4 स्वल्प॰ i. o. शङ्कु॰. 59.14 प्रधान॰ with B, इति om. with AB. 60.9 ॰दृष्टेरकतर॰ with B. 62.7 सर्वे॰ add. before कार्यो॰. 62.12 तत् om. with B. 63.3 वा om. with B. 63.10 कर्तव्यमिति with B. 64.5 न add. before भावे. 65.4 तण्डुलस्येत्यादि with B. 65.11 विवेके॰ with AB ; this has been altered into विवेचके॰ on the margin, but the correction has been afterwards blotted out again. 66.9 अपि om. with B. 67.7 त्यजति with C, पृथिवी om. 68.6 ॰भेदतस्त॰ i. o. ॰भेदस्त॰. 69.11 ॰चलन॰ with B. 71.6 ॰नुपूरेण with B. 73.10 ॰त्यचाह with AC. 73.11 तत् om. with B. 73.13 इत्यादि with B. 74.15 महदादिषु add. with AC. 75.1 तदेव with B. 76.2 प्रकृतेः with B. 76.8 यद्यात्मापि with AC. 80.10 तत्र add. before पुरुषकर्तृत्वं, अत्र om., सत्वात् i. o. सत्यत्वात्. 81.5 अत्राह with AC. 82.5 नानात्मक with B. 82.10 वामदेवादिर्मुक्तो नाद्वैतम् has been altered into वामदेवादिमुक्तेर्नाद्वैतम्. 83.2 इत्यचाह. 83.10 ॰च्छेदो ऽस्य i. o. ॰च्छेदः स्यात्. 83.13 सर्वे॰ om. with B. 84.2 तुल्यं with AC. 84.13 इत्यचाह with B. 87.1 विमुक्तमोचार्थं with B. 87.5 ॰निःचेपा॰ i. o. ॰निचेपा॰. 88.2 लक्ष्ये with BC. 88.5 तु i. o. ॰तत्त्व॰. 88.15 ॰लब्धसत्कारणकं. 88.16 ततश्च with AC. 89.1 च add. before जीवस्य. 89.2 विवेकेन ज्ञानाय with B. 89.11 भूत्वात्मानं i. o. भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं. 90.12 प्रकृतिः om. with B. 90.13 पुरुष with the other MSS. 90.13, 14 ॰पत्तिरेव त्वध्यासः with AC. 91.9 प्रकृतेः with B. 93.1 सृष्टेः with AC. 93.11 स्वार्थं i. o. स्वार्थे. 93.12 ऽयुक्तः i. o. युक्तः. 94.4 आदिशब्दस्य with B. 95.3 तस्य with BC. 95.14 एकादशं with B. 96.10 अहंकारिकत्व॰. 96.11 चेतनावाधादि॰ with B. 97.9 शक्तिभेद॰ om. with B. 100.1 ॰रसवर्गान्त with AB. 100.4, 5

परिणामाश्च मलानि i. o. ॰मलाः॰॰तदन्तः with B. 101.10 ग्टलामी॰ with B. 102.2 क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः. 102.6 स्मृतिरपि ज्ञानं किं त्वप्रमाणं with B. 103.1 जवा॰. 106.9 ॰संधानाश्च परः with B. 107.5 पुरुषार्थं with C. 108.10 ॰रम्भकस्वभावत्वे (the correct reading). 109.7 ॰दित्यत आह. 109.12, 13 कुचोपभोग. 109.14 अनारम्भत्वे with B. 113.1 भोगादा॰ with BC. 113.9 यद्यात्मनो with B. 115.1 ॰नत्पत्तिरपि with B. 116.2 स्तौ with AB. 116.10 ॰मित्येके with B. 117.14 प्रपञ्चमरणाद्यभावश्च with B. 118.1 प्रपञ्चस्य with B. 121.1 जाग्रत्प्रत्ययस्यापि with B. 121.12, 13 सर्वसिद्धि॰ with B. 123.2 रागोपहति॰ with B. 123.10 ध्यानसिद्धिः om. 124.1 धारणं with C. 124.2 Visarga om. with B. 125.9 ॰निरोधस्यो-पायमाह with B. 126.7 चशक्तिमाह om. 127.4 ॰वन्तं with B, द्वाषष्टिवि॰ with the other MSS. 127.10 सहिता. 129.5 ॰पङ्गुत्वं with A, Visarga om. with B. 129.9 ॰भेदमाह with A. 130.4 द्वितीया तुष्टिः om. 135.7 ॰प्रभेदाः with A. 135.10 ॰स्विर्दकः तथा, but the Visarga is effaced. 135.11 स्थावरादीनां with B. 137.3 उद्भिज्जाः with B. 137.4 ॰त्वं॰ with B. 137.4, 5 प्रकृतेः कथं with B. 139.4 चा॰ with A. 139.10, 11 ॰त्यचाह with B. 141.3 पि॰ i. o. वि॰ with B. 142.9 धान्यारोपादि with B. 143.6 ॰भिमान॰ with B. 144.6 तु om. with B. 144.11 इतर इतरत्त-दोषात् with B. 145.1 न add. with AB, but afterwards effaced. 145.10 ॰भिषङ्गः. 146.5 न om. before प्रवर्तते. 146.6 ॰क॰ om. with B. 147.11 प्रवृत्तिः i. o. प्रकृति॰. 148.1 प्रवृत्तस्यापि with B. 148.2 न्वत्यान् add. before निवतते. 148.3 पुरुषस्या॰ i. o. पुरुषस्य. 149.17 ॰त्याह with B. 150.4 कोष॰ with AC. 150.13 इति om. with B. 151.3 च om. with B. 151.9 नेतीत्यात्मा i. o. नेत्यात्मा. 152.5 विवेकिनां i. o. विवेकिनो. 153.7 च om. with B. 154.3 ॰सुप्तिसिद्धिः. 156.11 परम॰ i. o. पर॰. 157.2 ॰या॰ om. with B. 158.4 पाचेरा॰ with AC. 160.6 निःक्षिप्य. 161.8, 9 ॰त्वात्स्वस्य with B. 162.1 ॰निर्त्वयनीवत् with the other MSS. 162.2 निर्त्वयनी with the other MSS. 162.5 इत्यर्थः om. with B. 165.5 ॰गमनं with BC. 165.5, 6 प्रतीक्षमाणा उन्निद्रा with B. 165.14 व्याख्यानं with C. 166.5 ॰थिना उपसिद्धा with B. 169.12 मननादेः with B. 170.5 ॰कालाराधनेन with B. 170.7 च om. 170.10 ॰पसर्पणान्कृत्वा with the other MSS. 171.8 ॰त्ययाह with B. 171.14 च om. with B, हि add. with B after धर्मलाभाय. 172.1 तत्स्वरूपो॰ with B. 172.3 च om. with B. 173.15 ॰योगाद्वा with B. 174.8 युक्तवत् between न and कामचारित्वं with B. 174.11 ॰भूतैव i. o. ॰भूतैवम्. 175.12 काष्ठ॰. 176.2 गर्भ-वासादयश्च with B. 176.8 मलिने. 176.9 मलिने with B. 177.4 इव add. with B. 178.1 ऽपि add. with AC. 178.4 न तथा with AC. 178.

10 पक्षपक्षनिर्जयार्थं. 180.5 परार्थं with B. 180.6 परार्थ with A. 182.1 कारणत्व i. o. कारणस्य. 183.7 प्रमाणानि add. with B. 185.4 ॰त्यचाह (the correct reading). 187.8 अस्तु with AC. 187.14 ॰दुत्पत्स्यत with AC. 188.15 दर्शितम् om. with B. 191.5 च add. after गुणादीनां. 191.7, 8 कार्यकरणं. 191.14 परप्रबोधाय with C. 192.3 सपक्षे with B. 193.4 ॰साक्षित्य उभयो॰ with the other MSS. 198.14 ॰र्देवाधिपतिरिति. 199.3 अथ i. o. यत्तु with B. 201.4 च add. with B. 201.5 ॰द्वेदस्य i. o. ॰द्वेद॰. 202.5 तत्सिद्धेः with AC. 202.11 रात्रि॰ with AC. 203.2 ग्टह्यते. 203.4 इत्यचाह. 205.10 प्रमाणानां add. with AC. 206.2 ॰नुसारणं with C. 207.10 वेदान्त॰ with B. 208.12 निर्वचनीयत्वाच with B. 210.2 प्रतीतिवर्णं with B. 211.10, 11 ॰सिद्धान्त इति with B. 212.11 ॰स्वा॰ i. o. ॰स्त्वा॰ with B. 215.3 नानन्दो i. o. आनन्दो न. 215.11, 12 चित्तनो-र्नाभि॰ i. o. विभुनो नाभि॰ with B. 215.12, 13 सत्यत्वान्न तयोः with B. 216.2 ॰स्वीकारः with AC. 218.10 मनो with B. 221.7 कार्दस्य i. o. कार्य॰. 222.8 ॰निर्धर्म with AC. 222.9 ॰परिणामित्वेन has been altered into ॰परिमाणत्वेन. 223.3 सर्वदा क्षणिकत्वात् with B. 225.10 न भागियोगो भागस्य. 226.8 ॰प्राप्तिरेव with C. 227.4 च om. 228.3 ॰स्पर्श॰ with B, परिमाणपृथक्त्व॰ with B. 228.5 ॰स्नेहद्रवत्व॰ with B. 228.11 ॰रिति तचाह with AC. 229.4 ॰लब्धि॰ with the other MSS., विमर्षः with AC. 229.5 अर्थम् om. with B. 229.14 ॰कूल॰ i. o. ॰ग्कूल॰. 230.6, 7 ॰प्रक-रणा॰ with AC (the correct reading). 231.12 तन्निर्भागं. 231.13 उद्भूत-त्वाच प्रत्यक्षं नात्मा तथेति कथं प्रत्यक्ष इत्यत आह. 232.7 ॰दीर्घ॰ i. o. ॰दीर्घं 232.11 परिमाणे. 233.1 कार्यवप्रयोगा॰ with B. 234.9 लभेत with AC. 235.6 बहुतराल्पावयव॰ with B. 236.2 ॰लब्धौ i. o. ॰लब्धेः. 236.10 अन्यतो ऽप्यु॰. 237.4 on the margin: धर्मिग्राहकमानाभावादिति पाठान्तरं. 237.8 न च with the other MSS. 238.3 समवायो वा with the other MSS. 238.4 प्रतिभासः i. o. संप्रतिभासः. 238.5 वह्निः with the other MSS. 239.13 प्रत्यक्ष॰ i. o. प्रत्यक्षस्य. 240.1 तु om. 240.3 न संयोगविभागयोरिति i. o. भ्रान्तिः. 241.9 ॰न्तरितोप॰ i. o. ॰न्तरोप॰. 242.2 ना॰ om., यत्प्राप्तप्रकाश-कत्वम् om. 243.1 ॰क॰ om. with B. 244.4 स्फुरिताक्षस्य with B. 244.5 ॰बोधकाः with the other MSS. 244.12 द्रव्य॰. 246.6 इत्यचाह with AB. 246.10 ॰सांकल्पिक॰ with B. 247.9, 10 अल्पं चान्यदनुपभोगात् with B. 249.8 भ्रत्यवर्गद्वारा with AC. 249:9 वर्णितेन with B. 249.10 ॰निरोधः with AC. 251.14 सुख्या. 251.16 इत्यनेकसंस्कारास्ताश्चिरस्यति. 252.10 इषोर्न पात with C. 252.11 नाना॰ i. o. मन्दतरादि॰ with B. 252.14 ॰त्यचाह. 253.6 चा॰ i. o. च. 253.13 ॰दा॰ with AC. 254.2 जन्मान्तर॰ with B. 256.2 द्वेषः with B. 256.11 व्याप्तरूपस्य with B.

256.12 ०नुत्त्वं स्यात्. 258.1 पृथक् twice with B. 258.5 ऽपि add. with B. 258.7 यस्य मुख्या i. o. यस्य स्वल्पा. 258.13 ऽपि add. before चेति. 260. 4 ०विप्रतिपत्तेः. 260.7 ०देहा० with B. 260.8 कस्यापि with B. 261.3 ०करणज्ञानमस्तीति. 261.5 ०पुत्रस्य with B. 261.8 शिलापुत्रकव०. 262.6 न add. before तथा. 262.7 विद्यमानत्वादपुरुषा०. 263.10 निःक्षिपन्ते. 268. 10 अन्यथापुरुषार्थत्वम्. 268.11 पुनर्बन्धकः with B. 269.6 ०जरादिः with the other MSS. 271.16 वा० i. o. चा० with B. 272.13 विशेषः. 274. 7 ०मानादिनाशः. 274.12 ०प्रसादाभावात्. 275.1 किं i. o. कृतं. 275.6 ०भावित्वे किं with B. 275.10 गुणवत्त्वं सं०. 276.3 ०विरोधात्कृत०. 277. 15 तद्रूपता i. o. प्रधानता. 279.1 तृतीयाध्याये. 280.10 ०निमित्तसु० with BC. 282.3 नानात्म०. 282.4 ०स्वेत्याह with B. 282.11, 12 उपाधिसत्यत्वे० ०विरोधः om. with B. 284.2 प्रकाशधर्मत्वं युक्तम्. 284.8 ०रूपस्वै० with B. 284.14 व्यवहारादन्यथा० with the other MSS. 285.7 अविवेकानामे०. 285.8 एव add. before दृष्टेनैव with B, ०पत्तेर० i. o. ०पत्ताव० with B. 285. 10 यथात्मानुतन्तुवंशानां. 285.11 ०विशेषाः with BC. 285.14 स्वप्रकाशत्वे, ऽप्यंशेन with C. 287.3 जम्बूद्वीपः. 287.7 ०शृङ्गी० with the other MSS. 287.9 ०माल्यवंतपर्वतः. 287.11 जम्बूद्वीपः. 287.12 etc. always तद्द्विगुणः with AC. 289.7, 8 चिदवसानादात्मज्ञानावसानत्वात्. 289.13 अति० with BC. 290.5 ०तौ० om. 290.9 पूर्वमेवोक्तम् with AC. 291.5 च व्यापकत्वात् om. with B, एवं om. with B. 291.6 सर्वदेशे भोगप्रसङ्ग with B. 291.16 तत्र om. 292.7 ०स्वभावः with B. 292.11 मिथ्यैवा० with AC. 292.13 ०क्षिसंयोगाद्बीजसं०. 292.5 ०दर्पणप्रति०. 292.6 ऽपरिणामित्वाद०. 294.12 ०कारणं with B. 296.1 वायुवह्नि० with B. 296.2 ०संयोगविशिष्टस्य. 297.6 सहकारित्वं, तस्या अप्यन्यस्यास्तस्या अप्यन्यस्या. 298.9 ०भाव० om. before संबन्धा० with B, सादित्वात् with B. 299.5 ०वाह्यिकं शरीरम्. 299. 7 इति om. with AC. 300.2 तत्वतः. 300.6 समाप्तः add. after ऽध्यायः.

CORRECTIONS OF THE PRESS.

p. 2, l. 6 read 'himself' instead of 'myself.'
„ 7, „ 23 } blot out the strokes.
„ 11, „ 3, 4 }
„ 58, „ 13 read *liṅga* instead of *liṇga.*
„ „ „ 32 „ *vahnyabhâvaḥ* „ „ *vahnyabhâvah.*
„ 64, „ 28 put a comma between 'these' and 'then.'
„ 67, „ 16 read 'unreality' instead of 'un-reality.'
„ 80, „ 31 „ 'Liṅgapurâṇa' „ „ 'Liṇgapurâṇa.'
„ 80, „ 32 „ 'S'aṅkara' „ „ 'S'aṇkara.'
„ 94, „ 27 blot out the bracket.
„ 95, „ 28 put a bracket after 'principles.'
„ 123, „ 28 read 'does' instead of 'doess.'
„ 124, „ 20 blot out the brackets.
„ 133, „ 1 read 'acquiescence' instead of 'aquiescence.'
„ 150, „ 29 put a colon instead of the semicolon before 'because.'
„ 165, „ 23 } put a comma after { 'only.'
„ 169, „ 19 } put a comma after { 'time.'
„ 170, „ 2 } put a comma after { 'were.'
„ „ „ 22 } put a comma after { 'rule.'
„ „ „ 31 read *atiprasaṅga* instead of *atiprasaṇga.*
„ 171, „ 5 blot out the comma after 'required.'
„ „ „ 6 put a comma after 'meditation.'
„ 185, „ 13 read 'mouth' instead of 'month.'
„ „ „ 32 „ 'at' „ 'ot.'
„ 191, „ 18 put a comma after 'concomitated.'
„ 192, „ 2 read 'against' instead of 'againss.'
„ 194, at the top read V. 29, 30.
„ „ , l. 27 put a comma after 'principle.'
„ 200, „ 34 read *îḷe* instead of *île.*
„ 202, „ 31 „ *śaṅkâ* „ „ *śaṇkâ.*
„ 208, „ 35 „ *liṅga* „ „ *liṇga.*
„ 215, „ 13 put " at the end of the line.
„ „ , „ 27 read '[The multiplicity of souls]' instead of 'The multiplicity [of souls]'.
„ 219, „ 22 put a comma instead of the semicolon.
„ 233, „ 26 blot out the comma after 'which.'
„ 246, „ 27 disjoin 'nature of.'
„ 257, „ 19 read 'Therefore' instead of 'Therfore.'
„ 259, „ 16 put the words 'or impression, *saṃskâra*' in square brackets.
„ 266, „ 26 blot out the comma after 'arises.'
„ 269, „ 11 read 'the' before 'possessed.'

p. 276, l. 12 blot out " after 'etc.'
" 282, " 33 put ' after 'people.'
" 285, " 3 put a comma after 'Matter.'
" 287, " 12 blot out the bracket after 'diversity.'
" " , " 21 read 'S'vetâśv.' instead of 'Svetâśv.'
" 291, " 33 " *prasangât* " " *prasaṇgât.*
" 297, " 18 " o " " O.
" " , " 26 ") " "].
" 298, " 24 " 'Hereby' " " 'Here by.'
" 303, " 29 " 'unconnected' " 'un-connected.'
" 304, " 30 put a comma after 'lord.'

This list of errata has become regrettably long. I should have been able to secure a greater typographical accuracy to this volume, if I could have read more than a single proof myself.